Ultimately, all of the above factors must be considered as part of "a complex of inter-related considerations" ( R v Gallagher (1991) 23 NSWLR 220 (at 228)).
26 In this case, the defendant indicated a plea after five days had been set down for hearing but after an Amended Application for Order was agreed and to which a plea of guilty was then entered. However, this was a late plea. Five days of the Court time had been allocated for the hearing of a not guilty plea of which four days were vacated with only one working day's notice. The history of this prosecution and the negotiations between the defendant and the prosecution have been placed before me. I am persuaded the Amended Application for Order simply addresses matters related the particulars of the charge and could have been addressed in the Agreed Statement of Facts.
27 The plea cannot be considered an early plea. In Regina v S Y & Anor [2003] NSWCCA 291, Howie J said:
[86] It does not always follow that a plea is entered at the first reasonable opportunity simply because the plea occurs after negotiations with the Crown once the offender has been committed for trial. Clearly there will be occasions where the nature of the bargain struck does indicate that the offender could not reasonably have been expected to plead guilty before the opportunity was presented to plead to some less serious charge. But that is not always so and it behoves the sentencing judge to look at the situation realistically in determining the value of the plea on the utilitarian basis. . . . .
28 In Sullivan v R [2008] NSWCCA 296, Howie J was taken to his comments in R v SY by the applicant to support a submission that a plea of guilty after a plea negotiation with the Crown should have attracted a greater discount for an early plea. His Honour said at [16]:
. . . Clearly the applicant could have indicated a willingness to plead guilty to some charges early in the proceedings. He did not have to wait until the Crown was in a position to go to trial in order to enter into negotiations. If he chooses to wait to see what the Crown is going to do at trial then clearly the utilitarian value of the pleas is less. . , .
29 I do not consider the plea to be an early plea such as to attract a deduction in accordance with the principles enunciated R v Thomson, R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383. Under those authorities, the defendant would be entitled to a discount for the utilitarian value of its early plea from 10 to 25 per cent. However, because of the nature of this jurisdiction some of the Court's time reserved for this prosecution has been able to be used in conciliation of industrial disputes. I will, therefore, allow a small discount of eight per cent for the utilitarian value of the plea.
30 A number of significant features were placed before the Court for consideration as to the subjective elements of the offence. I accept the defendant has appropriately expressed contrition for the events and demonstrated assistance to the family of the deceased. A company representative accompanied the police to speak to the widow. It kept in close contact with the family and encouraged its employees to so do. Given the financial constraints placed on the family as a result of Mr Dring's death, it continued to pay his insurance payments for approximately 12 months. It paid for the funeral and burial costs and arranged a Benefit Night.
31 I accept significant steps have been taken by the company through its parent company's involvement to remedy the deficiencies and prevent recurrence of the incident. It determined to prohibit the operation of semi-trailer tippers on any of its sites. It notified all of its sites as to the risk associated with the tippers. It retrained its contractors and obliged them to follow its system of work when entering its sites.
32 Hy-Tec, the defendant corporation, is but a subsidiary of Adelaide Brighton, a conglomerate with approximately eight companies under its auspices. Adelaide Brighton has now a Regional Health and Safety Manager who operates out of Victoria but is responsible for safety procedures on sites in Victoria, Queensland and Adelaide. Due to the economic circumstance, the Seven Hill site closed for some time but they still operate a significant number of sites. I accept through this Manager there is now a focus on occupational health and safety although, given the nature of his task, I would urge a more on-site assessment of operational procedures rather than a site safe system imposed generally from the head office down to various site managers.
33 The defendant has reinforced its exclusion zones and safe areas and better co-ordinated the movement of trucks on its work sites. Signage has supported this rescheduling. Delivery contractors are now inducted and have been re-inducted into redefined site safety procedures. On site UHF radios for communication between the driver and site operators have been supplied by the defendant.
34 Hy-Tec, I accept, co-operated with the WorkCover Authority in its investigation. While I do not accept there was very clear acceptance of its safety obligations on this worksite at the time of the incident, I am now persuaded there is a rigorous procedure in place for worksite safety.
35 I accept Adelaide Brighton is a good corporate citizen contributing significantly into the communities in which it operates. It supports generally various children's organisations with both financial and personnel assistance.
36 The defendant company, and its parent company which operates other concrete plants, has no prior convictions in New South Wales.
37 Two Victim Impact Statements were read to the court. The brother of the deceased read a victim's impact statement on behalf of his mother and father one on behalf of himself and his brother. He spoke of the death of their brother, their "mate" and how that death had a desolating effect on the whole family. Clearly the deceased was very much loved in a close family environment and the court extends to the family its sympathy and acknowledges the terrible impact the death of their brother had on the family.
38 In sentencing, I adopt the view expressed by Boland J, now President in Inspector Glass v Foamex Polystyrene Pty Ltd [2004] NSWIRComm 100 who determined at [43] he was "... constrained" from taking into account the contents of the victim impact statement in coming to a conclusion as to what was the appropriate sentencing. Staff J considered the effect of s28 of the Crimes (Sentencing Procedure) Act in Inspector Jones v Buddy Charbel Challita; Inspector Jones v Mr Pump Pty Ltd [2005] NSWIRComm 385 saying at [137]:
In Inspector Sharpin v A Team Concrete (Aust) Pty Ltd & Ors [2004] NSWIRComm 182, I discussed recent decisions of the New South Wales Court of Criminal Appeal and of this Court which considered Pt 3 Div 2 of the CSP Act . I observed at [136] - [139].
[136] In light of s 28(4)(b) of the CSP Act, I do not think I am constrained from taking into account the contents of the victim impact statement from Ms Gowans in coming to a conclusion as to what is the appropriate sentence in this case. The question is whether it is appropriate to do so. I accept the general reasoning of Hunt CJ at CL in Previtera, Boland J in Foamex and Haylen J in Tomago Aluminium Co Ltd. However, the legislation does leave it open, in an appropriate matter, for the Court to consider a victim's impact statement given by a family victim.
[137] Mr R Debus, Attorney General and Minister for the Environment, during the second reading of the Victims Legislation Amendment Bill in the Legislative Assembly on 21 May 2003 (at page 926) commented:
On the one hand, the Government supports the admissibility of victim impact statements by immediate family members, because that provides a forum for the victim's family to assist in the healing process in the aftermath of the crime that has affected them. On the other hand, the Government agrees with the views of then Justice Hunt to the extent that, to use his words: "It is ... offensive to fundamental conceptions of equality and justice ... to value one life as greater than another". That would be the result of a harsher sentence on the accused made on the basis that, in some way, the death of a person who was, say, young and surrounded by a loving family and friends is more serious than, say, the death of a person who was alone, unhappy and elderly.
[138] Victim impact statements presently serve two distinct purposes. In the case of family victims, where a family member has died as a result of a breach of the Occupational Health & Safety Act 2000, it provides an opportunity for the family to express their feelings of grief and loss, and allows proper public respect to be paid to these feelings. In cases where there has not been a death, not only does the victim impact statement provide an opportunity for the victim to have proper public respect paid to their pain and suffering, but it also has a role to play in the determination of the appropriate sentence to be imposed by the Court. The statement will explain to the Court the extent of the impact the crime has had on the victim's life.
[139] I respectfully agree with the reasoning of Hunt CJ at CL in Previtera that a court should not, in cases involving death, permit a victim impact statement to affect the sentence…
39 Hunt CJ at CL in considering the similar provision in the prior Act, in R v Previtera (1997) 94 ACrimR 76 in acknowledging a receipt of a victim impact statement he noted what was said, then commented (at 84-86):
A victim impact statement was provided by the deceased's son. I acknowledge its receipt, and I sympathise with him (and with his sister) for their tragic and senseless loss. He describes his own and his sister's reactions to a the murder in moderate and compassionate terms, and I note what he has to say. Section 23C(3) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1986 (NSW) provides, however, that I must not consider that statement in connection with the punishment to be imposed upon the prisoner unless I consider that it is appropriate to do so. The legislation -- which is poorly drafted -- is nevertheless clearly wide enough to apply to the present case, where the offence involves the death of the victim but where the impact statement deals only with the effect of the death upon the victim's family. In my opinion, however, it could never be appropriate to take a statement of that nature into account in sentencing the offender in such a case. I must explain why.
There is a fundamental difference -- both in law and in common sense -- between punishing the offender for his crime and compensating the victim and the others affected by that crime for their loss or injury suffered as a result of that crime. The task of the criminal court in imposing a sentence is to punish; it is not to compensate. It is, in general terms, the task of the Victim Compensation Tribunal to award compensation to the victim and to others affected by the crime for their loss or injury.
The sentence imposed as punishment in any case must take into account the objective circumstances of the crime, the matters which aggravate those circumstances (or make them worse) and the matters which mitigate their seriousness. That is the framework adopted for these present remarks on sentence. The consequences of any crime upon the victim who is directly injured by it are always relevant to sentencing the offender as part of the objective circumstances of the crime, and sometimes they are relevant also in aggravation of those circumstances.
A simple example will show how the maximum sentence prescribed -- and thus the yardstick by which the actual sentence must be measured -- increases according to the degree of injury inflicted upon the victim. An assault, when prosecuted by indictment, carries a maximum sentence of two years. If the assault causes actual bodily harm, the maximum is five years. If the assault causes grievous bodily harm (that is, really serious physical injury), the maximum is seven years. Within those categories, the criminal court sentencing the offender would also be entitled to take into account other effects of the assault upon the victim in aggravation of the objective circumstances of the crime -- such as the fact that the offender failed to seek medical attention for the victim's injuries, or the fact that the victim had a long and painful recovery from those injuries. There are other matters which would be relevant, and I do not intend by those examples to cover the field. However, it is impossible to see how any loss or injury suffered by persons other than the victim directly injured by the crime could ever be relevant to sentencing in that way, however relevant they may be to the issue of compensation.
40 This was a serious offence where the system of work in place was not designed to ensure safe working and where I have found there was a known risk to safety in the rise of semi-trailer tipping trucks. I take into account the above contributing factors but note the penalty must reflect the objective seriousness of the offence.