Hijazi v R

Proposed Ground of Appeal

1. The applicant nominates a single proposed ground of appeal which is expressed in the following terms: That in determining the appropriate discount to reflect the value of the applicant's plea of guilty in accordance with s 16A(2)(d) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), her Honour did not have regard to the utilitarian value of the applicant's plea of guilty.
2. The applicant's sentencing occurred at a time when the decisions in this Court in Xiao and Huang v R (2018) 96 NSWLR 743; [2018] NSWCCA 57 and Huang v The Queen (2018) 332 FLR 158; [2018] NSWCCA 70 had not been determined. Those decisions (and subsequent decisions) considered whether, in sentencing for a Commonwealth offence, a discount may be given for the utilitarian value of a plea.
3. The sentencing judge applied the then accepted practice of assessing the appropriate discount for a guilty plea with regard to the applicant's "acceptance of responsibility and his willingness to facilitate the course of justice". A discount of 10% was awarded by the sentencing judge for the plea on that basis. However, in Huang v The Queen, the Court held that a failure to have regard to the utilitarian value of a plea of guilty when sentencing for a Commonwealth offence amounted to an error.
4. The Crown properly conceded that error. Accordingly, this judgment will proceed on the basis that error was established in accordance with the single proposed ground of appeal.

The Position of the Parties on the Proposed Appeal

1. The applicant submitted that, having regard to the prospects for success of the appeal and the explanation provided for delay in bringing the appeal by the applicant, the Court should exercise its discretion to permit the applicant to bring an application for leave to appeal out of time by the grant of an extension of time (such leave was not opposed by the Crown if the extension were granted) and then exercise the sentencing discretion afresh in accordance with s 6(3) of the Criminal Appeal Act (see Kentwell v The Queen (2014) 252 CLR 601; [2014] HCA 37 ("Kentwell") at [42]).
2. The applicant accepted that, even in the presence of "Xiao error", the granting of a 10% discount for a plea of guilty may be considered appropriate, albeit for a different reason, and in the result no lesser sentence may be warranted. However, the applicant submitted that, in all the circumstances, nonetheless, a lesser sentence was warranted. With respect to the discount for the plea, it was submitted that the lateness of the plea was not solely referrable to the applicant because the entirety of the brief had not been served until early 2014 and the co-offender, Mr Karout, had sought and obtained a committal. Accordingly, a greater discount was appropriate.
3. Four additional factors were relied upon by the applicant as establishing why a lesser sentence should be imposed if the Court were to resentence the applicant. They appear below: 1. It is appropriate to take into account the 12 month delay between the applicant's plea of guilty and the sentence imposed upon him as a mitigating factor due to the "uncertain suspense" which generated or exacerbated his anxiety as diagnosed in the psychological report relied upon by him in the sentencing proceedings. It was submitted that the sentencing judge failed to take into account this factor, although no separate ground of appeal was raised in this respect. 2. A proper reflection of the objective seriousness of the offence was that there was a small importation of cocaine and that the applicant had a "fairly minimal role. His role was important but he was a middleman who did little more than to introduce the significant players". 3. The strength of the subjective factors would point to a lesser sentence particularly having regard to the applicant's low risk of re-offending, his good prospects of rehabilitation and positive and productive custodial record. 4. These factors, when seen in the light of penalties in comparable cases, would warrant a lesser sentence.
4. Those same factors were relied upon to indicate why, having regard to the prospects of success of the appeal (that is, its final disposition), an extension of time should be granted.
5. In support of those contentions, the applicant relied upon his affidavit of 28 November 2019 and an affidavit of Suzanne Tezjan Knowles also affirmed on that date.
6. Overall, the Crown submitted that: 1. An assessment of the applicant's prospects of success is to be gauged not just by whether error has been established, but whether a different sentence would be imposed by the Court. If ultimately the Court were minded to resentence the applicant to a sentence other than that imposed by the sentencing judge, that would demonstrate strong prospects of the appeal and would favour a grant of an extension of time. If, however, despite error being established (and conceded) the Court were not minded to impose a different sentence in the exercise of its discretion, then that would be a factor militating against the extension of time. 2. After having regard to the prospects of appeal (should the Court not be minded to resentence the applicant), the Court would refuse the applicant an extension of time within which to apply for leave to appeal against his sentence, or would otherwise dismiss the appeal.

Factual Background

1. A thirty page statement of Agreed Facts was tendered in the sentencing hearing which incorporated a summary. The sentencing judge used that summary as a factual basis for her judgment, resolving facts disputed by Mr Karout in favour of the Crown.
2. Broadly, the summary by her Honour represents an appropriate factual background. It may be stated as follows: 1. The prosecution related to the offenders joint criminal involvement in the attempted possession of a marketable quantity of an unlawfully imported border controlled drug, namely, cocaine, sent by air freight from Syria and arriving in Australia on 9 October 2012. The drugs were concealed inside 182 plastic tubes, which had been woven into a carpet and secured by wool. The pure quantity of cocaine imported was 684.8 grams (1.147 kilograms including admixture). 2. The drugs were imported into Australia as the result of interactions between the applicant, the co-offenders and another co-offender, "Alpha" (a pseudonym). Those interactions can be summarised as follows: 1. Mr Karout approached Alpha and asked him to arrange for the importation of 1.25 kilograms of cocaine on his behalf. 2. Alpha communicated with his father, who resided in Lebanon, to organise for the cocaine to be imported from Syria. 3. Mr Karout provided Alpha with $166,000 in cash, $150,000 of which was as payment for the drugs, the remaining $16,000 of which was to pay the commission of the money remitter used to send the money to Lebanon, transfer fees, exchange rate fees and bank charges. 4. Alpha was to receive $20,000 from Mr Karout on the safe arrival of the cocaine into Australia. 5. Mr Karout's dealings with Alpha were facilitated by the applicant, who was an associate of Mr Karout. The applicant's role was to communicate with Alpha by telephone on behalf of Mr Karout and to drive Alpha to and from meetings where the importation was discussed. 6. The consignment was consigned to Mr Mokdad, whose role was to receive it. 7. At the instruction of Mr Karout, Mr Mokdad provided Alpha with his name and address so that those details could be provided overseas to be used as the consignee and delivery details for the consignment. 1. Alpha pleaded guilty to an offence under s 307.2(1) of the Criminal Code of importing a marketable quantity of a border controlled drug and was sentenced in relation to that offence at Sydney District Court by Lakatos DCJ on 17 October 2013.
3. The applicant's involvement in the enterprise was found to be less than that of Mr Karout or Alpha, who were sentenced to 8 years and 6 months' imprisonment (with a non-parole period of 5 years and 3 months) and 6 years' imprisonment (with a non-parole period of 3 years and 8 months), respectively: see Alpha v R [2015] NSWCCA 225 (per R A Hulme J, with whom Leeming JA and Price J agreed). The applicant's involvement was found to be greater than Mr Mokdad who was sentenced to a head sentence of 4 years' imprisonment, with a non-parole period of 2 years and 3 months.

Course of the Proceedings Below

1. The applicant was charged on 21 November 2012. He received bail on 12 February 2013. He pleaded not guilty in the Local Court.
2. There was a four day contested committal hearing before Local Court Magistrate Buscombe between 25 and 28 August 2014.
3. The trial was initially fixed to commence on 27 April 2015 before the District Court of NSW. That date was subsequently abandoned due to matters disclosed in the lead up to the trial. The delay was not occasioned by the applicant. The trial was relisted for hearing on 4 April 2016, with an estimated duration of 40 days.
4. On 7 April 2016, the fourth day scheduled for the trial, the applicant entered the plea of guilty referred to at the outset of this judgment. The Crown submitted that this was after some negotiations and before a judge had been allocated for the trial.
5. The sentencing proceedings had originally been listed for 5 August 2016 but, as earlier mentioned, ultimately commenced on 12 December 2016, proceeding over four days.
6. The applicant was sentenced on 7 April 2017, 12 months after the plea of guilty was entered. The sentencing judge found that the delay was brought about by Mr Karout's decision to dispute the facts underpinning the sentencing proceedings and "that those issues had to be resolved before the other offenders could be sentenced". A hearing was held with respect to that dispute (hereinafter referred to as "Mr Karout's disputed facts hearing"). Her Honour stated that she had "taken that period of delay into account". Despite the late plea, the Crown accepted that a 10% discount would be appropriate.

The Sentencing Proceedings

1. The applicant did not give evidence in his sentencing proceedings, but did rely upon material tendered on his behalf, including: 1. a psychological report by Mr Bradley Jones, dated 2 August 2016; 2. a letter of apology from the applicant, dated 12 December 2016; 3. character references; and 4. a medical certificate regarding the applicant's father.
2. The Crown tendered, on sentence, the indictment, an agreed statement of facts, a criminal history and custodial history, and a pre-sentence report. The Crown also handed up written submissions, which included the summaries of some comparable decisions.
3. Alpha gave evidence for the Crown in Mr Karout's disputed facts hearing. By that time, he had served his non-parole period and was living in the community.
4. Counsel for the Crown correctly submitted that, in the course of the sentencing proceedings, the applicant's then counsel adopted the following approach: 1. disputed the Crown's submission that the applicant "occupied an important and trusted role that required detailed knowledge with respect to the sophisticated cocaine importation enterprise", and submitted instead that the applicant was taking direction from others and was removed from the detail of the enterprise; 2. submitted that the applicant had no capital in the venture (or "skin in the game"); 3. submitted (albeit faintly) that the Court could impose a sentence of 3 years or less and suspend the sentence; 4. submitted that there was no evidence that the applicant was aware of the weight or expected purity of the cocaine being imported; and 5. cross-examined Alpha on 13 December 2016 in respect of the applicant's knowledge and involvement.

Reasons for Sentence

1. Despite making submissions as to the proper characterisation of the applicant's role in the offending, as I have earlier discussed, the applicant did not dispute the sentencing judge's findings of fact either as to objective or subjective matters.
2. The sentencing judge made the following findings as to the applicant's role: [The applicant was] described as Mr Karout's trusted lieutenant or right-hand man. He was at a lower level but not "at a much lower level", as his counsel described his role, p 227 of the transcript. He introduced Mr Karout to Mr [Alpha]. The agreed facts establish that [the applicant] was aware that Mr [Alpha] was to import 1.25 kilograms of cocaine at Mr Karout's request and for which Mr Karout paid $150,000. [The applicant] was the person who dealt directly with Mr [Alpha] by phone and by taking him to and from meetings with Mr Karout.
3. Her Honour also made the following factual findings: 1. The applicant was not an illicit drug user and was financially motivated to commit the offence. 2. The gross weight of the powder was 1.147 kilograms with a purity of 59.7%. The weight was calculated at 684.8 grams of pure cocaine, which is more than 340 times the marketable quantity of 2 grams, but within the bottom one third of the marketable range. 3. The estimated wholesale value of the cocaine at the time of the importation was $190,250. The estimated street value was between $489,189 and $547,902; 4. The applicant was to be paid for his role in the enterprise and the amount he was to be paid must have been more than was to be paid to Mr Mokdad. 5. The applicant had an almost unblemished record, entitling him to some leniency. 6. Most of the applicant's family lived in Lebanon. When his parents died, after he was arrested, he was unable to attend the funerals as his passport had been surrendered; this caused the applicant considerable distress. 7. The delay in the sentencing process was attributed to the applicant's conduct in not pleading guilty until April 2016 and Mr Karout's disputed facts hearing. 8. The applicant's mental illness will likely make his (first) time in custody more onerous. 9. In light of the applicant's letter to the court expressing remorse and the pre-sentence report and testimonials, the applicant had good prospects of rehabilitation.
4. As earlier mentioned, counsel for the applicant contended that the sentencing judge had not taken into account the delay occasioned by the sentencing process as a factor contributing to the applicant's depressive order. However, the sentencing judgment is not entirely clear in this respect. Her Honour recognised that Mr Jones had diagnosed the applicant as "suffering from a major depressive order, moderate severity". She found that some of his condition was attributable to delay, but found no mitigation applicable insofar as the delay was attributable to the applicant's conduct in "not pleading guilty until April 2016".Nonetheless, her Honour then returned to delay occasioned by Mr Karout's decision "to dispute the facts" and found, as I have mentioned, that was "a matter that really [had] to be resolved before the other offenders could be sentenced". Those remarks immediately preceded her Honour's rejection of mitigation for worsening of a psychological condition by delay occasioned by the applicant's own actions vis-à-vis the late plea. Her Honour's observations, in that further respect, were introduced by the word, "However" and the sentencing judge ultimately found that she had "taken that period into account", that is, the period of delay occasioned by the disputed fact hearing.
5. In my view, when the sentencing judgment is considered in that light, it may be comfortably concluded that her Honour did take into account delay occasioned by the disputed facts hearing in mitigation because it, at least, worsened the applicant's psychological condition although, as submitted by the applicant, her Honour did not expressly recognise that the worsening of the condition had resulted from the "uncertain suspense". It also follows that her Honour excluded delay occasioned by Mr Karout's disputed facts hearing in deciding upon the percentage discount for the plea.

Factors Raised by the Applicant on Merits of the Proposed Appeal

Objective Seriousness of the Offences

1. Despite a reference in the oral submissions for the applicant to his role being "fairly minimal", I consider that the sentencing judge's (essentially) undisputed finding as to the role of the applicant and the co-accused, his financial motivation and the significance of the weight and wholesale value of the cocaine in question, aptly described the objective seriousness of the applicant's offending.
2. The Crown made reference to a Case Note Report where it was recorded that the applicant made a statement to Mr Simmons that he did not profit financially from the offence. However, counsel for the applicant accepted that the applicant had not profited from the enterprise only because it was unsuccessful, and that the applicant had been financially motivated in his offending.
3. The offending is objectively serious.

The Discount on Sentence for the Plea

1. Since the hearing of this matter, the Court has delivered a judgment which has a bearing upon the applicant's submissions in this respect: Bae v R [2020] NSWCCA 35 ("Bae"). In Bae, Johnson J (with whom Bell P and Walton J agreed) discussed the utilitarian value of a plea in relation to Commonwealth offences and the significance of the timing of a plea in the ascertaining of any discount as follows (at [49]-[60]): [49] In Baden v R [2020] NSWCCA 23, Bell P (Walton J and myself agreeing) said at [15]-[16]: [15] The Xiao Court, comprising Bathurst CJ, Beazley P, Hoeben CJ at CL, McCallum and Bellew JJ, after a review of authorities which had either taken a different view to Tyler [ (2007) 173 A Crim R 458; [2007] NSWCCA 247 ] or questioned its correctness, relevantly held at [278] that: …in sentencing proceedings governed by s 16A [of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth)], a sentencing judge is entitled to take the utilitarian value of a plea into account in sentencing. To the extent that Tyler and the cases which followed it provide to the contrary, they should not be followed. [16] In Cameron [ (2002) 209 CLR 339; [2002] HCA 6 ], Gaudron, Gummow and Callinan JJ differentiated in terms between the utilitarian value of an early plea and an accused's 'willingness to facilitate the course of justice' which might be manifested in an early plea (see, for example, at [19]), even though the outcome or result of such a willingness may (and perhaps typically would) be a useful saving in time and expense, with obvious ramifications for the efficient deployment of scarce and valuable public resources. But an early plea may not be motivated by a willingness to facilitate the course of justice such as where, for example, it is actuated simply by an acceptance of the inevitable in the face of an overwhelming Crown case. In such a case, no discount would be justified on the subjective side of the sentencing exercise, but there would be an objective benefit which it has been recognised should attract a discount. [50] In Huang v R (2018) 96 NSWLR 743; [2018] NSWCCA 57, Beazley P (Bathurst CJ, Hoeben CJ at CL, McCallum and Bellew JJ agreeing) adopted the reasoning applicable to State offences in R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; [2000] NSWCCA 309 , whilst noting the need to guard against the application of a "norm" to Commonwealth offences. Beazley P said at [81]-[86]: [81] The appellant in this case pleaded guilty and is thus entitled to some discount for his plea. The utilitarian value of a guilty plea depends primarily upon the timing of the plea. In R v Thomson; R v Houlton (2000) 49 NSWLR 383; [2000] NSWCCA 309 , Spigelman CJ (Wood CJ at CL, Foster AJA, Grove and James JJ agreeing) stated at [152]-[154]: [152] In my opinion, the appropriate range for a discount is from 10-25 percent. [153] The determination of where, within such a range, the discount should fall in a particular case is a matter for the discretion of the sentencing judge. [154] There are however two circumstances which will generally affect the appropriate level of discount in a particular case: (i)The time at which a plea is entered. A plea entered at committal has a more significant utilitarian benefit than a plea entered at first listing, which in turn has the greater benefit than a plea entered at the beginning of trial. (ii)The complexity of the issues about which evidence will have to be gathered and adduced affects the value of the plea. The greater the difficulty of assembling the relevant evidence and the greater the length and complexity of the trial, the greater the utilitarian value of a plea. [82] Spigelman CJ observed, at [155], that a discount at the top of the range would be restricted to pleas entered into at the earliest possible opportunity and should not be given, save in an exceptional case, after a matter has been set down for trial. His Honour stated that a discount at the bottom of the range would be appropriate for late pleas, such as a plea entered into on the date fixed for trial. [83] Consistent with these observations, in the recent decision of Nash v Silver City Drilling (NSW) Pty Ltd v Silver City Drilling (NSW) Pty Ltd [2017] NSWCCA 96, Basten JA (Hoeben CJ at CL and Walton J agreeing) stated that where a plea is entered on the first day fixed for trial, the utilitarian value of the plea must be 'severely reduced'. As N Adams J (Hoeben CJ at CL and Button J agreeing) observed in Zhao v R [2016] NSWCCA 179, a discount of 10 per cent is usually allowed for a plea entered in such circumstances. In Hart v A-G (NSW) [2016] NSWCCA 71, Davies J (Hoeben CJ at CL and Harrison J agreeing) rejected the applicant's submission that a discount of 10 per cent for the applicant's guilty plea was inadequate. In that case, the applicant first indicated to the court his intention to plead guilty on the first day of the trial and only indicated such an intention to the prosecution on the Friday before the trial was due to start on the following Monday. [84] In Thomson; Houlton, which involved a state offence, Spigelman CJ did not purport to be prescriptive as to the discount that should be given in any particular case. As Spigelman CJ stated, it was a matter for the discretion of the sentencing judge as to the discount to be applied. There is, however, an inevitable logic in his Honour's observations that the time at which a plea is entered is relevant to the discount to be applied. But as the portion of his Honour's reasons cited above reveal, it is not the only consideration and may not be a decisive consideration in the given case. Nor is the range suggested by his Honour the necessary limit of the upper and lower range, although it is a useful guide. It is not, however, to use the language of the High Court in Hili [(2010) 242 CLR 520; [2010] HCA 45 ], a 'norm'. [85] The Court is presently concerned with sentencing for a federal offence. In Hili, the High Court held, at [13] and [44], that there was no 'judicially determined norm or starting point … for the period of imprisonment that a federal offender should actually serve in prison'. The so-called 'norm' of which the High Court was expressing its disapproval was the practice or convention in New South Wales of specifying, as the minimum period that an offender should serve in prison, a figure of 60 to 66 per cent of the term of imprisonment imposed. [86] In the present case, the plea was only entered on the day that the appellant's trial was listed for hearing. In addition, as the facts reveal, the case was not particularly complex. Accordingly, the utilitarian value of the plea was not high. Nonetheless, I consider that some discount ought to be allowed for the plea and that discount should be at the low end. In all the circumstances, I consider that an appropriate discount is 10 per cent for the appellant's guilty plea. [51] In Huang v R (2018) 332 FLR 158; [2018] NSWCCA 70 , this Court (in judgments of the same five-Judge Bench as in Xiao v R (Bathurst CJ, Beazley P, Hoeben CJ at CL, McCallum and Bellew JJ)) stated (per Bellew J at [69]) that the timing of the plea, to a large extent, determines the level of the utilitarian discount to be applied, citing R v Thomson; R v Houlton at [160]. [52] In considering the nature of a discount for the utilitarian value of pleas of guilty, it is helpful to have regard to the decision of this Court in R v Borkowski (2009) 195 A Crim R 1; [2009] NSWCCA 102 where Howie J (McClellan CJ at CL and Simpson J agreeing) explained the concept of utilitarian value of a guilty plea concerning State offences. Howie J said at [32]-[33]: [32] It should not be necessary to do so, but, because there appears to be discrepancies in the application of the discount for the utilitarian value of the plea, it is apposite to set out in point form the principles laid down by this Court and to be applied by sentencing courts. Of course these are principles of general application …: 1. The discount for the utilitarian value of the pleas will be determined largely by the timing of the plea so that the earlier the plea the greater discount: Thomson at [154]; Forbes [2005] NSWCCA 377 at [116]. 2. Some allowance may be made in determining the discount where the trial would be particularly complicated or lengthy: Thomson at [154]. 3. The utilitarian discount does not reflect any other consideration arising from the plea, such as saving witnesses from giving evidence but this is relevant to remorse: Thomson at [119] to [123]; nor is it affected by post-offending conduct: Perry [2006] NSWCCA 351. 4. The utilitarian discount does not take into account the strength of the prosecution case: Sutton [2004] NSWCCA 225. 5. There is to be no component in the discount for remorse nor is there to be a separate quantified discount for remorse: MAK and MSK [2006] NSWCCA 381; Kite [2009] NSWCCA 12 or for the 'Ellis discount'; Lewins [2007] NSWCCA 189; S[2008] NSWCCA 186. 6. Where there are multiple offences and pleas at different times, the utilitarian value of the plea should be separately considered for each offence: SY [2003] NSWCCA 291. 7. There may be offences that are so serious that no discount should be given: Thomson at [158]; Kalache [2000] NSWCCA 2; where the protection of the public requires a longer sentence: El-Andouri [2004] NSWCCA 178. 8. Generally the reason for the delay in the plea is irrelevant because, if it is not forthcoming, the utilitarian value is reduced: Stambolis [2006] NSWCCA 56; Giac [2008] NSWCCA 280. 9. The utilitarian value of a delayed plea is less and consequently the discount is reduced even where there has been a plea bargain: Dib [2003] NSWCCA 117 ; Ahmad [2006] NSWCCA 177 ; or where the offender is waiting to see what charges are ultimately brought by the Crown: Sullivan and Skillin[2009] NSWCCA 296 ; or the offender has delayed the plea to obtain some forensic advantage: Stambolis [2006] NSWCCA 56 ; Saad [2007] NSWCCA 98 , such as having matters put on a Form 1: Chiekh and Hoete [2004] NSWCCA 448 . 10. An offer of a plea that is rejected by the Crown but is consistent with a jury verdict after trial can result in a discount even though there is no utilitarian value: Oinonen [1999] NSWCCA 310; Johnson [2003] NSWCCA 129. 11. The discount can result in a different type of sentence but the resulting sentence should not again be reduced by reason of the discount: Lo [2003] NSWCCA 313. 12. The amount of the discount does not depend upon the administrative arrangements or any practice in a particular court or by a particular judge for the management of trials or otherwise. The last of these principles is derived from the present judgment and is included for completeness. [33] There also appears to be some looseness in the use of the expression 'a discount' that is apparent in the exchange between the prosecutor and the Judge set out above. Since Thomson and Houlton a 'sentencing discount' should be taken to mean a reduction in the otherwise appropriate sentence by a quantifiable amount due to a specific policy consideration. Such a discount is applied after the otherwise appropriate sentence has been determined. There are two sentencing discounts that have been identified: a discount for the plea of guilty and a discount for assistance. Where both these discounts apply they should be combined: R v SZ [2007] NSWCCA 19; 168 A Crim R 249 at [11]. The High Court has indicated that there should be limited use of 'arithmetical deduction' in determining an appropriate sentence: Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25; 228 CLR 357 at [39]. [53] The approach in R v Borkowski applies to the assessment of the utilitarian value of a guilty plea for State offences. Nevertheless, in the same way as R v Thomson; R v Houlton has provided guidance for Commonwealth offences, the decision in R v Borkowski assists in a practical understanding of the features of the utilitarian value of a guilty plea, a factor which Xiao v R states can be taken into account for the purpose of s 16A(2)(g) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth). [54] Counsel for the Appellant and the Crown both accepted at the hearing in this Court that the principles in R v Borkowski provided assistance in assessing the utilitarian value of a guilty plea for a Commonwealth offence (T2-3, 5, 11, 6 February 2020). [55] It will be apparent from the authorities referred to so far, including R v Borkowski , that identification of the utilitarian value of a plea of guilty involves an objective assessment to be undertaken for the purpose of s 16A(2)(g) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) . If an offender has demonstrated contrition involving facilitation of the course of justice, this factor may be taken into account in the offender's favour on sentence in accordance with s 16A(2)(f) Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) . This aspect falls on the subjective side of factors and involves an enquiry as to the attitude of the offender and an assessment of contrition. Reference to objective and subjective factors in this way was adopted in Diaz v R [2019] NSWCCA 216 at [77]-[83] as a useful way of distinguishing between these considerations. [56] As the cases have made clear, however, there is no bright line test for distinguishing between these objective and subjective considerations so that these factors may overlap. In Singh v R [2018] NSWCCA 60, Payne JA (with the concurrence of Campbell J and myself) said at [28]: [28] Whilst it is correct that contrition and remorse are factors required to be taken into account separately under s 16A(2)(f) in addition to the plea of guilty under s 16A(2)(g), those factors often overlap. Nothing in Xiao provided to the contrary." [57] The utilitarian value of a plea of guilty is an objective factor to be considered and preferably quantified (Xiao v R at [280]; Huang v R (2018) 332 FLR 158; [2018] NSWCCA 70 at [9], [49], [55]), with the subjective side involving demonstration of contrition to be an unquantified factor assisting the offender on sentence as part of the process of instinctive synthesis, but with the sentencing court guarding against double counting of these aspects in a manner favourable to the offender. [58] Mr Anderson, counsel for the Appellant, submitted that an assessment of the utilitarian value of the Appellant's pleas of guilty may take into account the reasons for delay in the entry of pleas, said to be referrable to the Appellant's unclear understanding of the brief of evidence and the strength of the prosecution case flowing from his earlier legal representation before Mr Ricci came to represent him. I do not accept this submission. Those aspects may bear upon the subjective issue of facilitation of the course of justice in explaining why the Appellant did not plead guilty earlier. However, they do not affect the utilitarian value, which in this case is reduced irrespective of the reason for the delay: R v Borkowski at 32 (at [52] above). [59] The discount for the utilitarian value of the Appellant's pleas should have regard principally to the timing of the pleas of guilty which occurred after the first trial date had been vacated and shortly before the second trial date. The Court was informed that the trial had a six-week estimate as a joint trial with a co-accused, but a two-to-three week estimate if the Appellant was tried alone (T14, 6 February 2020). It may be taken that the Crown had been preparing for trial up to October 2011. Although there may have been limited further preparation for trial between October 2011 and the rescheduled trial date of 23 January 2012, it was not until shortly before the rescheduled trial date that the pleas of guilty were entered. [60] In these circumstances, I would assess the discount for the utilitarian value of the Appellant's pleas of guilty at 12.5%. The subjective circumstances surrounding the Appellant's unfamiliarity with the brief of evidence before Mr Ricci came to represent him, and the Appellant's relatively prompt willingness to plead guilty thereafter, may be reflected in a further allowance for his willingness to facilitate the course of justice. This aspect lies as a subjective factor to be taken into account on sentence which ought not be quantified.
2. In this matter, the applicant entered a plea on the fourth day scheduled for a trial fixed for 40 days. The fact that the brief was not served until early 2014 and the co-offender, Mr Karout, sought to and obtained a contested committal is largely immaterial to the assessment of the utilitarian value of the plea. So too, is the fact that the applicant embarked upon negotiations as to the charges he could ultimately face. The essential question is the timing of the plea which, as earlier discussed, was very late. The applicant made the forensic decision (as is evidenced from his affidavit on resentencing) to, as earlier discussed, participate in the committal proceedings and to delay the entry of his plea.
3. It may be correct, as counsel for the applicant submitted, that the applicant could not have had his sentence determined until after the contested committal proceeding but this does not alter the fact that he could have entered an early plea in the Local Court as did Alpha.
4. In my view, and noting that the Crown sought no lesser discount, a discount of 10% was appropriate for the utilitarian value of the plea and the factors taken into account by the sentencing judge in reaching that discount.

Mitigation Due to the Uncertain Suspense after Plea

1. As earlier mentioned, whilst not bringing an appeal as to the failure of the sentencing judge to take into account as the mitigating factor the delay relevant to the plea of guilty and the sentencing of the applicant, it was submitted that the suspense created by the delay should have mitigated the sentence because it generated or exacerbated the anxiety referred to by the psychologist's report produced by the applicant in the sentencing proceedings.
2. I do not accept that submission on two bases: 1. First, I do not consider that, as was earlier found, that the sentencing judge did not take those considerations into account. 2. Secondly, whilst it is true the applicant experienced some "suspense" in waiting for his sentencing hearing, although the period was less than that contended by the applicant, at most the period was extended from 5 August 2016 (the original sentencing date) and 3 March 2017 (or perhaps 13 December 2016) when the applicant participated in Mr Karout's disputed facts hearing on sentence.
3. The applicant, through his counsel, participated in Mr Karout's disputed facts hearing in an attempt to obtain concessions from Alpha. The applicant's counsel submitted to her Honour that the applicant played no part in the disputed facts hearing, however, I agree with the submissions made by counsel for the Crown that, if he had succeeded in obtaining the concessions he sought in cross-examination, the applicant would undoubtedly have sought to use those to his benefit in sentencing.
4. The applicant is bound by the forensic decisions made by his counsel, and does not in the appeal claim that his counsel's conduct was flagrantly incompetent or such as to have led to a miscarriage of justice.
5. It may also be noted, in this respect, that the sentencing judge took into account as a mitigating factor that the applicant's mental health would make his time in custody more onerous. Further, the applicant's evidence in these proceedings raises some doubt as to whether the allowance on sentence for this factor was entirely necessary given he has functioned well in custody, obtained further education, maintained physical health and worked well. I will turn to those matters in the next consideration.

Subjective Factors

1. The Crown provided a summary of the evidence of Ms Knowles and the applicant as to subjective factors bearing upon resentencing, which is accurate and forms the foundation of that which follows: 1. Ms Knowles' affidavit annexes pages 22 and 30 of Corrective Services case note reports relating to the applicant, together with his custodial management history. The selected entries from Corrective Services case notes refer to the applicant's regret, his having learned about the social impact of his offending whilst in prison and his future plans. 2. The custodial management history indicated no offences or contraventions during the applicant's incarceration, with positive notes indicated in respect of his behaviour and work ethic. 3. In his affidavit, the applicant deposed: 1. he is truly sorry for having committed the offence, and now better understands the harm that drugs have on the community; 2. he has been a hard worker whilst in prison and has tried to use his time as productively as possible; 3. he has been hospitalised for one night in early May 2017 for hypertension; 4. he has no family in Australia except for his son, who has visited him five or six times; 5. he was unable to visit his parents or attend their funerals because of his bail conditions, which caused him great sadness; 6. the delay in the court proceedings has caused him great anxiety and depression; 7. he "had always admitted to [his] guilt", but it took him some time to plead guilty because of the ongoing delay with his co-offender; 8. he did not participate in the 4 day committal hearing, however was advised to wait until it finished in case it assisted him; 9. he pleaded guilty "straight away" after he was offered to plead to the second count in full satisfaction of the indictment; 10. he had to wait until the dispute between the co-offenders had been resolved; 11. that other than high blood pressure, he had good health; 12. he has held a number of working positions in prison and completed educational courses and programs (with the completion certificates annexed to his affidavit); and 13. he has positive supporting relationships with his son and former wife, waiting for him in the community.
2. That material readily permits an acceptance of the submissions of the parties (for the purposes of considering the issues raised in this matter) that: 1. the applicant is genuinely remorseful (as effectively found by the sentencing judge); and 2. there are good prospects for rehabilitation (again, as the sentencing judge found).
3. As mentioned, it may also be accepted that the applicant has a positive and productive custodial history.

Comparative Sentences

1. The table of comparative cases attached to the applicant's written submissions do not give clear support for the contention by the applicant that the sentence imposed upon the applicant should be less than that imposed by the sentencing judge.
2. The Crown contended that the sentence was not manifestly excessive. In my view, when attention is given to the maximum penalty for the offence of 25 years' imprisonment, the objective seriousness of the offence (addressed above) and the aforementioned rejection of the factors relied upon by the applicant, no lesser sentence is indicated than that imposed by the sentencing judge, notwithstanding a relatively strong subjective case (when seen in the light of further material relied upon by the applicant in these proceedings) and the applicant's plea. That conclusion follows, in my view, even if a slightly greater discount of 10% for the plea of guilty were allowed (I have not so determined), arising from a discount for the utilitarian value of the plea, and an additional allowance was made for the factors identified by the sentencing judge as warranting a discount for the plea. .

Extension of Time

1. The Court recently considered questions of an extension of time in Baladjam v R [2018] NSWCCA 304, in which the Chief Justice stated at [92]: [92] In Kentwell v The Queen, it was made clear that the power to extend the time for the filing of a notice of intention to apply for leave to appeal conferred by s 10(1)(b) of the Criminal Appeal Act 1912 (NSW) and the Criminal Appeal Rules (NSW) was to be exercised by consideration of "the interests of justice". The majority pointed out that relevant to that determination is the "prospect of success should the extension be granted".
2. In Kentwell, French CJ, Hayne, Bell and Keane JJ referred to provisions allowing an extension of time to appeal against conviction and sentence. Their Honours stated (at [32]): [32] These provisions (among others) are exceptions to finality in the trial and sentencing of offenders. The principle of finality finds expression in the prescription of the time limit within which an appeal or an application for leave to appeal may be brought. The discretionary power to extend the time limit is a legislative recognition that the interests of justice in a particular case may favour permitting an appeal or an application for leave to appeal to be heard, notwithstanding that it was not brought within that time. The interests of justice will often pull in different directions. As earlier noted, they may include consideration of the adverse effect on the victim, or on the community generally, occasioned by re-opening a concluded criminal proceeding.
3. In Lepine v R [2017] NSWCCA 83, the applicant was refused an extension of time within which to seek leave to appeal his conviction in circumstances of a delay for almost 2 years between the filing of a notice of intention to appeal and the filing of the appeal, and of almost 2 ½ years from the date of sentence. R A Hulme J (with whom Hoeben CJ at CL and Walton J agreed) found that the interests of justice did not favour an extension of time in the circumstances where there was unsatisfactory explanation for the substantial delay and that the proposed appeal had no merit: at [12].
4. As earlier mentioned, a sentence was imposed upon the applicant on 7 April 2017. He brought an appeal over two years later. As the applicant properly conceded, the overall period of delay is of some significance having regard (to some extent) to the public interest in the avoidance of delay and the principle of finality in litigation. An explanation was provided for that delay, although there remains a considerable gap between the (mistaken) advice to withdraw the notice of intention to appeal and the lodging of the application for leave to bring this appeal.
5. In my view, the extension of time sought should be refused for two reasons: 1. first, and primarily, the lack of merits of the proposed appeal, given the lack of prospects of obtaining a lesser sentence, if the applicant was resentenced, notwithstanding a finding of Xiao error; and 2. secondly, the delay is very lengthy and the explanation for delay does not wholly account for the period of delay.

Conclusion

1. In my view, the Court should, in the exercise of its discretion, refuse to extend time to bring the application for leave to appeal.

Orders

1. I propose the following order: 1. Application for extension of time to seek leave to appeal against sentence refused.
2. JOHNSON J: I agree with Walton J. DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 08 May 2020