Consideration
55 It is perhaps appropriate, at this point, to take a step back from the minutiae of the evidence. What the evidence discloses, at a high level of generality, is that two individuals developed, collaboratively, a business which was dependent on the significant contribution of both but which has always been owned and substantially controlled by only one of them. The individual who has owned the business is now resisting attempts by the other to assert a right which is very narrowly focused on a statutory right said to arise from authorship of computer software. It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the legal controversy this judgment addresses may not explore and resolve all bases on which the rights of the parties might be determined. However forensic decisions have been made for what probably is a mix of legitimate reasons including the personal and financial circumstances of the parties, to invite adjudication only on the copyright issue. As noted at the beginning of this judgment, the second respondent is gravely ill and having regard to matters raised in interlocutory proceedings, it appears the first applicant which is the present manifestation of the business, is in comparatively straightened financial times.
56 One possible consequence of the narrow focus of the litigation on the copyright issue is that it has created a prism through which the parties have sought to establish the facts but which has led to distortions of what in truth happened. Broadly described, the evidence at this high level of generality points to one of at least three possibilities.
57 The first is that Mr Vardanian was generally aware that copyright attached to the programs he was writing and always and genuinely believed that he owned it both before and after August 1996. Perhaps that was because he did not view himself as an employee at least after his initial years working in the business. If so, it is difficult to understand why he never discussed ownership of the copyright with Mr Dilanchian during the many years they worked closely and collaboratively together to develop the business in circumstances where they had close family ties. I have no doubt at all, having regard to the evidence, Mr Dilanchian never turned his mind to the question of ownership of the copyright before probably 2003.
58 The second possibility is that Mr Vardanian was generally aware that copyright attached to the programs but understood, perhaps in a vague and imperfect way, that while an employee of the Intelmail business it was owned by his employer but that his move to the Gold Coast and the new arrangements associated with it would alter that position to his benefit. If so, moving and not discussing the consequences with Mr Dilanchian would suggest some measure of deception on his part, which would have been curious given the way they had worked together and their family ties.
59 The third possibility is that Mr Vardanian never really considered the question of ownership of the copyright in the software until 2003 when it came into comparatively sharp focus because of the activities of the former employees of the Intelmail business. It was then that he began to appreciate that he (or his company) might own a valuable intellectual property asset which he could retain or endeavour to sell. Selling the asset to the Intelmail business would provide him with what he considered was an appropriate capital return for the time, energy and skill he had invested in the business. On the facts, as I view them, this third possibility most closely aligns with what happened.
60 What then is the answer to the question concerning ownership of copyright? Mr Vardanian conceded that, at the time he moved to the Gold Coast in 1996, he was employed by Intelmail Australia and had been an employee of the various companies running the Intelmail business since 1986. This led to the apparent concession that each of those various companies owned the copyright in the software written by him when an employee of the company. In particular, Intelmail Australia would have been the owner of the copyright in at least some of the software then being deployed to operate machines being sold by Intelmail Australia at that time, namely such software which may have been developed in the short period that company had been running the business since its incorporation in September 1994. It was not asserted by the respondents that in 1996 Mr Vardanian held, or Controlmech acquired, any interest in the copyright of the then subsisting software.
61 However the respondents disputed that Intelmail Australia owned the copyright in software developed by the other companies which had earlier run the Intelmail business. The legal foundation for this submission was that there was no evidence of any assignment of the copyright as required by the Act. But I doubt that this matters. The declarations sought by both parties concern, in the main, software written after 1996. I will return to questions of detail later. The critical question is what term, if any, is to be implied in the contract between Intelmail Australia and Controlmech in 1996 in relation to the ownership of the copyright in the software to be developed by Mr Vardanian in the ensuing years and later, when Controlmech contracted with Intelmail Explorenet to continue to provide the software.
62 There was plainly a strong and positive personal relationship between Mr Vardanian and Mr Dilanchian rooted in the family connection, cultural ties (they were both Armenian) and the fact that Mr Vardanian had contributed significantly to the growth of Mr Dilanchian's business. In those circumstances it is unlikely that either Mr Dilanchian or Mr Vardanian would have agreed to an arrangement that imperilled the rights of either or would have put at risk the continued growth or at least prosperity of the business. At this time, Mr Vardanian had no interest (in any relevant legal sense) in the copyright in the software. It is improbable they would have agreed to an arrangement which would, over time, invest in Controlmech copyright in the software over which Mr Dilanchian would have no control other than as a licensee and deny it the opportunity to control the source software. It is true that, at the time, there would have been no apprehension that, in the future, Mr Vardanian might behave in a way that might damage the interests of the business of Intelmail Australia. But the copyright would survive Mr Vardanian as the author: see s 33 of the Act, and his personal commitment to the business of Intelmail Australia could not be assured by anyone who succeeded to any interests he may have had in the copyright including anyone who might come to control Controlmech.
63 I accept that from Mr Vardanian's perspective he would not have been intending to relinquish any rights he then had. But in relation to the copyright of the then existing software, he had none.
64 Mr Vardanian's interests were to be protected into the future, both in a practical and commercial sense, by his personal relationship with Mr Dilanchian and the symbiotic relationship between him and his company and Intelmail Australia's business arising from him writing the software essential to the successful operation of the intelligent machines which were at the heart of the business and on which it was very substantially dependent. Those two circumstances dictated, as a practical matter, that Mr Vardanian's position would continue to be protected and he would continue to be retained to write the software and be remunerated appropriately for doing so. In addition, the 1996 contract may well have contained other implied terms relating to Intelmail Australia continuing to procure software from Mr Vardanian through his company Controlmech as the sole supplier and to pay Controlmech a reasonable amount for doing so having regard to the profitability, from time to time, of the Intelmail business. The pleadings (both the statement of claim and the cross claim) touched upon other aspects of the contract (beyond the ownership of the copyright) but they were not the subject of submissions by the parties or otherwise pursued. It is unnecessary, and probably inappropriate, to express a view about what those terms may have been.
65 It is against this background that it is necessary to determine what, if any, term should be implied in the 1996 agreement about ownership of the copyright in the software to be written thereafter. There is little room to doubt that there was at least a licence agreement to be implied in all circumstances. That proposition was not seriously resisted by the respondents. But was it a licence terminable on reasonable notice or was it something more? It seems to me that it must be something more in the circumstances just discussed for the reasonable and effective operation of the contract between Controlmech and Intelmail Australia. Was it a licence of the type advanced by the applicants as their subsidiary position or was it equitable ownership as advanced as their primary position? I am conscious of the observations of Lightfoot J referred to in (ii) in [52] above. However it seems to me that the parties would have, as a matter of imputed intention, agreed that Intelmail Australia would retain equitable ownership of the copyright in the software notwithstanding that legal ownership would, by operation of the Act, vest in Controlmech because of the new arrangements associated with Mr Vardanian's move to the Gold Coast. With Intelmail Australia armed with an equitable interest Controlmech could be required, if circumstances ever rendered it necessary, to transfer legal ownership to Intelmail Australia so that Intelmail Australia could protect the interests of the Intelmail business in the face of third-party infringement: see Acorn Computers Ltd v MCS Micro-Computer Systems Pty Ltd (1984) 6 FCR 277. Also, if circumstances ever rendered it necessary, Controlmech could be required to hand up the source code which would be essential to the capacity of Intelmail Australia to modify or rewrite programs in the event that Mr Vardanian no longer could do so through death, disability or other circumstances.
66 In my opinion, a term should be implied into the 1996 agreement that Intelmail Australia would retain the equitable ownership of the copyright in any programs written by Mr Vardanian from that time on. Such a term, in my view, was necessary for the reasonable and effective operation of the contract in all the circumstances.
67 This leads to a consideration of the contract arising between Intelmail Explorenet and Controlmech when the former commenced to conduct the Intelmail business. Firstly, and fundamentally, there is no reason, in my opinion, to proceed on the basis that the term in the 1996 agreement would not also have been a term in the later agreement. Nothing had materially changed. While, at that time, Mr Vardanian's company would have become the legal owner of such software as had been written in the preceding three years or so, that ownership would have been subject to the equitable ownership of Intelmail Australia.
68 One issue, which is convenient to address here, concerns the question of assignment. The respondents point to the absence of evidence of any assignment in writing of either the legal (pre 1996) or equitable (post 1996) ownership in the copyright from one to the other of a succession of companies which have, from time to time, conducted the Intelmail business. The applicants conceded that there was no transfer of the legal interest under s 196 of the Act from The Mailmachine to Intelmail Australia in the copyright in the software created before September 1994 or, as I apprehend it, the subsequent transfer of any legal interest of the pre 1996 works from Intelmail Australia to Intelmail Explorenet works or any equitable interest in the work created in the period 1996 to 1999 ('the 1996 to 1999 works') from the former to the latter.
69 Mr Dilanchian gave evidence, which I accept, that on incorporating Intelmail Australia in 1994, he arranged "the transfer of all staff and assets from The Mailmachine to Intelmail Australia... on a book entry basis, without any other documentation recording the transfer". He proceeded to give evidence, which was admitted over objection, that shortly after incorporating Intelmail Explorenet in 1999, "[i]n around 1999 to 2000, I... transferred the assets of Intelmail Australia to Intelmail Explorenet... on a book entry basis, without any other documentation recording the transfer". These book entries are not in evidence.
70 At common law, the voluntary assignment of an equitable interest merely requires a clear expression of intention: Comptroller of Stamps (Vic) v Howard-Smith (1936) 54 CLR 614, and requires no consideration: Norman v FCT (1963) 109 CLR 9 at 30. It seems clear to me that there was a clear intention on behalf of Mr Dilanchian, the sole owner of both companies, to transfer the equitable ownership of the copyright held by Intelmail Australia to Intelmail Explorenet. However "where an interest to be transferred is, as here, a creature of equity, equity requires a clear expression of intention to make an immediate disposition; that, in the absence of an applicable statutory requirement, suffices": Halloran v Minister Administering National Parks and Wildlife Act 1974 (2006) 229 CLR 545 at 569 per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ. In this matter, the respondents contend that the book entries, without any other documentation recording the transfer, fail to comply with s 23C(1)(c) of the Conveyancing Act 1919 (NSW), which provides:-
A disposition of an equitable interest or trust subsisting at the time of the disposition, must be in writing and signed by the person disposing of the same or by the person's will, or by the person's agent thereunto lawfully authorised in writing.
However, in my opinion, it is unnecessary to consider this issue having regard to the findings I earlier made at [9].
71 That is because the software that presently exists including the source code which underlies it was mostly written after 1999. It is true that the feeder and inserter software contains remnants of the software written before 1999 including software written before 1996. However having regard to the evidence of Mr Vardanian the relevant works for the purposes of the Act came into existence after 1999. I act on the basis that a declaration can be made, as I have concluded it should, that Intelmail Explorenet is the beneficial owner of the software in its most recent iteration (its 2008 form) and an order made requiring the respondents to deliver up to the applicants the associated source code.
72 The final issue concerns the letter that was sent to the applicants by the respondents' solicitors on 13 October 2008. The applicants contend that the letter contained an unjustifiable threat within the meaning of s 202(1) of the Act and seek damages under that section.
73 The letter from Shelston IP Lawyers, addressed to Intelmail Explorenet Pty Ltd and Mr Heros Dilanchian, said:
Infringement of Intellectual Property Rights
We act for Controlmech Pty Ltd and Avo Vardanian (our clients).
Factual matters
As you know, our clients are the creators and owners of control and processing software used in mailing machines such as Inserters. Feeders, Dual-Accumulator Feeders (DAF-s), Vertication Divert Units (also known as iTrack) (VDU Software) and the ILCom system that is used in conjunction with the machines (jointly referred to as "our clients' software").
Intelmail Explorenet Pty Ltd (Intelmail) was incorporated on 30 July 1999 and Heros Dilanchian is the sole director of that company.
It has recently come to our clients' attention that Intelmail and/or Heros Dilanchian have filed numerous patent applicants around for an invention entitled "Object Verification Method and System" (VDU Patents). We are instructed, by our clients, that the subject matter of the patents is the same as the VDU software.
Further, Intelmail has been entering into contracts with Third Parties for the supply of mailing machines which incorporate our clients' software. The contracts purport to grant a licence of our clients' software to the Third Parties without any authorisation from our clients.
Finally, our clients' have also recently become aware that Intelmail has been attempting to decipher the serial communication protocol between the feeder and inserting machines with the intent to reproduce the software and make mailing machines run without our clients' knowledge or authorisation. Additionally, we are instructed that you are also attempting to break the code in the "dongle" that facilitates use of the software on the mailing machines.
Copyright infringement
Our clients own copyright in all the software and code that runs the Inserters, Feeders, DAF-s, and also in the ILCom and VDU-s. These softwares and codes are literally works for the purposes of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth). Section 44 of the Copyright Act provides that it is an infringement of copyright in a work to reproduce, or authorise the reproduction of, a substantial part of the work, without the authority of the copyright owner.
As you know, our clients have not authorised or licensed you to use this software, nor has the copyright been assigned. Accordingly, it is clear that Intelmail has infringed copyright in that software.
In the present circumstances, our clients are therefore entitled to commence legal proceedings against Intelmail in the Federal Court of Australia seeking, among other things:
An injunction preventing the further use of our clients' copyright material; and
Damages, or (at our client's option) the payment to our clients of all profits made as a result of the infringement of our clients' copyright.
Payment of all software license [sic] fees received that have not been passed on to our clients, by way of an account of profits or assessment of damages.
Required undertakings
It is difficult to imagine a more blatant example of infringement of our clients' rights. Our clients view this conduct very seriously and will not hesitate to enforce their legal rights against Intelmail and its director. To that end, we have received instructions to commence legal proceedings against Intelmail and its director if this matter is not resolved to our clients' satisfaction.
In order to resolve this matter without recourse to litigation, Intelmail, and its director, are required to immediately provide the following undertakings.
Intelmail Explorenet Pty Ltd (CAN 088 887 889) of Level 66 MLC Centre Martin Place Sydney, NSW 2000, by its servants and agents, and Heros Dilanchian, sole director of Intelmail Explorenet Pty Ltd, by himself, his servants and agents, undetake to:
Immediately cease, and forever refrain from using the VDU software created by our clients;
Immediately cease, and forever refrain from using any of our clients software, including the ILCom, on mailing machines or at all;
Immediately assign all rights in the VDU Patents to our clients;
Notify all Third Parties who have entered into contracts with Intelmail of our clients ownership of all relevant software;
Immediately cease and forever refrain from all hacking activities on dongles and software programs created by our clients.
The above undertakings can be given by signing and returning a copy of this letter to our offices by no later than 5.00pm on Monday 27 October 2008.
Should the undertakings not be provided within the stipulated timeframe, we are instructed to commence proceedings against Intelmail and Heros Dilanchian in the Federal Court of Australia raising allegations, inter alia, of copyright infringement.
Please ensure that all correspondence in this matter are directed to the writer. No contact should be made direct to our clients.
Yours sincerely
Shelston IP Lawyers
Linda King
Partner
74 Section 202(1) provides, in relation to groundless threats of legal proceedings in relation to copyright infringement:-
Where a person, by means of circulars, advertisements or otherwise, threatens a person with an action or proceeding in respect of an infringement of copyright, then, whether the person making the threats is or is not the owner of the copyright or an exclusive licensee, a person aggrieved may bring an action against the first-mentioned person and may obtain a declaration to the effect that the threats are unjustifiable, and an injunction against the continuance of the threats, and may recover such damages (if any) as he or she has sustained, unless the first-mentioned person satisfies the court that the acts in respect of which the action or proceeding was threatened constituted, or, if done, would constitute, an infringement of copyright.
75 The principles concerning whether a letter contravenes this section were discussed by Conti J in Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 1312. It was not suggested in the judgment in the High Court in Concrete Pty Ltd v Parramatta Design & Developments Pty Ltd (2006) 231 ALR 663 was wrong. Indeed it must have been approved having regard to the orders the High Court made. At [43] Conti J said:
… the authoritative dictum of Mansfield J in Australian Consulting & Training Pty Ltd v Tiltform Pty Ltd[2001] FCA 1072, made in the context of the analogous provisions of the Australian patents legislation, and also of Cooper J in U & I Global Trading (Australia) Pty Ltd v Tasman-Warajay Pty Ltd (1995) 32 IPR 494, albeit again in the context of the same analogous provisions. In Australian Consulting & Training, his Honour said at [9]:
'That decision [whether conduct constituted a threat] must be made in the light of the circumstances in which the impugned conduct took place… and from the perspective of a reasonable recipient of the communication in those circumstances… It may not be necessary for there to be an explicit reference to enforcement proceedings.'
Further, in I & U Global, his Honour said at 500-501:
'The test is whether the language would convey to any reasonable person that the author of the letter in the present case intended to bring proceedings for infringement against the person said to be threatened. It is not necessary that there be direct words that action would be taken… It is a threat to sue for infringement if the Respondent is so minded on a future occasion. It is no less a threat that the Respondent may not be so minded…'
76 Mr Vardanian, who admitted he had seen the letter prior to authorising its dispatch from his solicitors, gave evidence in his affidavit of 19 December 2008 that "[i]n about September 2008, I became aware that customers of Intelmail (and previously The Mailmachine] were being asked to sign a licence agreement and were being charged a substantial software licensing fee. I have never discussed these arrangements with Mr Dilanchian or Mr Malouf". Mr Vardanian later gave oral evidence that he intended for the letter to be a catalyst to "start negotiations". In his cross-examination, he said that his position in the negotiations he envisaged was that he had "no problem" with the fact the machines were being sold with the installed software: He simply wanted royalties from the licensing fee income that the applicants were charging customers.
77 However, counsel for the applicants correctly, in my opinion, submitted that neither the letter nor any of the subsequent correspondence from the respondents' solicitors said that. Indeed, far from wishing to negotiate, during the course of the subsequent correspondence, Mr Vardanian's solicitors sent a letter on 8 December 2008 which actually said "[p]oints one to three are not open for negotiation". It was the applicants who volunteered to amicably resolve the matter in the letter sent on 10 November 2008 by their representatives Blake Dawson. The letter relevantly stated: "[f]inally, we are instructed to note that Mr Dilanchian continues to have respect and affection for Mr Vardanian and therefore wishes for this matter to be amicably resolved".
78 I am presently dealing only with the question of liability. Some of the submissions of the parties concerning the circumstances in which this letter was sent and, in particular, the financial circumstances of Intelmail Explorenet appear to me to be relevant to what damages might be ordered if they are. I am satisfied that the letter contained unjustifiable threats for purposes of s 202.
79 I propose to order that the parties bring in short minutes of order to reflect these reasons. The matter will be listed for directions at 9:30 on Thursday 24 September 2009 for that purpose.
I certify that the preceding seventy-eight (79) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Moore.