4 The defendant pleaded guilty to the charge and an agreed statement of facts was tendered to the Court. The following facts may be derived from the agreed statement:
(a) In the course of or as part of his employment, Mr Crabb was required or permitted by the defendant to operate and/or maintain a foam plastic moulding machine ("the machine"). The tasks performed by the Mr Crabb included the off-loading and subsequent stacking, strapping and movement of product from the machine and cleaning of the machine.
(b) The machine was still in a developmental stage. The machine was leased from Treffner Engineering by Foamex Pty Ltd who then provided it to the defendant.
(c) The machine operated in the following manner:
(i) Pre-expanded foam balls were fed from silos outside the factory into the hopper above the machine.
(ii) When the machine was activated, the platen, which is a flat steel plate, closed to a pre-compression position and foam balls were blown into the die via the hopper chute.
(iii) The platen moved forward towards the die in order to compress the foam balls and steam was supplied to the die to make the finished product (or pod).
(iv) After a pre-determined time and pressure the steam was shut off and air was introduced into the die to aid cooling. Once set, a vacuum was applied to the platen via slots in the steel plate and the platen removed.
(v) The finished product was drawn from the mould with the platen and dropped down to the floor when the vacuum was removed.
(d) At the commencement of the day, the person operating the machine was required to grease the platen seal and locks and clean out the slots in the platen. To clean out the slots the operator usually climbed into the space between the platen and the die block and used a strip of plastic to remove any build up from the slots. It was also necessary, from time to time, for the operator to climb into the space between the platen and the die block during the production run to scrape out a damaged or malformed pod stuck in the mould. A pod is the product that the machine was making. The operator was expected to enter the die area through an interlocked gate. However, access to the die block area was possible from several other areas.
(e) At the front of the machine was a control panel which had an extract or eject button. When someone pushed the extract button, an electric signal was sent to the Programmable Logic Controller (PLC), which had an eject cycle. The eject cycle was a back up system which was used to remove the pods if they were stuck in the die block. If someone pressed the extract button and the cam locks (or platen locks) were in the open position, the eject cycle would operate from the starting sensor position. If that occurred, the motor drove the platen into the die block, a vacuum was applied and the motor reversed moving the platen away from the die block thereby releasing the pod from the machine.
(f) The machine had an isolation switch on the side of one of the control panels. If that switch was turned off, the machine could not operate. There was no means by which an operator of the machine could turn the isolation switch off and ensure that it was kept off whilst he or she was cleaning out the slots.
(g) On the morning of Friday 14 December 2001, Mr Crabb attended the machine to start greasing the seal and cleaning the slots in the platen. There was no air pressure on the machine at the time because the main air compressor, located at the front of the factory about 115 metres from the machine, had not been switched on and was not operating. Mr Crabb attempted to run the platen back to the fully opened position so that he could climb into the machine to clean it. There was insufficient room for a person to climb into the machine in order to clean it unless the platen was back to the fully opened position of the starting sensor.
(h) The platen did not open and after several attempts to resolve the matter Mr Crabb sought help. He sought assistance from Syedabdul Qavi and then Andrew Brazakovski. Mr Brazakovski returned with Mr Crabb to the machine to sort out the problem. Mr Brazakovski opened the platen to the maximum position (which is indicated by way of a handwritten line on the machine) by accessing the control box and manually pressing the contactor controlling the platen drive motor. Mr Brazakovski did not turn off the main isolating switch.
(i) Mr Brazakovski then left the machine to turn on the air compressor but did not complete that task as Keith Short had in the meantime turned on the air compressor.
(j) In the intervening period Mr Crabb entered the die area of the machine to commence cleaning the slots. At some stage before he had entered the die area, the eject cycle had been activated by someone pressing the extract or eject button.
(k) After the air pressure was turned on, the air pressure rose in the air solenoids controlling the platen locks. This caused the platen locks to lift to the open position. Once the locks were opened, a signal was sent to the PLC to commence the eject cycle because the PLC had stored in its memory the order to commence the eject cycle in those circumstances. When the eject cycle started up, the platen motor started up, driving the platen forwards and fatally crushing Mr Crabb between the die block and the platen.
(l) There was a deficiency with the guarding of the machine in that the dangerous part of the die and platen could readily be accessed from a number of sides of the machine including from underneath an interlocked side gate installed on the right hand side of the machine. This deficiency had been drawn to the attention of the defendant on 22 March 2000 when the factory supervisor, Mr Vanden Hoogen, submitted to the General Manager of the defendant, Mr Hillar Treffner, a memorandum outlining his concerns. That memorandum was in the following terms:
I know we been busing (sic) with changing the boiler etc, etc. But I have to warn you, that the safety guards etc have to be fitted to the Pod Machine, as required by WorkCover.