Agreed statement of facts
6The prosecutor tendered an agreed statement of facts (ASF"). It was relevantly agreed that:
At all material times, Earth Quake (sic) was an employer and employed Mr Chris Moore and Mr Paul Duggan.
At all material times, Earth Quake's undertaking was operating a business which included transporting, assembling and operating amusement devices, including a ferris wheel.
At all material times, Mr Gill was responsible for day-to-day decision making in relation to the operations of the business, including managing the booking of the Ferris wheel, transportation, erection, operation, maintenance and dismantling of the Ferris wheel, and all the associated record-keeping.
7The ASF described the ferris wheel in the following terms:
The Ferris Wheel involved in the incident was manufactured in 1979 in South Australia with Design No. SA5 95970-5.
The Ferris Wheel's identification number was X1158.
At all material times, the Ferris Wheel was owned and operated by Earth Quake.
...
Earth Quake held a Log Book for the Ferris Wheel. The Log Book contained details for the Ferris Wheel dating from 1998, including ownership, identification number, plant item registration, date of manufacture, design number and the class of amusement device that the Ferris Wheel fell within. The Log Book also included information on the inspection and operation of the Ferris Wheel, [sic] The critical components list, usually filled in by an engineer was not listed for this Ferris Wheel prior to the incident.
Some of the documentation in the Log Book was provided to Earth Quake at the time it purchased the Ferris Wheel.
On 27 November 2009, WorkCover NSW issued a 'Certificate of Plant Item Registration' for the Ferris Wheel, with an expiry date of 26 November 2010.
At all material times, the Ferris Wheel was registered in New South Wales and Queensland.
The Ferris Wheel arrived at the Site on 30 March 2010. It took approximately two days to erect the Ferris Wheel.
8The incident that resulted in the injuries to the three persons was described thus:
On the afternoon of 5 April 2010, Nicola Alroe (aged 16), Kate Malouf (aged 15) and Lily Havers (aged 15) arrived at the Festival.
At or about 7:00pm, Ms Alroe, Ms Malouf and Ms Havers purchased tickets for the Ferris Wheel and handed them over to Mr Moore, an employee of Earth Quake. Mr Moore subsequently directed them into a gondola.
The Ferris Wheel commenced moving in an anti-clockwise direction and rotated approximately one and a half times.
The gondola that Ms Alroe, Ms Malouf and Ms Havers were riding in stopped briefly at the top of the Ferris Wheel then continued to move slowly. The gondola then began to descend as the Ferris Wheel continued to rotate.
As the Ferris Wheel was rotating, the gondola shook and there was a loud noise. The gondola continued moving and by the time it was approximately halfway down, one end of the sweep axle on the gondola broke away. The sweep axle then broke away at the opposite end, causing the gondola to fall.
As the gondola was falling, it struck a winch which was directly below it.
The gondola fell approximately 3 to 4 metres to the ground.
Ms Alroe, Ms Malouf and Ms Havers were treated at the Site by St John Ambulance personnel and NSW Ambulance Paramedics and then conveyed by ambulance to Tweed Heads Hospital.
As a result of the incident, Ms Alroe sustained soft tissue injuries to her thoracic spine and head, plus cuts and abrasions to her left arm, knee and ankle.
As a result of the incident, Ms Malouf became unconscious and sustained right eye and facial bruising, multiple soft tissue injuries to the head, neck, shoulders, thoracic and lumbar spine, leg pain and limited mobility, and was diagnosed with a compression fracture of the L1 vertebrae (Lumbar Spine) and an unstable compression fracture of the T12 vertebrae (Thoracic Spine).
As a result of the incident, Ms Havers sustained soft tissue injuries to her neck, concussion, chipped teeth, and ongoing headaches.
9There are Australian Standards that apply to the design, construction, operation and maintenance of amusement devices such as the ferris wheel. In this regard, the ASF stated:
Clause 139 (2) of the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001 requires Log Book records to be kept in accordance with Australian Standard AS 3533.2: Amusement Rides and Devices Part: 2 Operation and maintenance.
Australian Standard AS 3533.3 Amusement rides and devices Part 3: In service inspection', requires load supporting shafts to undergo non-destructive testing. The Ferris Wheel was classified as a class 3 device and required non-destructive testing to be carried out every 2 years. This did not occur prior to the incident.
Clause 139(2) of the Occupational Health and Safety Regulation 2001 requires that maintenance, repair, inspection and testing be carried out in accordance with 'Australian Standard AS 3533.2 Amusement rides and devices Part 2: Operation and maintenance'. Earth Quake failed to do this.
At all material times, Earth Quake did not conduct an inspection that included the removal of grease and dirt from these surfaces to adequately assess their integrity.
10Following the incident, WorkCover issued Prohibition and Improvement Notices on the first defendant. On 7 April 2010, Mr Brian Bradley, a registered consulting engineer engaged by WorkCover, carried out an inspection of the ferris wheel at the site. The ASF described Mr Bradley's findings as follows:
Mr Bradley inspected the broken ends of the gondola axle that were still attached to the Ferris Wheel and noted "the line of the break, an indication of rust on one section of the break, on the A side, a torn lip on the bottom of the break on the B side".
After removing accumulated grease and dirt from the broken stub ends of the axle, Mr Bradley found evidence that the cracks had passed through indentations on the broken stub axle.
Using a digital vernier calliper, Mr Bradley measured the diameter of the axle stubs, at both sides A and B, as near as possible to the cracks. Similar measurements were also taken on the central section of the axle that had snapped and broken away at the time of the incident. This crack was about 25mm long on the stub end and about 22mm long on the centre section of axle.
Mr Bradley noted that these indentations would have acted as stress concentrations, which resulted in side "A" failing first and side "B" then not having the capacity to carry the total load and then also failing.
Mr Bradley observed on the gondola axles, a pair of flanges, at each end of the axle that had been welded to act as locators for the gondola hangers. Mr Bradley also inspected three other gondola axles and also identified indentations on the axle bearing surface.
Similar measurements were also taken of the three other gondola axles, and from the measurements taken Mr Bradley stated"...it was evident that significant wear had occurred on all the gondola axles examined between each pair of locating flanges i.e. inside the pair of flanges..." and that "The wear in the axle between the flanges was visible to the naked eye..."
Mr Bradley indicated that the Ferris Wheel operator, during erection and/or dismantling of the Ferris Wheel, would also be unlikely to notice the extent of wear or the existence of the indentations unless the grease and dirt was cleaned off to show the state of the metal.
11Changes were made to the ferris wheel and these were described in the ASF:
On 13 April 2010, Mr Jack Wade inspected the disassembled Ferris Wheel at Earth Quake's request.
Following inspection, Mr Wade, at the request of Mr Gill, redesigned the support/sweep axle, using a hollow tube of high tensile steel which included an inner steel rod intended to act as a second mechanism of support should the axle fail again.
Earth Quake subsequently engaged T J Welding to carry out the repair work on the Ferris Wheel.
The complete Ferris Wheel structure, including sweeps, bracing and the main wheel (circle), was voluntarily rebuilt using new materials, including the modified gondola axle designed by Mr Wade.
12The ASF further stated:
On 9 June 2010, Mr Wade inspected the completed work on the Ferris Wheel and indicated that it had been carried out "in a workmanlike manner and in accordance with....design assumptions".
Mr Wade then reviewed the Log Book and added a critical components list, which specifically nominated the main axle of the Ferris Wheel as critical components.
Mr Wade specified that the axles be non-destructive tested annually, and visually inspected every six months. It is conceded this had not been previously specified by an engineer or recorded in the critical component section of the logbook by any engineer prior to this date. Mr Wade also recorded in the Log Book that the Ferris Wheel is to be restricted to five adults per gondola, rather than its stated capacity of six.
On 10 June 2010, Inspector Wong received correspondence from Mr Wade detailing the rectification work carried out on the Ferris Wheel. Mr Wade stated in this correspondence that he was satisfied that the Ferris Wheel was now safe to operate and that it now conformed to the requirements of Australian Standard AS 3533.1-2009 Amusement Rides and Devices Part 1: Design and Construction.
Following the incident, Bluesfest made a decision not to have any amusement devices at the Festival that operated at height or speed, for the foreseeable future.
The Inspector was informed that if Bluesfest made a decision to have any amusement devices at the Site in the future, it would require a more in-depth analysis of the Log Book for those devices: to determine what maintenance had been carried out, including non-destructive tests; to make sure that all necessary checks and periodic maintenance schedules had been adhered to; and seeking guidance on requirements for amusement device operators.