Idoport Pty Limited & Anor v National Ausralia Bank Limited & 8 Ors, Idoport Pty Limited & Anor v Donald Robert Argus

Idoport Pty Limited & Anor v National Ausralia Bank Limited & 8 Ors, Idoport Pty Limited & Anor v Donald Robert Argus - [2004] NSWSC 270 - NSWSC 2004 case summary — Zoe

[2]

3 On 29 January 2002, the Court dismissed all of the claims brought by the plaintiff against the defendants and made orders requiring the plaintiff to pay the defendants' costs of the proceedings (see [2002] NSWSC 18) (29 January 2002 judgment). 4 On 15 August 2002, the Court of Appeal dismissed the plaintiff's appeals with costs [see [2002] NSWCA 271]. Applications for special leave to appeal to the High Court were dismissed with costs on 20 June 2003. 5 On 1 September 2003, the defendants filed notices of motion in the proceedings seeking a gross sum costs order pursuant to Part 52A rule 6(2)(c) of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW). 6 At a directions hearing before Justice Bergin on 12 March 2004, the defendants sought directions that the proceedings "be listed for further directions before [myself]". The plaintiff apparently opposed those directions on the grounds of apprehended bias. 7 The defendants have asked that the notice of motion be referred to me for hearing. The plaintiff apparently opposed that on the same grounds. On 17 March 2004, Bergin J referred the issue to me. Matters of Procedure 8 The rules of procedure governing the manner in which a superior court judge must deal with an objection to his or her hearing of a particular case are as follows: · A judge must not (in ordinary circumstances) entertain any formal application or notice of motion seeking disqualification on the ground of bias, as "[i]t is beyond doubt that a judge of any court who might reasonably be suspected of bias should not hear the cause": Barton v Walker (1979) 2 NSWLR 740 at 748 per Samuels JA (with whom Reynolds and Glass JJA agreed) citing R v Watson; ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 at 264. Rather the proper course is for a party to raise its concerns by way of objection, to be dealt with in the usual manner, as "[o]rdinarily matters of bias or pre-judgment are not susceptible of proof in the ordinary way, by allegation and counter-allegation; whether a judge is affected in such fashion is ordinarily a matter known essentially to him": Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) and Anor (1992) 26 NSWLR 411 at 436, per Mahoney JA with whom Gleeson CJ and Meagher JA agreed. · Accordingly, a decision of a judge to disqualify or not to disqualify him or herself from the hearing of a particular case is not an order or a direction and, as such, relief in the nature of injunction or the prerogative writs will not lie: Barton v Walker (1979) 2 NSWLR 740 at 755, per Samuels JA (with whom Reynolds and Glass JJA agreed). Rather, as stated by Gleeson CJ in Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 196 ALR 385 at 389: "[i]f one party takes objection to a judge hearing a case, then that objection will be determined in accordance with ordinary procedures and, if unsuccessful, may ultimately constitute a ground of appeal." · Thus while the judge may publish reasons rejecting any such objection, appeal against those reasons will not lie save insofar as they are an aspect of a subsequent order or determination susceptible to appeal in the ordinary course: Rajski v Wood & Ors (1989) 18 NSWLR 512 at 518, per Kirby P. · Nonetheless, despite the general rule that disqualification is not usually a matter for factual contestation, there exists scope for the judge in certain circumstances to adopt an informal procedure by which the parties may be heard in this regard. This proposition was advanced, with an abundance of caution, by Mahoney JA in Bainton v Rajski (1992) 29 NSWLR 539 at 545 in the following manner: "The third matter is more complicated. It involves the procedure to be adopted where it is not immediately apparent to the judge what are the reasons advanced against his determining the proceeding. In such a case the judge may feel it appropriate to adopt a procedure whereby he can be informed of what, in principle, is urged against his determining the proceeding. In my opinion, within the limits of the principle established by Barton v Walker , it is open to a judge to adopt a procedure appropriate to determine what in principle are the matters urged against his determining the proceeding. There are, of course, dangers inherent in such a procedure. If the judge invites such a statement, he may invite, or provide the occasion for the allegation of matters which, by the fact of their allegation, may produce embarrassment or apprehension of the kind referred to in the Livesey [see p. 1 above] decision. It may provide the occasion for the allegation of matters which are inaccurate or manipulative, or which constitute contempt of court. If a procedure is adopted which invites a statement of such matters, experience has suggested that it may be necessary to provide formal sanctions which will deter the making of allegations which are untrue or worse. In some cases, a course which requires a prior statement of such matters on affidavit will provide the safeguard of penalties for perjury, false swearing or the like. In other cases, the sanction of contempt of court may be available. But, I think, the proper conclusion is that such a procedure will ordinarily be inapt if the facts in question are contested facts." 9 Indeed, demonstrating the width of the judge's discretion in dealing with objections to him or her hearing a matter (again, of course, within the dictates of Barton v Walker), the adoption of a course allowing the parties to advance submissions on the question of disqualification was precisely that undertaken by Cole J in Spedley. As detailed by Mahoney JA on appeal at 436-437, the trial judge heard submissions and then made an order properly the subject of appeal in itself, an action which "by his judgment, invited the decision of the Court on the matter." As per Mahoney JA at 436, such a procedure might be particularly convenient in circumstances where the hearing is expected to occupy a substantial degree of the Court's time. As a matter of further observation, it might also be stated that, on the facts of Spedley, the basis of the submission that Cole J recuse were particularly susceptible to factual submission and formal reasons. More specifically, there was no suggestion of actual bias or partiality arising from a pecuniary interest or personal relationship debate which could potentially scandalise or embarrass the Court, and as a result many of the concerns expressed in Barton v Walker were not applicable. Gross sum costs orders 10 The availability of a gross sum costs order arises under Part 52A, rule 6(2)(c) of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) ("Supreme Court Rules"). That section provides:

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17 The above tests notwithstanding, it must nonetheless be borne in mind that the application of the 'principle of apprehension' aspect of the rule is necessarily predicated upon what Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ in Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 at 570 deemed a "real world" understanding of legal proceedings. Specifically, their Honours stated (at 570) that the "requirement of the reality and the appearance of impartial justice in the administration of the law by the courts is one which must be observed in the real world of actual litigation." Alternatively expressed, the application of the relevant rule is thereby entirely contingent, within the parameters of the impartial administration of justice, on the circumstances of the case and the content of the matters said to give rise to an apprehension of bias. Attributes of the "fair-minded lay observer" 18 The test for apprehension of bias such as to disqualify a judge is objective. It is a reasonable and not a fanciful or fantastic apprehension that must be established: Gascor v Ellicott [1997] 1 VR 332 at 342 per Tadgell JA, approved by the NSW Court of Appeal in Dovade Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Group & Anor (1999) 46 NSWLR 168 at 188 [92]; see also Barbosa v Di Meglio [1999] NSWCA 307 at [8] per Mason P. Accordingly, the fictional observer, by reference to whom the test is formulated, is taken to be reasonable: Johnson at 493 [12]. 19 The observer is not assumed to have a detailed knowledge of the law, or of the character or ability of a particular judge: Webb & Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 (Webb) at 73 per Deane J, cited with approval in Johnson at 493 [13]. The context connotes knowledge of "ordinary judicial practice" and the actual circumstances of the case: see Johnson at 493 [13] and Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70 ("Laws") at 87 per Mason CJ and Brennan J. Prejudgment as bias 20 A party alleging apprehension of bias in the form of prejudgment must show a reasonable apprehension on the part of the fictitious observer that "the decision-maker's mind is so prejudiced in favour of a conclusion already formed that he or she will not alter that conclusion irrespective of the evidence or arguments presented": Laws at 100 per Gaudron and McHugh JJ; see also JRL, Re; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 ("Re JRL") at 352 per Mason J; Kwan v Kang [2003] NSWCA 336 ("Kwan") at [83] per Sheller, Ipp and Tobias JJA. 21 The state of mind described as bias in the form of prejudgment is one so committed to a conclusion already formed as to be incapable of alteration; whatever evidence or arguments may be presented: Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 ("Jia") at 531-532 [71]-[72] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J and at 564 [185]-[186] per Hayne J. Natural justice does not require the absence of any predisposition or inclination for or against an argument or conclusion: Jia at 531 [71] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J. 22 Saying that a decision-maker has prejudged or will prejudge an issue, or even saying that there is a real likelihood that a reasonable observer might reach that conclusion, is to make a statement which has several distinct elements at its roots: Jia at 564 [185] per Hayne J.

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"The question is not whether a decision-maker's mind is blank; it is whether it is open to persuasion": [ Jia at 531 [71] per Gleeson CJ and Gummow J]. 24 Natural justice does not require the absence of any predisposition or inclination for or against an argument or conclusion: Jia at 531 [71]; see also Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 ("Vakauta") at 570-571 per Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ and at 575-576 per Dawson J. 25 Accordingly, a trial judge's relevant obligation in hearing a gross sum costs application would not be to approach the application with a mind free of the views formed during the hearing. Indeed, this would be totally contrary to the policy behind the availability of a gross sum costs order: see Harrison at 742-743; Wentworth at 35. Rather, the trial judge's obligation is to afford both sides a fair hearing, with the opportunity to lead evidence relevant to the issues that have to be determined, and to make submissions on those issues. The trial judge must bring to bear an open mind in the sense of being prepared to be persuaded by that evidence and those submissions. It would be a failure to meet this obligation that a reasonable person must apprehend in order for a party seeking a disqualification of a trial judge to succeed. 26 It is irrelevant whether a party considers that a trial judge is likely to decide the case adversely to it by, for example, awarding the other party a significant amount in gross sum costs: Re JRL at 352; Masters v R (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 ("Masters") at 471 per Hunt CJ at CL, Allen and Badgery-Parker JJ. Further, the fact that it may be easier to persuade a trial judge of a proposition than it is to persuade another judge does not mean that either of them is affected by prejudgment: Jia at 531 [71]; see also R v Commonwealth Conciliation & Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 ("Angliss") at 553-555 per Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ. Comments made by judges must be considered in context 27 Any comments made by a trial judge on which a party seeks to rely as evidence of a reasonable apprehension of bias must be considered in the context in which they were made including the context of ordinary judicial practice: Johnson at 493 [13] and 494-495 [16]-[17]; Re JRL at 371 per Dawson J; Webb at 73-74 per Deane J; Kwan at [69]. The rules and conventions governing such practice are not frozen in time but take account of the exigencies of modern litigation: Johnson at 493 [13]. It is not appropriate to consider the comments of the trial judge in isolation from their relevant context. Accordingly, the judgments and transcripts relevant to the comments relied upon by a party must be considered when determining whether a trial judge prejudged relevant issues: Johnson at [13]. The danger of a judge disqualifying himself or herself too readily 28 It is important that judicial officers discharge their duty to sit and do not, by acceding too readily to suggestions of appearance of bias, encourage parties to believe that by seeking the disqualification of a judge they may be able to influence the composition of the Bench: see Re JRL at 352; Ebner at 348 [20]. 29 It would be:

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"an abdication of judicial function and an encouragement of procedural abuse for a judge to adopt the approach that he should automatically disqualify himself whenever he was requested by one party to do so on the grounds of a possible appearance of pre-judgment or bias, regardless of whether the other party desired that the matter be dealt with by him as the judge to whom the hearing of the case had been entrusted by the ordinary procedures and practice of the particular court". [L ivesey at 294] 30 In Angliss at 554, the High Court rejected the notion that a fair and unprejudiced mind was "necessarily a mind which has not given thought to the subject matter or one which, having thought about it, has not formed any views or inclination of mind upon or with respect to it". The comments relied upon by the plaintiff 31 The plaintiff submits that the judge who hears the application for a gross sum costs order will have to determine "whether particular work was necessary, whether the extent of the evidence filed by the defendants was appropriate, [and] whether the hourly and daily rates charged by the [defendants' legal representatives]… are appropriate". 32 The plaintiff contends that I "[expressed] opinions…touching upon" matters that will be at issue in the gross sum costs application namely, "the reasonableness of charges of the defendants' lawyers, the volume of work which was undertaken for the case, and of the expenses incurred by [the defendants]". 33 The plaintiff then quotes certain comments made by me in certain judgments made during the course of the proceedings (most particularly judgments of 13 September 2001, 5 October 2000, 26 November 2001, and 29 January 2002), and certain transcript references, as demonstrating that a reasonable person could take the view that I "prejudged the issues" for determination in the gross sum costs application. Analysis of the Idoport judgments 34 The grounds upon which the claim is advanced that "a reasonable person could take the view that I had prejudged the issues" are certain comments and findings made by me in relation to the reasonableness of both the defendants' expenditure in resisting the proceedings, and the conclusions of Ms Vine-Hall regarding likely determinations of costs assessors. Those reasons, in terms of the comments and findings in the Idoport judgments properly construed, could not it seems to me give rise to any such apprehension:

[20]

· The statements relied upon by the plaintiff need to be seen in the context in which they were made namely the application was one for security for costs. By its nature a security for costs application is concerned with estimating likely future costs rather than a determination of whether costs that have been incurred can be recovered on an assessment or by way of a gross sum. · The Court was not considering the reasonableness of costs that had been incurred but rather the reasonableness of the estimates advanced by Mr Lovell of future costs. The Court reduced the estimates advanced by Mr Lovell by 15 percent to take account of uncertainties such as the proceedings concluding earlier than expected or for changes in approach: See paragraph 152 of the 13 September 2001 judgment. · The specific and discrete context provided by a security for costs application was highlighted by the inclusion of paragraphs 69-81 in the 13 September 2001 judgment which dealt with the general principles concerning delay as a factor in security for costs applications. Paragraph 82 of the 13 September 2001 judgment is the commencement of an examination of the facts in relation to that factor and introduces paragraph 83 under the heading "Time estimates for the final hearing". The reference to the defendants' conduct as being a "logical and reasonable approach" is in the context of the duration of the final hearing which was relevant to whether there had been a delay in bringing the application for security for costs and the effect the amendments to the statement of claim would have on the length of hearing. That was made plain in the subsequent paragraphs and in particular by the conclusion reached on that issue set out at 98. · The analysis undertaken by the Court in the 13 September 2001 judgment is unexceptional in the context of a security for costs application. The effect of the plaintiff's complaints about the comments made by the Court in that judgment would be that a trial judge who heard a security for costs application could not subsequently hear a gross sum costs application in the proceedings. Such a result I accept would be surprising and would significantly limit the utility of the gross sum procedure. The Judgment of 5 October 2000

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· It has been held by the High Court that the expression by a trial judge of merely tentative views on matters to which the parties are entitled to put full submissions is not sufficient to give rise to apprehended bias. In Re Keely; Ex Parte Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1990) 94 ALR 1, the trial judge advanced propositions to a party not specifically put to him in argument and used language ("strike-breakers") which the defendant claimed gave rise to an apprehension of partiality. In refusing the defendant's application for orders nisi, Dawson J said: "If his Honour expressed views, he did so tentatively and not in any concluded way. He allowed the applicants full opportunity to make whatever submissions they wished about the matters which he sought to explore. If any criticism can be made of the proceedings it must surely be that argument was not more closely confined. His Honour did on occasions use language which might be described as colourful, but he did so indiscriminately and not for the purpose of voicing any prejudice against the applicants. That was simply his mode of expression. His Honour did not, in my view, use emotive terms. The expression "strike-breaker" was a term which had been used in the context of the dispute between the pilots and the airlines and it is not apparent that his Honour used it in any pejorative sense against the airlines. It is quite clear that the applicants disagreed with the line of inquiry undertaken by his Honour, but his Honour's refusal to accept the applicants' submissions (albeit not in any concluded way) displayed no lack of impartiality" · The dictates of procedural fairness and natural justice which underpin the rule are cognisant of the reality of litigation and, as such, do not demand a judicial mind that is absolutely devoid of any forethought on the question in issue. In R v Commonwealth Conciliation & Arbitration Commission; Ex Parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546, the Court (Barwick CJ, McTiernan, Kitto, Taylor, Menzies, Windeyer and Owen JJ) stated (at 553-554) that: "[t]hose requirements of natural justice are not infringed by a mere lack of nicety but only when it is firmly established that a suspicion may reasonably be engendered in the minds of those who come before the tribunal or in the minds of the public that the tribunal or a member or members of it may not bring to the resolution of the questions arising before the tribunal fair and unprejudiced minds. Such a mind is not necessarily a mind which has not given thought to the subject matter or one which, having thought about it, has not formed any views or inclination of mind upon or with respect to it. "

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· In regard to the plaintiff's concerns regarding my previous findings as to the reliability of Ms Vine-Hall as an expert witness, it is critical to note that a distinction is drawn when applying the pre-judgment aspect of the rule against apprehended bias between prior expressed views as to the reliability of expert witnesses who have come before the judge in question on numerous occasions and those regarding the reliability and truthfulness of lay witnesses. In Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568, the trial judge made relatively abrasive comments regarding the reliability of an expert medical witness called by the defendant insurers, including the remark that such experts "think you can do a full week's work without any arms or legs." While the whole Court held that such comments were sufficient to raise a reasonable apprehension of prejudgement, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ noted (at 570-571) that: "It is inevitable that a judge who sits regularly to hear claims for damages for personal injury will form views about the reliability and impartiality of some medical experts who are frequent witnesses in his or her court. In some cases and notwithstanding the professional detachment of an experienced judge, it will be all but impossible to put such preconceived views entirely to one side in weighing the evidence of a particular medical expert. That does not, however, mean that the judge is disqualified from hearing the particular action or any other action involving that medical expert as a witness. The requirement of the reality and the appearance of impartial justice in the administration of the law by the courts is one which must be observed in the real world of actual litigation. That requirement will not be infringed merely because a judge carries with him or her the knowledge that some medical witnesses, who are regularly called to give evidence on behalf of particular classes of plaintiffs (e.g members of a particular trade union), are likely to be less sceptical of a plaintiff's claims and less optimistic in their prognosis of the extent of future recovery than are other medical witnesses who are regularly called to give evidence on behalf of particular classes of defendants (e.g those whose liability is covered by a particular insurer). If it were so infringed, the administration of justice in personal injuries cases would be all but impossible. In that regard, both necessity and common sense require that a distinction be drawn between the case where a judge has some preconceived views about the expertise or reliability of the professional opinions of an expert medical witness and the case where a judge has preconceived views about the credit or trustworthiness of a non-expert witness 'whose evidence is of significance on ... a question of fact' which 'constitutes a live and significant issue' in the case (see Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1993) 151 CLR 288 [at 300] )." · Accordingly, given the basis of the plaintiff's objections regarding the previous evidence of Ms Vine-Hall in terms of the judgement on the September 2001 security for costs application is that I did not accept certain portions of her evidence, on the above dicta no reasonable apprehension of pre-judgement arises.

[41]

· Finally, and perhaps most critically, it must be emphasised "loudly and clearly" that apprehended bias as a ground of disqualification does not relate to an apprehension that, based on prior decisions of fact and law, a particular judge might decide a case adversely to one party. Rather, commensurate with the status of the rule as an adjunct of broader procedural fairness requirements, the apprehension must be that partiality or prejudice will be brought to the proceedings such as to undermine the administration of justice in the most general of senses. This conclusion was made manifestly clear by Deane, Toohey and Gaudron JJ in Finance Sector Union of Australia, Re; Ex Parte Illaton Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ALR 581, where their Honours stated (at 583) that: "care must be taken to bear in mind that the basis for disqualification by reason of apprehended bias is that there are grounds upon which a party or the public might entertain a reasonable apprehension that the particular member of the Commission will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice. The basis for disqualification is not merely that the member's past decisions, on questions of fact or law, might lead to a reasonable expectation that she or he will decide the case adversely to one of the parties. Nor is it that she or he has had previous contact or experience, as a member of the Commission, with the facts involved in the particular matter, with the context in which the particular matter arises, or with one or more of the parties involved in the particular matter." · Similarly in Re JRL; Ex Parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342, Mason J (at 352) emphasised the following: "[i]t needs to be said loudly and clearly that the ground of disqualification is a reasonable apprehension that the judicial officer will not decide the case impartially or without prejudice, rather than that he will decide the case adversely to one party. There may be many situations in which previous decisions of a judicial officer on issues of fact and law may generate an expectation that he is likely to decide issues in a particular case adversely to one of the parties. But this does not mean either that he will approach the issues in that case otherwise than with an impartial and unprejudiced mind in the sense in which that expression is used in the authorities or that his previous decisions provide an acceptable basis for inferring that there is a reasonable apprehension that he will approach the issues in this way." 48 Such dicta bear directly upon the plaintiff's primary objections to my hearing this application; the comments and findings which their submissions claim manifest apprehended bias are, taken at their highest, mere suggestions that it was reasonable that the defendant incurred a high degree of legal costs in resisting this action. 49 The plaintiff contends that this case is different in that, in the usual course:

Legislation Cited (2)

Legal Profession Act 1987(NSW)

Supreme Court Rules 1970(NSW)

Cases Cited (38)

CITATION : Idoport Pty Limited & Anor v National Ausralia Bank Limited & 8 Ors, Idoport Pty Limited & Anor v Donald Robert Argus [2004] NSWSC 270 HEARING DATE(S) : 5/04/04 JUDGMENT DATE : 5 April 2004

CATCHWORDS : Courts and Judges - Bias - Principles - Procedures to determine claims that a judge should recuse for apprehended bias - Whether reasonable apprehension of bias - Final hearing of proceedings continued for one and a half years - Proceedings then dismissed for failure to comply with security for costs orders - Defendants motions seek a gross sum costs order - Plaintiff opposes trial judge hearing motions on grounds of apprehended bias relying upon comments as to reasonableness of defendants legal expenditure in resisting the proceedings made on various occasions during determination of sundry interlocutory applications - Refusal to withdraw - Costs - Application for gross sum costs order pursuant to Part 52A rule 6 (2) (c) of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) LEGISLATION CITED : Legal Profession Act 1987 (NSW) Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) Australian National Industries Ltd v Spedley Securities Ltd (in liq) & Anor (1992) 26 NSWLR 411 Bainton v Rajski (1992) 29 NSWLR 539 Barbosa v Di Meglio [1999] NSWCA 307 Barton v Walker (1979) 2 NSWLR 740 Beach Petroleum NL & Claremont Petroleum NL v Johnson (1995) 57 FCR 119 Clenae Pty Ltd & Ors v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (2000) 205 CLR 337 Dovade Pty Ltd & Ors v Westpac Banking Group & Anor (1999) 46 NSWLR 168 Ebner v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (2000) 205 CLR 337 Finance Sector Union of Australia, Re; Ex Parte Illaton Pty Ltd (1992) 107 ALR 581 Gascor t/as Gas & Fuel v Ellicott, Esso Australia Resource Ltd & BHP Petroleum (NW Shelf) Pty Ltd [1997] 1 VR 332 Gas & Fuel Corporation Superannuation Fund and Ors v Saunders and Anor (1994) 123 ALR 323 Hadid v Lenfest Communications Inc [2000] FCA 628 Hagan v Independent Commission Against Corruption [2003] NSWCA 93 Harrison v Schipp (2002) 54 NSWLR 738 CASES CITED : Idoport Pty Ltd & Anor v National Australia Bank Ltd & Ors, [1999] NSWSC 828; [2000] NSWSC 338; [2000] NSWSC 945; [2000] NSWSC 1141; [2001] NSWSC 427; [2001] NSWSC 509; [2001] NSWSC 648; [2001] NSWSC 838 JRL, Re; Ex parte CJL (1986) 161 CLR 342 Kwan v Kang [2003] NSWCA 336 Laws v Australian Broadcasting Tribunal (1990) 170 CLR 70 Livesey v New South Wales Bar Association (1983) 151 CLR 288 Masters v R (1992) 26 NSWLR 450 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Jia (2001) 205 CLR 507 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Wang (2003) 196 ALR 385 R v Australian Stevedoring Industry Board; Ex Parte Melbourne Stevedoring Co Ltd (1953) 88 CLR 100 R v Commonwealth Conciliation & Arbitration Commission; Ex parte Angliss Group (1969) 122 CLR 546 R v Watson; ex parte Armstrong (1976) 136 CLR 248 Rajski v Wood & Ors (1989) 18 NSWLR 512 Re Keely; Ex Parte Ansett Transport Industries (Operations) Pty Ltd (1990) 94 ALR 1 Vakauta v Kelly (1989) 167 CLR 568 Webb & Hay v R (1994) 181 CLR 41 Wentworth v Wentworth, unreported, NSWCA, 21 February 1996, BC9600215 Idoport Pty Limited (Plaintiff) PARTIES : National Australia Bank Limited (Defendant) Donald Robert Argus (Defendant) FILE NUMBER(S) : SC 50113/98; 50026/99 COUNSEL : Mr N Hutley SC, Mr A Paterson (P) Mr TF Bathurst QC, Mr JA Halley (D) SOLICITORS : Withnell Hetherington (Plaintiff) Freehills (Defendant)

(1992) 26 NSWLR 411

(1992) 29 NSWLR 539

(1979) 2 NSWLR 740

(1995) 57 FCR 119

(2000) 205 CLR 337

(1999) 46 NSWLR 168

(1992) 107 ALR 581

(1994) 123 ALR 323

(2002) 54 NSWLR 738

(1986) 161 CLR 342

(1990) 170 CLR 70

(1983) 151 CLR 288