Q. And it would have been clear to you that these differences were related to the collision?
A. Well, there was something different, yes."
35 The concluding question in this cross-examination is as close as Mr Gretton came to being challenged on the connection. It was put to him, as will be seen, that it should have been clear that the differences in his personality were related to the collision. However, his answer cannot be accepted as an adoption of that proposition. The balance of the questioning pointed out to him the temporal succession, namely the occurrence of a collision and then the emergence of the symptoms. I do not think that either that cross-examination or Mr Gretton's responses to it demonstrate an appreciation of the connection.
36 Nor do I think that a layman, particularly one of Mr Gretton's relevantly modest educational attainments, should have perceived an issue of connection, or causation, from the mere fact of temporal succession.
37 In this context, it is interesting to note that there is evidence to suggest that the Navy itself considered, and rejected, the likelihood of psychological or psychiatric disturbance or illness, and rejected the proposition that psychological counselling should be offered generally to survivors of the collision. This attitude did not appear to change over the years; and, in litigation, the connection has been denied in some cases. It is very difficult to see why a greater degree of insight should be imputed to a rating who was involved in the collision than to those whose duty it was to deal with the consequences of the collision.
38 In any event, the test of sub para (iii) is whether Mr Gretton was unaware of the connection, not whether (contrast, for example, para (b)) he ought to have been, or become, aware of it.
39 It should be noted that (as one might expect) Mr Gretton has seen a number of medical practitioners over the years from 1964 to 2000. There is no basis for thinking that any of them was asked to, or did, consider the relationship between Mr Gretton's manifold symptoms and the collision; far less that any of them proffered advice to him on that subject.
Conclusion on s 60I
40 I therefore conclude that s 60I(1)(a)(iii) is satisfied in respect of all the injuries that, to the relevant level of satisfaction, are shown to have been sustained by Mr Gretton as a result of the collision.
41 I conclude further that s 60 I(1)(a)(i) and (ii) are satisfied in respect of some - what I have called the second group - of those injuries.
42 There is no doubt, on those findings, that these proceedings (including the application for extension of the limitation period) were brought within the three year period prescribed by s 60I(1)(b).
43 It follows that I may make an order under s 60G. I turn to consider the question, whether it will be just and reasonable to do so.
"Just and reasonable" - the Commonwealth's case
44 It is, of course, for Mr Gretton to show that it is just and reasonable for the limitation period to be extended, not for the Commonwealth to show that it is not. However, on this issue, the evidence and submissions revolved around the question of prejudice to the Commonwealth. Accordingly, and notwithstanding (nor in derogation from) the onus on Mr Gretton, I propose to consider this issue by reference to the Commonwealth's case. I wish to make it clear in doing so, that if the Commonwealth is not significantly prejudiced by reason of the delay in bringing these proceedings, the balance must favour an extension of the limitation period. Indeed, I did not understand the Commonwealth (on that hypothesis) to submit otherwise.
45 In considering this issue, it is necessary to bear in mind that the Commonwealth has admitted negligence (although not to the full extent alleged). But as I have said, if there is to be a trial, it will be limited to the assessment of damages. That confines in a significant way the area of debate.
46 The Commonwealth relied heavily on the passage of time since the collision, and the consequent difficulty of investigating and defending Mr Gretton's claim. It pointed to the fact that many potential witnesses had died or could not be located. Further, as to those who could be located, it pointed to the lack or paucity of their recollection (where indeed they were prepared to talk) and to the unwillingness of many to talk at all.
47 Further, the Commonwealth submitted, Mr Gretton was a witness who could not be relied upon to give a true account of events. Thus, the Commonwealth submitted, there was engaged what it said was the principle recognised in Commonwealth of Australia v Diston [2003] NSWCA 51.
Prejudice apart from Diston
48 There was a real issue between the parties as to the extent of the prejudice. The Commonwealth's evidence showed that an inquiry agent, Mr Campanella, had sought to locate and contact many men who had known Mr Gretton, in different ways, in the Navy. That evidence showed that the majority of those identified as potentially relevant witnesses could not help - because they were dead, or otherwise could not be located, or had no recollection, or simply did not wish to help.
49 But the Commonwealth's evidence did not show that it could not make a case relying on those who did remember Mr Gretton and who were prepared to help. Indeed, the Commonwealth's evidence on this point was less than forthcoming. Its evidence simply showed, at best, whether or not Mr Campanella had located the potential witnesses and whether or not they recalled Mr Gretton. On cross-examination, however, three points became apparent.
50 The first is that it does not seem that any great attempt was made to jog the memories of those contacted. Mr Campanella said at first simply that he rang them, and asked them whether they recalled Mr Gretton. It became apparent later that something more was said, including whether the person had served in the Navy and (where relevant) whether he was serving on board the Melbourne at the time of the collision. But I am not satisfied that any real or thorough attempt was made to jog the memories of those contacted. Thus, I regard with some degree of suspicion the proposition that some of those contacted had no, or only a limited, memory.
51 The second point is that Mr Campanella's recorded conclusions in some cases could not be regarded as accurate. That can be seen by comparing two contacts, a Mr Wilson and a Mr Zemick. In Mr Campanella's final report, the statement in relation to Mr Wilson was "recalled plaintiff". In relation to Mr Zemick, the statement was "had limited recollection of the plaintiff". Mr Campanella in cross-examination produced his notes of those contacts. It is apparent on comparing the notes that in fact Mr Zemick had a greater recollection, and provided more information, than did Mr Wilson. Of course, Mr Wilson's evidence was that Mr Gretton was a "hooligan" whereas Mr Zemick's evidence was that Mr Gretton was "very sincere ... very sound bloke"; and is capable of supporting the inference that Mr Gretton's behaviour on the night of the collision was "outstanding". Not only do I regard those details as not supportive of the summary given in Mr Campanella's report, I note with some alarm that the attribution of limited recollection is to someone whose case, on what the Commonwealth called the "premorbid personality", might have been thought to support Mr Gretton.
52 In this context, there is a significant difference of substance between the vast majority of Mr Campanella's reports relating to Mr Gretton and those that were provided relating to some other plaintiffs. In those cases, Mr Campanella's reports show not only the result of an attempt to contact the potential witness. They show also that, where contact was made, what information the person could give. In almost all cases, the reports in relation to Mr Gretton do not do so, although it is apparent, from what I have just said in relation to Mr Wilson and Mr Zemick, that some information was conveyed. There is no explanation of why the reports were so much more limited in Mr Gretton's case. The inference is open that this was done to maximise the appearance of prejudice.
53 The third of the points to which I have referred is (as the second point makes clear) Mr Campanella went beyond what might be gathered from the reports that the Commonwealth has proved. He has made some inquiries as to what those who had a recollection could say. The responses have been proved in two cases. Without knowing what other responses (if any) have been gathered, and bearing in mind the difference between the "Gretton" reports and the other reports, it is not possible to make an assessment of the quality of the evidence that will be available to the Commonwealth.
54 It does not follow, simply because many of those thought to be relevant as witnesses have not (for whatever reason) been available or helpful, that no defence can be mounted from the evidence of those who are found to be available or helpful. It does not follow that the evidence based on Mr Campanella's investigations takes this category of prejudice from presumptive to actual.
55 At this point, it should also be noted that there was evidence that information is available from other sources, including the HMAS Melbourne Association, HMAS Voyager Association and the Returned Services League. There is no evidence of any attempt to locate relevant personnel through those sources. Nor was any attempt made to contact those who have made claims (or were making claims). At least for those whose claims have been finalised, I see no apparent reason why it would not be possible to contact them; of course, whether they would be prepared to help is a different matter.
56 The Commonwealth relied also on the destruction of Navy records relating to the period after the collision until Mr Gretton left the service in 1968.
57 The evidence shows that the Navy was aware by May 1964 of the existence, not just the likelihood, of psychological injury. The Commander of HMAS Sydney, to which ship many sailors from the Voyager had been posted, sent a signal requesting "psychological assessment of ex Voyager ratings". That request was refused: