Legal framework
25 Although the orders for production are expressed to have been issued under s 597(9) of the Act, that provision concerns the production of documents at an examination. In this case, the production was required in advance of examinations of Mr Golman and Mr Bruzzano. The Court has power to issue orders for production in advance of examinations under r 30.34 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 ("Rules"), which applies to a proceeding under the Act by r 1.3(2) of the Federal Court (Corporations) Rules 2000 ("Corporations Rules").
26 There is no express power in the Rules to set aside an order for production made under r 30.34, in contrast to the position in relation to a subpoena (which may be set aside under r 24.15), or an examination summons (which may be discharged under r 11.5 of the Corporations Rules). However, as Jagot J noted in Re Bell Group NV (in liq) (No 2) [2017] FCA 927; (2017) 122 ACSR 418 at [19] ("Bell Group NV"), in connection with an application for an order discharging an examination summons, where an order is made by a Registrar, s 35A(5) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) is necessarily applicable.
27 Section 35A relevantly provides:
(1) [T]he following powers of the Court may, if the Court or a Judge so directs, be exercised by a Registrar:
…
(h) a power of the Court prescribed by Rules of Court.
…
(5) A party to proceedings in which a Registrar has exercised any of the powers of the Court under subsection (1) may, within the time prescribed by the Rules of Court, or within any further time allowed in accordance with the Rules of Court, apply to the Court to review that exercise of power.
(6) The Court may, on application under subsection (5) or of its own motion, review an exercise of power by a Registrar pursuant to this section and may make such order or orders as it thinks fit with respect to the matter with respect to which the power was exercised.
28 Mr Condon SC, submitted that the Court's power to grant the relief sought by Mrs Golman is conferred by s 35A(6), as a review on the Court's motion of an exercise of power by a Registrar. Counsel for Mrs Golman, Mr Anderson, did not dispute that proposition.
29 Accordingly, I have treated Mrs Golman's interlocutory application as an invitation to review the Registrar's decision to exercise the power under r 30.34 in relation to the orders for production.
30 Concerning the application of s 35A(6), in Bell Group NV, Jagot J said relevantly (at [20]):
As explained by Kenny J in Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2013] FCA 623; (2013) 304 ALR 319 the right of review under s 35A(5) is "by way of a hearing de novo in the sense that the parties may adduce fresh evidence as of right", "is a complete rehearing; and the judge is not fettered by the Registrar's decision" (at [36]), so that the "court must determine the facts on the evidence that is adduced at the hearing before it, whether or not that evidence, and the facts to which they relate, were in existence at the time the Registrar made the decision under review" (at [38]).
31 Mrs Golman's submissions acknowledged that the guiding principles that apply to the making of orders for production in aid of public examinations are those identified by Bryson J in Re BPTC Ltd (in liq) (No 5) (1993) 10 ACSR 756 at 762-763:
(1) the power is to be exercised "where the production of documents is required for the exercise of the power to conduct an examination";
(2) the power to compel production is a wide one and, while there is a need for wide powers, there is also a need to avoid oppressive operation;
(3) there must be a connection between the order for production of documents and the purpose of the examination under the relevant section of the Act; and
(4) the production of documents is ancillary to the process of examination.
32 The bounds of the power are marked out by asking whether a person acting judicially could reasonably be of the view that production of the document or thing described in the order was required for the purpose of examining a person within the bounds set by s 597 and the internal limitation in the examination orders: Re BPTC Ltd (in liq) (No 5) at 763.
33 By reference to Re BPTC, Master Sanderson held in Re Griffin Energy Group Pty Limited (subject to DOCA) [2012] WASC 389 at [64] ("Griffin Energy Group") that:
The scope of the power to issue an order for production under the section is more narrow than the power to issue a subpoena. Each examination for which the documents are sought must be assisted or facilitated by the production of each specific category of documents. It is not enough to merely say that the examinations generally relate to the examinable affairs of the company and the documents produced will assist in these examinations. Further this 'implied limit' on the power will be informed by the role of the examinee and the part they have played in the examination affairs, including relevant times at which they were associated with the company.
34 In Re Bill Express Ltd Limited (in liq); Di Donato v Crosbie [2010] VSC 101; (2010) 238 FLR 329 at [26], Davies J said, in relation to the power to make an order under s 596D but of equal relevance to the power under r 30.34, relevantly:
An examination may be confined by the order of the Court to particular matters and if so, the scope of documents that a court may order for production would similarly be confined. Where, as is the case here, no limitation is placed on the subject matter of the examination, other than that it must be about a corporation's examinable affairs, an order for production in terms that the examinee must produce all books and records relating to the affairs of a corporation is within the power of the Court. They are separate questions as to whether the purpose for which the examination has been sought is a proper and permissible purpose or whether the order may operate oppressively in relation to the person summonsed.
35 The term "examinable affairs" is defined in s 9 of the Act as:
(a) the promotional, formation, management, administration or winding up of the corporation; or
(b) any other affairs of the corporation (including anything that is included in the corporation's affairs because of section 53); or
(c) the business affairs of a connected entity of the corporation, in so far as they are, or appear to be, relevant to the corporation or to anything that is included in the corporation's examinable affairs because of paragraph (a) or (b).
36 The scope of this definition is enlarged by the terms of s 53 of the Act (to which sub para (b) refers), which relevantly provides:
For the purposes of the definition of examinable affairs in section 9, section 53AA, 232, 233 or 234, paragraph 461(1)(e), section 487, subsection 1307(1) or section 1309, or of a prescribed provision of this Act, the affairs of a body corporate include:
(a) the promotion, formation, membership, control, business, trading, transactions and dealings (whether alone or jointly with any other person or persons and including transactions and dealings as agent, bailee or trustee), property (whether held alone or jointly with any other person or persons and including property held as agent, bailee or trustee), liabilities (including liabilities owed jointly with any other person or persons and liabilities as trustee), profits and other income, receipts, losses, outgoings and expenditure of the body; and
…
(g) matters concerned with the ascertainment of the persons who are or have been financially interested in the success or failure, or apparent success or failure, of the body or are or have been able to control or materially to influence the policy of the body …
37 "Property" is defined in s 9 as follows:
[A]ny legal or equitable estate or interest (whether present or future and whether vested or contingent) in real or personal property of any description and includes a thing in action …
38 In Meteyard v Love [2005] NSWCA 444; (2005) 65 NSWLR 36, Santow JA cautioned against a narrow interpretation of the "examinable affairs" of a corporation, saying at [9]:
Insofar as the scope of the power depends upon whether the enquiry is directed to the "examinable affairs" of the corporation, I would emphasise the need for caution in any a priori observations seeking to limit the scope of that very broadly defined expression. It will often be only when the matter is looked on in closer detail, that the court will be in any position to ascertain whether the scope of the power has been exceeded or the power abused by its use in a vexatious or oppressive manner. That may only emerge when the examination is under way, though it can emerge earlier in a clear-cut case. Many cases however only reveal themselves as having that abusive or oppressive character after the Summons has issued and examination under way. Some may only have that adverse character in a particular aspect of the examination.
39 In Re Bill Express, at [27], Davies J continued:
It is uncontroversial that the following are legitimate purposes of an examination under s 597 of the Corporations Act:
(a) an examination is designed to serve the purpose of enabling an eligible applicant to gather information to assist the eligible applicant in the administration of the corporation;
(b) an examination assists the corporation's administrators to identify the corporation's assets, both tangible and intangible and also allows the corporation's liabilities to be identified;
(c) the purpose is to protect the interest of the corporation's creditors;
(d) the examination serves the purpose of enabling evidence and information to be obtained to support the bringing of proceedings against examinable officers and other persons in connection with the examinable affairs of the corporation;
(e) an examination assists in the regulation of corporations by providing a public forum for the examination of examinable officers of corporations.
40 The purposes of an examination may include inquiring as to the worth of a potential defendant: Grosvenor Hill (Qld) Pty Ltd v Barber (1994) 48 FCR 301 at 307 ("Grosvenor Hill"); Re New Tel Ltd (in liq) [2005] FCAFC 114; (2005) 145 FCR 176 at [81] and [82]. In Grosvenor Hill, at 311, the Full Court said:
In our view, the ambit of the power is sufficiently wide to enable information to be sought from a defendant or potential defendant as to the ability of that person to satisfy any reasonable judgment which may be obtained in litigation instituted by the liquidator.
41 In Re GEBIE Services Pty Ltd (in liq) [2017] FCA 323 at [29] to [31], White J rejected a submission that in order to establish that documents sought by liquidators were relevant to the examinable affairs of the company, it was necessary for the liquidators to assert that they were actually contemplating litigation against the applicant and to identify the particular proposed cause of action.