The jurisdiction of the Federal Court with respect to the warranties under the BWC Act
288 The respondents submitted that this Court does not have jurisdiction to determine the applicants' claim for damages with respect to breach of the statutory warranties implied by s 32 of the BWC Act.
289 The respondents based their submission principally on s 37 of the BWC Act which provides:
37 - Powers of court in relation to domestic building work
(1) This section applies to -
(a) a domestic building work contract or subcontract for the performance of domestic building work (whether entered into before or after the commencement of this section); and
(b) domestic building work (whether commenced before or after the commencement of this section).
(2) A party to a domestic building work contract or a person entitled to the benefit of a statutory warranty may apply to the Magistrates Court for the determination of a dispute arising out of the contract or the performance of the building work to which the warranty relates.
(3) An application may not be made under subsection (2) in respect of a dispute arising out of a domestic building work contract unless the dispute involves some question of whether building work has been performed in accordance with the contract.
(4) If an application is made under subsection (2) in respect of a dispute arising out of a domestic building work contract, application may be made to the Magistrates Court for the determination of a dispute arising out of a subcontract for the performance of any of the building work, but only if it involves some question of whether building work has been performed in accordance with the subcontract.
(5) If the Magistrates Court joins proceedings on an application under subsection (4) with proceedings relating to the domestic building work contract, it must ensure that the hearing and determination of any question as to the performance of work under the domestic building work contract is not unduly delayed.
(6) If, on an application under this section, the Magistrates Court is satisfied that there has been any breach of, or failure to perform or fulfil, a contract or warranty to which the proceedings relate, the Court may, subject to this section, make one or more of the following orders:
(a) to the extent to which it is satisfied that it is practicable for the breach or failure to be remedied by the performance of building work - an order requiring the performance of remedial work;
(b) an order requiring the payment of an amount due under the contract or an order requiring the payment of an amount by way of compensation for the breach.
(7) An order made against a person under subsection (6)(a) may -
(a) require the person to perform remedial work specified in the order within the time specified; or
(b) if the Magistrates Court is of the opinion that the person is not likely to perform the remedial work properly - require the person to employ at the person's own expense a licensed building work contractor to perform remedial work specified in the order within the time specified.
(8) If the Magistrates Court orders a person to perform remedial work, or to cause remedial work to be performed, it may further order the person to provide to the Court, within a specified time after completion of the work, a certificate of a person holding qualifications specified in the order certifying that the remedial work has been performed properly in accordance with the order.
(9) If a person fails to perform remedial work, or to cause remedial work to be performed, in accordance with an order of the Magistrates Court (or an order of the Commercial Tribunal under Part 5 of the repealed Act) -
(a) the person is guilty of an offence and liable to a penalty not exceeding a fine of $10 000; and
(b) the Court may, on application, order the person to pay to the applicant such amount by way of compensation as the Court thinks just.
(10) In this section -
statutory warranty means -
(a) a warranty arising under this Act; or
(b) a warranty arising under Part 3C of the repealed Builders Licensing Act 1967.
(Emphasis added)
290 As is apparent, s 37(2) permits an application to be made to the Magistrates Court in South Australia for the determination of a dispute arising out of a domestic building contract or from the performance of the building work to which one of the statutory warranties relates. Subsection (3) qualifies the disputes which can be the subject of such an application by requiring that the dispute involve some question of whether building work has been performed in accordance with the contract.
291 Reference should also be made to s 40 of the BWC Act, which provides:
40 - Magistrates Court and substantial monetary claims
(1) If proceedings before the Magistrates Court involve -
(a) a monetary claim for an amount exceeding $100 000; or
(b) a claim for relief in the nature of an order to carry out work where the value of the work exceeds $100 000,
the Court must on the application of a party to the proceedings refer the proceedings into the Civil Division of the District Court.
(2) If proceedings are referred to the Civil Division of the District Court, this Part (including Division 7) applies in relation to the proceedings and parties to the proceedings as if a reference to the Magistrates Court were a reference to the Civil Division of the District Court.
292 I note that the general civil jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court is limited to claims not exceeding $100,000 (although it is possible for the parties to waive that limit) - see s 8 of the Magistrates Court Act 1991 (SA) (the MC Act).
293 The effect of s 10 of the MC Act is that the Magistrates Court has jurisdiction to hear and determine an application under Pt 5 of the BWC Act (which includes ss 32, 37 and 40) in its Civil (Consumer and Business) Division. By reason of ss 3(2)-(4) of the MC Act, claims in the Magistrates Court under the BWC Act will, in the absence of an election by one party to the contrary, be within the definition of a "minor civil action" and, accordingly, be subject to the less formal regime for determination for which s 38 of the Magistrates Court Act provides.
294 The respondents submitted that the effect of ss 37 and 40 of the BWC Act is that only the Magistrates Court and the District Court in South Australia can "address a warranty claim" under the BWC Act. They referred to the particular powers bestowed by s 37(6) authorising the Magistrates Court (and only the Magistrates Court unless a transfer is made to the District Court under s 40) to make orders for remedial work and the payment of compensation and for the enforcement of those orders. The submission was that s 37, in conjunction with the provisions in the MC Act concerning the jurisdiction with respect to claims under the BWC Act, makes the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court exclusive, except in the circumstances in which s 40 of the BWC Act applies.
295 In support, the respondents referred to Cirocco Constructions Pty Ltd v Clarke [2015] SADC 98 in which Judge Tilmouth had adverted to the question of whether the jurisdiction bestowed on the Magistrates Court by s 37(2) was exclusive. That case involved a claim commenced in the District Court by a builder for the payment of two progress payments pursuant to certificates issued by an architect. The building owner sought summary judgment in the proceedings on the basis that the Magistrates Court was the "appropriate forum" to hear the claim. The nature of the builder's claim meant that it was not necessary for Judge Tilmouth to resolve the question concerning the claimed exclusivity of the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court with respect to disputes arising out of the performance of the building work to which the statutory warranties relate. In this respect his Honour noted that the effect of s 37(3) is to qualify significantly the ambit of s 37(2), at [17], and that the builder's claim for payment of the progress payments was a dispute arising out of the contract within the meaning of s 37(2), but did not involve a question of whether building work had been performed in accordance with the contract within the meaning of s 37(3), at [16] and [17].
296 Judge Tilmouth said in respect of the submission concerning the exclusive jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court that:
(i) the Parliament had not said expressly that the jurisdiction conferred on the Magistrates Court by s 37 was exclusive, at [15]; and
(ii) on the contrary, the expression "may apply" in s 37(2) suggested a permissive or facultative construction in accordance with s 34 of the Acts Interpretation Act 1915 (SA), at [15].
297 Judge Tilmouth accepted that "Parliament intended questions of performance and statutory warranty enforcement 'for relief in the nature of an order to carry out work' to fall within the initial jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court when invoked, whereas questions of the pure construction of building contracts, or the enforcement of monetary claims thereunder unconnected to statutory relief claims, remain with the ordinary civil courts, according to their jurisdictional limits" (emphasis added). As already seen, his Honour then concluded that the claim before the Court did not involve a question of whether building work had been performed in accordance with the building contract and, hence, s 37(3) precluded the claim being made under s 37(2).
298 In Duthy Homes Pty Ltd v Tincknell & Tincknell [2017] SADC 133, Judge Tracey in the District Court seemed to regard Cirocco Constructions as authority for the proposition that "[t]he exclusive jurisdiction to commence proceedings in relation to the [BWC Act] is in the Magistrates Court" - see footnote 67.
299 I respectfully take a different view. If the Parliament of South Australia had intended that the jurisdiction of the Magistrates Court (other than in the circumstances to which s 40 refers) should be exclusive, it would have been easy for it to have said so. Instead, s 37(2) provides only that an application "may" be made to the Magistrates Court: not that it "must" be made to that Court.
300 The qualification imposed by s 37(3) that an application may not be made to the Magistrates Court under s 37(2) unless the dispute involves some question of whether building work has been performed in accordance with the contract cannot reasonably be understood as a legislative statement that, when the dispute does involve some question of whether building work has been performed in accordance with the contract, it can only be litigated in the Magistrates Court. Such a construction is to turn the provision on its head.
301 In my respectful opinion, s 37 contemplates that a party to a domestic building contract who wishes to have determined a dispute concerning the performance of the building work to which a statutory warranty relates may commence proceedings in the Magistrates Court. When that occurs, the Magistrates Court will then (in the absence of an election under s 3(4) of the MC Act) apply to the resolution of the dispute the quick, informal and efficacious means for the determination of disputes for which s 38 provides. It may also exercise the powers for which s 37(6) provides. That may be particularly advantageous at a time when work under the contract remains to be performed. I am, however, unable to see any indication that the jurisdiction of the District Court or, for that matter, of the Supreme Court of South Australia in an appropriate case, is excluded. On the contrary, it may be thought unlikely that the Parliament in South Australia intended such a consequence given that domestic building disputes are often multi-faceted and can involve, in addition to claims relating to the statutory warranties, disputes arising from other contractual provisions. It should also be taken that the Parliament understood that the disputes arising from domestic building work contracts may involve amounts in excess of $100,000. It should not readily be taken to have intended that, when that was so, the applicant still had to commence proceedings in the Magistrates Court but with the expectation that they would be transferred to the District Court under s 40.
302 Accordingly, I consider that the respondents' present submission proceeds on an incorrect premise.
303 However, even if that be incorrect, an exclusive jurisdiction provision in the legislation of a State Parliament is not conclusive of this Court's jurisdiction. It is not within the legislative competence of the Parliament of South Australia to confine the jurisdiction of this Court.
304 The jurisdiction of this Court derives from s 39B of the Judiciary Act 1903 (Cth) and from s 19 of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). Section 39B(1A) provides (relevantly):
The original jurisdiction of the Federal Court of Australia also includes jurisdiction in any matter:
…
(c) arising under any laws made by the Parliament, other than a matter in respect of which a criminal prosecution is instituted or any other criminal matter.
305 A number of matters concerning the application and breadth of s 39B(1A)(c) are now well established. The jurisdiction exercised by the Federal Court is always federal jurisdiction: Re Wakim; Ex parte McNally [1999] HCA 27; (1999) 198 CLR 511. The jurisdiction derives from ss 75 and 76 of the Australian Constitution and is defined by laws made under s 77(i) of the Constitution.
306 The existence of a "matter" is central to the question of whether a proceeding is within federal jurisdiction and to the question of whether a proceeding is within the jurisdiction of this Court. In Re Wakim, Gummow and Hayne JJ described a "matter" and the process by which it is identified as follows:
[139] The central task is to identify the justiciable controversy. In civil proceedings that will ordinarily require close attention to the pleadings (if any) and to the factual basis of each claim.
[140] In Fencott it was said that "in the end, it is a matter of impression and of practical judgment whether a non-federal claim and a federal claim joined in a proceeding are within the scope of one controversy and thus within the ambit of a matter." The references to "impression" and "practical judgment" cannot be understood, however, as stating a test that is to be applied. Considerations of impression and practical judgment are relevant because the question of jurisdiction usually arises before evidence is adduced and often before the pleadings are complete. Necessarily, then, the question will have to be decided on limited information. But the question is not at large. What is a single controversy "depends on what the parties have done, the relationships between or among them and the laws which attach rights or liabilities to their conduct and relationships". There is but a single matter if different claims arise out of "common transactions and facts" or "a common substratum of facts", notwithstanding that the facts upon which the claims depend "do not wholly coincide". So, too, there is but one matter where different claims are so related that the determination of one is essential to the determination of the other, as, for example, in the case of third party proceedings or where there are alternative claims for the same damage and the determination of one will either render the other otiose or necessitate its determination. Conversely, claims which are "completely disparate", "completely separate and distinct" or "distinct and unrelated" are not part of the same matter.
(Emphasis added and citations omitted)
307 In Rana v Google Inc [2017] FCAFC 156; (2017) 254 FCR 1, the Full Court said, at [17], that the "matter" is "the justiciable controversy between the parties arising out of the substratum of facts and claims representing, or amounting to, the dispute or controversy between or amongst the parties. Where federal and non-federal claims comprise the same justiciable controversy, a court exercising federal jurisdiction will have jurisdiction to resolve the entire matter in the exercise of federal jurisdiction" (emphasis added).
308 The Full Court in Rana v Google also noted that a matter will "arise under" a law of the Parliament in a number of ways. In the present case, the applicants' claim with respect to misleading or deceptive conduct arises under the ACL. Plainly, the applicants' claim with respect to misleading or deceptive conduct and their claim for damages in respect of the breach of the warranties under the BWC Act arise out of the same substratum of facts. Counsel for the respondents did not contend to the contrary.
309 The respondents' initial submissions with respect to the jurisdiction of the Court were made without any reference to s 39B(1A)(c). After his attention had been drawn to the provision and to the decision of the Full Court in Rana v Google, counsel referred to Fencott v Muller [1983] HCA 12; (1983) 152 CLR 570 in which the plurality (Mason, Murphy, Brennan and Deane JJ) said at 608:
The unique and essential function of the judicial power is the quelling of such controversies by ascertainment of the facts, by application of the law and by exercise, where appropriate, of judicial discretion. In identifying a s76(ii) matter, it would be erroneous to exclude a substantial part of what is in truth a single justiciable controversy and thereby to preclude the exercise of judicial power to determine the whole of that controversy. What is and what is not part of the one controversy depends on what the parties have done, the relationships between or among them and the laws which attach rights or liabilities to their conduct and relationships. The scope of a controversy which constitutes a matter is not ascertained merely by reference to the proceedings which a party may institute, but may be illuminated by the conduct of those proceedings and especially by the pleadings in which the issues in the controversy are defined and the claims for relief are set out. But in the end, it is a matter of impression and of practical judgment whether a non-federal claim and a federal claim joined in a proceeding are within the scope of one controversy and thus within the ambit of a matter.
310 Parts of this passage were cited by the plurality (French CJ, Kiefel, Bell and Keane JJ) in CGU Insurance Ltd v Blakeley [2016] HCA 2; (2016) 259 CLR 339 at [30] and by the Full Court in Rana v Google at [19].
311 Counsel referred to the emphasised words in the passage from Fencott v Muller. He submitted that in the present case it is the law of South Australia in the form of the BWC Act which attaches rights and liabilities to the parties to a domestic building contract and that a critical part of those rights and liabilities is the means for their enforcement afforded by the BWC Act. This had the effect, counsel submitted, that there was not one justiciable controversy. Counsel's submission did not indicate why that was so, but in any event, the submission cannot be accepted.
312 The justiciable controversy in the present case concerns the creation of, and performance of work under (and in relation to), the contract between Arborcrest and the applicants. In the contractual part of their claim, the applicants pleaded contractual terms of three kinds. It would be artificial to distinguish between those contractual terms which are said to arise from the parties' own agreement and those said to arise from statute. It would also be artificial to distinguish that part of the applicants' claim arising under the misleading or deceptive conduct provisions in the ACL from those concerning the contract claims. In each case, the controversy involves what was said and done in the pre-contractual discussions.
313 It is to be remembered that s 32 implies warranties into every domestic building work contract. It may be taken that in enacting that provision, the Parliament of South Australia intended that, in addition to the powers bestowed by s 37(6)-(9), the usual range of remedies provided by the law for the enforcement of contracts, and for their breach, should be available. That is to say, the Parliament did not create new rights of a distinctive kind which were dependent for their enforcement solely on the provisions in the same statute. The rights which the Magistrates Court enforces on an application to it are not sui generis, or uniquely statutory in origin. They are the rights for which the common law provides with respect to contractual warranties, even though the warranties were implied into the parties' contract by statute independently of the parties' agreement.
314 When this is understood, the provisions in s 37 cannot be regarded as an intrinsic part of the rights created by s 32 with the consequence that those rights do not exist independently of s 37.
315 Moreover, acceptance of the respondents' submissions would have the consequence that, if the applicants had commenced their proceedings in the District Court of South Australia, it would have been required to hold that it had no jurisdiction unless and until proceedings were commenced in the Magistrates Court and then transferred to it pursuant to s 40 of the BWC Act. Such a conclusion would be absurd.
316 These matters are sufficient by themselves to indicate that the rights and liabilities established by s 32 of the BWC Act may form part of the same matter for the purposes of s 39B(1A)(c) of the Judiciary Act.
317 The respondents' challenge to this Court exercising jurisdiction with respect to the BWC Act warranties fails.