Hanna v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation

Extension of time 13 The respondent made the remission decisions under s 8AAG in relation to the GIC, and Sch 1, s 298-20(1) in relation to the FTL penalties, of the Tax Administration Act 1953 (Cth) (the TAA). The remission decisions are decisions to which the ADJR Act applies. 14 Sections 11(1)(c) and (3) of the ADJR Act determine the circumstances in which an application such as the substantive application may be lodged. Section 11(1)(c) provides that, where a decision has been made, and the terms of this decision have been recorded in writing and set out in a document furnished to the applicant, any application for review of that decision must be lodged with the registry of the relevant court within the "prescribed period" or "such further time as the court concerned … allows". 15 Section 11(3)(a) of the ADJR Act provides that the prescribed period for the purposes of s 11(1)(c), where the decision sets out the findings on material questions of fact, refers to the evidence or other material on which those findings were based, and gives the reasons for the decision, is 28 days after "a document setting out the terms of the decision is furnished to the applicant". Section 2(6) of the ADJR Act provides that document is "furnished" where it has been posted to the relevant person at the address the person has provided, or where no such address has been provided, to the person's last known place of residence. 16 Accordingly, the substantive application should have been filed by 5 September 2019, which is 28 days after the 8 August letters were posted to the applicant's last known address.

Principles 17 The principles applicable to the exercise of the Court's discretion to grant an extension of time were set out in Hunter Valley Developments Pty Ltd v Cohen [1984] FCA 176; (1984) 3 FCR 344 at 348-9, and adopted by the Full Federal Court in Parker v The Queen [2002] FCAFC 133 at [6]: 1. applications for an extension of time are not to be granted unless it is proper to do so; the legislated time limits are not to be ignored. The applicant must show an "acceptable explanation for the delay"; it must be "fair and equitable in the circumstances" to extend time; 2. action taken by the applicant, other than by way of making an application for review, is relevant to the consideration of the question whether an acceptable explanation for the delay has been furnished; 3. any prejudice to the respondent in defending the proceedings that is caused by the delay is a material factor militating against the grant of an extension; 4. however, the mere absence of prejudice is not enough to justify the grant of an extension; and 5. the merits of the substantial application are to be taken into account in considering whether an extension of time should be granted. 18 In respect of this last principle, subsequent case law has stated that an extension of time will not be granted where the substantive application is without merit: Kalanje v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs [2006] FCA 1618 at [5]. Further, in making an assessment, the Court is not required to go into too great a detail, but is to "assess the merits in a fairly rough and ready way": Jackamarra v Krakouer [1998] HCA 27; (1998) 195 CLR 516 at [7]-[9].

Discussion 19 The respondent's written submissions focused on the applicant's status as an undischarged bankrupt. The respondent submitted that the application should be dismissed on the basis that the applicant did not have standing to bring the substantive application. These submissions were as follows: (a) By reason of s 58 of the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth), the property of the Applicant vested in the trustee in bankruptcy on the day of the trustee's appointment (that is, 11 July 2017)…; (b) "Property" for present purposes is defined in s 5 as follows: real or personal property of every description, whether situated in Australia or elsewhere, and includes and estate, interest or profit, whether present or future, vested or contingent, arising out of or incidental to any such real or personal property. (c) Section 153 of the Act, under the heading "Effect of discharge", provides that where a bankrupt person is discharged from bankruptcy, that discharge operates so as to release him or her from all debts provable in the bankruptcy (s 153(1)). There are a number of exceptions to this position (see, for example, s 153(2)) but none of them are enlivened presently, where it is not in dispute that the Applicant remains an undischarged bankrupt; (d) Section 60(2) of the Act provides that an action commenced by a person who subsequently becomes bankrupt is stayed unless the trustee elects to prosecute or discontinue it. Exceptions to this position are set out at s 60(4) but, once again, they do not arise presently; (e) Section 116 of the Act permits recovery of property but provides that, if recovered, such property is divisible amongst creditors. In such a matter, the proper applicant would be the trustee who is vested with the property; (f) The applicant is not a "person aggrieved" by a decision which enlivens the Court's jurisdiction under the ADJR Act … prior to his being declared bankrupt … [the applicant] would have been a person aggrieved by the decisions apparently in issue … However, on his becoming bankrupt, the Applicant ceased to be personally liable for the amount of the GIC and/or FTL penalties where they became a debt provable in his estate … [and] is not (and has not been at any relevant time) a person aggrieved by the either of the two decisions which the Commissioner understands to be the subject of these proceedings. 20 The respondent referred to various cases supporting the proposition that an undischarged bankrupt is not a "person aggrieved" for the purposes of the ADJR Act in connection with decisions concerning the bankrupt estate and thus does not have standing to make an application such as the substantive application. 21 In Cummings v Claremont Petroleum NL [1996] HCA 19; (1996) 185 CLR 124 (Cummings), the majority (Brennan CJ, Dawson and McHugh JJ) explained at 137-139: …the bankrupt has no financial interest which would confer locus standi to appeal in his own name against the judgment. That is because it is fundamental to the law of bankruptcy that the bankrupt is divested of both his interest in his property and liability for his provable debts … A bankrupt's contingent interest in a surplus does not give him an interest which would allow him to sue to enforce proprietary rights and, that being so, it cannot give him an interest to appeal to minimise liabilities … So far as a judgment entered in an action against a bankrupt creates or evidences a provable debt … the bankrupt has no financial interest which would confer locus standi to appeal in his own name against the judgment. That is because it is fundamental to the law of bankruptcy that the bankrupt is divested of both his interest in his property and liability for his provable debts. (Citations omitted). 22 In support of this conclusion, the majority in Cummings explained the correspondingly broad administrative powers of a trustee of bankruptcy under the Bankruptcy Act 1966 (Cth) (Bankruptcy Act), at 138: The powers of a trustee are defined by s 134. By subsection 1(j), the trustee is authorised to 'bring, institute or defend any action or other legal proceeding relating to the administration of [the bankrupt's] estate.' That is ample power to permit the trustee to institute an appeal against a judgment entered against a bankrupt that affects the administration of his estate. 23 In their agreeing minority judgment in Cummings at 148, Dawson and Toohey JJ endorsed the similar conclusion of Hoffmann J in Heath v Tang [1993] 1 WLR 1421 at 1425 that, "in principle a bankrupt cannot in his own name appeal from a judgment against him which is enforceable only against the estate vested in his trustee." 24 The principles in Cummings have been widely followed, for example, in McCallum v Commissioner of Taxation [1997] FCA 533;(1997) 75 FCR 458 (McCallum) at 475E, where Lehane J (Whitlam J agreeing) held that, while a trustee in bankruptcy had standing to bring an application to the Administrative Appeals Tribunal to review an objection decision of the ATO, a bankrupt "will not have standing merely because, for example, a successful challenge to the objection decision may result in a surplus in his bankrupt estate". 25 The reason for a bankrupt's lack of standing was explained by Carr J in Robertson v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [2003] FCA 944; (2003) 23 ATR 824 at [23]: It is quite clear from the High Court's decision in Cummings and the majority judgments in McCallum that the reason why the bankrupt loses standing is because the debt concerned is payable solely out of the bankrupt's estate, and is no longer otherwise recoverable from the debtor. (Citations omitted). 26 The authorities relied on by the respondent do not state that an undischarged bankrupt will never have standing to bring an application such as the substantive application. For example, in McCallum Lehane J (Whitlam J agreeing) said at 462 that it was conceivable that an undischarged bankrupt would have standing in limited circumstances such as where "an objection decision in relation to a particular assessment will have consequences in relation to tax payable … in years following discharge from bankruptcy, for which [the bankrupt] will be personally liable". However, his Honour did not express any opinion about this possibility, and the applicant has made no submissions relating to any future interest of the kind adverted to by Lehane J. 27 The respondent's written submissions also referred to a number of cases considering s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, which provides that an "action" commenced by a person who then becomes bankrupt is stayed upon his or her becoming bankrupt "until the trustee makes election, in writing, to prosecute or discontinue the action". The mechanism in s 60(2) reinforces the conclusion that a bankrupt does not have standing to bring an application such as the substantive application. 28 The respondent submitted that an appeal constitutes an "action" for the purposes of s 60(2) of the Bankruptcy Act, relying on Kirby P's statement in Daemar v Industrial Commission of New South Wales (1988) 12 NSWLR 45 at 54 that the term "action" in s 60(2) is "given an extremely wide definition to embrace 'any civil proceeding, whether at law or in equity'". 29 Justice Young endorsed Kirby P's statement in Savage v Australian Unity Funds Management Ltd [2011] NSWCA 270 at [15], and also stated that there are "a number of authorities that support the proposition that an appeal is within the term 'action'", including Cummings, Arnoya Holdings Pty Ltd v Metway Leasing Ltd [1999] NSWCA 120 at [14], Bryant v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1997] FCA 582; (1997) 75 FCR 545 at 547 and Cole v Challenge Bank Ltd [2002] FCAFC 200 at [11]. 30 The respondent referred to a number of decisions in administrative review contexts which relied on the reasoning that a bankrupt lacks standing to bring an action in respect of the bankrupt estate when he or she does not have an interest in that estate. For example, in Civitereale and, Department of Family and Community Services [1999] AATA 486 at [83]-[84], the Administrative Appeals Tribunal found that it had jurisdiction because the applicant's interest in the review of the relevant decision "extend[ed] beyond the immediate effect of his bankruptcy to his future financial interests once he has been discharged from bankruptcy". Similarly, in Singh and Secretary, Department of Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs [2009] AATA 850 at [24], Member Handley stated that "the applicant, as a bankrupt is not who has an interest which is affected by a decision that he would want to review … Any interest he might have had, but for the bankruptcy, can only be pursued, if at all, by his Trustee and then, for the benefit of creditors." 31 I accept these submissions. The authority referred to above clearly supports the proposition that a person such as the applicant has no proprietary interest in the bankrupt estate, and is therefore not a "person aggrieved" by the remission decisions for the purposes of the ADJR Act. Although the cases referred to by the respondent qualify that an undischarged bankrupt may have standing where the relevant decision affects some future interest that exists after he or she has been discharged from bankruptcy, no submissions to this effect were put by the applicant. 32 It necessarily follows that the application is without merit, leading to the conclusion that the application for an extension of time should be dismissed. 33 The respondent also submitted that: …the materials relied on by the Applicant (including the application, the supporting affidavits and written submissions) do not, with any clarity or cogency, identify with precision the nature of the application which the Applicant seeks leave to file. 34 In this respect, the respondent pointed to parts of the application which seek relief which this Court cannot provide: There is reason for thinking - having regard to the Hanna Affidavit which was filed in support of the Application - that the relief sought presently goes beyond the jurisdiction of the Court. For example, paragraph 55 of the Hanna Affidavit reads as follows: As a commercial reality I beg the court to ask the ATO to accept a 100 cents [sic] in a dollar of the original amount which pays for social securities [sic] and hospitals and other community services. … In your hand, I surrender my request. … The Applicant's submissions appear to culminate in a "PROPOSAL" which again goes beyond the Court's jurisdiction presently … that is, for example, he … is seeking a "bankruptcy composition…such that he wishes to put forward a proposal to his trustee in bankruptcy in satisfaction of his debts" … [and] outlines the importance of the Commissioner "voting in favour of such an arrangement". 35 I agree also with this submission. The relief which the applicant seeks is unclear. I have taken it to be judicial review of the remission decisions which is suggested by the terms of the applicant's submissions and the context. 36 In relation to the other extension of time considerations, I note that the applicant's delay was minimal, being a period of only 5 days. 37 No submissions were made regarding any prejudice to the respondent should the extension of time be granted. 38 Weighing all the factors referred to above, I consider that the extension of time should be refused. Although the applicant's delay in bringing the application is minimal, the applicant is an undischarged bankrupt and as such does not have standing to make the substantive application. Accordingly, the application for an extension of time should be dismissed. I certify that the preceding thirty-eight (38) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Jagot.