Consideration
11 The First Applicant Administrators submit unequivocally that they do not seek the approval of the Court in respect of the loan and mortgage facility proposed. They properly draw to my attention observations of Giles J in Re Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) (1992) 9 ACSR 83 at page 85 where his Honour observed that it is generally not appropriate in an application for directions to make the liquidator's commercial decisions for him or her, and that the liquidator should not seek directions as a kind of insurance that the right commercial decision has been made.
12 Nonetheless, in aid of s 447A the First Applicant Administrators rely on the following comments of Goldberg J in Re Ansett Australia Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 376:
[42] The Court does not have express powers to "approve" an agreement entered into or proposed to be entered into by administrators appointed and acting pursuant to Pt 5.3A of the Act, or to direct that the administrators may properly and justifiably enter into an agreement and perform it. For the reasons which I set out in Re Ansett Australia Limited (2001) 39 ACSR 355, I am satisfied that s 447A of the Act empowers the Court to make such an order. Although courts will not pronounce upon the commercial prudence of an agreement entered into by administrators, they will act in an appropriate case to protect administrators from claims that they have acted unreasonably in entering into particular agreements.
13 The real question before the Court is not whether the Court will "allow" the First Applicant Administrators to enter the loan and mortgage agreement they propose - it is whether the Court will approve the administrators so acting without becoming personally liable for the resultant debt as would normally follow the operation of s 443A of the Corporations Act.
14 In my view it is appropriate to make the orders sought by the applicants. I form this view for the following reasons.
15 First, there does not appear to be any doubt that the proposed expenditure is necessary in order to maintain the operation of the premises which relate to a key function of KASH. To that extent, the proposed arrangements will enable the premises (and the related lease to the Salvation Army) to continue, thus meeting the object of Pt 5.3A of the Corporations Act as described in s 435A of that Act (cf observations of Mansfield J in Re Carter; SFM Australasia Pty Ltd (Administrators Appointed) [2009] FCA 360 at [21]).
16 Second, there does not appear to be any doubt that not only does KASH lack the ability to fund the necessary repairs to the sewerage treatment system, but that there is no ready source of funding either from government or on the open market. Accordingly, I accept that funding from KMQ is a reasonable option in the circumstances, including the provision of a mortgage to secure the loan. I take this view particularly in light of the evidence before the Court that:
(a) loan funds will be provided by KMQ from its overdraft facility with the Commonwealth Bank;
(b) the interest rate proposed by the Loan Agreement mirrors any interest rate payable by KMQ to the Commonwealth Bank; and
(c) to that extent, it is clear that neither KMQ nor the First Applicant Administrators are benefitting financially from the loan and associated mortgage over the KASH premises.
17 Third, valuation evidence before the Court annexed to the affidavit of Ms Muller sworn 26 July 2012 indicates that, should the land on which the premises are located (and which is the proposed subject of the mortgage) be sold, it would realise at least $725,000 (on the basis of a forced sale), which would be more than sufficient to discharge any liability pursuant to the loan and mortgage.
18 Fourth, it appears that the loan and mortgage arrangement proposed by the applicants is for repair and maintenance in respect of property of the company under administration, and not for fees or expenses of the First Applicant Administrators.
19 Fifth, there is evidence before the Court that one creditor, DOHA, has been notified of the proposal. There was no appearance in Court today by DOHA. I am concerned that, on the submissions of the applicants, none of the unsecured creditors of KASH have been given notice of this application, and accordingly none have been given notice of their opportunity to oppose this interlocutory application. However I am satisfied that, by the terms of the orders sought, creditors of KASH may apply to vary or discharge these orders should they see fit to make such application. In light of the apparent urgency of the application before me I consider that this entitlement of the creditors provides adequate protection of their interests.
20 Sixth, there is evidence before the Court that one option currently being considered by the First Applicant Administrators is for assets of the Second Applicant to be sold. The First Applicant Administrators submit that, in light of the prospect of sale, they are concerned that they could be potentially liable for any loan entered into in respect of the repairs, and that any practical right to be indemnified from the assets of KASH could be illusory depending on the terms of any sale. In my view, this is a reasonable apprehension, and one against which the First Applicant Administrators are reasonably entitled to protection.
21 Finally, the urgency of the current application is further understandable in light of potential workplace hazards arising at the KASH premises, and the potential liability of the First Applicant Administrators (in their capacity as "persons conducting a business or undertaking") for the purposes of the Work Health and Safety Act 2011 (Qld).
I certify that the preceding twenty-one (21) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Collier.