Hollins v NSW Land and Housing Corporation

Background

1. The tenant is a 24 year old woman who has been a social housing tenant since 2014. Relevantly, the tenant has three young children, two of whom were removed from her care, about 18 months prior to the hearing, by the Department of Family and Community Services and were placed with a foster carer. Her eldest child, resides permanently with his father a former partner of the tenan. The tenant has regular weekend access to that child at her home, the residential premises.
2. On 23 November 2017 the tenant entered into a written residential tenancy agreement in respect of the premises with the landlord. The agreement was for a fixed term of two years, three months and one week from 27 November 2017.
3. The landlord believed that the tenant had performed unauthorised work at the premises in respect of installation of a swimming pool; a chicken wire fence; and a shade cloth. The landlord requested the tenant remove the works. According to an internal email of Ms Browne of the landlord dated 26 March 2018, which formed part of the evidence at the hearing, at a site visit on 23 March 2018, the tenant had been reluctant to remove the unauthorised work and had allegedly been verbally abusive to the landlord's staff.
4. The landlord commenced proceedings in the Tribunal. On 17 April 2018, the Tribunal ordered that the tenant remove unauthorised works and restore the property. The swimming pool was to be emptied immediately and other works removed by 1 May 2018. We note the tenant appears to have consented to an order that she comply with the terms of her tenancy agreement by removing the unauthorised work.
5. Further, the Tribunal ordered that the landlord was authorised to enter the residential premises between 10.00 am and 11.00 am on 9 May 2018 for purpose of "Inspecting the residential premises for compliance with the above Orders" ('the access order'). The Tribunal also ordered that: "6. If the landlord cannot gain access to the residential premises on the date agreed or in accordance with the above order, the landlord or their representative may engage a locksmith to gain entry to the premises and if the locksmith alters the locking device the landlord is to provide a copy of the door opening device to the tenant immediately".
6. Two employees of the landlord, Sonya Browne (Ms Browne) and Lynedela Rowe (Ms Rowe), attended the premises at 10.00 am on 9 May 2018. The landlord had arranged for a locksmith to also attend the property in the event that the tenant did not give access. The locksmith met Ms Browne and Ms Rowe at the premises.
7. The tenant was not at the premises. Ms Browne telephoned the tenant and informed her that the landlord and a locksmith were present and the landlord required access by reason of orders of the Tribunal. The tenant was aware of the access order, but stated that she believed the representatives of the landlord could only access the yard of the premises because that is where the unauthorised structures were located, and not enter the house.
8. The tenant told Ms Browne that she was at a shopping centre a short distance from the residence, and was walking back. The tenant told Ms Browne to wait and not enter the property. Ms Browne responded that the landlord could not wait because the access period was only for 1 hour, and the locksmith had other jobs to attend to and could not wait for a long period.
9. At approximately 10.20 am the locksmith changed the locks and Ms Browne and Ms Rowe entered the premises. The tenant's dog was locked in a room. Ms Browne and Ms Rowe took photographs and went into the rear yard. According to Ms Browne, there were geese and chickens in the rear yard.
10. At that stage, the tenant arrived in a taxi. She was swearing and shouting as she left the taxi. The words she used were highly offensive and directed towards Ms Browne and Ms Rowe. The tenant approached Ms Browne in the rear yard. Ms Browne gave her a copy of the access order, which the tenant tore up and threw back at Ms Browne. Ms Browne held up her hands and said words to the effect of 'Don't hit me'. The tenant then followed Ms Browne and Ms Rowe as they took further photographs, while continuing to swear and shout. After a brief period of time, the tenant said words to the effect of 'That's it, get out' and said she would 'get the dog' onto Ms Browne and Ms Rowe if they did not leave.
11. The tenant told Ms Browne the landlord couldn't evict her, and Ms Browne responded that the landlord would go to the Tribunal and have her evicted.
12. Ms Browne and Ms Rowe left the residence and went to their car, which had been parked in close proximity. The tenant continued to shout and swear. Ms Rowe called the police. Police arrived at approximately 10.45 am. Police escorted Ms Browne and Ms Rowe back into the premises and into the rear yard, where they took further photographs. The tenant continued to swear and shout.
13. Police and the officers of the landlord then left the premises. The tenant was not arrested, and it does not appear any criminal charges were laid against her in respect of her conduct on 9 May 2018.
14. The landlord then commenced the proceedings that are the subject of this appeal.
15. The matter was listed for a Group List and Conciliation hearing on 28 May 2018, when it was set down for a special fixture hearing and directions issued regarding the filing and serving of documentary evidence.
16. The documentary evidence of the tenant at the hearing included a statutory declaration by her dated 5 July 2018; and a letter from Ms Hundley, Accredited Mental Health Social Worker, dated 6 June 2018.
17. The statutory declaration of the tenant dated 5 July 2018 relevantly stated: I am on Newstart Allowance from Centrelink. I receive about $387 a fortnight. I am a sole parent and have 3 children… I am seeking restoration of my children and need stable housing to be able to pursue this. I fear that I would not be able to get my children back if I lost my housing. If I lose housing, I won't be able to see (my eldest son) either and this would put me in a downward spiral with my mental health again. As to the events of 9 May 2018, I was upset when the woman from Housing rang me as I thought that the Tribunal orders did not permit Housing to go into my home and that there was no need to do that as all the disputed structures were outside. I accept that my behaviour was unacceptable and I sincerely and unreservedly apologies to the workers from Housing for my behaviour. I am going to get help so that this behaviour does not happen again and I am seeking a mental health plan from my doctor. I believe that losing my current housing would cause me significant hardship. I don't have any family or friends who could support me and Newstart does not give me enough money to try and make a new start …
18. The letter from Ms Hundley stated that the tenant had been treated at Newcastle Clinic from February to May 2017 under funding from the Attorney General's Victims Services Counselling Program to receive therapy for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder arising from long term domestic violence and removal of her children. Ms Hundley said the tenant reported with symptoms that included 'severe anxiety, especially in social situations' and 'panic and reactivity' and that she had become 'agoraphobic'. Ms Hundley said that as the tenant was 'unable to get appointments they ceased in May 2017' and while she was uncertain about the tenant's current mental health 'without long term treatment these symptoms would continue to be prevalent'.
19. The respondent relied on an email of Ms Browne, sent on the afternoon of 9 May 2018, in which she set out her account of events that morning. Shortly after sending this email Ms Browne sent another email to say that she was emotionally shaken by what had occurred and that she felt fearful and threatened by the tenant's behaviour.
20. The respondent also relied on an email of Ms Rowe, sent during the evening of 10 May 2018 in which she set out her account of events and the impact the tenant's behaviour had on her and Ms Browne. She said she concerned about their physical safety when the tenant threated to release her dog. She also felt nauseas and stressed and worried about the impact the tenant's behaviour was having on Ms Browne.
21. The hearing commenced at the Tribunal at 1.15 am on 2 August 2018. The landlord was represented by a legal officer from its internal legal department, Paul White (Mr White). The tenant was represented by John Mackenzie (Mr Mackenzie) a tenant's advocate from the local Tenant's Advice and Advocacy Service. At the hearing, Ms Browne attended and gave evidence and the tenant gave evidence. Both were cross examined. There were no other witnesses.
22. At the hearing, the tenant did not dispute that her conduct was in breach of s 92(a) of the RT Act. Rather, her evidence and argument was focussed upon the Tribunal exercising its discretion not to terminate the residential tenancy agreement.
23. At the conclusion of the hearing, the Member briefly reserved his decision, and then returned to the bench to make orders and give oral reasons. The Tribunal terminated the tenancy and suspended the date of vacant possession for 4 weeks.
24. On 10 August 2018, the tenant requested written reasons from the Member in accordance with s 62 of the NCAT Act. Written reasons were subsequently provided in early October 2018. The written reasons comprised of 3.25 pages exclusive of the cover sheet.
25. The tenant filed the appeal on 29 August 2018, well before she received the requested written reasons. A stay of the orders for termination and possession was also sought, and granted by the Appeal Panel, differently constituted, on 4 September 2018. That stay order is subject to the tenant not seriously or persistently threatening or abusing the landlord's employees, agents or contractors: see Hollins v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2018] NSWCATAP 206. The Appeal Panel also made an order granting the landlord liberty to have the appeal listed, on 24 hours notice, for the Appeal Panel to consider lifting the stay if the tenant breached the condition of the stay.
26. At the conclusion of the hearing of the tenant's appeal, we extend the stay until further order of the Appeal Panel. As the landlord has not made an application to have the stay lifted it remains in force as of the date on which this decision is published.

Grounds of Appeal

1. The tenant filed Amended Grounds of Appeal on 11 October 2018 and written submissions in support of the grounds of appeal dated 10 October 2018. The landlord filed written submissions responding to the proposed Amended Grounds of Appeal dated 23 October 2018.
2. At the directions hearing before the Appeal Panel on 4 September 2018, no direction had been made granting the tenant leave to amend the grounds of appeal. However, in circumstances where the landlord has been put on notice of the proposed amended grounds of appeal a reasonable time prior to the hearing, and has responded to the proposed amended grounds of appeal, we grant leave to the tenant to amend the grounds of appeal to reflect the Amended Grounds of Appeal dated 11 October 2018.
3. Both parties also sought leave to adduce fresh evidence. For reasons that will be discussed further, we do not grant leave to adduce further evidence as it is unnecessary to do so.
4. The tenant's amended grounds of appeal can be summarised as follows: 1. Ground 1- The Tribunal erred in the exercise of its discretion under s 92 of the RT Act. At the hearing of the appeal, the tenant accepted that for this ground of appeal required leave to appeal. The essence of this ground was the Tribunal's failure to adequately consider whether: 1. the circumstances by which the landlord's employees were at the premises on the day in question; 2. the impact of the tenant's behaviour on the landlord's employees; 3. the steps taken by the tenant to engage with services; 4. the tenant's conduct during the proceedings; and 5. the tenant's significant difficulties in her life justified termination of the tenancy in circumstances where there was evidence before the Tribunal that the tenant would be homeless if evicted, the tenant would have little chance of regaining custody of her children and the availability of restraining orders as an alternative to termination. 1. Ground 2 - The Tribunal erred in law in failing to consider the 'mandatory consideration' of s 154E of the RT Act. 2. Ground 3 - The Tribunal erred in law in failing to provide adequate reasons. In particular, the Tribunal had provided inadequate reasons in respect of: 1. its finding that threatening or abusive conduct of the landlord's employees by the tenant may reoccur; 2. the effect of a termination order on the tenant's ability to maintain a relationship with her eldest son; and 3. the mandatory factors it had to consider under s 154E of the RT Act. 1. Ground 4 - The Tribunal erred in law in making a finding of fact in the absence of evidence. The relevant finding of fact was that the tenant's behaviour in seriously threatening or abusing the landlord's employees would likely reoccur. 2. Ground 5 - The Tribunal erred in law in that its decision to terminate the tenancy was unreasonable because it lacked an evident and intelligible justification. 3. Ground 6 - The Tribunal erred in law in failing to address a substantial argument of the tenant in respect of her being homeless if evicted and not being able to see her eldest child if evicted, with such a failure to attend a substantial argument of a party being a denial of procedural fairness.

Reply to Appeal

1. In its Reply to Appeal, the landlord contended that the appeal should be dismissed as the Tribunal had given adequate reasons, considered the matters in s 154E of the RT Act and otherwise had not erred as contended by the tenant.

Material before the Appeal Panel

1. In support of her appeal, the tenant filed and served a bundle of documents which included a copy of her evidence and that of the landlord that was before the Tribunal, a transcript of the hearing before the Tribunal and the Tribunal's written reasons for decision.
2. Also included in the tenant's bundle were copies of fresh evidence, not before the Tribunal at the hearing below, as follows: 1. an affidavit sworn by the tenant on 31 August 2018; and 2. correspondence the tenant received from the landlord on 5 September and 9 October 2018.
3. The respondent also filed and served a bundle of documents which included copies of the same material that was in the tenant's bundle concerning the hearing before the Tribunal and the evidence that was before it at the hearing on 2 August 2018.
4. Also included in the landlord's bundle was fresh evidence from two employees of the Department of Family and Community Services, Mr White who had appeared before the Tribunal at first instance on behalf of the landlord and Shannon Hill (Ms Hill). Each statement was dated 3 September 2018.
5. The fresh evidence, we note, was filed and served for the purpose of the tenant's stay application that was heard and determined by the Appeal Panel on the following day. However, we reserved our position as to whether this evidence should be accepted in the determination of the tenant's substantive appeal.
6. We have now considered the fresh evidence and are not satisfied that either party should be granted leave to rely upon fresh evidence. In respect of the statement of Ms Hill, her statement could reasonably have been obtained prior to the hearing before the Tribunal at first instance. We make a similar finding in regard to the tenant's affidavit.
7. In his statement, Mr White recounts what he alleges others to have said to him about the tenant's behaviour towards them during and immediately after the hearing at first instance, on 2 August 2018. In our view, in the absence of the tenant being given an opportunity to cross examine those who are alleged to have made the comments referred to in Mr White's statement, it is inappropriate to grant leave to the landlord to rely on this hearsay evidence.

The relevant provisions of the RT Act

1. Section 6 of the RT Act provides that the Act applies to all residential tenancy agreements. We note the residential tenancy agreement between the tenant and the landlord expressly provided that the RT Act and the Residential Tenancies Regulation 2010 (NSW) (RT Reg) applied to the agreement and that the landlord and tenant 'must' comply with these laws.
2. The RT Act and RT Reg, makes provision for the regulation of all residential tenancy agreements within New South Wales, including social housing residential tenancy agreements (RT Act, Part 7). Section 81(1) provides that a residential tenancy agreement can only be terminated in the circumstances set out in the Act, which includes by order of the Tribunal: RT Act, s 81(3).
3. One such circumstance is that set out in s 92. It is convenient to set out the terms of this section in full: 92 Tribunal may terminate residential tenancy agreement for threat, abuse, intimidation or harassment (1) The Tribunal may, on application by a landlord, make a termination order if it is satisfied that the tenant, or any person who although not a tenant is occupying or jointly occupying the residential premises, has: (a) seriously or persistently threatened or abused the landlord, the landlord's agent or any employee or contractor of the landlord or landlord's agent, or caused or permitted any such threats, abuse or conduct, or (b) intentionally engaged, or intentionally caused or permitted another person to engage, in conduct in relation to any such person that would be reasonably likely to cause the person to be intimidated or harassed (whether or not any abusive language or threat has been directed towards the person). (2) The termination order may specify that the order for possession takes effect immediately. (3) A landlord may make an application under this section without giving the tenant a termination notice. (4) The Tribunal may make a termination order under this section that takes effect before the end of the fixed term if the residential tenancy agreement is a fixed term agreement.
4. As can be seen from the terms of this section, where a tenant, or other person occupying or jointly occupying the residential premises of the tenant, behaves in the manner prescribed in s 92(1)(a) or (b), the landlord is given the right to make an application to the Tribunal for a termination order, without the need to first issue a termination notice: see RT Act, s 82.
5. If, on an application by a landlord under this section, the Tribunal is satisfied that the tenant, or any other person occupying the premises the subject of the tenancy agreement, has engaged in behaviour of the kind prescribed in that subsection, the subsection also provides that the Tribunal 'may' make a termination order. That is, the Tribunal has a discretion as to whether the residential tenancy agreement should or should not be terminated.
6. While the discretion in s 92 is unconfined, it is well accepted that it remains a matter of construction of the statute conferring the discretion as to what is or can be taken into account. That is, where matters relevant to the exercise of the discretion are not expressly set out they are to be determined by implication from the subject matter, scope and purpose of the conferring statute: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko- Wallsend Ltd [1985-6] 40, per Mason J, at [15], (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 40 and 39-40; and Director General, Department of Finance & Services v Porter [2014] NSWCATAP 6 at [26] and [27].
7. Where the residential tenancy agreement, for which the landlord seeks a termination order is a social housing residential tenancy, and the Tribunal has a discretion as to whether the tenancy should or should not be terminated, s 154E of the RT Act prescribes a number of matters the Tribunal 'must' take into account in the exercise of its discretion. That section provides as follows: 154E Exercise of discretion to make termination order (1) In considering whether to make a termination order for a social housing tenancy agreement, the Tribunal must have regard to the following: (a) the effect the tenancy has had on neighbouring residents or other persons, (b) the likelihood that neighbouring residents or other persons will suffer serious adverse effects in the future if the tenancy is not terminated, (c) the landlord's responsibility to its other tenants, (d) the history of the current tenancy and any prior tenancy arising under a social housing tenancy agreement with the same or a different landlord, (e) whether the tenant, wilfully or otherwise, is or has been in breach of an order of the Tribunal. (2) This section does not limit any other matter that may be considered by the Tribunal under this Act.
8. It is accepted that where a tenancy is a social housing tenancy the matters prescribed in s 154E(1) are 'mandatory considerations' that the Tribunal 'must' take into account in the exercise of its discretion under s 92: Kelly v NSW Land and Housing Corporation NSWCATAP 154 ('Kelly') and Coffs Harbour and District Local Aboriginal Land Council v Lynwood [2017] NSWCA 317 at [38]. However, as noted in s 154(2), these 'mandatory considerations' do not limit the matters the Tribunal can otherwise take into account in exercising its discretion under s 92.
9. Section 187 and 188 of the RT Act set out what orders the Tribunal can make in proceedings brought by a landlord or a tenant under that Act. Those sections relevantly provide as follows: 187 Orders that may be made by Tribunal (1) The Tribunal may, on application by a landlord or tenant or other person under this Act, or in any proceedings under this Act, make one or more of the following orders: (a) an order that restrains any action in breach of a residential tenancy agreement, (b) an order that requires an action in performance of a residential tenancy agreement, … (i) a termination order or an order for the possession of premises, … (2) … (3) An order under subsection (1) (a) or (b) may be made even though it provides a remedy in the nature of an injunction or order for specific performance in circumstances in which such a remedy would not otherwise be available. … 188 General order-making power of Tribunal The Tribunal may, in any proceedings before it under this Act, make any one or more of the following orders: (a) an order that the Tribunal may make under this Act, (b) an order that varies or sets aside, or stays or suspends the operation of, any order made in proceedings or earlier proceedings, (c) any ancillary order the Tribunal thinks appropriate, (d) an interim order.
10. We have discussed the application of these sections and the discretion vested in the Tribunal in more detail below.

Consideration

1. There is considerable overlap in the tenant's grounds of appeal. As we have indicated above, for the reasons set out below, we are satisfied that the tenant has established ground 3 - inadequacy of reasons. The remaining grounds of appeal on a question of law have not been established. As we are satisfied that the tenant has established an error of law on which the appeal should be allowed, it is unnecessary to deal with ground 1 for which leave to appeal is required.

Ground 2 - failure to take into account a mandatory consideration

1. In regard to the mandatory considerations in s 154E of the RT Act, the Tribunal said the following, at [21]: 21 Both parties made statements concerning factors in section 154E of the RT Act, and their relationship to the present matter. I hold that the factors, and the arguments in relation to them, have little or no relevance to the matters before me.
2. The tenant contends that the Tribunal's conclusion that the factors in s 154E were 'little or no relevance' indicated a failure of the Tribunal to have proper, genuine and realistic consideration of those factors especially where there was no evidence of the tenant's tenancy having any effect on neighbouring residents, or that the neighbouring residents would suffer serious adverse effects in the future if her tenancy was not terminated, or that there had been issues in regard to her prior tenancies.
3. The respondent contended that it was evident from the Tribunal's reasons at [21], that the Tribunal did have regard to the factors in s 154E. The respondent went on to contend that each of the factors were irrelevant given the seriousness of the admitted breach of s 92, which did not involve any neighbours.
4. A failure to take into account a relevant consideration which a decision maker is required to take into account is an error of law: see (Prendergast v Western Murray Irrigation Ltd [2014] NSWCATAP 69 at [13(5)] and Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (supra).
5. In Director General, Department of Finance & Services v Porter [2014] NSWCATAP 6, at [28] and [29], the Appeal Panel, having noted that a failure to take into account a 'relevant consideration' was an error of law, went on to observe as follows: 28 Whilst the question of weight is one for the Tribunal, the Tribunal will not have given adequate attention to a relevant consideration where its process is merely a formulaic reference: see Azriel v NSW Land & Housing Corporation [2006] NSWCA 372 at [49] per Basten JA (with Santow and Ipp JJA agreeing). Instead what is required can be described as a proper, genuine and realistic consideration of the relevant consideration: Bruce v Cole (1998) 45 NSWLR 163 at 185-6 per Spigelman CJ. However, as Basten JA warned in Azriel at [51] referring to Spigelman CJ in Bruce at 186, assessing whether the decision-maker has given a proper, genuine and realistic consideration to a mandatory matter must be approached with caution, with care to avoid an impermissible reconsideration of the merits of the decision. 29 In assessing a purported failure to take into account a relevant consideration a mere failure to refer expressly to a matter will not necessarily justify an inference that there has been a failure to take into account a relevant consideration. Despite this, such an inference is still open to be drawn by the Tribunal in those circumstances: see Australian Conservation Foundation v Forestry Commission (1988) 19 FCR 127 at 132 per Burchett J. In determining whether or not to draw the inference that failure to deal at all or in detail with a relevant consideration gives rise to an error by the decision-maker, the extent to which the facts and circumstances of the particular matter engage that consideration will be relevant and often determinative. Further, in the context of an appeal from a decision of an administrative review tribunal, such as this appeal, the nature and scope of the submissions put to the tribunal at first instance may also inform that process of determination.
6. In Kelly (supra), at [38]-[50], the Appeal Panel noted that in regards to a 'relevant consideration' in the exercise of a discretion a distinction is made between 'mandatory considerations' and non-mandatory relevant considerations ('permissive considerations'). In that case, the respondent had sought a termination order of a social housing tenancy under s 87 of the RT Act. That section gives a landlord the right to bring an application to the Tribunal for a termination order on the grounds of a breach of the tenancy agreement by the tenant. However, the Tribunal's discretion as to whether to terminate or not terminate the tenancy is only enlivened if the Tribunal is satisfied on the matters prescribed in s 87(4), namely if it is satisfied that (italics added): (a) the tenant has breached the residential tenancy agreement, and (b) the breach is, in the circumstances of the case, sufficient to justify termination of the agreement, and (c) the termination notice was given in accordance with this section and the tenant has not vacated the premises as required by the notice.
7. In Kelly, at [33], it was accepted that 'the circumstances of the case' was 'mandatory' in the Tribunal's evaluation of that case as to whether the tenant's breach was sufficient to justify termination under that section. Section 87(5) also prescribes what matters the Tribunal 'may' consider in regard to 'the circumstances of the case'. It was the meaning of this phrase which was at issue in that case and whether the Tribunal was bound to take into account any or all of the matters identified by the appellant as 'the circumstances of the case'. The Appeal Panel found that the matters prescribed in s 87(5) were 'permissible considerations' in determining the 'the circumstances of the case' and were not 'mandatory', unlike those prescribed in ss 154B and 154E.
8. Section 154B of the RT Act sets out the matters the Tribunal 'must' have in determining whether a social housing tenancy should or should not be terminated on an application of a landlord under s 87 for breach of agreement.
9. As noted in Kelly, at [29], in the absence of a statutory indication of what weight is to be given to the consideration, be it 'mandatory', or 'permissible' and subject to whether the decision is unreasonable in the Wednesbury sense, the weight to be given to the relevant consideration, be it 'mandatory' or 'permissive' is a matter for the decision-maker.
10. In Yonan v NSW Land and Housing Corporation [2017] NSWCATAP 37 at [48] the Appeal Panel said that s 154E(1) did not require the Tribunal to enquire into and consider each of the matters prescribed in that subsection, 'but rather to deal with matters that have weight, significance or relevance'.
11. In Aboriginal Housing Office v Blacklock [2019] NSWCATAP 51, at [40], the Appeal Panel accepted that the Tribunal was not required to consider each of the criteria in s 154E(1), but in that case, the Appeal Panel went on to find that the matters referred to in subparagraphs (d) and (e) of s 154E(1) were clearly necessary in that case.
12. We do not understand the Appeal Panel in Yonan or Blacklock to have used the word 'relevant' in the context of the Tribunal not being required to consider each of the factors in s 154E(1), but rather a reference to the weight and significance the Tribunal has given to a factor based on the evidence of the case that is before it.
13. We note from the transcript of the hearing, the landlord and the tenant addressed the Tribunal on each of the factors in s 154E(1).
14. In our view, while the Tribunal did not, in its reasons for decision, refer to each factor in s 154E(1) or the specific arguments of the parties in regard thereto, it cannot be said that it failed to take each factor into consideration when determining whether or not to make the order sought by the landlord.
15. Accordingly, we are not satisfied that the tenant has established this ground of appeal.
16. However, for the reasons set out below, we are satisfied that the tenant has established her ground of appeal in so far as it relates to the Tribunal's adequacy of reasons in regard to its finding that the factors in s 154E were 'little or no relevance' to the matters before it.

Ground 3 - adequacy of reasons

1. A failure to provide proper reasons gives rise to a question of law: see Prendergast (supra), at [13(1)], where the Appeal Panel noted the following: Section 62 of the Act requires the Tribunal to furnish reasons. This requirement was earlier reflected in s 49 of the Consumer, Trader and Tenancy Tribunal Act 2001 (NSW). Recently, the Appeal Panel (Wright J, President; G Walker, Senior Member; and M Bolt, General Member) in Director General, Department of Finance & Services v Porter [2014] NSWCATAP 6 said in relation to the similar provision in s 89 of the Administrative Decisions Tribunal Act 1997 (NSW) at [32]: 32 Notwithstanding the words in the chapeau to subs (5), there is no reason as a matter of principle why the requirements set out in that subsection do not apply equally to reasons for decision which were not given as a result of a request under subs (3). Further, given the right of appeal from a decision of the ADT to the Appeal Panel under s 113 of the ADT Act and from the Appeal Panel to the Supreme Court on a question of law under s 119 of that Act, the Tribunal's obligation to give reasons should be commensurate with that of courts whose decisions are subject to appeal to the Supreme Court - see generally the discussion of principles in Campbelltown City Council v Vegan (2006) 67 NSWLR 372. As this matter was not the subject of any substantial submissions by the parties, however, it is inappropriate to deal with the topic in more detail and it can be accepted for the purposes of this appeal that the Tribunal was obliged to give proper reasons for its decision. Such reasons would include making findings on material questions of fact, referring to the evidence on which those findings were based, setting out the Tribunal's understanding of the applicable law and explaining the reasoning processes that lead the Tribunal to the conclusions it made. In assessing such reasons, however, it is appropriate to bear in mind the High Court's endorsement of the view that in the case of administrative decision makers this assessment is not best approached with an "eye keenly attuned to the perception of error": see Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs v Wu Shan Liang (1996) 185 CLR 259 at 272
2. In Rockwell Constructions Pty Ltd v Llamas [2018] NSWCATAP 262, the Appeal Panel summarised the relevant principles in regard to adequacy of reasons as follows (at [17]-[18]) "The principles in this area are well known. They include the following: (1) the content and detail of the reasons for decisions will vary according to the nature of the jurisdiction which the body in question is exercising, as well as the consideration of the particular matter the subject of the decision: Wesfarmers General Insurance Ltd v Jameson [2016] NSWCATAP 136 at [39]; (2) the reasons should explain how the decision maker arrived at his conclusion. This involves reference to the relevant evidence; the relevant facts being set out and the reasons for making the relevant findings of fact: Beale v GIO of NSW (1997) 48 NSWLR 430 at 443; (3) reasons for decision need not be highly detailed and they should not be examined with an overly critical eye: O'Brien v Twyman [2016] NSWCATAP 125 at [51]; (4) it is essential to expose the reasoning on a point critical to the contest between the parties: Keith v Gal [2013] NSWCA 339 at [117]; (5) a judge (here the Tribunal member) should provide reasons for making the relevant findings of fact (and conclusions) and reasons in applying the law to the facts found. Those reasons, or the process of reasoning, should be understandable and logical: Beale at 444; (6) there is a balancing act which needs to be undertaken in considering the sufficiency of a statement of reasons, which involves the adoption of, at the least, a minimum standard which places the parties in a position to understand why the decision was made sufficiently to allow them to exercise any right of appeal: Beale at 443. Beale is also authority for the proposition that an appellate body (here, the Appeal Panel) will reserve any intervention for situations in which it is left with no choice: that is, where no reasons have been given in circumstances where there was an obligation to provide them, and in circumstances where a statement of reasons is so inadequate as to constitute a miscarriage of justice."
3. As noted above, the tenant contends that the Tribunal erred in failing to provide adequate reasons in: (a) finding that the threatening and abusive conduct may reoccur, (b) the effect of a termination order on the tenant's ability to maintain a relationship with her son; and (c) the mandatory factors in s 154E.
4. At [18] of its reasons for decision, the Tribunal said: 18. It is argued by the applicant that it cannot be certain that such behaviour by the tenant would not re-occur, should the residential tenancy agreement be allowed to remain on foot. I do acknowledge this concern and it bears heavily on my deliberations
5. The Tribunal dealt with tenant's arguments at [19] to [20] of its reasons for decision as follows: 19. The respondent raised in her arguments the difficulties she has experienced in her life and I accept this to be so. I have empathy for her in this regard. However, as these life circumstances have been raised to support the tenant's desire to remain in the premises, it is appropriate to look at what steps Ms Hollins is taking to rectify her circumstances and situation. It became apparent from the tenant's evidence, and by way of cross examination of Ms Hollins by the applicant that the tenant has taken only limited and inconsistent action in regards to courses and counselling. The tenant's evidence in this regard was sketchy at best. 20. I note that the tenant's two youngest children have been removed from her care, and although Ms Hollins talks of attempting to get them back, there is no evidence presented as to what action she is taking in this regard. This is relevant to my deliberations, as the respondent claims that the retention by her of a stable home is important to the process of having her children returned.
6. At [23] of its reasons for decision, the Tribunal said: 23. I have observed the tenant's behaviour in the hearing. I understand the tenant being upset in having to attend these proceedings, however Ms Hollins behaviour has at times involved anger and an adverse attitude towards the applicant.
7. At [24], the Tribunal concluded: 24. In the circumstances of the matter, I share the applicant's concerns that if the residential tenancy agreement is not terminated, the threatening and abusive conduct of Ms Hollins that took place on 9 May 2018 may reoccur whilst the landlord's employees are conducting its business as the landlord. I am not persuaded by Ms Hollins arguments, to allow the residential tenancy agreement to remain on foot.
8. For the reasons that follow, we find that the Tribunal erred in failing to give adequate reasons for its findings in regard to: (a) that the threatening and abusive conduct of the tenant that had occurred on 9 May 2018 may reoccur if her tenancy was not terminated and (b) that the factors in s 154E had little or no relevance to the matters before it.

(a) threatening and abusive conduct may reoccur

1. As we have noted, the tenant did not dispute that her threats and abuse on the day in question were serious and persistent. In her evidence before the Tribunal, the tenant explained that she was 'verbal and abusive' because she was pretty sure the Tribunal's order only permitted the landlord to gain access to her backyard and not to the house (T; 19).
2. The tenant went on to say that she regretted doing what she did and was sorry and apologetic for what she had done (T, 20).
3. We agree that the likelihood of further conduct by the tenant to that which is the subject of an application under s 92(1), is a relevant consideration in the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion as to whether to make the termination order or not. It may also be relevant to the 'mandatory' factors in s 154E. However, it must be objectively assessed on the basis of the evidence before the Tribunal.
4. We note that, in this case, there was no evidence before the Tribunal of any previous conduct by the tenant which would fall within s 92(a) of the RT Act. In particular, Ms Browne, who gave oral evidence on behalf of the landlord at the hearing, made no mention of similar conduct by the tenant prior to the 9 May 2018 incident.
5. The only evidence of prior incidents related to the unauthorised structures the tenant had on the premises and for which the landlord had obtained orders from the Tribunal. However, there was no evidence before the Tribunal of behaviour by the tenant towards the landlord or its employees that was threatening or abusive a she had been on the day in question.
6. The respondent contends that the Tribunal did give adequate reasons for this finding. In particular, it pointed to the Tribunal findings at [19] and [23], that the tenant had taken only limited and inconsistent action in regards to course and counselling and her behaviour during the hearing involved anger and adverse attitude towards the landlord. Our difficulty with this contention is that the Tribunal did not expressly say or explain in its reasons for decision why these findings led it to the conclusion that the threats and abuse, which had not occurred previously, may re-occur if the tenancy was not terminated.
7. While the tenant had stated in her statutory declaration of 5 July 2018 that she was going to get help so that her behaviour does not happen again, in our view, her responses to the questions asked of her at the hearing four weeks later were indicative of the difficulties she has had in obtaining help and not that she was unwilling to do so.
8. In regard to the tenant's alleged adverse attitude towards the landlord at the hearing, we note that towards the end of her cross-examination, the tenant appears to have become very anxious and distressed when questioned in detail about steps she had taken to address her mental health issues and having her children returned to her care. The Tribunal intervened and the transcript records the following, at T: 29-30: MEMBER: Q. Calm… [TENANT] A: I have my son to go pick up, youse are eating into my kid's time, so you want to hurry this up before I fucking freak out and just lose the (indistinct). Sorry, I just (indistinct)… MR WHITE [Landlord's Representative]: Q Look, I'll try and make this as quick as I can. A …might lose it (indistinct) over the head with this and you just keep pushing my buttons like them ladies did when they come to my house. Q. In your space would this … MEMBER: I mean, I just … MR MACKENZIE [Tenant's representative] - Can I suggest we take a break? MEMBER: Yes. I was just going to ask the question. It is appropriate to have a brief break because this … A [TENANT]: I just want to get this over and done with so I can go home. I don't want to be here, can't deal with this.. MEMBER: Q. You realise the implications of this is that if the tribunal - if I decide to make an order as requested by the landlord in relation to this, then I will be terminating the residential tenancy agreement? A. Yes, and I .. Q So I've got to consider what's in front of me in relation to this and a lot of your defence is going to the aspect of the difficulties you're having in your life. A (Indistinct) and sometimes I (indistinct) want me to lose the kids, what's the difference anyway? MR MACKENZIE: But the Member hasn't made a decision. MEMBER: Q I haven't made a decision. I'm hearing your … A He's (indistinct) going to lose my kids.
9. The Tribunal then asked the tenant if she needed a break for a few minutes, to which she responded 'yes please'. The Tribunal said he would adjourn for 5-10 minutes and informed the tenant that: 'There's some rooms down the hallway, ma'am, sit there in one of those quietly and refocus a bit'.
10. The transcript records the tenant having made the following remarks during an interchange with Mr Mackenzie just prior to the adjournment: [TENNANT]: I have issues at the moment. You're causing me to (indistinct) and cause my (indistinct) go, my-it's just going to trigger me off". Mr McKenzie: (indistinct). Tenant: I can't do (indistinct) because this is killing me.
11. At no stage did the Tribunal inform the tenant that her behaviour during the hearing might be taken into account in the exercise of its discretion. In any event, in our view, the abovementioned exchanges of the tenant must be seen in their proper context. In our view, her responses during her cross-examination were an emotional response to what she saw as not only her social housing tenancy being at risk, so too was her ability to have her children returned to her care and her ability to have regular contact with her eldest child. In our view, it is difficult to see how the above exchanges at the end of her cross-examination was indicative of a likelihood of her 9 May 2018 threatening and abusive conduct reoccurring. However, as we have already said, the Tribunal did not identify the evidence or its reasoning as to how it made its finding that the tenant's behaviour was likely to reoccur.
12. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the tenant has established that the Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for its findings the tenant's threatening and abusive conduct may reoccur. This does not mean that we consider her conduct of 9 May 2018 as having been other than a serious and persistent threat and abuse of Ms Browne and Ms Rowe.

(b) Section 154E matters had little or no relevance

1. As we have noted, the s 154E(1) factors were matters the Tribunal was required to consider in the exercise of its discretion as to whether the tenancy should or should not be terminated. Hence, they were also relevant 'mandatory' considerations the Tribunal was required to take into account when determining whether a termination order should or should not be made. Had Parliament not included such a directive in the RT Act, in our view, they would nevertheless have been 'permissive' considerations in the exercise of a social housing tenancy.
2. In this case the Tribunal's only reference to the section 154E(1) factors is in a two sentence paragraph: see Tribunal's reasons for decision, at [21] (set out in full at paragraph 58 above). In the first sentence the Tribunal referred to both parties having made statements concerning the s 154E factors and their relevance to the matter before the Tribunal. The Tribunal then went on, in the second sentence, to conclude that the s 154E factors and the arguments that were made in regard thereto were of 'little or no relevance to the matter before me.' No explanation was given as to which factors it had found to be of no relevance or of little relevance. Nor did the Tribunal set out its reasoning processes in making the finding that it made.
3. We note neither party submitted that the factors were either of no relevance or of little relevance. In its arguments on this issue (T. 35 & 36), the landlord pointed to the effect the tenant's behaviour on the day in question had on Ms Browne and Ms Rowe. The landlord otherwise agreed that there had been no impact on neighbouring residents, nor was there a prior Tribunal order in regard to the matter and it had not provided any evidence of the history of the tenant's prior or current tenancies.
4. In its arguments (T. 37 & 38), the tenant contended that the term 'other person' in s 154E(1)(a) and (b) did not include the landlord, its employees or agent. While not argued in this appeal, we doubt that this is correct. However, the tenant did rely on each factor, and contended, on the evidence these favoured her. For example, other than what had occurred on 9 May 2018, there was no evidence of the tenant's tenancy having an adverse effect on neighbouring residents or other persons (s 154E(1)(a)). Nor was there any evidence of the tenant having behaved previously, as she behaved on 9 May 2018, in her current tenancy or her tenancies prior thereto (s 154(1)(d)), or that she had wilfully or otherwise been in breach of an order of the Tribunal (s 154(1)(e)).
5. In regard to her current tenancy, we note the tenant gave evidence at the hearing that in the period immediately prior to 9 May 2018 she had removed the swimming pool and the fence, but not the shade cloth.
6. Accordingly, we are satisfied that the tenant has established this aspect of this ground of appeal in that the Tribunal failed to give adequate reasons for its findings that the arguments of the parties in regard to s 154E(1) were of 'little or no relevance to the matters before' it in regard to the matter before it.

Ground 4 - no evidence

1. It is accepted that where there is no evidence to support a finding of fact, this will constitute an error of law: see Prendergast (supra), at [13(7)] and Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond (1990) 170 CLR 321 at 355-6, [1990] HCA 33 at [86] and The Australian Gas Light Company v Valuer-General (1940) 40 SR (NSW) 126 at 138. However, as explained in Australian Broadcasting Tribunal v Bond, at [88] and [89], there is no error of law simply in making a wrong finding of fact even where it appears to have been drawn as a 'result of illogical reasoning' from established facts.
2. In our view, this ground of appeal is misconceived, as the basis on which the Tribunal's discretion was enlivened was the undisputed threatening and abusive behaviour of the tenant on 9 May 2018. Based on this evidence, the Tribunal may, as a result of illogical reasoning, concluded that she may do it again, which is not an error of law. However, as we have explained, the Tribunal failed to set out its reasoning which is the error and a no evidence error.

Ground 5 - unreasonableness

1. It is accepted that where a decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable decision-maker would make it constitutes an error of law: see Prendergast (supra) at [13(8)], citing Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesday Corp (1947) 45 LGR 635 citing Lo v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2013) 85 NSWLR 86 at [10] and Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li [2013] HCA 18 at [76], (2013) 249 CLR 332.
2. As noted by the respondent, in Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Li (supra), at [76], the High Court said: 76 As to the inferences that may be drawn by an appellate court, it was said in House v The King[157] that an appellate court may infer that in some way there has been a failure properly to exercise the discretion "if upon the facts [the result] is unreasonable or plainly unjust". The same reasoning might apply to the review of the exercise of a statutory discretion, where unreasonableness is an inference drawn from the facts and from the matters falling for consideration in the exercise of the statutory power. Even where some reasons have been provided, as is the case here, it may nevertheless not be possible for a court to comprehend how the decision was arrived at. Unreasonableness is a conclusion which may be applied to a decision which lacks an evident and intelligible justification.
3. In our view, this ground of appeal is also misconceived and in essence a attack on the merits of the Tribunal's decision. Accordingly, we have not considered it any further.

Ground 6 - Denial of procedural fairness

1. It is accepted that a failure to afford procedural fairness is an error of law: see Prendergast (supra), at [13(4)].
2. Section 38(2) of the NCAT Act, expressly requires the Tribunal's procedures to accord with natural justice. Sub-sections 5 and 6 also embody aspects of the rules of natural justice, which are commonly referred to as procedural fairness: see Aronson, Dyer and Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, 4th Ed; (2009) Lawbook Co at [7.20]. Sections 38(5) and (6) of the NCAT Act are reflective of the common law rules of a fair hearing where the Tribunal is to ensure that the parties understand the nature of the proceedings and that each party is given a reasonable opportunity to present their case.
3. The respondent accepts that a failure of the Tribunal to attend to a substantial argument put by a party would be a denial of natural justice.
4. In Transport for NSW v Waters [2018] NSWCATAP 200, at [31], the Appeal Panel noted that a failure by the Tribunal to attend to a substantial argument of a party is a denial of natural justice and an error of law. At [37], the Appeal Panel noted the following remarks of the High Court, at [24], in Dranichnikov v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2003) 197 ALR 389: To fail to respond to a substantial, clearly articulated argument relying upon established facts was at least to fail to accord Mr Dranichnikov natural justice."
5. On appeal in Transport for NSW v Waters (supra), a matter in issue was whether the appellant had clearly articulated an argument in response to a substantial issue that was before the Tribunal for determination at first instance. On appeal the appellant contended that it had clearly articulated an argument based on established fact and law that its collection of the respondent's personal information was for a lawful purpose. for which the appellant had collected the respondent's personal information pursuant to the collection information protection principles under the provisions of the, had been clearly articulated before the Tribunal below. In that case, whether there was a lawful purpose for the collection of the information was essential to the issue as to whether there had been a breach of the collection information protection principle under the relevant provisions of the Privacy Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW). The Appeal Panel found that the appellant had failed to clearly articulate such an argument.
6. In our opinion, this ground of appeal, as described by the tenant, does not raise a question of law in the relevant sense described above. As noted in its reasons for decision, at [19], the Tribunal did make reference to her arguments. While that reference did not deal with all her evidence this does not mean she was denied procedural fairness.
7. In our view, this ground of appeal is in essence an attack on the merits of the decision and does not raise a question of law.

Conclusions

1. For the reasons set out above, we are satisfied that the tenant has established that the Tribunal erred in law in failing to give adequate reasons for its findings that: 1. the threatening and abusive conduct of the tenant which took place on 9 May 2018 may re occur; and 2. the factors in s 154E(1) of the RT Act and the arguments in relation to them were of little or no relevance.
2. In our view, the above findings of the Tribunal were material in its decision to terminate the tenancy 'in the sense they contribute' to the decision to terminate the tenancy and 'but for the error, the decision would have been or might have been, different': see Bond (supra) at [80] and NCAT Act, s 81. Hence it is appropriate to allow the appeal and set aside the decision of the Tribunal.
3. As we have noted, the only matter in dispute in the proceedings before the Tribunal was whether the discretion in s 92 should or should not be exercised to terminate the tenant's tenancy on the grounds that on 9 May 2018 the tenant did seriously and persistently threaten and abuse Ms Browne and Ms Rowe, employees of the landlord when, pursuant to an order of the Tribunal, they came to inspect whether the unauthorised work of the tenant had been rectified as ordered by the Tribunal.
4. We have been provided with all the material and arguments that were before the Tribunal, hence, in our opinion, it is appropriate for us, based on that material and those arguments, to determine whether the tenant's conduct of 9 May 2018 warrants termination of the tenancy under s 92: NCAT Act, s 81(2).
5. We note the seriousness of the tenant's conduct on the day in question. It is the kind of mischief s 92 is intended to address so as to protect landlords, their employees and agents from serious threats or abuse in the exercise of their obligations, on behalf of the landlord, under the terms of the tenancy.
6. We accept Ms Browne and Ms Rowe were fearful of being physically assaulted by the tenant and being attacked by the tenant's dog. Their response was appropriate in that they returned to their car and called the police. When the police arrived Ms Browne and Ms Rowe completed their inspection of the unauthorised structures. We note the police appear to have been at the premises for a relatively short period of time and have taken no action against the tenant.
7. We also accept that Ms Browne and Ms Rowe were emotionally shaken by what had occurred on this day.
8. In regard to the s 154E(1) factors, we find: 1. there is no evidence of any adverse effects of the tenant's tenancy on neighbouring residents. As we have noted above, Ms Browne and Ms Rowe were emotionally shaken by what occurred, but there is no evidence of any ongoing effects on them by the tenant's conduct on this day; 2. in her email of 10 May 2018, Ms Rowe said that the tenant's 'inappropriate behaviour' had escalated from 'minor abuse to serious prolonged verbal to threats of harm by setting her dog on two staff' and should her tenancy not be terminated this could place staff at significant risk given the tenant's belief that she cannot be evicted regardless of what happens. We note that in an email Ms Rowe sent on 26 March 2018 concerning the inspection she and Ms Browne undertook on 23 March 2018 of the back yard of the premises, Ms Rowe recorded the tenant as having yelled and shouted at them as they were leaving the yard and getting into the car. There is otherwise no evidence of a neighbouring resident, or any other person (including an employee or agent of the landlord) having previously or subsequently suffered adverse effects from conduct of the tenant of the kind that occurred on 9 May 2018. Hence, in our view, on the material before us, the conduct of the tenant on the day in question was isolated to the particular circumstances of that day where the tenant had assumed Ms Browne and Ms Rowe would only be inspecting the back yard as this was where the unauthorised works were located. She has acknowledged that she was wrong and that she should not have behaved in the way she did behave. The landlord suggest that the tenant's assertion that she was seeking a mental health plan to address her behaviour was disingenuous as she had in fact done nothing and ceased any treatment in mid 2017. We are not persuaded that this is the case. Obtaining access to a mental health plan can also take time and access to treatment for persons such as the tenant are limited. This does not mean that her behaviour is excused. As we have noted whether there is a likelihood of neighbouring residents, or other persons (including an employee or agent of the landlord) would suffer serious adverse effects in the future if the tenancy is not terminated is to be objectively assessed on the evidence. In our view, other than the isolated incident there is no evidence to support that such a likelihood is more probable than not, but we remain concerned about the seriousness of the events of that day; 3. the landlord's responsibility to other tenants is well understood in that 'social tenancy housing waiting lists are long, and there are many persons likely to be in circumstances of significant hardship who cannot gain access to social housing because of limited stock': Kelly (supra), at [52]. The landlord submitted that the tenant, if evicted, would be eligible for Commonwealth rental assistance which would give her sufficient income to access the general residential tenancy market. The landlord also submitted that it was the tenant alone that should be considered, as there was an absence of any evidence of her children being returned to her care. We are not persuaded by these submissions. The tenant did give evidence about the difficulties she has had in securing housing in the past, that she had moved to her current premises because she was closer to her eldest son, who was five years old, and with whom she had regular contact. In regard to her other children being returned to her care, this, as the respondent must be aware this can be a long process and stable housing is a factor that is taken into account in such a process as well as the tenant's ongoing contact with her eldest child; 4. as we have noted above, the tenant has been in social housing since 2014, when she was 20 years of age. She has always asserted that she pays her rent. The landlord has not disputed this, but as pointed out by Ms Browne and Ms Rowe, this does not mean the tenant is excused from her other obligations under her tenancy and the landlord's right to enforce those obligations. Other than what we have already mentioned, the respondent did not raise any further issues in regard to the history of the tenant's tenancies; 5. on the material before us, it would appear that the tenant has remained in breach of the Tribunal's order of 17 April 2018, in regard to the unauthorised shade cloth, but she has otherwise rectified the unauthorised structures. We note the tenant explained that the shade cloth was needed for the protection of her eldest child when he came to be with her and the landlord has not taken any further issue in this regard. Otherwise, there is no evidence that the tenant has remained in breach of an order of the Tribunal.
9. Having regard to the material before us and the abovementioned factors, we are not satisfied that the tenant's conduct of 9 May 2018 should result in a termination of the tenancy. At the same time, given the seriousness of her conduct, especially the tenant's threat of turning her dog onto Ms Browne and Ms Rowe, we are not satisfied that the landlord's application should be dismissed. While we do not find that there is a high likelihood of the tenant behaving in the same manner she behaved on 9 May 2018, we remain concerned about the seriousness of that behaviour.
10. We note, the landlord asked, at T. 34, that in the alternative of an order for termination, it 'would ask for the longest relist possible' given the seriousness of her conduct. Such an order is an order under s 187(1)(a) and 188 of the RT Act. We also note that the tenant did not oppose such an order being made. Hence, given our concerns we have decided that in substitution of the decision made by the Tribunal on 2 August 2018, it is appropriate to make a decision restraining the tenant from engaging in conduct of the kind prescribed in s 92(1)(a) and that this decision should be in force for a period of 26 weeks commencing from the date on which this decision is published.

Orders

1. For the reasons set out above, we make the following orders: 1. The appeal is allowed. 2. orders of the Tribunal in SH 18/21239, made on 2 August 2018 and the Appeal Panel's stay of such orders are set aside and in substitution of these orders the following orders are made: 1. Jessica Hollins ('the tenant') is not to: 1. seriously or persistently threaten or abuse the landlord, the landlord's agents, any employee of the landlord, or any contractor of the landlord; or cause or permit any such threats, abuse or conduct; or 2. intentionally engage or intentionally cause or permit another person to engage, in conduct in relation to any such person that would be reasonably likely to cause the person to be intimidated or harassed (whether or not any abusive language or threat has been directed towards the person). 1. If the tenant does comply with order (a) above, then on or before 26 weeks from the date of this decision, the landlord may apply to the Tribunal to re-list the proceedings before the Tribunal and seek an order to terminate the tenancy.

I hereby certify that this is a true and accurate record of the reasons for decision of the Civil and Administrative Tribunal of New South Wales. Registrar DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 29 May 2019