Inspector Selby v Mark David Coulbeck

Relevant Principles 10In considering penalty, I take guidance from the reasoning of the High Court in Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; (2005) 215 ALR 213; (2005) 228 CLR 357 and their Honours' view that the task of sentencing must acknowledge the effect of the applicable legislative provisions (in this case s 8(1) and s 26(1) of the Occupational Health and Safety Act 2000 with ss 21A, 22, 23 and 34 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999). The Court, using the "instinctive synthesis" approach, would include an assessment of the objective and individual subjective factors, with the appropriate weight given to each factor, and could (but not should) give a degree of deduction in penalty to some element in the consideration, in such circumstances as where it better serves the interests of transparency, which element should be narrowly confined (for example, the utilitarian value of the plea). 11Their Honours recognised the "instinctive synthesis" approach to sentencing gives rise to an inevitable tension between the need for transparency and adequate reasoning on the one hand, and the need to avoid a mathematical approach pursuant to which the sentencing court engages in a "staged sentencing process" starting at the maximum penalty and then making deductions from it without adequately assessing (even in a provisional way) the sentence called for by the objective facts (see Markarian at [32]). 12Spigelman CJ in R v Thomson; R v Houlton [2000] NSWCCA 309; (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; 115 ACrimR 104 , correctly, given the consideration in Markarian , recognised this "instinctive synthesis" approach to sentencing saying at [57]: The instinctive synthesis approach is the correct general approach to sentencing. This does not, however, necessarily mean that there is no element which can be taken out and treated separately, although such elements ought be few in number and narrowly confined. As long as they are such, their separate treatment will not compromise the intuitive or instinctive character of the sentencing process considered as a whole. Proper regard is to be had to express legislative provisions and to the relevant statutory regime ( Markarian at [27]). 13The object of the Act is to protect employees from risk to safety, health and welfare whilst compelling attention to occupational health and safety issues so that persons are not exposed to risk to their health and safety at the workplace. In Inspector Morgenthal v Houghton [2010] NSWIRComm 192, the Court observed at [9]: In R v Way (2004) 60 NSWLR 168 it was emphasised that the provisions of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act ...are not to be construed as representing "a departure from settled principles of sentencing practice, or an abandonment of the discretion that is essential to any system calling for individualised justice". As was said at [59]: '[i]t is clear that the legislative policy ... so far as that can be discerned from the legislation itself, was not to create a straight jacket for judges ... but rather [was] intended to provide "further guidance and structure to judicial discretion.' 14Of relevance particularly is the effect of s 21A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. Section 21A sets out factors that the court is to take into account in any sentencing hearing and states, inter alia : . . . (2) Aggravating factors . . . (d) the offender has a record of previous convictions, ... (g) the injury, emotional harm, loss or damage caused by the offence was substantial, . . . (3) Mitigating factors . . . (e) the offender does not have any record (or an significant record) of previous convictions, ... (g) the offender is unlikely to re-offend, ... (k) a plea of guilty by the offender (as provided by section 22) (l) the degree of pre-trial disclosure by the defence (as provided by section 22A), (m) assistance by the offender to law enforcement authorities (as provided by section 23) ...

Consideration 15In a consideration as to penalty, the Court assesses the objective seriousness of the offence or, as has been said "the nature and quality of the offence". The Full Bench commented in Lawrenson Diecasting Pty Limited v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector James Swee Ch'ng) (1999) 90 IR 464 ad idem with the view expressed in Markarian (at 474): ...in our view, it is important to reiterate that the primary factor to be considered when a judicial officer is determining the appropriate sentence to impose is the objective seriousness of the offence charged. In case of prosecutions under the OH&S Act, this proposition has often been expressed by saying that the "true measure of penalty lies in the nature and quality of the offence"... And in Morrison v Powercoal Pty Limited [2003] NSWIRComm 416; (2003) 130 IR 364 at [32]: In assessing the gravity of the offence the focus, therefore, must be on the risk and, viewing it objectively, the seriousness of the act or omission that gave rise to the risk, In other words, the consequence of an accident will not, of itself dictate the seriousness of the offence or the amount of penalty. However, the occurrence of death or serious injury may well manifest the degree of seriousness of the risk to health and safety to which persons may have been subjected... 16Yashwin Prasad was 18 years old and had been employed by Advanced Wire Products Australasia Pty Ltd (Advanced Wire) for six and a half months. Advanced Wire was a corporation but it has now been removed from the Corporations Register. Both defendants worked at the premises of Advanced Wire and were directors. Mr Coulbeck was in effect the CEO and Ms Lam was in effect the financial officer of the corporation. Both had invested significant monies into the business. 17The essence of the offence, as pleaded against each defendant, was that a dangerous cutting machine had its safety guard removed and a young male employee, in operating the cutting machine. The risk became a reality and his hands were caught in the cutting machine whereupon he lost three fingers of his right hand and two from his left hand. 18Some matters were put before the Court, by the defendants, for its consideration in its assessment of the objective seriousness of the offence. 19Mr Coulbeck contended the guard was removed because metal used to be caught in the machine and the machine was more effective without a guard. Further, a clamp had been placed on the micro switch which left the machine in operation. It was asserted the machine was safer this way because it could then be operated solely by the use of the foot pedal. I reject these propositions. 20The primary failure was that at the time of the incident the brake press machine did not have any guard on the blade to prevent an operator's exposure and access to the dangerous point/hazardous area between the blade both from the front and either side of the machine. The modification to the brake press, involving the metal ring being connected by a piece of nylon cord to the micro switch allowing the machine to always be in operation mode, did nothing to prevent access to the danger point/hazardous area between the blade and die/jig when the blade was operational. Further, Mr Prasad did not receive a safe work procedure document (for example, the document titled "Safety and Operating Procedure for brake press") prior to operating the brake press. He only received verbal instructions on the use of the brake press. 21An examination of the documented system of work, as set out in "Safety and Operating Procedure for Brake Press", did not eliminate the possibility of the operator's limbs coming into contact with the danger point/hazardous area between the blade and the die/jig. Even if the steps documented were followed there was still a risk of the operator's upper limbs/hands coming into contact with the blade. Given the guard had been removed, Mr Prasad was not adequately supervised in the performance of his duties on the Brake Press. The system that was in place exposed persons working on the Brake Press to considerable risk to their health and safety. 22Both defendants worked on the premises. Photographs tendered reveal the eye could see the blade was exposed and the risk was therefore obvious. These were serious offences. The removal of the guard on a cutting machine (a dangerous machine) revealed a well known, even basic, safety breach. An open blade is an obvious risk to safety. 23There was a foreseeable element to these offences which makes them more serious. The foreseeable element is one carried by both defendants as directors of the corporation who were obliged under the Act to ensure the safety of their employees and especially since each worked at the site of the risk. 24The principles of general and specific deterrence are also relevant in sentencing considerations. The approach to be taken has been considered in some detail in Capral Aluminium Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales [2000] NSWIRComm 71; (2000) 49 NSWLR 610 at [71]-[77]. Each approach to deterrence in the sentencing process is encapsulated in the following passage from the Full Bench at [74]: ... both aspects of deterrence are matters which should normally be given weight of some substance in the sentencing process; and although there may be exceptional cases (see, for example, Page v Walco Hoist Rentals Pty Ltd (No 2) [2000] NSWIRComm 39 at [40]-[43]) we would expect such cases to be very rare, and where the relevant circumstances were held by the sentencing judge to be established, the judge must indicate with some precision the circumstances which had led to the exceptional course being adopted. and in Capral , the Full Bench also affirmed what was said by Hungerford J in Fisher v Samaras Industries Pty Limited (1996) 82 IR 384 (at 388): the fundamental duty of the Court in this important area of public concern ... [is] to ensure a level of penalty for a breach as will compel attention to occupational health and safety issues so that persons are not exposed to risks to their health and safety at the workplace. 25As to specific deterrence, the corporation is no longer operating. Mr Coulbeck suggested one day he would again like to manage a factory operation. However, he is at present working as a salesperson. Ms Lam is an accounts clerk. In dealing with the issue of specific deterrence, the Court in Capral noted at [76]: ... the attitude of a defendant to questions of workplace safety and any steps taken to improve safety following an accident may be relevant to specific deterrence. Here the objective is to deter the particular offender from repeating the offence ... The propensity to re-offend must be considered when determining the weight, in any, to be attached to specific deterrence. and at [77]: In sentencing, a court may disregard the element of specific deterrence if satisfied that the risk of re-offending is low or non-existent. The court may form such a view as a result of the rehabilitation of the offender: R v Corner (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 19 December 1997) or because the offender will not have the opportunity to commit a similar offence in the future: R v Macdonell (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, 8 December 1995). However, we think it unlikely that the weight to be attached to specific deterrence could be reduced to zero in case of offences under the Act. At least where the offender continues to be an employer, risks to the safety of its employees or contractors may exist or be possible. Breaches of the duties imposed by the Act may occur both by commission and omission. Employers are required to maintain constant vigilance and take all practicable precautions to ensure safety in the workplace. 26I see no evidence that there should be an element of specific deterrence in this penalty. While both personal defendants are operational, they are no longer conducting manufacturing businesses. Neither has employees working under them. While Mr Coulbeck has an ambition to one day return to management, he is at present in a low paying position with no authority or prospect of leadership. There will be no element of specific deterrence. 27However, as to general deterrence, there will be an element factored into each penalty. This was such a basic safety breach of the Act by directors. It was known that a guard was removed from a cutting machine to improve production. All the additions made to the workings of the machine were but a distraction to safe working. It must be reiterated, steps such as removing a guard from a machine exposes what, even in the design, is an acknowledged risk to safety. All directors have an obligation to ensure that known hazards from working with dangerous machinery are risk assessed, all safety measures are left in place and are actively promulgated and enforced with their employees. The industry must be reminded the guards on dangerous parts of machinery are designed to ensure safety and must be left in place. Increasing production is not an acceptable reason for removing a safety feature. 28Further, this employee was young and not properly trained, instructed and supervised. The words of Walton J, Vice-President in WorkCover Authority of NSW (Inspector Ankucic) v McDonald's Australia Limited [2000] NSWIRComm 277; (1999) 95 IR 383 at [230] are also apposite: . . . In my view, the existence of a risk to safety in a business which engages a large number of young, inexperienced and vulnerable workers, particularly where the business utilises dangerous equipment, must enhance the seriousness of the offence. Such a circumstance compels the imposition of a sentence which will attract the attention of other persons or corporations operating enterprises with similar features to the necessity of vigilantly ensuring the safety of young and inexperienced workers. The youthfulness of Mr Prasad makes it a more serious offence. He was young, untrained and now, with two seriously damaged hands, will have difficulty in seeking work in a labouring capacity. The gravity of the risk is exposed in this circumstance. 29Each defendant is entitled to the benefit of subjective factors that tend to mitigate the objective seriousness of the offence. It is also necessary to have regard to those general matters going to aggravation, mitigation and other factors identified in s 21A(1) of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 relevant to the defendant. As was said in R v Way [2004] NSWCCA 131; (2004) 60 NSWLR 168 at [56]: ... it is not to be overlooked that there is a well established body of principles that have been developed by the courts over a long period of time. By providing guidance in the form of a list of aggravating and mitigating factors in s 21A, the Parliament did not intend to overrule or disturb those principles or restrict their application. In so far as those principles refer to factors, whether objective or subjective, that affect the "relative seriousness" of the offence, they are expressly preserved by s 21A(1)(c). Ultimately, all of the above factors must be considered as part of "a complex of inter-related considerations" ( R v Gallagher (1991) 23 NSWLR 220 (at 228)). 30In Alcatel Australia Limited v WorkCover Authority (Inspector Clyant) (1996) 70 IR 99, the Full Bench (Hungerford, Marks and Schmidt JJ) observed (at 106): We accept that there are good policy reasons for the encouragement of early pleas of guilty and the giving of assistance to the WorkCover Authority in its investigation of suspected breaches of the OH&S Act. ... I accept both defendants entered early pleas. In accordance with the principles of R v Thomson; R v Houlton, I accept there is a utilitarian value to each defendant's early plea of guilty. I allow in the circumstances a 25 per cent discount for the utilitarian value of each plea. 31The defendants co-operated fully with the WorkCover Authority throughout its investigation. 32I accept the defendants have, until the incident, been good industrial citizens. They had been operating the corporation for three years with no prior convictions. The maximum penalty for each defendant is $55,000. 33The principle of parity is relevant in this consideration in the circumstances. The parity principle was stated by Dawson and Gaudron JJ in Postiglione v R (1997) 189 CLR 295 (at 301-303) as follows: ... The parity principle upon which the argument in this Court was mainly based is an aspect of equal justice. Equal justice requires that like should be treated alike but that, if there are relevant differences, due allowance should be made for me [12]. In the case of co-offenders, different sentences may reflect different degrees of culpability or their different circumstances. If so, the notion of equal justice is not violated. On some occasions, different sentences may indicate that one or other of them is infected with error [13]. Ordinarily, correction of the error will result in there being a due proportion between the sentences and there will then be equal justice. However, the parity principle, as identified and expounded in Lowe v The Queen [14], recognises that equal justice requires that, as between co-offenders, there should not be a marked disparity which gives rise to "a justifiable sense of grievance" [15]. If there is, the sentence in issue should be reduced, notwithstanding that it is otherwise appropriate and within the permissible range of sentencing options. Discrepancy or disparity is not simply a question of the imposition of different sentences for the same offence. Rather, it is a question of due proportion between those sentences, that being a matter to be determined having regard to the different circumstances of the co-offenders in question and their different degrees of criminality. ... 34In Warman International Ltd v WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Ankucic) (1998) 80 IR 326 (at 341), the Full Bench referred to the applicable principles in a consideration as to penalty, which were best stated by Mason J in Lowe v R (1984) 154 CLR 606 (at 610) as follows: Just as consistency in punishment - a reflection of the notion of equal justice - is a fundamental element in any rational and fair system of criminal justice, so inconsistency in punishment, because it is regarded as a badge of unfairness and unequal treatment under the law, is calculated to lead to an erosion of public confidence in the integrity of the administration of justice. It is for this reason that the avoidance and elimination of unjustifiable discrepancy in sentencing is a matter of abiding importance to the administration of justice and to the community. 35Given the circumstances outlined, and the fact Mr Coulbeck was acting in the capacity of manager, I find he carries a heavier liability for the offence than does Ms Lam, who was generally involved in the finances of the corporation. Mr Coulbeck was overseeing the worksite, he knew the machine was unguarded, and he failed to insure Mr Prasad was properly trained, instructed and supervised. He did initiate a safe work procedure but it allowed for the cutting element on a machine to be exposed. 36Mr Coulbeck reveals he, as an undischarged bankrupt, carries a large debt to his father for a loan to enter the business and has significant maintenance and child care commitments. He has revealed he had some relief when assets of the business were sold but he still has considerable debts as well as commitments. 37Mr Coulbeck is a man of good character. He was financially cautious when he went into the business, working in it before purchase to assess its value. However, it did not trade well. He bought new machinery to try to boost the trade. Mr Coulbeck has shown remorse and contrition. While it is not of persuasive value, the impact the incident has had on him, both emotionally and financially, has been dramatic. The staff (many related to Mr Prasad) were badly affected. The business failed after the incident although clearly it was already struggling. Mr Coulbeck, in setting up the system of work, had given safety a consideration but he failed to recognise the basic risk created by the removal of the guard. Further, his was not generally a sophisticated work safety procedure. 38Ms Lam advanced Mr Coulbeck significant monies over time, most of which are lost or unrecoverable. However, she also was given some relief from debt with the sale of assets of the corporation. She still carries debt of approximately $100,000. I accept she has been quite distressed by the incident and has expressed her remorse and contrition. She has made inquiries as to Mr Prasad's circumstances. 39I accept neither defendant is likely to re-offend. 40Both defendants ask consideration under s 10 and s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 and s 6 of the Fines Act 1996. The basis for this submission relates to each defendant's poor financial circumstances, their health, contrition, remorse and early pleas of guilty. 41Section 10 relevantly states: 10 Dismissal of charges and conditional discharge of offender (1) Without proceeding to conviction, a court that finds a person guilty of an offence may make any one of the following orders: (a) an order directing that the relevant charge be dismissed, (b) an order discharging the person on condition that the person enter into a good behaviour bond for a term not exceeding 2 years, (c) an order discharging the person on condition that the person enter into an agreement to participate in an intervention program and to comply with any intervention plan arising out of the program. In considering such a submission regard must be had to factors in s 10(3): (3) In deciding whether to make an order referred to in subsection (1), the court is to have regard to the following factors: (a) the person's character, antecedents, age, health and mental condition, (b) the trivial nature of the offence, (c) the extenuating circumstances in which the offence was committed, (d) any other matter that the court thinks proper to consider. 42In Inspector Jennifer Short v The Crown in the Right of the State of New South Wales (NSW Police) [2007] NSWIRComm 138, Boland J (President of the Industrial Relations Commission of New South Wales) considered the application of s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. This case concerned the Redfern riots in which 42 police officers sustained injuries. In considering its application, Boland J stated at [47]: Where the risk to health and safety was known, where the breach had potentially very serious consequences for the health and safety of employees, where the risk was easily preventable, where the main factor to be considered in determining an appropriate penalty to be imposed is the objective seriousness of the offence, and where the subjective factors do not outweigh the objective considerations, there is no scope, in my opinion, to apply s 10. 43Reliance is also placed by both defendants on the reasoning in Inspector Cooper v Kwik-Seal Pty Ltd & Anor [2006] NSWIRComm 48 at [43], [45] and [51] and Inspector Mulder v Girotto Precast Pty Ltd [2008] NSWIRComm 94 where a s 10 order was given in the case of a fatality. 44It has also been held that the s 10 discretion is to be reserved for extraordinary and highly exceptional circumstances ( WorkCover Authority of New South Wales (Inspector Downie) v Menzies Property Services Pty Ltd [2004] NSWIRComm 259; (2004) 136 IR 449 at [45]). 45Counsel for the prosecution submitted, relying on the above authorities, that the financial means of the defendant is not a relevant consideration in the determination of whether discretion to exercise the sentencing option of s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999 is to be utilised. The relevant consideration is whether the objective seriousness of the offence proven warrants the imposition of penalty other than a nominal one. Any other approach, the prosecution submitted, would render nugatory the effect of s 6 of the Fines Act 1996 which provides a court with an ability to reduce the fine that was otherwise appropriate in light of the objective seriousness of the offence, having regard to the financial means of the defendant. I accept that under s 10 the subjective elements put before the Court cannot displace the weight which must be given to the objective seriousness of the offences. However, given provisions under s 10(3)(d), the discretion given to the Court is broad. It may well be in weighing up the individual's circumstances including personal health, whether the offence is of a trivial nature and any extenuating circumstance the financial circumstance could be an element of the consideration of a s 10 order. However, I do not accept any of the above circumstances, on the evidence, outweighs the seriousness of these offences. 46Considerable medical evidence has been placed before the Court for its consideration under s 10 related to the mental condition of both defendants. While I accept the offences had serious ramifications on not only their business but on each defendant's health, and I accept part of the cause of this decline in health was concern, contrition and remorse for the offence, I cannot accept the circumstance in which the offence was committed allows for any extenuating circumstance which would attract a s 10 order. The offence was not of a trivial nature. It was known the guard had been removed. The defendants were as directors the controlling mind of the corporation and as well working on site. 47In the alternative to a s 10 order, given their financial circumstances, both defendants ask for consideration under s 10A of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999: 10A Conviction with no other penalty (1) A court that convicts an offender may dispose of the proceedings without imposing any other penalty. ... This provision was inserted into the Act in 2006. In R v Wilhelm [2010] NSWSC 378 at [36], Howie J in the Supreme Court of New South Wales described s 10A as being: a section that has recently been added to the armoury of the sentencing court in such a case where the Court indicates that the charge was deserving of a conviction but one where it is deserving of no other punishment in the circumstances of the particular case. 48I cannot accept there should be an order for each defendant under s 10A given the basic breach to safety. I do not accept that the plea of guilty leading to a conviction will be sufficient penalty for such a serious offence. The fact that each defendant has limited means establishes no reason for a s10A order. These offences revealed a disregard for the basic principles necessary for safe working, namely, ensuring the dangerous parts of machinery are guarded. I reject the proposition that either defendant has established that because of their health and poor financial circumstances that it is sufficient to conclude in taking a plea of guilty and a conviction they are deserving of no other penalty. 49In the alternative to the application for a s 10 or s 10A order, an application is brought under s 6 of the Fines Act 1996 . The Court takes into account a consideration of the defendants' means to pay under s 6. Section 6 is in the following terms: 6 Consideration of accused's means to pay In the exercise by a court of a discretion to fix the amount of any fine, the court is required to consider: (a) such information regarding the means of the accused as is reasonably and practicably available to the court for consideration, and (b) such other matters as, in the opinion of the court, are relevant to the fixing of that amount. The evidentiary onus on establishing matters in mitigation, including the financial situation, lies with each defendant. The onus is on the balance of probabilities. The Court must be satisfied as to the truth of such evidence and its relevance to the fixing of penalty ( McColl v John Watson Building Services Pty Ltd [2004] NSWIRComm 353). 50Mr Coulbeck was made bankrupt on 10 December 2010. He remains undischarged from the bankruptcy. The impact of the imposition of a monetary penalty on a bankrupt was considered comprehensively by Staff J in Inspector Wilkie v Anstee (No. 2) [2007] NSWIRComm 20. His Honour discussed a number of applicable authorities then posed the question at [47]: This raises a question as to whether a fine or monetary penalty if imposed by the Court becomes a provable debt in bankruptcy. If so, then the burden of the fine would be borne not by ..., but by his creditors, whose dividend would thereby diminish. If it were not a provable debt in bankruptcy, then .. would continue to be personally liable for any such fine. Staff J then concluded that a fine imposed by this Court for a breach of the Act is not provable in bankruptcy and would therefore not deprive the creditors of the bankrupt of any access to funds (see [53]). Accordingly he determined justice required the application of a penalty and his Honour imposed a penalty. Marks J in WorkCover Authority of NSW v Missingham [2007] NSWIRComm 44 agreed with the reasoning and conclusions of Staff J. The appropriate approach to sentencing an individual who was a bankrupt has also been discussed by Haylen J in Inspector Patton v Hall and Quinn [2010] NSWIRComm 6 at [36] - [37]). The general law related to a consideration of penalty under occupational health and safety legislation is therefore applicable. 51The Court, in adopting the reasoning in the above authorities, is therefore entitled to take Mr Coulbeck's full financial circumstances into consideration for the purpose of penalty (see s 6 of the Fines Act). He therefore continues to face liability and a possible penalty for a breach of the Occupational Health and Safety Act. It is the level of penalty that is affected in this consideration. Mr Coulbeck is at present in bankruptcy. Ms Lam has not been made bankrupt but I accept she still has considerable debt so the level of penalty is also an issue in her circumstances. 52I am satisfied I have before me sufficient, cogent evidence as to each defendant's current means to pay. I accept they both carry considerable debt from this failed business venture. The Court also has regard to the facility provided by the WorkCover Authority of New South Wales to enter into an arrangement for a payment of any penalty imposed by reasonable means. 53Section 6 of the Fines Act allows consideration of the question of costs when considering a defendant's means particularly if that person is a bankrupt. The usual order in prosecutions where the defendants plead guilty is the defendant carries the burden of a costs order. The prosecution has prepared a bill of costs and disbursements in the sum of $15,421.37. 54I accept both defendants have now succeeded in obtaining good work. Both still have significant debts and are paying them off. Mr Coulbeck has serious family financial commitments. He at present has not obtained a well paying position but he had good managerial skills for which I am sure he will eventually obtain appropriate income. Ms Lam has a good income. Both are hard working members of our community who have suffered financially from a bad business venture but both have also committed a serious breach of the Occupational Health and Safety Act as directors and controlling minds of the corporation. I will allow in mitigation a consideration of each defendant's separate financial circumstance but note each penalty must reflect the seriousness of the offences. 55I find each defendant guilty as charged.

Orders 56The Court makes the following orders:

1. In IRC 1677 of 2009, I find the defendant, Mark David Coulbeck, guilty of the offence as charged.
2. In IRC 1677 of 2009, the defendant is fined in the sum of $7,000 with a moiety to WorkCover Authority of New South Wales.
3. In IRC 1678 of 2009, I find the defendant, Ai Chau Lam, guilty of the offence as charged.
4. In IRC 1678 of 2009, the defendant is fined in the sum of $3,500 with a moiety to WorkCover Authority of New South Wales.
5. I order the costs of the prosecutor shall be shared equally between the defendants. Each defendant will therefore pay as costs to the prosecutor the further sum of $7,710.68. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 28 April 2011