The referee's report
8 In order to address the liquidators' criticisms of the referee's report, it is necessary to summarise the approach and findings of the referee as reflected in her report.
9 The referee identified that the four companies in question are the following:
(1) Delta Coal Mining Pty Ltd (in liq);
(2) Delta Mining Pty Ltd (in liq);
(3) SBD Services Pty Ltd (in liq); and
(4) Delta SBD Ltd (in liq).
10 Delta SBD was a public, no liability company listed on the ASX, and was the ultimate holding company of the other three companies. The four companies are referred to as the Group. The Group employed approximately 600 staff and provided labour and equipment hire to mine owners in NSW and Queensland.
11 The referee identified that s 95A(1) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) relevantly provides that a person is solvent if, and only if, the person is able to pay all the person's debts as and when they become due and payable, which she described as the test of solvency. The approach adopted by the referee in reaching a conclusion as to if, and when, each of the companies in the Group became insolvent was as follows:
(1) The referee considered relevant statute and case law to identify the criteria to be taken into account when considering solvency and insolvency, which she referred to as insolvency indicators.
(2) The referee made inquiries, undertook analysis, and reviewed the information made available to her to identify the factual position with respect to each of the insolvency indicators.
(3) On the basis of her analysis and review, she formed a view as to if, and when, each insolvency indicator pointed towards the companies in the Group being insolvent within the relevant period.
(4) Following the analysis of each of the insolvency indicators, the referee considered the weight of evidence in respect of each insolvency indicator and the relative importance of each insolvency indicator in the context of the Group's overall position to form her opinion as to the date from which each of the companies was insolvent.
(5) The referee set out in her report her conclusions and her reasoning. In addition, to the extent that her opinion materially differed from the submissions of parties to the proceeding or the conclusions of the liquidators in the liquidators' solvency report, she identified those differences.
12 The referee said that this is not a case where a specific incident guides the identification of a date when solvency ceased. Rather, the insolvency of the Group arose from a number of trading and financial factors which, whilst some originated in prior periods, converged in early 2017 to render the Group insolvent.
13 The referee is of the opinion that whilst there were indications of potential insolvency at earlier dates, having regard to the primacy of the cash flow test to assess insolvency, the Group was solvent until the end of January 2017 and was insolvent thereafter.
14 Consistently with the approach of the liquidators, the referee took the view that the business and affairs of the four companies were operated as a group.
15 The referee said she assessed the solvency of the Group having regard to the principles she identified as derived from case law and regulatory guidance. She identified a consolidated list of the indicators which, in her opinion, required consideration, in the context of the financial position of the Group as a whole, and having regard to commercial realities, in order to ascertain if and when the Group failed to meet the test of solvency and was therefore insolvent. Each of the indicators, which she drew from ASIC v Plymin [2003] VSC 123; 46 ACSR 126, is addressed in detail in a separate section of her report. They are the following:
(1) Trading and financial performance - continuing losses;
(2) Debts due and payable having regard to an analysis of trade creditors' terms and ageing profiles leading up to and during the relevant period, arrangements entered into with creditors to amend terms, and debts other than trade creditors, taxes and statutory obligations;
(3) Liabilities and timelines of payment to Commonwealth, State taxes and similar obligations including GST, PAYG and superannuation obligations;
(4) The assets available to meet creditor claims;
(5) Liquidity - capacity to meet creditor claims due and payable from cash on hand or assets able to be readily converted to cash and current and quick ratio analyses;
(6) Relationships with suppliers - changes to terms, cessation of supply, demands or threats issued, payment arrangements implemented;
(7) Relationships with financiers and capacity to raise additional or alternative finance or equity;
(8) Ability to produce timely and accurate information to display the company's trading performance and financial position and make reliable forecasts; and
(9) Concerns raised about ability to pay debts (by financiers, directors and employees).
16 After having considered each of those factors in detail, in section 13 of her report the referee considered collectively the findings of her review and analysis undertaken in respect of each of the indicators of insolvency. The referee prepared a pictorial representation, referred to as a "heat map", of the strength of each of the indicators of insolvency across the relevant period. The pictorial scheme that was applied was the following:
black strongly indicates insolvency;
grey indicates potential insolvency;
pale blue indicates potential solvency; and
blue indicates solvency.
17 The referee ascribed to each indicator of insolvency a different weight because, in her opinion, they do not all carry equal weight in the overall assessment of whether and when a company is insolvent. As the question of insolvency is predominantly a cash flow test, those indicators which inform an understanding at a point in time of a company's actual available resources to meet the debts then due and payable were given greater weight in the determination of insolvency than indicators which have a lesser focus on the timing of availability of resources. The referee then consolidated a "heat map" of insolvency indicators listing them in descending order of pertinence to a cash flow test. That is represented graphically as follows (noting that it is necessary to observe it in colour in order to appreciate its full impact):
18 Having regard to her analysis and assessment of each of the indicators, the referee was of the opinion that whilst there were indications of potential insolvency at earlier dates, and some indicators remained at a satisfactory level afterwards, having regard to the primacy of the cash flow test, the Group was solvent until the end of January 2017 and was insolvent thereafter. With reference to Figure 5 reproduced above, the referee explained that the vertical redline is positioned at 31 January 2017. To the left of the line, prior to that date, it was her assessment that whilst there were some indicators of insolvency, a number of indicators had not yet emerged or were present at a mild degree, whereas to the right of the line, being after that date, additional factors emerged in the majority of those she considered most pertinent had intensified.
19 The referee drew specific attention to the following:
(1) At 31 December 2016, liquid assets were adequate to satisfy all debts greater than 30 days but by 31 January 2017, the shortfall of liquid assets to debts greater than 30 days was in excess of $1 million and, even if it were reasonable to consider that only debts greater than 60 days were payable on the basis of usual commercial practice, the liquid assets at the end of January 2017 only covered these debts by a small margin.
(2) Prior to 31 December 2016, a relatively small number of invoices in number and quantum fell due which were ultimately never paid, however, through January 2017, such invoices escalated in both number and quantum. Thirty-three invoices totalling approximately $193,000 fell due for payment by 31 January 2017 and remained unpaid at the date the companies went into voluntary administration.
(3) By 31 January 2017, the ageing of creditors had deteriorated and from then the proportion and value of debts greater than 60 and 90 days increased month on month.
(4) At 31 December 2016, liabilities for taxes had been brought back closer to order as a result of payments received from a significant debtor/client, Wollongong Coal Ltd (WCL), in late December, but through January 2017, the Group could only satisfy its obligations through negotiation and renegotiation of payment plans.
(5) A default of a payment plan with the ATO due to failure to lodge and remit November PAYG when due on 28 December 2016 was resolved by the cancellation of the plan and implementation of a new plan. However, from January 2017 onwards payment plans were increasingly being renegotiated and few were fully complied with.
(6) Throughout December and into January there was clear concern within the Group regarding management of cash flow and frequent mention in the management and board minutes of the slowness of WCL in paying invoices and challenges in gaining South 32 Ltd's (a mining company debtor/client) attention to approve invoices to be raised. The initial pressure was alleviated by payments made by WCL in late December but by the end of January 2017, it was apparent that the relief was short-lived.
(7) In December 2016, the board had identified options to seek additional debt and equity. However, the information available to the referee suggested to her that the board had a range of ideas as to possible options but in her opinion none was likely to be successfully implemented in a short enough timeframe to mitigate the looming cash deficiencies identified in various forecasts and which were inevitable given what was then understood regarding:
(a) industrial problems with the Appin Colliery that would affect profit and invoicing;
(b) significant operational issues on the WCL contract causing it to be unprofitable and exacerbated by WCL being an excluded customer under the Group's invoice finance facility and WCL having proven itself by that time to be an unreliable payer; and
(c) weak half-year results which would not support the raising of new capital.
(8) Creditor agitation in the form of stop supply, stop credit, and some preliminary steps to more formal recovery action escalated significantly from March 2017 in an attempt to recover debts due in January and December.
20 The referee also took account of the following:
(1) The audit opinion in relation to the accounts at 31 December 2016 included an emphasis on matters with regard to the ability of the Group to continue as a going concern with particular reference to the reliance on timely recovery of WCL debts. Notwithstanding that the auditors, at the time they signed the audit report in late February 2017, did not conclude that it was inappropriate for the Group to prepare its accounts on a going concern basis, in the referee's assessment by the end of January 2017 it was apparent that timely receipts of WCL debts was a continuing issue and this was exacerbated by the lower revenue and receipts from Appin Colliery as a result of the industrial action in December and January.
(2) In general, but particularly in this case where it is not a single incident which gives rise to the insolvency of the Group, but a range of factors which have developed over time, the referee considered it necessary to consider the financial position of the Group as a whole in order to form a view as to solvency/insolvency. That required reference to complete accounts comprising aged debtors, aged creditors, profit and loss and balance assets which are prepared as at the same date so that they are balanced and internally consistent. The information available to the referee included financial reports of this nature for each month end; they were not available for dates within any month. The referee considered the typical signs or indicators of insolvency across each of the month ends in the relevant period, and formed the opinion that at 31 January 2017, in contrast to the position at 31 December 2016, the key indicators of insolvency were compelling and supported her conclusion that each company in the Group was insolvent on that date.
21 It is apparent from the above synopsis that the referee's conclusion as to the date of insolvency was reached as an evaluative determination having regard to numerous factors and circumstances where no single factor was decisive. That approach is consistent with the authorities. In those circumstances, if the liquidators identify error in the referee's consideration of any particular factor it is unlikely to have a material effect of the ultimate determination.