[39] In assessing the culpability of the second defendant it is, in my view, important to place particular weight upon the role of the defendant in the management of the corporation and the nature of the gravity of the offence as identified in relation to the first defendant, and to make an assessment in that context of the situation of the second defendant. Any matters of doubt should, generally speaking, be resolved in favour of the defendant: R v Olbrich (1999) 73 ALJR 1550 at 24 - 28; Camilleri's Stock Feeds Pty Ltd v Environment Protection Authority (1993) 32 NSWLR 683 at 698 - 699. Although the second defendant was an important and crucial part of the management of the first defendant, nevertheless he was a manager in the context of a small company which was a family company which was itself managed and run by a highly experienced manager who had many years of experience in the industry, as did those members of the family who preceded him. He was not the alter ego of the company. It would be appropriate therefore to proceed on the basis that although the second defendant would have had a significant role in decision making as to employment and the like and otherwise in the running the first defendant, it could not be assumed that he could make all crucial decisions, or changes to practices, relating to a change in employment policy as to, for example, the qualifications that would necessarily be required of all employees. Therefore, it may be appropriately assumed, and thus found for the purpose of these proceedings, that the system now in place as exemplified by paragraph 21 of the defendants' submissions was not a matter within the authority of the second defendant. Accordingly, I consider that there is a significant qualitative difference between the culpability attaching to the first and second defendants, although I find that the gravity of all of the offences is serious.
48 In Department of Mineral Resources (Chief Inspector McKensey) v Berrima Coal Pty Ltd & Anor [2001] NSWIRComm 130; (2001) 105 IR 348, Walton J, Vice President, approved of the observations of Wright J set out above. (See [178] and [179]). A Full Bench of the Commission in Court Session (Walton J, Vice President, Boland J and Staff J) set out inter alia [178] and [179] of the judgment of Walton J in Berrima Coal and proceeded to apply them to the circumstances of the proceedings before them in Morrison v Powercoal Pty Ltd (no 3) [2005] NSWIRComm 61.
49 It may be assumed that in applying these observations, the Full Bench intended fully to approve them.
50 In undertaking the sentencing process, the Court is to have regard to the culpability of Mr Paul in the context of his involvement in the management of Dekorform and the part played by him in the particular breach of safety with which the Court is concerned in these proceedings.
51 The effect of the evidence given in the proceedings to which I have previously referred is that Mr Paul had ultimate responsibility for occupational health and safety matters in the Dekorform business. However, he was not involved in the day-to-day management of that business which appears to have been vested in Mr Brydson who was the manager of Dekorform. Assessed objectively, and given the evidence about the obligations, responsibilities and duties both overall and specifically with respect to occupational health and safety matters, I would assess Mr Brydson as being much more culpable than Mr Paul in terms of the matters surrounding the incident that is at the heart of these proceedings. I am unaware whether the prosecutor has instituted proceedings against Mr Brydson under s 26 of the Act, but certainly they are not proceedings with which I have had to deal.
52 The maximum penalty applicable to the charge against Mr Paul is $55,000. Assuming that his culpability is less than that of Dekorform, on the basis of the matters to which I have just referred, an appropriate monetary penalty would be something less than $5,000.
53 It was submitted on behalf of Mr Paul that the Court should apply the provisions of s 10 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act 1999. Relevantly, s 10(1) to (3) of that Act is in the following terms: