Agreed statement of facts
7The prosecutor tendered an Agreed Statement of Facts ("ASF"). Annexed thereto was the following documentation:
(a) colour photographs of the incident scene taken by the prosecutor on 9 December 2010;
(b) a factual inspection report into the incident by the prosecutor dated 14 December 2010;
(c) a risk assessment carried out on the Five Tier Winch by representatives of the corporate defendant dated 10 May 2010; and
a further risk assessment carried out by representatives of the corporate defendant dated 19 May 2010;
(d) Australian Standard, Safety of machinery, Part 1601: "Design of controls, interlocks and guarding - Guards - General requirements for the design and construction of fixed and movable guards";
(e) record of convictions for the defendants, indicating no prior convictions;
(f) colour photographs of the incident scene taken by Inspector Webb on 4 May 2010;
(g) factual inspection report of Inspector Webb dated 4 May 2010.
8The ASF indicated that the corporate defendant was the landlord of the premises and owned the plant and equipment used in the production of mushrooms. The corporate defendant also supplied substrate (i.e. growing material) for the production of mushrooms to Sovereign Mushrooms Pty Ltd and Imperial Mushrooms Pty Ltd, two companies that undertook the growing of mushrooms at the premises and the sales operations. These two companies leased, pursuant to a commercial lease with the corporate defendant, certain rooms and equipment at the premises.
9The corporate defendant managed administrative issues at the premises. It also had a maintenance team and a works team. The corporate defendant employed persons to undertake these roles. At the time of the incident, the defendant company employed 11 staff.
10The corporate defendant employed the workers responsible for filling and emptying the compost in the growing rooms, who are referred to as the 'Works Team'. The workers prepare the compost and casing mixes to grow the mushrooms. At the time of the incident, the members of the 'Works Team' received instructions from Mr Michael Hardman, who was employed by Imperial Mushrooms as its grower/manager, and who was the sole director of Imperial Mushrooms, Mr Simon Wilson who was employed by Sovereign Mushrooms as the grower/manager and the leading hand, Mr Hesham Arab who was employed by the corporate defendant.
11The growing rooms were emptied of spent compost using the Winch. The Winch had been purchased second hand in or around 2000 from a Victorian Mushroom farmer. The ASF indicated no manufacturer's manual or operating manual was provided at the time of purchase. No modifications were made to the Winch between purchase and the day of the incident and the Winch had no guards at the time of the purchase. The corporate defendant was the owner of the Winch, which was exclusively operated by its employees who were members of the Works Team of which Mr Konrad was a member.
12The ASF described the use of the Winch:
The mushrooms are grown on the shelves of various five tier shelving units located in the various growing rooms of the farm. At the commencement of each 40 day growing cycle, each shelf was lined with a layer of plastic and netting and the compost was deposited on top.
At the conclusion of each growing cycle, after the mushrooms have been grown and picked, the spent compost was removed from each shelf onto a mobile conveyor. The spent compost then travels up the mobile conveyor to a tipper truck. The winch was used to empty growing rooms on the Sunday, Tuesday and Thursday of each week.
The Five Tier Winch was used to remove the spent compost from each shelf onto the mobile conveyor. The Winch was wheeled to one end of the shelving unit and operates to wind the separate layers of netting and plastic that line each shelf onto a roller, causing the spent compost to drop from the end of each shelf onto the mobile conveyor at the foot of the Winch.
There was a roller on each tier of the Winch. The rollers are driven by an electric motor. The speed and direction of rotation of the motor was controlled electronically. Each roller was engaged separately so that the spent compost was removed from one shelf at a time. The Winch has a two-speed operation.
The operation of the Winch may be performed by one worker but the defendant company's system required two workers for its operation. One worker would operate the control panel of the Winch. The other worker was to engage the rollers into the Winch and to monitor the process and make adjustments to stop the plastic sheeting from falling and travelling up the conveyor. This was done by a worker placing their hand underneath the roller, grabbing the plastic and working it around the roller in the direction the roller was turning.
According to the members of the Works Team, the machine would either be stopped or slowed down when there was a need to wrap the plastic around a roller as part of the work process.
13The ASF explained the role of various employees. Mr Tolson, as Managing Director of the corporate defendant, was ultimately responsible for the management of the Works Team. Mr Wilson managed the daily activities of the Works Team. He reported to Mr Tolson.
14Mr Danny Zammit was employed by the corporate defendant and was responsible for maintenance and repairs of plant and equipment at the premises. Mr Zammit had worked at KT Regal for about nine years and held the position of Maintenance Manager. He was responsible for maintenance on the machinery and repairing breakdowns. Mr Zammit was a metal fabricator by trade and a welder. He also held a restricted electrical license to connect and disconnect equipment as long as he did not alter the wiring.
15Mr David Cameron, an employee of the corporate defendant, reported directly to Mr Zammit and had worked with him for the past seven years. Mr Zammit would schedule the maintenance work to be done at the beginning of each week. That schedule would be interrupted to attend to breakdowns where necessary. Ms Lyn Dickson was employed by the corporate defendant as the Human Resources Manager performing those duties for KT Regal, Sovereign Mushrooms and Imperial Mushrooms, including responsibility for occupational health and safety matters.
16The ASF described the incident in which Mr Konrad's arm became entangled in the Winch:
On 4 May 2010, Mr Konrad, commenced work at about 6:00am. Mr Konrad and co-worker Mr Peter Cogan were working on the Five Tier Winch and were undertaking the task of removing spent compost from the shelving of growing room 6.
Mr Hesham Arab, who was the site supervisor of the Works Team, had instructed Mr Konrad and Mr Cogan to undertake this task. No direct supervision was provided whilst the task was being undertaken. Mr Arab was working close to the area where the Winch was being operated.
Mr Cogan was operating the control panel on the Winch whilst Mr Konrad was engaging the rollers and monitoring the process.
Mr Konrad placed his right hand in a gap underneath one of rollers of the winch whilst it was running to grab the plastic, pull it through and feed it back into the nylon netting, to stop the plastic from falling onto the conveyor. He then proceeded to tuck the plastic into the netting, as he did so, the glove he was wearing became caught and Mr Konrad felt his hand starting to be pulled around a roller.
Mr Konrad shouted to Mr Cogan to stop the Winch and put it in reverse. By the time Mr Cogan had pressed the stop button, Mr Konrad's right arm had become entangled in the machine.
Once Mr Cogan had stopped the machine, he ran out of growing room 6 and shouted out to his colleagues.
Mr Arab was working outside the growing rooms with Mr Benjamin Lloyd, Works Team member and second in charge to Mr Arab. Mr Arab saw Mr Cogan running out of growing room 6 and heard him screaming out. Mr Arab proceeded immediately to the growing room and the area where Mr Konrad's arm was entrapped in the Winch.
Mr Arab started up the Winch and put the machine into reverse, which in turn released Mr Konrad's arm from the machine. Mr Konrad walked out to the hallway located in the inside of the building. Mr Arab followed and placed a t-shirt over Mr Konrad's arm and they both walked to the gazebo towards the front of the site.
Mr Konrad sat on a bench in the gazebo and rested his arm on the table. An ambulance was called.
Mr Arab cut off Mr Konrad's sleeve while Mr Wilson, who was a nominated first-aider, was asked questions by the ambulance service operator with regard to the state of the injury.
An ambulance arrived at the site shortly thereafter, and ambulance officers transported Mr Konrad to Westmead hospital, where he presented with an incomplete traumatic right forearm amputation.
Between 4 and 14 May 2010 inclusive, the medical procedures performed on Mr Konrad during his admission included multiple blood transfusions, wound debridement, open reduction and internal fixation right radius and ulnar, vein grafts, multiple embolectomy and multiple surgeries in an attempt to save his right arm. Ultimately, a right elbow amputation was performed on 15 May 2010. The surgeries appear to have resulted in cellulitis and exacerbated pre-existing deep vein thrombosis of both his legs. He was discharged on 7 July 2010.
Mr Konrad returned to work for the defendant company in December 2010 on suitable duties for four hours a week operating a ride-on mower until 16 March 2011.
Mr Konrad was admitted to Hawkesbury Hospital on 17 March 2011 for surgery to his right side shoulder relating to the injury sustained on the day of the incident. He was discharged on 21 March 2011 and was certified unfit for work for one month.
As at 12 October 2011, Mr Konrad had undergone further surgery and was having further treatment to his shoulders and legs. He has returned to suitable duties with the defendant company working two days a week for six hours a day.
17The ASF gave details of the system of work at the premises prior to the incident. Those details may be summarised as follows:
(a) the corporate defendant had documented Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) policies and procedures. These included:
OHS Policy;
Workplace Procedure and Inspection Policy;
Maintenance Policy.
(b) the OHS Policy provided a statement in relation to the commitment of the defendant company in relation to OHS and meeting their responsibilities. Additionally, it outlined the responsibilities of managers, supervisors and employees. The policy was displayed in the staff amenities and discussed at Tool Box talks;
(c) a checklist titled 'Regal Mushrooms Site - OHS Inspection Checklist' had been developed by the corporate defendant to be used to record these inspections. On the checklist was a section on plant and equipment, which included checks for adequate guarding, safe operating and instructions and risk assessments being available for all plant. The defendant company was unable to provide documentary evidence of inspections having been completed for the period 1 January 2008 to 4 May 2010;
(d) regular inspections were carried out by Mr Wilson, Mr Hardman and Ms Dickson of the growing room. However, these were done during a growing process, not when the rooms were being emptied;
(e) the Maintenance Policy dated 18 October 2004 was a one page document that outlined the defendant company's commitment to provide properly maintained equipment by employing suitably qualified and competent operators, carrying out regular checks and undertaking maintenance in accordance with manufacturer's requirements;
(f) the corporate defendant had in place systems that required the Winch to be regularly inspected and maintained by Mr Zammit. Any work required on the equipment at the premises was done by Mr Zammit or if he was not able to do the work required he would arrange an external tradesperson to attend;
(g) the corporate defendant's system of plant maintenance in addition to the regular inspections carried out by Mr Zammit, relied upon employees to check that safety devices were in working order, and report any faults using the Corrective Action Report ("CAR"). They could in addition report the problem directly to Mr Zammit or write on a whiteboard located near his workshop;
(h) the system for reporting faults was computerised in February 2010 replacing a paper based reporting system. Maintenance of all of the equipment on site was conducted by the Maintenance Team, who were all employees of the defendant company. To ensure equipment was maintained regularly, machines were looked at once a week. Issues considered urgent by the person making the report, were reported by going to the workshop and telling Mr Zammit or a member of the Maintenance Team directly. Evidence gathered during the WorkCover investigation only elicited the corrective actions summary sheet, which detailed the faults reported, not the work undertaken to fix the faults. Records detailing the work undertaken by the Maintenance Team to fix the issues were not available according to Mr Zammit;
(i) management meetings were held on site at regular intervals where OHS was a standard agenda item. Mr Tolson attended those meetings;
(j) the corporate defendant's system in relation to servicing the Winch was not documented other than Mr Zammit recording on the manual CAR report that the work was completed. According to Mr Zammit, servicing on the Winch would be conducted weekly on a Friday. This would consist of lubricating the Winch, undertaking visual checks and checking the emergency stop buttons. Machines would be taken to the workshop every six months for major maintenance work or as required. The records for the maintenance work carried out were kept by Mr Zammit. The corporate defendant was unable to provide records of this maintenance work carried out on the Winch;
(k) while there was no scheduled maintenance undertaken on the Winch it was inspected weekly by Mr Zammit. There was no manufacturer's manual or operating manual available for employees who used or maintained the Winch;
(l) all employees in the Works Team had completed an induction/orientation when they commenced employment. This included how to report faulty equipment and hazards, an overview of policies, first aid and accident reporting. However, this induction did not include an assessment or understanding of what was covered in the induction/orientation with the exception of Mr Arab;
(m) gloves were supplied by the defendant company to employees in the Works Team. According to one employee Mr Lloyd, he had been told not to wear gloves when operating the Winch, in case the fingertips became caught in the Winch;
(n) training was the only system in place in relation to preventing someone from placing their hands in between the rollers on the Winch (guarding was not). The training provided to employees on the operation of the Winch had been on the job training whereby they observed existing employees undertaking the task. According to Mr Arab, employees were assessed as being competent from observations done on the job whilst being supervised;
(o) the Winch did not have installed guarding which complied with the requirements of Australian Standards AS 4024. 1601-2006 - Safety of Machinery, Part 1601 Design of Controls, Interlocks and Guarding - Guards - General requirements for the design and construction of fixed and movable guards at all crush points and in-running nip points and in particular the moving parts including the rollers on the Winch;
(p) there were three emergency stop buttons located on the Winch, namely one on the centre panel and one on each side of the Winch. The emergency stop button was located on the right hand side of the Winch. At the time of the incident this stop button had been damaged and was not present on the Winch. The wires underneath where the emergency stop button would normally have been located had been taped together, which according to Mr Morley, bypassed the broken button so that the Winch would continue to operate. No reports had been raised in relation to any faults or hazards associated with the emergency stop located on the righthand side of the Winch by the Works Team, Mr Wilson, Mr Hardman or Mr Zammit;
(q) no safe operating procedures were developed and implemented for the safe operation of the Winch. No risk assessments were conducted in relation to the safe use and operation of the Winch.
18The ASF provided details of the system of work after the incident:
(a) on 4 May 2010, Inspector David Webb issued a prohibition notice to the defendant company that focused on risks of injury due to unguarded moving parts on the Winch. This notice was lifted on 5 May 2010 as a result of guarding being fitted to the Five Tier Winch and repair to the emergency stop button;
(b) on 6 May 2010, Inspector David Webb issued four Improvement Notices to the defendant company all of which were complied with, namely, notices that focused on: risks of entanglement due to the inadequate assessment of hazards whilst operating the Winch; risks of entanglement due to lack of a safe system of work whilst operating the Winch; a requirement for prescribed consultative arrangements to be followed; and risks to health and safety due to inappropriate storage of personal protective equipment used for chemical handling;
(c) as a result of the incident, and notices issued, the corporate defendant undertook a number of actions:
Fence guards fitted with interlocked gates were fitted to the Five Tier Winch. The guarding was fabricated and installed by Mr Zammit.
The broken emergency stop button located on the opposite side of the control panel was replaced by Mr Morley, a licensed electrical contractor engaged by KT Regal. Mr Morley also installed interlock switches, so that when the gates were open to access the rollers, the Winch would come to an immediate stop, which stops the rollers from turning. He also installed an interlock between the Winch and the mobile conveyor so that the Winch would not run without the conveyor being in place.
The defendant company also undertook a risk assessment on the task of emptying the compost from the growing rooms. The risk assessment resulted in the identification of hazards including manual handling, electricity, entanglement associated with the mobile conveyor and suggested remedial actions to control those hazards. The remedial actions identified various training requirements for employees. At this stage, it is unknown whether this training has been undertaken.
A safe work procedure for the emptying of compost from the growing rooms has been developed and implemented. The defendant company has trained the employees who undertake this task in the safe work method procedure. This training was conducted by members of the Safety Committee including Lyn Dickson and Michael Hardman and involved running through to the documented safe work procedure. Employees were shown the safety features including the guards, the emergency stop button and the interlock between the Winch and the mobile conveyor. They were also told that they should not try and climb over the conveyor or make the machine work without the guards.
The defendant company has formalised their consultation arrangements. A Safety Committee has been formed and meetings are conducted and minuted.