(a) On the face of the information that was given to the appellant, an experienced commercial solicitor, it was almost inconceivable that the proposed (unexplained) program, which was said to be concerned with refugee work in Liberia, could produce a return of 1,000 per cent in one year. The suggestion that a very large amount of money should be placed in such an investment would ordinarily give rise to an apprehension that it might be no more than a device to persuade investors to part with their money. At the very least, it screamed out for an explanation as to how the money would be used to earn such staggering profits, and yet no such explanation was given to (or sought by) the appellant. The requirement for a full explanation would have been heightened by the lack of a rational reason as to why the appellant could not sight - even on a confidential basis - the master agreement which was supposed to govern the transaction.
(b) A reputable major bank, with international presence, advised that the scheme was probably fraudulent.
(c) The nature and the terms of the documentation that was provided to the appellant by McKay and to which I have referred raised further queries as to the genuineness of the transaction.
(d) During the period leading to the investment, the position of Smith Barney as a participant in the money flow and as trustee of the funds and of the prime bank guarantee, became progressively and increasingly vague, and later its role in that regard was effectively terminated. Moreover, during the period when Smith Barney was to be the trustee, no confirmatory letter was forthcoming from it. Worse still, McKay sought to fob off his promise of such a letter by producing an unsigned copy of a letter, purportedly from Smith Barney, the terms of which were unacceptable to the appellant and when he sought to change those terms to overcome the perceived deficiency, Smith Barney was effectively "taken off the scene".
(e) No prime bank was ever nominated by the scheme promoters. Moreover, the bank guarantee, which was obviously a most critical document, was not provided to the appellant and his claim to his sister that the later produced pro forma guarantee referred to earlier was "just as good" as the promised guarantee, defied credulity.