Greiss v Seven Network

THE IMPUTATIONS 41 Although there was initially a dispute about whether one of the pleaded imputations was conveyed, ultimately the respondents accepted that all the pleaded imputations were conveyed and were defamatory. 42 I therefore make the following findings. 43 The first matter conveyed the following imputations or imputations no different in substance, each of which is defamatory: (1) Mr Greiss engaged in the vile act of staring down and spitting towards Mr Hayne's rape victim; (2) Mr Greiss stared down and spat in the direction of Mr Hayne's rape victim; (3) Mr Greiss is despicable, in that he stared down and spat in the direction of Mr Hayne's rape victim; and (4) Mr Greiss sought to harass and intimidate Mr Hayne's rape victim by staring her down and spitting at her. 44 The second matter conveyed the following imputations or imputations no different in substance, each of which is defamatory: (5) Mr Greiss spat at a rape victim outside court; and (6) Mr Greiss is despicable, in that he spat at a rape victim outside court. 45 The third matter conveyed imputations (2), (3) and (4) or imputations no different in substance, each of which is defamatory.

THE RESPONDENTS' AMENDMENT APPLICATION 46 In their defence the respondents originally pleaded justification and honest opinion. On 4 July 2022 I made case management orders which included provision for the exchange of witness statements, discovery and the fixing of the hearing dates. 47 On 3 February 2023, five weeks before the trial was due to start, the respondents filed an interlocutory application (the application) seeking leave to amend their defence. The application was supported by an affidavit of Justine Munsie, the respondents' solicitor. 48 Mr Greiss opposed the application, relying on an affidavit sworn on 28 February 2023 by his solicitor, Margaret Antunes of Antunes Lawyers. 49 The application was listed for hearing on the first day of the trial. After hearing argument, I informed the parties that I would allow the application and give my reasons later. Counsel for Mr Greiss then indicated that reasons for that decision were not required "for the purpose of the trial". At the time, I had the impression that reasons were not required at all. On reflection, however, I considered my impression may well have been wrong. Consequently I record the reasons below. As the amendments concerned multiple aspects of the respondents' defence, it is convenient to set out my reasons for allowing them before turning to the substantive determination of this matter.

The relevant considerations 50 Rule 16.53 of the Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) (Rules) requires that any party wishing to amend a pleading after pleadings have closed must apply for the leave of the Court. Rule 1.41 provides that, if a party makes an application, the Court may grant or refuse the order sought or make a different order. The Court's discretion is at large, save that, like any power conferred by the Rules, it must be exercised in the way that best promotes the overarching purpose of the civil practice and procedure provisions of the relevant legislation, including the Rules, set out in s 37M(3) of the Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) (FCA Act). That purpose is the just resolution of disputes according to law and as quickly, inexpensively and efficiently as possible: FCA Act, s 37M(1). 51 Various factors are relevant to the exercise of the power. The respondents relied on the uncontroversial summary contained in the judgment of Besanko J in Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 5) [2020] FCA 1067, drawn from a number of authorities listed at [15] of that judgment. They are: (1) the nature and importance of the amendments to the party applying for them; (2) the extent of the delay and the costs associated with it; (3) the explanation for the delay; (4) the prejudice that might reasonably be assumed to follow from the amendment and that which is shown; (5) the parties' choices to date in the litigation and their consequences; (6) the detriment to other litigants in the court if the amendments are allowed; and (7) the potential loss of public confidence in the legal system which can arise where a court is seen to accede to applications made without adequate explanation or justification.

The proposed amendments 52 The respondents wished to amend their defence by: (1) adding a defence of contextual truth under s 26 of the Defamation Act 2005 (NSW) (Defamation Act) to the first and third matters, including a new particular 8; (2) amending particular 7 of their justification defence; and (3) amending their particulars of mitigation to enable them to rely on the substantial truth of the contextual imputations in mitigation of damages in the event that their substantive defences were not made out.

The amendment to the particulars of the justification defence 53 It is convenient to deal first with this aspect of the amended defence. 54 Particular 7 initially read: The Applicant faced the Walkway and stared at the Victim and spat towards her feet as she passed by him to exit the court precinct. 55 The respondents' amendment sought to delete the words "towards her feet as" and insert "after" in substitution. 56 Mr Greiss submitted that, as amended, the particular was "hopelessly imprecise and … incapable of proving the substantial truth of any of the pleaded imputations because it does not address a material part of the sting". He argued that "[t]here is no longer any particularised allegation that the spitting was directed towards the victim, and it is clear that it is no longer the respondents' case that the spitting occurred in her presence, but merely an unspecified time after she had left". In the result, he contended that the entire justification defence was no longer tenable and should be struck out. He claimed that the respondents' case "now rises no higher than an allegation that Mr Greiss spat in an unspecified direction an unspecified amount of time after the victim left the area" and was incapable of proving the substantial truth of the pleaded imputations, let alone in the context in which they are conveyed by each publication. 57 In its proposed form the amendment was imprecise. But the reason for the amendment was apparent from the correspondence in which it was foreshadowed. 58 In Ms Munsie's letter of 23 December 2022, in which she notified Mr Greiss's lawyers of the respondents' intentions to file the amended defence, the amendment was said to be necessary to remove part of an allegation following the preparation of a short supplementary statement of Ms Ryan served at the same time. In that statement Ms Ryan said that, having reviewed the footage discovered by Seven and the CCTV footage from the day of the incident, she "[does] not believe [Mr Greiss] spat in the direction of the victim's feet" but rather believed that he "spat in her direction". This is the point of the amendment. 59 In the circumstances, I decided that the justification defence should not be struck out. Instead, I granted the respondents leave to amend particular 7 so that it reflected what Ms Ryan said in her supplementary statement, namely that Mr Greiss spat in the victim's direction as she passed by him, a course which Mr Greiss agreed disposed of his objection to the amendment. 60 Consequently, particular 7 now reads: The Applicant faced the Walkway and stared at the Victim and spat in her direction as she passed by him to exit the court precinct.

The amendment to raise a contextual truth defence 61 The amendment proposed was a single contextual imputation with respect to each of the first and third matters in the following terms: The Applicant behaved disgracefully outside of Court to the woman Jarryd Hayne had been sentenced for raping. 62 The respondents allege that the contextual imputation in each case is substantially true and, by reason of its substantial truth, publication of such of the pleaded imputations as may not be found to be substantially true did no further harm to Mr Greiss's reputation. 63 Mr Greiss objected to the amendments on four bases: (1) the contextual imputation does not arise; (2) the particulars were not capable of proving the truth of the contextual imputations; (3) the delay was not explained or at least not adequately explained; and (4) he would be prejudiced by the amendment. I deal with each of these objections below in the same order.

Does the contextual imputation arise? 64 As the respondents submitted, this was a trial issue. The real question on the application was whether the imputation was capable of being conveyed or, put another way, it was reasonably arguable that the contextual imputation arises. 65 Mr Greiss pointed out that s 26 of the Defamation Act (as it was before the amendments that commenced on 1 July 2021, which are inapplicable) required that a contextual imputation be carried "in addition to" the imputations pleaded by him. He submitted that any such imputation must be formulated so that facts, matters and circumstances that can be relied on to establish its truth bear a reasonable relationship to the contextual imputation itself and to the matters complained of. Otherwise, as Wigney J pointed out in Domican v Pan Macmillan Australia Pty Ltd [2019] FCA 1384 at [44], "the respondent can then rely on particulars of truth that may have nothing whatsoever to do with the published material". 66 Mr Greiss submitted that the way his behaviour is said to have been disgraceful is that he stared down and spat towards the victim, but as the first and third matters do not refer to any other relevant conduct, the contextual imputations are not "in addition to" the pleaded imputations. As I explain below, a contextual imputation need only differ in substance from the pleaded imputation and I was persuaded that the contextual imputation the respondents wished to plead did differ in substance from the pleaded imputations. I considered it was at least reasonably arguable that the single act of spitting towards, or in the direction of, a rape victim was sufficiently serious to support the general meaning of disgraceful behaviour. 67 In any case, as the respondents submitted, the matters complained of were not bare recitations that Mr Greiss stared down and spat at the victim. The contextual imputation also arises from the headline of the first matter ("Disgusting scenes outside court …") and from the description of Mr Greiss's behaviour (staring the young woman down and spitting in her direction) in circumstances in which the publication also reported that her assailant had just been jailed for a "brutal sexual assault" and "the vile act aimed towards [her] occurred just hours after she declared [her assailant] had destroyed her life …". In the third matter, the contextual imputation arises not merely from the reference to a supporter staring down the victim and spitting in her direction but from the words "foul behaviour". 68 Mr Greiss also contended that "the vice of the proposed contextual imputations is that they seek to re-articulate the sting of the [f]irst and [t]hird matters at a high level of abstraction as the pretext for introducing evidence of a specific incident which is not mentioned anywhere in the [f]irst or [t]hird matter[ ] and which is remote from the conduct which is mentioned" (original emphasis). He argued that it involved a verbal exchange with a journalist, was not directed to the victim, and took place well after the victim is said to have left the court precinct. He claimed that this was the vice identified by Wigney J in Domican at [44] and in the authorities his Honour cited. 69 I reject this contention. The only new particular relied upon was that: After the Victim had left the Court precinct the Applicant described her as an "escort" to a member of the media. 70 The proposed amendment did not reflect the vice identified by Wigney J in Domican. The facts, matters and circumstances upon which the respondents intended to rely in order to establish the truth of the contextual imputation were capable of bearing a reasonable relationship to the contextual imputation and would not have "nothing whatsoever" to do with it. The remark Mr Greiss is said to have made at the courthouse occurred after the victim's assailant was convicted, within an hour after she left, and in an exchange which included references to the episode in which Mr Greiss was said to have spat towards, or in the direction of, the victim. Moreover, I considered it could indicate that Mr Greiss was contemptuous of the victim; that he felt she had no right to complain; and it arguably explained why he might have spat at or towards her (or in her direction), if indeed he did. 71 Nothing in Domican or the other authorities to which Wigney J referred in that case (in which contextual imputations were said to be so broad as to capture, as the respondents put it, "historical, disparate and wholly unconnected acts" of a plaintiff) suggests that the contextual imputations the respondents sought to plead were of that type: see Domican at [45]-[51].

Are the particulars capable of proving the truth of the contextual imputation? 72 Mr Greiss submitted that the "extremely limited particulars" do not support a contextual imputation of disgraceful behaviour "to" the victim because the reference to her as an escort was not made to her and, given the proposed amendment to particular 7 to the justification defence, there is now no allegation that Mr Greiss spat towards her or in her presence. 73 As a result of the respondents' revised amendment to particular 7, this question also fell away. Particular 7 of the contextual truth defence is now in the same terms as the revised particular 7 to the justification defence. In their revised form, I was satisfied that the particulars were capable of proving the truth of the contextual imputation.

The extent of the delay 74 The originating application and statement of claim were filed on 21 April 2022 and sealed copies were served on the respondents' solicitors by email on 26 April 2022, the day the documents were accepted for filing. The respondents filed their defence on 14 June 2022 and no reply was filed. Mr Greiss was notified of the proposed amendments by email six months later, on 23 December 2022. The email was sent to Ms Antunes and Andrew Kaine, an associate of her firm. Mr Kaine replied on 16 January 2023. He said that the firm's office was closed from 22 December 2022 and the email did not come to their attention until 9 January 2023 when the office reopened. Ms Munsie wrote to Antunes on 2 February 2023 requesting their consent to an order she proposed to seek at the forthcoming case management hearing that leave be granted to the respondents to file their draft amended defence. Since that time the scope of the contextual truth defence had narrowed. 75 Ms Antunes' affidavit disclosed that CCTV footage in the possession of Mr Greiss was served on the respondents' solicitors on 8 July 2022 and Ms Ryan's first statement was served on Antunes on 23 August 2022. A mediation took place on 18 October 2022.

Is the delay adequately explained? Is there the potential for the public to lose confidence in the legal system if the amendments are allowed? 76 These questions are related and can be considered together. 77 In my opinion the delay was not adequately explained. 78 As Mr Greiss pointed out, Ms Munsie did not expressly address the reason(s) for the delay in her affidavit. The rather opaque inference from her affidavit was that the amendments were proposed by senior counsel who was only briefed in late October 2022. 79 As Mr Greiss submitted, while Ms Munsie deposed that senior counsel was briefed on 26 October 2022 and a draft amended defence was served on 23 December 2022, she did not say that the defence was amended on the advice of senior counsel. The respondent's written submissions on the application, however, which purported to be the work of both senior and junior counsel, recorded that "[a]s to the defence of contextual truth, senior counsel took the view that it ought to be pleaded" and, as to the change to particular 7 of the justification defence, "Ms Ryan took this view after further observing video footage". 80 In these circumstances I accepted that the proposal to amend to plead contextual truth was made on the advice of senior counsel. That said, Ms Munsie did not say when she received the advice or how long it took to obtain instructions to make the application. If it was around the time senior counsel was briefed, then there was a two-month delay in notifying Mr Greiss which is unexplained. Moreover, the evidence upon which the respondents rely to plead the "escort" allegation was in their possession at all relevant times. It is contained in the Seven videos of which Ms Munsie was aware since before the proceeding commenced, as she referred to them in pre-litigation correspondence in August 2021. And no evidence was adduced to indicate when Ms Ryan first reviewed the footage or when she decided that her initial statement should be revised. 81 Nevertheless, for the following reasons I did not consider that there was any real risk of a loss of confidence in the legal system.

Would Mr Greiss be prejudiced if the amendments are allowed? 82 Mr Greiss did not suggest that he was unable to meet either the new contextual truth defence or the amendment to the justification defence. In particular, as the respondents observed, he did not suggest that if notice had been given at an earlier point in time he would have issued a subpoena, made some forensic decision or had lost some opportunity. Rather, he submitted that there was "general prejudice caused by the lateness of the amendment" and "specific prejudice because the contextual truth defence … [was] an attempt to introduce an exchange not referred to in the publications, so as to cause further harm and damage to Mr Greiss in the conduct of the trial". 83 The "general prejudice" was not identified and no proper foundation was laid for the serious accusation of bad faith inherent in the allegation of "specific prejudice". 84 While it was understandable that Mr Greiss would want to exclude from the trial evidence that he had referred to the victim as an escort, that is not relevant prejudice. Even if the respondents did not raise the making of the comment by way of a defence of contextual truth or in mitigation of damages, their counsel would be able to cross-examine on it and it would emerge in evidence in any event. It would be relevant to Mr Greiss's state of mind and would arguably support the respondents' version of events. 85 As no relevant prejudice was occasioned by the lateness of the amendments, I was of the opinion that little weight should attach to the inadequacy of the respondents' explanation for the delay. 86 Of course, in some cases, the absence of an explanation (or an adequate explanation) for the delay in applying for an amendment will be significant. In Aon Risk Services Australia Ltd v Australian National University (2009) 239 CLR 175 at [103], the plurality (Gummow, Hayne, Crennan, Kiefel and Bell JJ) observed that "[g]enerally speaking, where a discretion is sought to be exercised in favour of one party, and to the disadvantage of another, an explanation will be called for" and in most cases in which delay has occurred the party responsible should explain it. In that case the absence of an adequate explanation was significant. The University had applied for an adjournment of a four-week trial on the third day of the trial in order to make substantial amendments to its statement of claim. Still, as the Full Court (Keane CJ, Gilmour and Logan JJ) observed in Cement Australia Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (2010) 187 FCR 261 at [51]: Aon Risk is not a one size fits all case. Whilst various factors are identified in the judgment as relevant to the exercise of discretion, the weight to be given to these factors, individually and in combination, and the outcome of that balancing process, may vary depending on the facts in the individual case. As the plurality in Aon Risk observed at [75], statements made in cases concerning amendment of pleadings are best understood by reference to the circumstances of those cases, even if they are stated in terms of general application. 87 The factors that persuaded the High Court in Aon that the applications for adjournment and amendment should not have been allowed were the timing of the application, the necessity to vacate or adjourn the trial dates, the inadequacy of the explanation, and the fact that new claims were intended to be raised which had not previously been agitated because of a deliberate tactical decision not to. 88 The circumstances of the present case were very different. I was not persuaded that the deficiencies in the respondents' explanation were a sufficient reason to refuse their application. Where amendments to a pleading have arguable merit and there is no significant or appreciable prejudice, a court will rarely deny an application to amend a pleading. Nor is it to the point that some additional expense may be incurred in addressing the new defence. As Marshall, Rares and Flick JJ said in Dye v Commonwealth Securities Limited (No 2) [2010] FCAFC 118 at [81]: A new factual allegation permitted by an amendment may involve putting the party against whom it is made to the expense of meeting it at trial. However, that will rarely, if ever, be a reason for refusing an amendment that enables a real issue to be heard and determined in the controversy between the parties provided that it can be done having regard to the overarching purpose in Pt VB of the Federal Court of Australia Act. The object of inexpensive determination of disputes does not require the Court to preclude a party ventilating a real dispute at all.

To what extent, if at all, would other litigants in the court be adversely affected if the amendments were allowed? 89 It was not suggested that leave should be refused because other litigants would be adversely affected if the amendments were to be allowed. Mr Greiss made no submissions on this question. In circumstances such as this, where no application was made or foreshadowed for the hearing dates to be vacated and the hearing would not be prolonged as a result of the amendments, no detriment to other litigants could arise.

Conclusion 90 Taking all relevant factors into consideration and weighing them in the balance, I was satisfied that the best way to promote the overarching purpose was to allow the respondents' amendments and require the respondents to pay the costs of the application.

ISSUES 91 It follows that the remaining issues concern: (1) whether the defences of justification, honest opinion and/or contextual truth have been made out; and (2) if not: (i) the extent to which any of the matters relied upon to prove justification, honest opinion and/or contextual truth mitigates damages; (ii) whether Mr Greiss has made out a case for aggravated damages; and (iii) the amount, if any, of damages that should be awarded.

The law 92 Section 25 of the Defamation Act provides that it is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that the defamatory imputations carried by the matter of which the plaintiff complains are substantially true. A defendant who raises such a defence must prove that each of the imputations and every material part of those imputations was substantially true at the time of publication: Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Mahommed [2010] NSWCA 335; 278 ALR 232 at [138] (McColl JA, with whom Spigelman CJ (at [1]), Beazley JA (at [2]), McClellan CJ at CL (at [283]) and Bergin CJ in Eq (at [284]) agreed). There is no defence of partial justification: Kumova v Davison (No 2) [2023] FCA 1 at [96] (Lee J). "Substantially true" is defined in s 4 of the Defamation Act to mean "true in substance or not materially different from the truth". It is unnecessary for a defendant to prove that every part of an imputation is literally true; it is enough that its gravamen or "sting" of the imputation is true: Mahommed at [138]. 93 In considering whether imputations that require an evaluative assessment of Mr Greiss's conduct (such as the imputations that his conduct was "vile" or "despicable" or that he behaved "disgracefully"), it is necessary to consider whether ordinary decent people, that is, reasonable people of ordinary intelligence, experience and education, bringing to bear their general knowledge and experience of worldly affairs, would come to that conclusion: Harbour Radio Pty Ltd v Trad (2012) 247 CLR 31 at [54]-[56] (Gummow, Hayne and Bell JJ). 94 If the justification defence fails, however, evidence led in support of that defence may mitigate damages. Thus, if the respondents fail to prove that one imputation or a material part of an imputation is not substantially true but prove that another is, the substantial truth of the other may reduce the damages "perhaps almost to vanishing point": Pamplin v Express Newspapers Ltd [1988] 1 WLR 116 at 120 (Neill LJ).

The scope of the factual dispute 95 Mr Greiss denied having any interest in the victim. He claimed not to have been looking at her, let alone staring her down, and in his evidence in chief he insisted he did not spit at all, let alone at the victim, until after the victim had left the court precinct. 96 I take it to be common ground that, if Mr Greiss is found to have acted in this way, that was a vile act, that it was despicable conduct and disgraceful behaviour, and that it was intimidating and harassing. Certainly there was no argument to the contrary. In any event, I have no doubt that ordinary decent people would so conclude.

What does the video footage show? 97 The CCTV footage shed some light on the events, although it has its limitations. One of those limitations is that there is no audio. Another is that that footage was taken from fixed cameras which do not apparently correspond to the perspectives of various witnesses at all material times. In particular, the evidence was insufficient to establish that the CCTV footage captured the line of sight of each of the respondents' witnesses at any relevant time. In addition to the CCTV footage there was audiovisual evidence obtained from material produced on subpoena by three media organisations. 98 I have watched and listened to this material several times. I make the following findings based on what I saw and heard. The times given below reflect the time stamps on the CCTV footage. It was common ground, however, that the time stamps were inaccurate in that they were approximately 15 minutes behind the real time.

As the victim's group leaves the courthouse 99 At 3:31:19 pm a sheriff's officer, who the parties agreed was Mr Girkin, emerged from the courthouse followed by the other members of the victim's group. They immediately turned right and proceeded down a disability ramp, which runs along the front of the courthouse and then turns left towards Hunter Street. The ramp is wide enough for two people to walk alongside each other. 100 Mr Girkin led the group down the ramp, until he stopped at the bottom of the small staircase which connected the ramp to the mezzanine, while the rest of the group continued down the ramp. Behind Mr Girkin was a man in a suit. Walking behind that man were two women walking side-by-side. The woman closer to the wall of the courthouse was the victim. Behind the two women was the Crown Prosecutor followed by three women in single file. At the end of the group was Mr Weaver. At approximately 3:31:49 pm (around 30 seconds after Mr Girkin first exited the courthouse) the last member of the group (Mr Weaver) left the ramp and turned right down Hunter Street. 101 At the time this group emerged from the courthouse, Mr Greiss was sitting on a bench outside on the mezzanine level. The bench was approximately halfway between the entrance to the courthouse and the small staircase. Mr Greiss was facing away from the entrance. But at approximately 3:31:27 pm (that is eight seconds after Mr Girkin walked out of the courthouse) Mr Greiss looked over his left shoulder towards the group. At 3:31:29 pm Mr Greiss stood up from the bench and walked towards the stairs that connected the mezzanine and the ramp. 102 The following still depicts the scene as it would have appeared to anyone standing at the top of the ramp at 3:31:38 pm. Mr Greiss was looking towards, or in the direction of, the victim as she passed by with other members of the group. She did not look at him. Like all members of the group, she was looking ahead. Mr Girkin was standing at the bottom of the staircase but not obscuring Mr Greiss's view of the victim. 103 At 3:31:39 pm Mr Greiss pointed in the direction of the victim. His mouth was moving. The woman walking next to the victim turned her head to look at Mr Greiss. I infer that he said something which attracted her attention. 104 Two seconds later, Mr Greiss pointed in the direction of the victim again and once more the woman to the left of the victim turned her head to look at him as the following still shows. 105 At 3:31:45 pm Mr Greiss turned his head slightly to face Hunter Street and spat into a garden bed: 106 The man in the blue shirt is Mr Petras. The man in the red shoes seated on the bench is Mr Iuta. 107 At this point the victim had almost reached the end of the ramp as the following still from the CCTV footage shows. 108 At 3:31:47 pm Mr Greiss pointed in the direction of the victim for a third time. At this juncture Mr Girkin started to walk up the stairs towards Mr Greiss. About a second later, three sheriff's officers standing outside the front of the courthouse moved towards Mr Greiss. Four seconds after that, the last member of the victim's group disappeared from view. 109 The video footage taken by Channel 7 records the reactions of journalists. An unidentified man asked: "Are they intimidating her? That's outrageous." Three seconds later, Ms Genders said: "That's disgusting. He just spat at them". Three seconds after that, Ms Ryan said: "He was staring down the victim [inaudible] yeah". These comments or comments to the same effect are picked up in a video taken by a Channel 10 camera operator. All but one of them is made within 36 seconds of the time the respondents allege Mr Greiss spat at or towards the victim or in her direction. In addition, both the Channel 7 and Channel 10 footage record Ms Ryan saying: "He was staring the victim down and then spat towards her". 110 At 3:32:21 pm, after Mr Greiss and Mr Petras spoke to the sheriff's officers, Mr Greiss spat for a second time into the garden bed near the main stairs outside the front of the courthouse. This second spit is difficult to discern on the CCTV footage but it is crystal clear on the Channel 10 footage. Following the second spit Mr Greiss returned to talk to the sheriff's officers.

After the victim's group left 111 At 3:35:10 pm, footage obtained from Channel 10 reveals that Mr Greiss called out: Did you put that she's an escort? (gesticulating as though writing in the air) Did you put that in your…yeah, you're journalists right? Yeah, put that in your thing. 112 A woman in the media pack immediately responds but only her last word is audible. That is "spat". 113 Two seconds later, Ms Ryan said: "Absolutely appalling behaviour". Mr Greiss replied: "Yeah? Oh good, I'm happy with that." 114 These exchanges were referred to in submissions as the first escort conversation. 115 At 3:35:40 pm, Mr Greiss, along with Mr Mateo, Mr Iuta and Mr Petras left the mezzanine via the stairs that lead down to the disability ramp. 116 A few minutes later, Ms Ryan tweeted the third matter complained of. 117 Approximately nine minutes later (and about 12 minutes after the respondents allege that Mr Greiss stared down the victim and spat at, towards, or in her direction) video footage obtained from Fairfax depicts Mr Greiss approaching Ms Ryan and other members of the media who were still milling around at the bottom of the stairs on Hunter Street outside the courthouse. At this point, the following exchange (the second escort conversation) took place: Mr Greiss: You're quick on Twitter. Ms Ryan: What? Oh yeah, I'm good at tweeting. Mr Greiss: [Inaudible] quick. Grub you reckon? Ms Ryan: Yeah, you are. Mr Greiss: Yeah, all good, yeah. I'm happy with that. Ms Ryan: Ok. Mr Greiss: I can, I can live with that. Ms Ryan: If you want to be remembered by that, that's fine. Mr Greiss: I can deal- Ms Ryan: And I just love that you've focused on another woman, haven't you? Mr Greiss: Yeah, absolutely. Yeah. Ms Ryan: Yeah, yeah. Course. Mr Greiss: Did you put that she's an escort? Ms Ryan: That's indicative of the type of person that you are. Mr Greiss: All good. Did youse put that an escort? None of your articles said es - nothing about her being an escort. Ms Ryan: Didn't come out in court, did it? Mr Greiss: Oh, that's what comes out in court, aye. Only what comes out in court. Ms Ryan: No, yeah. We report on facts, mate. Mr Greiss: Yeah Ms Ryan: Yeah, we do, yeah. Mr Greiss: Yeah, yeah? Good work. Good work. Ms Ryan: Yeah. Mr Greiss: Fuck out of here bro. Female: She's not an escort, that's why. (Emphasis added.) 118 About five minutes after this exchange, Mr Greiss (along with Mr Petras, Mr Mateo and Mr Iuta) walked away from Ms Ryan and the other members of the media and, at 3:50:16 pm on the CCTV footage, Mr Greiss spat for a third and final time, this time towards the journalists. The spit was immediately preceded by the following exchange (the third escort conversation), which was captured variously by Channel 9 and 10 video cameras and incorporated in a compilation video which was tendered without objection and became Exhibit 12: Ms Ryan: Trying to intimidate another woman are you? Mr Greiss: You're not a woman. Ms Ryan: Get out of my face. Mr Greiss: You're not a woman. Ms Ryan: Get out of my face. Mr Petras: Why you calling him a grub, why you calling him a grub on social media? Mr Greiss: Yeah…[inaudible]. Ms Ryan: Uh, I called him a grub. Mr Petras: Yeah, why you calling him a grub? Ms Ryan: Because he spat towards the victim. Mr Greiss: Yeah, I did spit. Mr Petras: Yeah, he spat on an escort. He spat on an escort. Mr Greiss: Don't touch me, don't touch me. Did you see what she's fucking putting up? Ms Ryan: Yeah, ok mate. Get out of my face. Mr Petras: He should spit on you. Male: Say that again. Mr Petras: He should spit on you- Mr Greiss: Yeah, exactly! Mr Petras: Treat you like a dog like you are. Mr Greiss: Fuck out of here. Mr Petras: Look at the fucking dropouts from school. Look at the nerds. Mr Greiss: Yeah, put that on your thing…still racks up, yeah? Hey, put that on there… Mr Petras: Hey put that, put that on there she's an escort. Put it on there, she's an escort. Mr Greiss: (spits) Here, another one for ya. (Emphasis added.) 119 With the exception of the first remark by Mr Greiss ("You're quick on Twitter"), which is plainly audible and which Mr Greiss accepted he made, the above account is taken from a transcript of the three conversations prepared by the respondents. While counsel for Mr Greiss disputed its accuracy, I have both watched and listened carefully to the footage. I consider that the transcript of these conversations that the respondents prepared is substantially correct, indeed almost word perfect. While the words uttered immediately after the final spit (at about 42 seconds into the compilation video) are not as loud as others, I am satisfied that Mr Greiss did say those words or words to precisely the same effect. Indeed, in cross-examination, immediately after Exhibit 12 had been played, Mr Greiss agreed: MR RICHARDSON: Now, Mr Greiss, I want to suggest that at the last moment played there, you said, "Here's another for you," or, "There's another one for you"?---Okay. I - - - Do you agree with that?---Yes, I agree.

The evidence from the witnesses 120 Mr Greiss gave his account of what occurred. He also relied on evidence adduced from two friends and supporters of Mr Hayne, who were with him at the time the conduct the subject of the proceeding took place. They were Mr Mateo and Mr Iuta. 121 Ms Ryan was the first of the respondents' witnesses to be called. Two other journalists were also called. They were Giselle Wakatama, a journalist with the Australian Broadcasting Corporation, and Ms Genders, a journalist with Channel 9. 122 What follows is a recitation of the salient parts of the evidence or its effect. 123 Although Mr Greiss was the first witness to be called in the proceeding, it is convenient to begin with the evidence of Ms Ryan and the other journalists who were called by the respondents since they bear the onus of proof on the justification defence.

Leonie Ryan 124 Ms Ryan sat in a designated media room where the proceedings concerning Mr Hayne were being livestreamed until the sentence was handed down when she left the courthouse and stood at the bottom of the stairs leading from Hunter Street to the front of the building with reporters from various media outlets. Her purpose was to try to obtain a reaction from Mr Hayne's supporters outside court. 125 Ms Ryan saw a sheriff, followed by others including the victim, leave the courthouse and descend the ramp. She estimated that there were about half a dozen people in the group with the victim. At about the time they started to move, Ms Ryan noticed Mr Greiss stand up from his seat and "almost walk [in] the direction of where the alleged victim was walking" while "staring at her and mumbling". In cross-examination she clarified that she did not hear him mumbling but saw his mouth moving. She maintained that she could see this movement from where she was standing because his face was "side on" rather than directed away from her. She denied that Mr Greiss's large beard would have prevented her from being able to see him mumbling. 126 As the victim walked past, Mr Greiss "spat in her direction". She saw his "head move back and go forward" and heard "a spitting sound". 127 Mr Greiss appeared to be facing "the group of people that had just passed him" and she formed the impression that his behaviour was directed at the victim. 128 When asked what gave her that impression, Ms Ryan replied: When he stood up, it coincided at the exact same moment she walked out of the doors. And she was on the inside, but almost third from the front. It just appeared that his - his - his eyeline was directed at her. 129 Ms Ryan stated that Mr Greiss was staring at the victim but that the victim did not notice him. 130 When put to her in cross-examination that she was too far away to hear any spitting sound, especially in light of her acceptance that she could not hear Mr Greiss mumbling, she stood her ground. She admitted, however, that she did not see Mr Greiss spit towards the victim's feet, despite saying so in a witness statement she prepared about nine months earlier. In that respect she accepted that her recollection at that time was incorrect. 131 In cross-examination she said that "a second or two" after she saw Mr Greiss spit, she saw him point towards the group. 132 After being shown the footage from Channels 7 and 10 of the journalists' reactions, Ms Ryan identified her voice and that of Ms Genders. 133 In cross-examination Ms Ryan recalled that she was standing on the footpath facing the court at the bottom-left of the main entry stairs when she saw Mr Greiss spit. She described (correctly) the victim's position within the group. At the invitation of the cross-examiner, Ms Ryan marked her position at that time and the positions of other members of the media, the victim and Mr Greiss on a photograph of the courthouse (Exhibit R). She indicated that Ms Wakatama, Ms Genders and the Channel 7 and Channel 9 cameramen were standing with her. She placed Mr Greiss on the mezzanine level close to the small staircase and the victim on the lower part of the ramp near the position of the small staircase. 134 When challenged about the position of the victim at the moment of the spit, Ms Ryan said she was more focused on Mr Greiss so was not paying attention to the victim's position. But she denied the proposition that at the time of the alleged spit the victim was about to step onto the footpath on Hunter Street. 135 Ms Ryan was unable to recall whether there was a sheriff's officer near Mr Greiss at the time she claimed to have first seen him spit. But Ms Ryan testified that "within seconds" of seeing Mr Greiss spit, "a number of sheriffs" approached him. 136 Ms Ryan said she had two or three interactions with Mr Greiss after she saw him spit. She rejected the proposition put to her in cross-examination that his exchanges with her were not motivated by his animus towards the victim. She agreed that he first approached her about her tweet, saying words to the effect of "You're very quick on Twitter" (see the second escort conversation). She denied the proposition that much of the exchange she had with him and Mr Petras related to content of her tweet. She also denied the proposition that Mr Greiss was "expressing to her his concern and upset" about the tweet. In this respect, the video footage of the escort conversations supports her denial.

Giselle Wakatama 137 Like Ms Ryan, Ms Wakatama sat in the media room during the sentencing hearing. After the sentence was handed down, she moved outside and waited on the pavement at the bottom of the main entry stairs. 138 She recalled seeing "a group gliding down the walkway" which she understood to consist of various officers and the victim. At this time she observed Mr Greiss stand up "quickly" and make his way to a "gap with stairs" that led to the disability ramp. When asked about what she observed about Mr Greiss at this point she said: I just remember hands, and I remembered a lunge, like, sort of a - a motioning, a lunge towards that open area as they walked down. He had his mouth open. I didn't see - I thought he was saying something or yelling something, but then there was just, as I said, this sort of motion and then, sort of, an ostrich-type move as he got to the end of the lunge. 139 At this time, Ms Wakatama remembered that the victim was "going past, down the walkway, past the open area where there are steps up to the mezzanine level from the rampway". 140 At the moment she saw Mr Greiss lunge, she said he called the victim "an escort" and spat at her but in cross-examination it became clear that her evidence that he spat at her was based on what Ms Ryan or Ms Genders (or both) had said. 141 In cross-examination Ms Wakatama said that the mouth opening and hand movements occurred about 20 seconds before the lunge. She said she never saw or heard any spitting but did see Mr Greiss's mouth open and saw him lunge, in an "ostrich-type" movement, while "facing across the walkway" when the victim passed. While it was put to Ms Wakamata that she could not have seen his mouth moving or moving to the extent she described, having regard to her position and his bushy beard, Ms Wakamata was unshakeable. She maintained that she could see "a profile of a mouth open and hands" and could see "his head move as [the victim] moved". 142 Ms Wakatama said that Mr Greiss appeared to be facing the group and that, at the time, she formed the impression that his behaviour was directed at the victim. When asked what gave her that impression she stated that "his eyes seemed intent on focusing on her" and that, as she passed by the small staircase and proceeded down the ramp, his head "moved as she moved". She also maintained that she could see the victim's group "move in a wave" down the ramp, led by a sheriff's officer. She rejected the proposition that Mr Greiss was standing at least two metres away from the victim. She said he was more like one and a half metres away. 143 In cross-examination Ms Wakatama also said that she believed that there were four or five people in the victim's group, or at least that many "cocooned around her", although she accepted that she could be mistaken. She recalled (correctly) that the victim was approximately two or three people back from the front of the group. She thought (incorrectly) that the victim was "more in the middle" and that there were people on either side of her. While she did not see the sheriff's officer who was positioned at the bottom of the small staircase, having seen a video about a week earlier she accepted that he was there at the relevant time. When it was put to her that, because she could not see the sheriff's officer at the bottom of the stairs, she did not know where the victim was, she accepted that she made "assumptions" about the position of the victim based on the speed at which the group was "gliding" down the ramp from one end to the other and noted that she was "looking at the whole scene". 144 On a photograph that became Exhibit S, Ms Wakatama identified her position at the time of the first spit as near the bottom-left corner of the stairs leading to the courthouse from the footpath on Hunter Street. On being shown Exhibit A (a CCTV image of the foot of those stairs), which does not show any women standing in the bottom-left corner of the stairs, Ms Wakatama accepted that she may have been further to the right. She identified Mr Greiss's position at the time she saw his mouth open. She placed the victim as "near the gap in the walkway", meaning near the small staircase at the top of which Mr Greiss was standing. She said that at the time of the "lurching" or "lunging" motion, he had moved "slightly forward" and she placed the victim as past the "gap". At the time Mr Greiss's head moved to follow the victim, Ms Wakatama placed the victim towards the end of the ramp.

Tiffiny Genders 145 After Mr Hayne was sentenced, Ms Genders left the media room and stood outside the building to gauge the reaction of those present. As the group which included the victim left the building, she noticed another group of people standing on the mezzanine level just one level above her (Ms Genders). She saw one of the latter group, whom she identified as Mr Greiss, approach the victim's group, and look down at the victim or the group as they walked down the ramp. She said Mr Greiss was "staring at the victim as she walked past" and indicated that he was standing as close as he could to the victim. She said she could hear him say something but could not make out the words. She had the impression from the fact that he was watching her, that his behaviour was directed at the victim. When asked what happened next, she replied: "He spat in her direction". She testified that she saw the spittle. She said she was "in complete shock". It was suggested to her in cross-examination that she had no idea where the victim was at the time she said she saw Mr Greiss spit, but she disagreed. She denied that she was mistaken about what she saw. She also denied that it was false to say that Mr Greiss spat at the victim. She rejected the proposition that, having regard to where she was standing, the positions of Mr Greiss, the victim's group, all the other people surrounding her and the ambient noise, she could not possibly have given truthful evidence. She denied making assumptions and reconstructing events she did not actually see and hear. She accepted that, if her evidence was correct and Mr Greiss did spit in the direction of the victim, he was also spitting in the direction of the sheriff. 146 On a photograph of the courthouse that became Exhibit U, Ms Genders identified her position at the bottom-left corner of the main entry stairs at the time Mr Greiss spat. She placed Mr Greiss at the top of the small staircase. And she placed the victim in a position past the small staircase. 147 In cross-examination, Ms Genders testified that, "moments after the spitting incident", she asked Mr Greiss whether he spat in the victim's direction and he did not deny it. 148 Consistent with her recollection, footage taken by a Seven camera operator discloses that she called out: "That is disgusting. He just spat at them". 149 Almost immediately after she saw Mr Greiss spit at the victim, sheriff's officers approached Mr Greiss. She could not hear what they were saying. 150 At 3:50 pm that day (four minutes before Ms Ryan's tweet), Ms Genders published a tweet in the following terms: A repulsive Jarryd #Hayne supporter was just staring down the victim & spat as she walked past with police. @9NewsSyd 151 In cross-examination Ms Genders denied giving the evidence she did in order to try to justify her tweet. 152 After sending this tweet, Ms Genders became aware of the Ryan tweet and re-tweeted it. 153 In cross-examination Ms Genders recalled "maybe eight to 10 people" in the victim's group and that the victim was "a couple of people" inside the group although she admitted that she could not remember the "exact formation" of the group. She described Mr Greiss's conduct, including speaking, looking and spitting at the victim, as having occurred in "one fell swoop, in one fluid movement". 154 It was suggested to Ms Genders that there was a difference between spitting at someone and spitting in their direction but Ms Genders disagreed. 155 That evening, on the 6 pm news bulletin, Channel 9's story featured commentary from the newsreader, Georgie Gardner, and Ms Genders which was interspersed with statements recorded at the courthouse. Georgie Gardner: There's been outrage at the behaviour of Jarryd Hayne supporters who turned on his rape victim outside court. Tonight, police are considering charges, with concerns the ugly scenes will deter other women from speaking out about sexual assault. Tiffiny Genders: Do you think it's acceptable to spit at a woman? [directed to Mr Greiss] Mina Greiss went to court to support Jarryd Hayne, but today, he became the story. Mina Greiss: Get out of here, get of here [inaudible], shove that camera [inaudible] get out of here. Tiffiny Genders: This was the 38-year-old moments after witnesses claim he tried to intimidate the rape victim. The father of one seen hurling abuse at the 28-year-old before spitting in her direction. Tiffiny Genders: Others within in the group then unleashed on a female reporter. Unnamed man [in all probability Daniel Petras]: He should spit on you, treat you like a dog like you are. … 156 In cross-examination Ms Genders admitted that she was the source for Ms Gardner's opening remarks and maintained that her comments were accurate.

Mr Greiss 157 On 5 May 2021 Mr Greiss drove to Newcastle with Mr Petras, Mr Mateo and Mr Iuta in order to support Mr Hayne who was to be sentenced the following day. Mr Greiss had been friends with Mr Hayne for around 17 years at the time of his sentencing. 158 At around 9:30 am on 6 May 2021, the four men arrived at Newcastle courthouse. At around 3:00pm Mr Greiss heard that Mr Hayne had been sentenced. At this time he was in the foyer of the court. Soon afterwards he moved outside with his three friends and waited outside the entrance to the courthouse to make sure that Mr Hayne's wife, Ms Bonnici, found her way safely to the car. He believed the dozen or so members of the media, who were gathered outside, were waiting for her. In cross-examination he accepted that he was not part of the group of people with umbrellas that assisted Ms Bonnici in leaving the court. 159 Mr Greiss denied spitting at the victim, spitting in her direction or staring her down. 160 Mr Greiss conceded in cross-examination that he was angry after learning the sentence because he felt the sentence was unjust. He said he believed that Mr Hayne was innocent and that the victim was not telling the truth. He denied blaming the victim for his friend's plight. 161 Before Ms Bonnici emerged, Mr Greiss noticed other people leaving the court led by a sheriff's officer. He then rose from his seat and walked towards the top of the stairs connecting the mezzanine and the ramp. In the group led by the sheriff's officer he saw a man wearing a barrister's robe and a woman whom he said he initially mistook for Ms Bonnici, but within a second or two he realised that it was the victim. 162 He denied that he moved to that position so that he could be nearer to the victim and that he looked at her as she passed by in an attempt to see her close up. He also denied that he wanted her to see him or that he intended to draw attention to himself. 163 While standing at the top of the stairs Mr Greiss pointed at the victim's group twice, but denied pointing at the victim or anyone in particular. He accepted that he was speaking but claimed to be addressing the sheriff's officer. He said that he asked the sheriff why they had not escorted Ms Bonnici out first and that the officer informed him that they were going to do so after they had "finished with the victim". 164 Mr Greiss described his interactions as "harmless". He said he asked the officer a "simple question" ("when are you taking the accused's wife out?"). He denied calling the victim a liar or saying anything derogatory about her. He also denied that the victim would have been able to hear what he was saying, denied raising his voice and denied wanting to intimidate or harass the victim. He maintained that he was speaking in a quiet voice. Nonetheless, he accepted that his conduct might be intimidating and harassing but only if it were directed at her: MR RICHARDSON: You would agree, wouldn't you, that a man standing a few metres away from a sexual assault victim moments after a sentencing hearing who is pointing and speaking in a raised voice would likely be found by that woman to be intimidating?---If he was directing at her, yes. It would be. And also, I suggest to you, likely to be found by that woman to be harassing?---Yes. Mr Greiss, do you agree, in circumstances where a woman has been the victim in a sexual assault case and the man who assaulted her has just been sentenced and she is leaving a public courthouse, that she would likely be in a vulnerable state?---Of course. You knew, didn't you, that in those circumstances, a man pointing and speaking, would very probably make that woman feel intimidated, didn't you?---Yes. And also harassed, you agree?---Yes. 165 Mr Greiss accepted that at the time he was pointing he was angry. When it was put to him that there was no reason to be angry with the sheriff, he said that he "wasn't angry at the sheriff" while also denying that he was angry with the victim. 166 Mr Greiss accepted that he turned to his left to face the street and moved his head in a sharp downward motion. The cross-examiner then put to him that that was the precise moment when he first spat. At first he claimed not to recall that, but then denied the possibility. When asked whether he could suggest any other explanation for the movement of his head, he said that he could not recall and did not know, but suggested he could have sneezed. 167 Mr Greiss denied that his head gesture was an expression of his disgust or contempt for the victim or a reaction to her having walked past him. 168 He accepted that four sheriff's officers came straight to him after the sharp downward movement of his head, that one ascended the ramp and that a number of others approached from the main entrance. 169 He also accepted that he was angry at the time but he denied that the sheriff's officers were critical of his behaviour moments before and that he was defending himself. He described the interaction as "simple" and "a normal conversation" that did not involve "harsh talking" or "confrontation". 170 Although he initially denied the second spit, after being shown the relevant footage Mr Greiss accepted that he did spit following his conversation with the sheriff's officers. He agreed that that was "a deliberate act". He denied it was an expression of his anger. 171 After the victim left he and his friends walked down to Hunter Street. 172 While on the street, Mr Petras showed him Ms Ryan's tweet. When asked how he felt on seeing it, he replied: Well, I was shocked. I was shocked. I felt like - I felt - there was no words that I could say that - I felt embarrassed. Really embarrassed. And I felt let down. I felt that there's nothing I could do or say to fix this, to even - It was just embarrassing. It was just so embarrassing, and there was nothing I could - that I could do to defend myself over - about it. 173 In cross-examination, Mr Greiss initially denied speaking twice to the journalists on two occasions before Ms Bonnici left, maintaining that there was only one conversation with Ms Ryan, and also denied speaking to Ms Ryan after Ms Bonnici had left the precinct. He later accepted that all three interactions occurred, although he denied speaking to the journalists during the first interaction. 174 In relation to the first escort conversation, Mr Greiss accepted that the video footage shows that he was filming the journalists. He claimed, however, not to remember calling the victim an escort or saying to the journalists "did you put that she's an escort" and after hearing the recording he denied it. 175 In relation to the second escort conversation, Mr Greiss agreed that he approached Ms Ryan about her tweet. He accepted that there were many people within earshot, plenty of cameras around and many media representatives listening. Relevantly, he agreed that he said to her "grub, you reckon?" to which Ms Ryan said "yeah, you are" and that he then replied: "yeah, all good, yeah. I'm happy with that". He also accepted that he asked her: "did you put that she's an escort". He claimed not to understand Ms Ryan's remark that "I just love that you're focussed on another woman …", despite voicing his agreement with her at the time ("Yes, absolutely"), and denied that he had previously been focussed on the victim. 176 Mr Greiss testified that when he confronted Ms Ryan "it was basically about the whole tweet", which he described as "all a lie". While he accepted that he did not say to her that the tweet was a lie, he maintained that he confronted Ms Ryan about the whole content of the tweet. He agreed, however, that at no point in time did he ask Ms Ryan to take down the tweet. 177 Mr Greiss testified that he was speaking to journalists outside the courthouse because he was upset that "there [were] things that didn't come out" in Mr Hayne's trial and, although he could not "go into too much detail", there were "things that the jury weren't told". In cross-examination he stated that he had discussed the allegations made against Mr Hayne with him. He agreed that his comments about the victim being an escort were meant to convey that she was a prostitute and "a person of little worth". Incredibly, he denied wanting the media to report his comments in the following troubling exchange: You wanted the media to write that about her, didn't you?---No, it wasn't - it wasn't my business. You felt that, if the media reported she was an escort, it would be good for your friend, the accused?---No, I just felt that it didn't come out in court. You felt it would mean it would be less likely she would be believed?---No, I felt like it would give my friend a better chance to defend himself in court. You felt contempt for this woman, didn't you, Mr Greiss?---I had no - I don't know who she is. I have got nothing against her. Okay. Mr Richardson, I have got nothing against her. I don't know her. Okay. I was angry because my friend was sent to jail. Okay, and the truth of the whole matter didn't come out as it should have been. Okay, and now this is - this is why I didn't want to talk in the first place. Okay. This is happening right now, that we should not be discussing this. Okay, but there are a lot of things, aspects, that did not come out in his sentencing that did come out now and that's why he's getting a retrial. You didn't even sit through the first and second trials, did you?---I know - I know about. You didn't sit through either the first or the second trial. You said that earlier, didn't you?---No, I didn't. 178 Despite denying that he wanted the media to write about the victim, Mr Greiss ultimately conceded that he urged the journalists to report that she was an escort. Although he claimed to have nothing against the victim, he said he wanted them to report she was an escort because he believed she falsely accused his friend of rape and was responsible for his imprisonment. He disavowed a belief that an escort could not be raped. He claimed his point was that he was "just angry that … a lot of things … didn't come out in [the] trial". He thought it would have made a difference to the outcome if the jury had been told she was an escort but was unable to explain why. 179 He admitted to spitting while walking down to the street (third spit) and accepted that it was an expression of his anger following his conversation with Ms Ryan. Although he initially denied saying "here's another one for ya", as I indicated above, after the video was replayed he accepted that he did say words to that effect, but claimed (disingenuously in my opinion) not to know what he meant by them or to what he was referring. Similarly, he flatly denied saying to Ms Ryan "You're not a woman", although at that point, too, the video had been played twice to him. I accept that the latter comment was difficult to hear in the courtroom. I, myself, could not then hear it. But that was not Mr Greiss's evidence. 180 Mr Greiss accepted, however, that (in the third escort conversation) Mr Petras said that "he spat on an escort" and that he did not correct him. After multiple denials, he also accepted that he said "I did spit" after Ms Ryan had said "… he spat towards the victim", but denied that in doing so he was agreeing with Ms Ryan. He also denied replying "Yeah, exactly" to Mr Petras's statement that, "He should spit on you". 181 Again, Mr Greiss accepted that during this confrontation with Ms Ryan there were many people within earshot, plenty of cameras around and he had an audience. 182 On the drive home Mr Greiss was shown publications by Channel Seven. His former partner called and told him "there was a lot of publications and comments". When asked how he felt about "publications being put up about [him]", he replied: It was embarrassing. It was - it was an overwhelming feeling of let down and shame. Shame. Because it's not the way we were brought up. It was something way beyond comprehension. Like, I couldn't - I was never in that position in my life before. I've never been accused of something like this, or - I didn't know how to feel. Later on I was just - I just felt let down. I just felt really let down. 183 The next day Mr Greiss saw the first matter complained of (the news article). His reaction to that was the same. He said he "felt shame", "felt ashamed" and "embarrassed". 184 He was "outraged" by the Facebook post (the second matter), "very angry" and "very upset".

Mr Mateo 185 At the time the victim left the court, Mr Mateo was standing on the footpath on Hunter Street. He had walked down the small staircase onto the disability ramp and then the street to call his mother. He said that he was standing "probably directly down from where the waiting area was on the upper level of the courthouse" and, at the time the victim left, he "turned towards where she was coming from". He could see Mr Greiss from where he was standing. He testified that he did not see Mr Greiss spit towards, or in the direction of, the victim's group and could not hear what Mr Greiss was saying to the victim's group as he was still on the phone. 186 In cross-examination, however, Mr Mateo said that he did observe Mr Greiss spit at the time the victim left. He testified: As I was watching the victim leave, she was - well, like, the group that she was with almost turned the corner around the building, and he spat in - pretty much in my direction, into the garden bed. 187 When shown the CCTV footage he confirmed that this was at the time of the first spit, which Mr Greiss had denied: And you see now, Mr Mateo, there's a group of people leaving?---Yes. And you see Mr Greiss has stood up and is moving to the top of the ramp there?---Yes. Did you see Mr Greiss move his head then?---Yes. Was that the moment that you believe that he spat?---Yes. 188 He agreed with the cross-examiner that he saw Mr Greiss turn to the left to face the street, then move his head and spit. At the time, he said, he believed he (Mr Mateo) was "facing where the victim was coming down".

Mr Iuta 189 Mr Iuta's evidence on this point was of little to no assistance. 190 In his evidence in chief, Mr Iuta testified that, when the victim's group left the court building down the ramp he was sitting down facing the street with his back to the courthouse. Mr Greiss, he said, was on his right. At that time he did not see Mr Greiss spit in the direction of the victim or towards the victim. Nor did he see him talk to the victim. 191 In cross-examination Mr Iuta said that he did not see Mr Greiss spit at any time, although it is common ground that he spat at least once while on the mezzanine level and once on the footpath in front of the reporters. He did not say that he was watching Mr Greiss. All of that is unsurprising since his evidence indicates that he was not focussed on Mr Greiss. Indeed, it suggests that he was not paying any attention to Mr Greiss as he was preoccupied with thoughts of Mr Hayne.

Other evidence 192 Mr Greiss also relied on certain passages in two statements produced on subpoena. Those statements were made by Mr Weaver (the sheriff's officer at the back of the victim's group) and Mr Marsay (another sheriff's officer who was presented at the courthouse that day). 193 The relevant representations from Mr Weaver were: At the conclusion of the sentencing Acting Sergeant GIRKIN and I escorted the victim in the substantive matter away from the court without incident. There was no interaction with her and the HAYNE group. After the (substantive) victim in the matter had safely left the area, I walked back towards the court entrance. (Emphasis added). 194 The relevant representation from Mr Marsay was that "the victim was removed from the building … without incident". 195 Mr Greiss claimed, in effect, that these representations undermined the respondents' case. 196 As I said in Greiss v Seven Network (Operations) Limited (Evidentiary Ruling) [2023] FCA 235 at [47], [51]-[52], however: It is difficult to know what to make of this. What did Mr Weaver mean by "without incident"? What would he have regarded as sufficient to constitute an "incident"? What did he mean by "no interaction"? Would he have considered a spit in the direction of the victim to amount to interaction with the victim anyway? Was he in a position in which he could have seen a spit in any event? It is no part of the respondents' case that the victim was struck by spittle. …Again, what did Mr Marsay mean by "without incident"? Was he reporting something he was told or something he saw? If he was reporting something he was told, was his informant a person who could have seen the incident the respondents allege occurred? The respondents submitted that the representations in his statement should not be admitted for a hearsay purpose because it is so unclear what he heard or from whom and where he was at any relevant time. Mr Marsay did not suggest that he was one of the sheriff's officers who escorted the victim from the building. Indeed, it is common ground that they were Mr Girkin and Mr Weaver. Nor does Mr Marsay suggest that he was outside the courthouse at the time Mr Greiss is alleged to have spat at the victim. It is clear he did not witness a spit and he does not appear to have been in a position in which he could have done so. 197 For those reasons, I would give these representations little weight.

Proof 198 The burden of proving the substantial truth of the imputations rested with the respondents. As this is a civil, not a criminal, case the standard of proof is the balance of probabilities. Section 140(2) of the Evidence Act 1995 (Cth) (Evidence Act) provides: Without limiting the matters that the court may take into account in deciding whether it is so satisfied, it is to take into account: (a) the nature of the cause of action or defence; and (b) the nature of the subject-matter of the proceeding; and (c) the gravity of the matters alleged. 199 This provision incorporates some of the observations made by Dixon J in Briginshaw v Briginshaw (1938) 60 CLR 336 at 361-2: The truth is that, when the law requires the proof of any fact, the tribunal must feel an actual persuasion of its occurrence or existence before it can be found. It cannot be found as a result of a mere mechanical comparison of probabilities independently of any belief in its reality. No doubt an opinion that a state of facts exists may be held according to indefinite gradations of certainty … Except upon criminal issues to be proved by the prosecution, it is enough that the affirmative of an allegation is made out to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. But reasonable satisfaction is not a state of mind that is attained or established independently of the nature and consequence of the fact or facts to be proved. The seriousness of an allegation made, the inherent unlikelihood of an occurrence of a given description, or the gravity of the consequences flowing from a particular finding are considerations which must affect the answer to the question whether the issue has been proved to the reasonable satisfaction of the tribunal. In such matters "reasonable satisfaction" should not be produced by inexact proofs, indefinite testimony, or indirect inferences. 200 In Neat Holdings Pty Ltd v Karajan Holdings Pty Ltd [1992] HCA 66; 67 ALJR 170; 110 ALR 449 at 449-50, the plurality (Mason CJ, Brennan, Deane and Gaudron JJ) wrote: The ordinary standard of proof required of a party who bears the onus in civil litigation in this country is proof on the balance of probabilities. That remains so even where the matter to be proved involves criminal conduct or fraud. On the other hand, the strength of the evidence necessary to establish a fact or facts on the balance of probabilities may vary according to the nature of what it is sought to prove. Thus, authoritative statements have often been made to the effect that clear or cogent or strict proof is necessary "where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found". Statements to that effect should not, however, be understood as directed to the standard of proof. Rather, they should be understood as merely reflecting a conventional perception that members of our society do not ordinarily engage in fraudulent or criminal conduct and a judicial approach that a court should not lightly make a finding that, on the balance of probabilities, a party to civil litigation has been guilty of such conduct. (Citations omitted.)

The arguments 201 The respondents invited the Court to make the following findings of fact in relation to Mr Greiss's conduct. (1) Mr Greiss's attention was focussed on the victim from the moment he stood up to the moment the victim left the court precinct (Fact 1); (2) Mr Greiss stared at the rape victim (Fact 2); (3) Mr Greiss pointed at the rape victim (Fact 3); (4) Mr Greiss made pejorative statements to the rape victim as she passed by him (Fact 4); (5) At the time Mr Greiss's head made a downward motion on the CCTV, he spat (Fact 5); (6) Mr Greiss spat in the direction of the rape victim (Fact 6); (7) Mr Greiss intended for his spit to be a sign of disgust and contempt for the rape victim (Fact 7); (8) Mr Griess called the rape victim an escort on two separate occasions and urged the media to publish this allegation (Fact 8); (9) Mr Greiss intended to harm the rape victim by calling her an escort (Fact 9); and (10) The conduct referred to in Facts 1 to 9 above is disgraceful (Fact 10). 202 For the reasons given below I am satisfied of all of these matters except for the fourth. The evidence does not allow any conclusion to be drawn about whether Mr Greiss made pejorative statements to the victim as she descended the ramp. I do accept, however, that he spoke with a raised voice that was loud enough to attract the attention of the woman walking beside the victim. I am not persuaded that he was speaking quietly, just asking the sheriff a "simple" or "harmless" question or having a polite conversation with the sheriff. 203 The following submissions were put on behalf of Mr Greiss. 204 First, the Court should accept Mr Greiss's evidence that he did not move from his seat on the mezzanine so that he could see the victim up close and she could see him, that he neither wanted to draw attention to himself nor the victim to notice him, that he was not pointing at her and expressing anger towards her, and that he did not call her an escort or a liar or say anything derogatory to her. The evidence should be accepted because there is no evidence to contradict him and his evidence is consistent with the evidence of the sheriff's officers. The Court should find, consistent with his evidence, that Mr Greiss approached the sheriff's officer in order to ask when they intended to escort Ms Bonnici out. 205 Second, at the time Mr Greiss is alleged to have spat at or in the direction of the victim, he could not recall spitting, did not know what he was doing, and suggested he could have been sneezing. That suggestion is a plausible one and the Court could not exclude that possibility. While Mr Mateo "thought" that Mr Greiss spat at this time, he could have mistaken a sneeze for a spit as he was distracted, speaking to his mother on the phone. 206 Third, even if the head movement (which Ms Wakatama fittingly described as ostrich-type) was a spit, Mr Greiss was facing the street and spitting into a garden bed, "as Mr Mateo's evidence confirmed". At this point the victim's group had almost turned the corner around the building, was about 10 metres away from Mr Greiss, and was not looking towards him. 207 Fourth, at all times when Mr Greiss was anywhere near the wheelchair ramp a sheriff's officer was standing between him and the ramp and the victim was at the front of the group on the right-hand side closest to the wall so there was always at least one person from her group to the left between her and Mr Greiss. 208 Fifth, Mr Mateo and Mr Iuta never saw Mr Greiss spit towards or in the direction of the victim's group or say or shout anything at the victim or her group and it was not suggested to either of them in cross-examination that they were mistaken about this evidence. 209 Sixth, Mr Greiss's evidence was consistent both with the CCTV footage and the contemporaneous evidence of the sheriff's officers, who recorded that the victim left the court complex "without incident", that she left the area "safely" and that there was "no interaction" between her and Mr Hayne's supporters, and the victim's statement to police that she did not see anybody spit at her. 210 Seventh, Ms Ryan and Ms Wakatama each had a different perception of what occurred and the evidence of both was unreliable because of where they were standing and because it was inconsistent with the CCTV footage, which is "the best evidence", and the contemporaneous records obtained by the police. Ms Ryan's evidence was inconsistent with the respondents' case as put to Mr Greiss in cross-examination and, for various reasons, implausible. 211 Consequently, Ms Greiss submitted that the Court would not be satisfied that he spat at, towards, or in the direction of the victim. To the extent that the respondents' case is based on Ms Ryan's recollection her evidence cannot be accepted. If it depends on the head movement at 3:31 pm, the footage is not clear enough to enable such a finding to be made and Mr Greiss's suggestion that he might have been sneezing cannot reasonably be excluded. Even if he did spit at this time, he spat into a garden bed and not at or towards the victim or in her direction. 212 In oral argument, senior counsel for Mr Greiss contended that each matter imputes "a direct and close interaction between [Mr Greiss] and the victim". She argued, in effect, that the justification defence must fail because the victim was "metres away" from Mr Greiss when he is alleged to have spat in her direction and her back was turned so he could not have been staring her down.

The reliability of the witnesses 213 Mr Greiss submitted that the evidence of Ms Ryan and Ms Wakatama was unreliable because they could not have seen what they claimed to have seen from where they were standing and because their evidence was inconsistent with the CCTV footage and the contemporaneous evidence obtained by the police. He submitted that having regard to the relevant positions of the journalists, Mr Greiss and their height differences, when Mr Greiss turned his head (to spit), they had "a parallax error". The journalists would have been unable to discern where Mr Greiss is facing from the "back side angle" from where they were standing. 214 I do not accept the submission. 215 Ms Wakatama's evidence about the "ostrich-type" movement of Mr Greiss's head at the time of the first spit is a perfect description of what appears in the CCTV footage. 216 It is not correct to say, as counsel did, that Ms Wakatama's evidence contradicted Ms Ryan's evidence that she saw or heard a spit. The mere fact that Ms Wakatama did not see or hear a spit does not mean that Ms Ryan did not or could not, even if Ms Wakatama was further along Hunter Street towards the ramp than Ms Ryan at the relevant time. Further, contrary to Mr Greiss's submission, the fact that Ms Ryan recalled Mr Greiss pointing after the spit is consistent with the CCTV evidence. 217 It was never put to Ms Wakatama that her evidence was affected by what she had seen in the CCTV footage or by something that someone else had said. In the absence of expert evidence to support Mr Greiss's submission that they could not have seen what they claim to have seen, having regard to my own conclusions about what the CCTV footage reveals and the remarks made by Mr Petras and Mr Greiss shortly afterwards, I am not persuaded that either Ms Ryan or Ms Wakatama was not in a position to see what they claim to have seen. Each of them made concessions in cross-examination and I formed the view that they were honest witnesses who were genuinely trying to assist the Court. 218 Each of Ms Ryan, Ms Wakatama and Ms Genders gave evidence that they were present at the courthouse that day to observe the reactions and obtain commentary from supporters of Mr Hayne and other parties involved in the matter. In these circumstances it is likely that each of them was keenly watching Mr Greiss once they caught sight of him. 219 The fact that the journalists did not know the precise position of the victim at each moment is not decisive. As the respondents submitted, they knew as "functional, rational human beings, that she entered a ramp, they had a rough idea of the pace she was moving". 220 Mr Greiss argued that "what really happened" was that one of the journalists thought she saw Mr Greiss spit and the rest of them picked up on it and convinced themselves that he did, in what they referred to as "a Crucible-like effect", alluding to "the troubled adolescent females" from the Arthur Miller play "who in the midst of religious frenzy made false accusations of witchcraft against respectable members of the Salem community". I reject that argument. 221 First, contrary to the rule in Browne v Dunn (1893) 6 R 67 no such proposition was put to any of the respondents' witnesses and should not therefore have been put in submissions. 222 In any event, the analogy is inappropriate. There was no frenzy here. Each of the respondents' witnesses reported on what they perceived to have occurred, based on what they saw and heard. 223 On the other hand, I accept that there are difficulties with some of Ms Genders' evidence. It seems unlikely that she heard Mr Greiss speaking to the victim when neither Ms Ryan nor Ms Wakatama was able to make out what he was saying. Indeed, she said she "could hear something coming out of his mouth" but was unable to hear the words. Still, she maintained that she knew he was speaking to the victim because he was staring at her. That does not necessarily follow. In circumstances in which she was unable to hear what Mr Greiss was saying, it was certainly unreasonable of her not to concede that her report that Mr Greiss was "seen hurling abuse at the [victim]" (my emphasis) was false. 224 No challenge was made to the reliability of the evidence given by either Mr Mateo or Mr Iuta. I accept that they were doing their best to give truthful evidence. 225 However, for the reasons given below in my consideration of the respondents' case, I do not hold the same view of Mr Greiss. 226 Of course, the mere fact that a witness's evidence is not believed does not establish the contrary or necessarily allow a court to conclude that the positive case of the opposing party is correct: Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 220 CLR 363 at [60] (the Court). The burden of proof rests with the respondents throughout. Still, if a party is found to have lied, that circumstance may not only affect their credibility but in some circumstances it may also demonstrate a consciousness of guilt or, put another way, amount to an implied admission. A recent discussion of the relevant principles appears in Roberts-Smith v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 41) [2023] FCA 555 at [196]-[205] (Besanko J).

Absent witnesses 227 Mr Greiss made much of the respondents' failure to call any of the people in victim's group who might have been able to give valuable evidence. They included police and sheriff's officers as well as the Crown prosecutor, all of whom were either identified or identifiable. But none of these people were in the respondents' camp, so to speak, such that it might be expected that the respondents would call them to give evidence. It was equally open to Mr Greiss to do so. See Jones v Dunkel (1959) 101 CLR 298. 228 Mr Greiss argued, in effect, that the absence of evidence from members of the victim's group should be taken into account in determining what weight should be given to the evidence upon which the respondents relied. As senior counsel put it in argument, "this is not a Jones v Dunkel submission… [but] a Neat Holdings submission". I understood her to mean that she was not asking the Court to infer that evidence these other potential witnesses could have given would not have assisted the respondents' case, rather that she was suggesting that the Court would not be comfortably satisfied that the respondents' justification defence was made out because witnesses who would have been in a position to support it did not give evidence. She submitted that the other members of the victim's group were in a position much closer to Mr Greiss than any of the witnesses called by the respondents and, by inference, only they and Mr Greiss's companions could give probative evidence about Mr Greiss's behaviour at the critical time. 229 It is true that the respondents could have called others who were present at the scene to give evidence. But it is not incumbent on a party to a civil suit to call all possible witnesses: see Heydon JD, Cross on Evidence (14th ed, LexisNexis, 2024) at [1215]. Moreover, with the exception of Mr Girkin and perhaps the unidentified woman on the victim's left, it is not apparent that any member of the victim's group could have given evidence about what Mr Greiss was doing because the CCTV evidence indicates that, unlike Ms Ryan and Ms Genders, they had no interest in, and were not looking at, Mr Greiss. Their concern was in shielding the victim to enable her to leave the precincts of the court as quickly as possible. 230 On the other hand, the person who at all material times was standing closest to Mr Greiss was not called. That was Mr Petras. The respondents urged the Court to draw a Jones v Dunkel inference against him. Mr Greiss argued that no such inference was available. 231 In Jones v Dunkel the High Court held that in certain circumstances a court may draw three inferences against a party who fails to give evidence or call witnesses. The first is that the evidence that could have been called would not have assisted the party's case: at 308 (Kitto J), 312 (Menzies J) and 321 (Windeyer J). The Court may take that circumstance into account in deciding whether to accept particular evidence that relates to a matter on which the absent witness could have spoken: Cross at [1215], citing O'Donnell v Reichard [1975] VR 916 at 929 (Newton and Norris JJ). The second is that evidence the witness might have contradicted can be accepted more readily: at 308 (Kitto J) and 312 (Menzies J). The third is that an inference favourable to the other party for which there is a foundation in the evidence can more comfortably be drawn: at 308 (Kitto J) and 312 (Windeyer J). 232 A Jones v Dunkel inference cannot fill gaps in the evidence or convert conjecture or suspicion into inference, but if the inference is drawn it can "weigh the scales, however slightly, in favour of the opposing party": Adler v Australian Securities and Investments Commission [2003] NSWCA 131; 21 ACLC 1810; 46 ACSR 504; 179 FLR 1 at [649] (Giles JA, Mason P and Beazley JA agreeing at [1] and [2] respectively). 233 As Hodgson JA explained in Ho v Powell (2001) 51 NSWLR 572 at [15]-[16], Jones v Dunkel was a particular application of the principle in Blatch v Archer (1774) 1 Cowp 63 at 65; 98 ER 969 at 970 (Lord Mansfield) that "all evidence is to be weighed according to the proof which it was in the power of one side to have produced, and in the power of the other to have contradicted". 234 Before a Jones v Dunkel inference may be drawn, however, three conditions must be met: first, the witness would be expected to be called by the party against whom the inference is sought; second, the evidence would elucidate a particular matter, and third, the failure to call the witness is unexplained: Payne v Parker [1976] 1 NSWLR 191 at 201-2 (Glass JA). A Jones v Dunkel inference will not be drawn if there are facts which disclose that the reason for not adducing evidence from the person was not that the party "fears to do so": Fabre v Arenales (1992) 27 NSWLR 437 at 445-6 (Mahoney JA, Priestley and Sheller JJA agreeing at 454). 235 In the case of Mr Petras the conditions are firmly established. 236 With respect to the first condition, in Payne v Parker at 201-2 Glass JA observed that: The first condition is also described as existing where it would be natural for one party to produce the witness, or the witness would be expected to be available to one party rather than the other, or where the circumstances excuse one party from calling the witness, but require the other party to call him, or where he might be regarded as in the camp of one party, so as to make it unrealistic for the other party to call him, or where the witness's knowledge may be regarded as the knowledge of one party rather than the other, or where his absence should be regarded as adverse to the case of one party rather than the other. (Citations omitted.) 237 As a friend of Mr Greiss who was in a prime position to witness the contentious events, it would be natural for Mr Greiss to call Mr Petras. He was (as the respondents put it) squarely in Mr Greiss's "camp". The Court was informed that he would be called as a witness for Mr Greiss. And an outline of evidence it was proposed to lead from him, prepared by Mr Greiss's solicitor, was served on the respondents and included in the Court Book. 238 With respect to the second condition, it will be recalled that during the contretemps with Ms Ryan (the third escort conversation) Mr Petras said that Mr Greiss "spat on an escort". In context, the "escort" was obviously a reference to Mr Hayne's victim. As I observed earlier, Mr Iuta's evidence about Mr Greiss's movements and actions at the critical time was of little, if any, assistance as on his own admission he was not focusing on Mr Greiss. Mr Mateo had left the seating area but confirmed that he saw Mr Greiss spit at the time of the downward head motion in the CCTV footage (the first time Mr Greiss was alleged to have spit, a spit which Mr Greiss repeatedly denied). Neither Mr Iuta nor Mr Mateo gave evidence to corroborate Mr Greiss's story of moving over to the disability ramp to speak to the sheriff. Yet Mr Petras was standing very close to Mr Greiss at the time of all the critical events and in a position to see what Mr Greiss was doing and/or hear him spit and talk. Mr Petras was also with Mr Greiss when, as Mr Greiss contended in cross-examination that he confronted Ms Ryan about her tweet, a contention, it will be recalled, that Ms Ryan disputed. 239 With respect to the third condition, no explanation was given for Mr Petras's absence. The Court Book included an outline of evidence that he "will give" and which had been served on the respondents. In cross-examination Mr Greiss admitted to having dinner with him only a few days before the hearing. There is no doubt he was available to be called. Counsel for Mr Greiss conceded as much in closing written submissions in reply. But they submitted that there was no basis to draw any inference from the fact that Mr Greiss had elected not to call him. 240 Mr Greiss submitted that whether it was appropriate to draw a Jones v Dunkel inference depended on what other evidence has been adduced in the case, noting that Mr Greiss was not obliged to call unnecessary witnesses. Mr Petras's evidence was said to be unnecessary given that the CCTV footage was the "best evidence" of whether the alleged spit occurred and any evidence Mr Petras could give was of little probative value as it would have been limited to his opinion about the person for whom the spit was intended. Further, Mr Greiss submitted that it was unnecessary to call Mr Petras to adduce evidence about this statement that "he spat on an escort" because neither that statement nor Mr Greiss's silence in response to it could be relied upon as evidence. 241 I reject these submissions. For the reasons given above, the evidence that Mr Petras could have given was not merely cumulative, particularly in circumstances where the evidence of Mr Mateo and Mr Iuta was of limited assistance. Mr Petras was in a far better position than either of them to give evidence of the relevant facts. As I have already observed, the CCTV footage has limitations. And, as I will explain later, both Mr Petras's statement and Mr Greiss's silence in response can and should be taken into account. 242 Mr Greiss also submitted that the inference should not be drawn because whether a party would be expected to call a particular witness depends on "whether that party relevantly has any onus of proof", citing Glass JA in Payne v Parker at 201, and that the onus of proving the defence of justification was with the respondents, not Mr Greiss. 243 In Payne v Parker at 200-201, Glass JA said: The reasoning which is permissible involves the treatment of a failure to adduce evidence as a reason for increasing the weight of the proofs of the opposite party or reducing the weight of the proofs of the party in default: O'Donnell v. Reichard. The principle may be invoked for a deficiency in the evidence either of a party bearing the legal onus of proving an issue, or of a party bearing the evidentiary burden only: Ibid.; Steele v. Mirror Newspapers Ltd. If the failure is of the latter kind, the direct evidence of the party with the onus of proof can be more readily accepted, and inferences in his favour may be more confidently drawn: Jones v. Dunkel. If the failure is of the former kind, a consonant formulation would be that the direct evidence of the party carrying the onus may be more readily rejected, and the inferences for which he contends may be treated with greater reserve. The default "brings a great slur on his cause": Ward v. Apprice. (Emphasis added, footnotes omitted.) 244 In my opinion, this submission is based on a misreading of his Honour's remarks. His Honour said that the principle may be invoked in respect of a deficiency in the evidence of a party bearing a legal or evidentiary burden. He did not say it may only be invoked in that situation. His Honour's use of the adverb "only" merely served to highlight the lower threshold of the evidentiary burden. That must be what his Honour intended. Otherwise it would be inconsistent with the authorities upon which his Honour relied and Jones v Dunkel itself. 245 O'Donnell was a negligence action in which the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had failed to mitigate her loss and in which the plaintiff failed to call the doctors who treated her in hospital. In the passage cited by Glass JA, Gillard J said (at 921): In these proceedings, it might be interpolated that the onus of proof that the plaintiff failed to mitigate her loss was imposed upon the defendant. The plaintiff's conduct whilst in and after leaving hospital in refusing, though advised, to have medical treatment, would become quite relevant on this issue. Was her conduct reasonable in the circumstances? It may be well assumed that the evidence of the three doctors could have shed some light on this matter. In relation to the plaintiff's actions in leaving the hospital and her conduct thereafter in refusing to have medical treatment, the defendant should as a matter of commonsense be entitled to rely on the absence of proof of the treating doctors as a basis for the jury to draw an adverse inference that the plaintiff's advisers were afraid to call the doctors, that if they had done so and the doctors had gone into the witness box that evidence would probably be unfavourable to the plaintiff, and that as the plaintiff failed to call the doctors, the plaintiff's case on the question of mitigation of loss would have been impaired, or the weight of the defendant's case on such matter would have been increased. 246 In the trial with which Steele v Mirror Newspapers Ltd [1974] 2 NSWLR 348 was concerned the plaintiff did not give evidence and the defendant sought a Jones v Dunkel direction on the question of economic loss. Moffitt P described the rule in Jones v Dunkel at 360: If a party wishing to prove a particular fact relied upon seeks to do so by inference from other facts, and fails to give or call available direct evidence of the fact, and there is no sufficient explanation for the failure to call that evidence, then, there will properly be less confidence in drawing the inference in question. The failure to call the available direct evidence may weaken the inference and in some cases this may lead a trier of the facts to decline to draw the inference. Thus, if a plaintiff, capable of proving by his direct evidence that he was at a particular place or that he suffered a loss, but sits in Court while inconclusive inferential evidence is led from others, he runs the risk that, by reason of his unexplained failure to testify, the inference he seeks to have drawn will be weakened and possibly rejected. These observations are consistent in principle with the decision in Jones v. Dunkel and are supported by the observations of Windeyer J. 247 Hutley JA commented on the principle at 367: This principle is of general application, and operates in favour of and against parties on both sides of the record. A party is entitled to have some guidance given to a jury as to the consequences of the tactical withholding of relevant evidence which must be available to a party. In my opinion, the direction sought should have been given. 248 In O'Donnell at 921, Gillard J expressly endorsed the giving of a Jones v Dunkel direction in relation to the plaintiff's failure to call her treating doctors even though the defendant carried the legal burden of proving she had failed to mitigate her loss. In Steele neither Moffitt P nor Hutley JA tied the availability of a Jones v Dunkel direction to a party holding some burden of proof, with Hutley JA stating additionally that it "operates in favour of and against parties on both sides of the record". It is difficult to see why Glass JA would have cited those cases if he had intended to limit the availability of Jones v Dunkel inferences in the manner contended for by Mr Greiss. 249 In Jones v Dunkel itself, in which the defendant failed to give evidence, the majority held that a direction should have been given to the jury that they could more confidently draw inferences favourable to the plaintiff and assume that the defendant's evidence would not have assisted his case (that the defendant was negligent), despite the fact that the burden of proving negligence lay with the plaintiff: at 308 (Kitto J), 312 (Menzies J) and 320-321 (Windeyer J). Indeed, at first instance counsel for the defendant made the same submission put to this Court in the present case (see Kitto J at 308, Menzies J at 311-12 and Windeyer J at 317), following which the trial judge declined to give such a direction. Windeyer J observed at 319 that the defendant's "silence may amount to much more than an acquiescence in the primary facts[;] [i]t may be eloquent in support of an inference to be drawn from those facts". 250 Dixon CJ and Taylor J dissented only, it appears, because they considered that the evidence the plaintiff adduced, which Kitto J described at 305 as "meagre in the extreme", was insufficient to enable the drawing of an inference that the defendant was negligent. 251 In Ho v Powell at [15] Hodgson JA said that, in deciding whether limited material is sufficient to discharge the civil onus of proof, "it is important to have regard to the ability of parties, particularly [not exclusively] parties bearing the onus of proof, to lead evidence on a particular matter, and the extent to which they have in fact done so" (emphasis added). In Cross (at [1215]) Ho v Powell is cited in support of the statement that "[t]he rule [in Jones v Dunkel] can operate against both parties not bearing the burden of proof and parties which do". See also Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd (2001) 115 FCR 442 at [33] (Hill J) and the cases referred to there. 252 Similarly, in RPS v The Queen (2000) 199 CLR 620 at [26] Gaudron ACJ, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ said: In a civil trial there will very often be a reasonable expectation that a party would give or call relevant evidence. It will, therefore, be open in such a case to conclude that the failure of a party (or someone in that party's camp) to give evidence leads rationally to an inference that the evidence of that party or witness would not help the party's case. 253 The learned author of Cross concluded at [1215], consistent with the above, that the rule in Jones v Dunkel "only applies where a party is 'required to explain or contradict' something" and that "[w]hat a party is required to explain or contradict depends on the issues in the case as thrown up in the pleadings and by the course of evidence in the case". While "the opponent is not required to answer" if "the party bearing the burden of proof has tendered no evidence" in relation to the issue in dispute, that is not the case here. The respondents adduced footage and evidence from several witnesses in support of their allegation that Mr Greiss had spat at, towards or in the direction of the victim which called for a response from Mr Greiss. 254 I infer from his failure to call Mr Petras that nothing Mr Petras could say would have assisted Mr Greiss's case. I also consider that, without evidence from Mr Petras, the inferences the respondents invited the Court to draw can more comfortably be drawn.

Have the respondents established the substantial truth of the imputations? 255 The substance of each of the imputations is that Mr Greiss stared down the victim and spat towards her or in her direction. It is common ground that to succeed, the respondents must establish the substantial truth of both elements in relation to the first and third matters and in relation to the second matter complained of the substantial truth of the statement that he spat at the victim.

Did Mr Greiss stare down the victim? 256 The Macquarie Dictionary (8th ed, Macquarie Dictionary Publishers, 2020) defines the expression to "stare someone down" as "to gaze imperiously or angrily at a person with whom one is seeking an ascendancy, until they look away in defeat or discomfort". The expression is defined in The New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (4th ed, Clarendon Press, 1993) as to "stare at (a person) without being first to blink or lower one's gaze, [usually] as an expression of resistance or hostility; outstare". The meaning given in the Macquarie Dictionary is implicit, if not explicit, in this definition. As Mr Greiss submitted, it implies a direct interaction or a "composite act" between two parties. 257 The respondents submitted that Mr Greiss was staring at the victim with whom he was angry. 258 It is clear from the CCTV footage that Mr Greiss walked towards the victim's group as the victim left the building and that he moved towards where she was walking as she proceeded down the ramp and was focussed on her until she left the court precinct. I accept the respondents' submission that he was staring at her. That, too, is evident from the footage. In this respect the CCTV footage supports Ms Ryan's evidence that "he was staring at her and she did not notice". Contrary to the submissions made for Mr Greiss, in this respect the evidence given by the reporters is consistent, not inconsistent, with the CCTV footage. 259 I also accept the respondents' submission that he was angry with her. 260 After his friend was sentenced, Mr Greiss was admittedly angry. He believed Mr Hayne was innocent and the complainant (the victim) had not told the truth. Of course the mere fact that he was angry and had these beliefs does not mean that the respondents must succeed. However, in the light of those concessions, I cannot accept his evidence that he had no animus towards the victim, was not angry with her and had nothing against her. Indeed, I conclude that his evidence in these respects was dishonest. He plainly blamed the victim for his friend's plight. I am satisfied that he bore her ill-will. I am also satisfied that he wanted to harm her because, by testifying against Mr Hayne, she had harmed his friend. 261 In cross-examination Mr Greiss admitted to calling the victim an escort in front of the journalists "moments after she left", but only "once or twice". He later accepted that he did so three times. He admitted that by referring to the victim as an escort he meant she was a prostitute and intended to convey that she was a person of little worth. 262 It is evident that Mr Greiss held the victim in contempt. 263 In cross-examination Mr Greiss denied wanting the media to write about her. But his denial defies credibility in the light of the statements he made in his confrontations with the journalists and Ms Ryan. He later claimed that he thought it would make a difference to Mr Hayne's case if the jury were told she was an escort. But when I asked him why, he was unable to offer any explanation. 264 Within about 30 seconds of the victim having passed Mr Greiss, Ms Ryan can be heard saying: "He was staring the victim down and then spat towards her". But was that an accurate description of what she saw? Was he actually staring her down? 265 The CCTV footage does appear to show that Mr Greiss was gazing imperiously or angrily at the victim. I am satisfied that he was pointing at or gesturing towards her repeatedly and forcefully, as the respondents contended. That is apparent from the CCTV footage. But the evidence does not indicate that their eyes ever met. The journalists' language was imprecise in this respect. Thus, while I am satisfied that Mr Greiss was staring at her or staring down at her, I am not satisfied he was staring her down. I am conscious of the fact that all that is required is that "the sting of the libel" was true: Sutherland v Stopes [1925] AC 47 at 79 (Lord Shaw of Dunfermline). But the sting of the libel here is that Mr Greiss was intimidating or trying to intimidate the victim, not that he was trying to attract her attention in order to do so. This is a qualitative difference. In other words, it is different in substance from the imputations.

Did Mr Greiss spit at, towards, or in the direction of the victim? 266 I do not doubt that Mr Greiss spat while he was on the mezzanine at the top of the small staircase. Whatever limitations there were on the journalists' vision, I am satisfied that it did not affect their ability to perceive this. The evidence on this question is overwhelming. 267 In closing submissions counsel for Mr Greiss asserted that Mr Greiss said he did not recall spitting, that he did not know what he was doing and that he suggested that he could have been sneezing. They also asserted that Mr Mateo only "thought" that Mr Greiss spat. I reject both assertions. They are inconsistent with the CCTV and video footage, the evidence given by the reporters, the evidence given by Mr Mateo, and the contemporaneous evidence of the exchanges between Ms Ryan, Mr Greiss and Mr Petras. I conclude that Mr Greiss was dishonest. 268 I reject the suggestion made by Mr Greiss in cross-examination that what others might have perceived to be a spit might have been a sneeze. It was never suggested to Ms Ryan that she could have mistaken the sound of a sneeze for a spit. More importantly, perhaps, I am convinced from the CCTV footage that Mr Greiss's behaviour is much more consistent with a spit than a sneeze. I can see from the footage that he moved his head, as Ms Wakatama put it, in an ostrich-type movement and pursed his lips. His lips are not obscured by either his moustache or his beard. If someone were watching him, as Ms Ryan and Ms Genders were, they would have seen that. Obviously, if one were not watching him it is unlikely one would see it. 269 The fact that Mr Iuta did not see him spit is beside the point. As I have already observed, he was not focussing on him at the time. Mr Petras, who was in a position to have seen him, did not give evidence. While the other evidence does not indicate that Mr Greiss spat on the victim, Mr Petras's contemporaneous statement to Ms Ryan in the presence of the other reporters indicates that Mr Greiss's spit was an expression of his attitude towards the victim and that it was directed at, or intended to represent his contempt for, her. 270 Mr Greiss argued that even if he did spit, he spat into a garden bed facing the street when the victim's group were "many metres" from him, having nearly exited the wheelchair ramp onto Hunter Street, and were at a 45 to 75-degree angle to the right of the direction he was facing. The angle varied from one paragraph of the submissions to another. The respondents accepted that on the CCTV Mr Greiss appears to turn left towards the street. But they submitted that "his focus of attention moves with [the victim]" from the moment he rose from the bench until the moment she left the court precinct and the angle with respect to her was "close enough as a matter of substance". It was a "spit for her", they argued, and his response to the victim walking past. I was not invited by the parties to undertake a view at the Newcastle courthouse to assess the inherent likelihood of the competing claims and no measurement of the distance between Mr Greiss and the victim's group at the time of the spit is in evidence despite the importance of these matters. In these circumstances and in the absence of expert evidence on the subject, I am unimpressed by the submissions based on distance and angles. 271 When asked by his own counsel why he was speaking to journalists outside the court, Mr Greiss replied that he was upset about things that the jury was not told: Why were you speaking to journalists outside the court?---I believe that there are things that didn't come out. I - at the end of the day, he's my friend, and there are things that didn't come out in his trial. He didn't get - yes. I can't go into too much detail, but there were things that the jury weren't told, and this was part of it. And were you upset about that?---Yes. 272 As the respondents submitted, however, in each of the first and second escort conversations, Mr Greiss approached the media to make his views about the victim known. 273 At first, Mr Greiss denied that he wanted the media to report that she was an escort: You wanted the media to write that about her, didn't you?---No, it wasn't - it wasn't my business. 274 That evidence defies credibility and is inconsistent with the fact that his complaint about the Ryan tweet was that it failed to report that the victim was an escort. 275 To the extent that Mr Greiss sought to characterise the second escort conversation as a general complaint about the Ryan tweet, I reject it. The evidence clearly shows that the conversation began with Mr Greiss saying "You're quick on Twitter" and the transcript prepared by the respondents captures the conversation in its entirety. 276 The respondents submitted that Mr Greiss's fabrication of a benign reason for approaching the disability ramp together with his dishonest denial that he spat while on the mezzanine indicate a consciousness of guilt that evidences the contrary of what he asserted, namely that he engaged in the impugned conduct against the victim and, if he lied about having spat at all, then it may readily be inferred that he knew he had spat towards the victim or at the very least that his spit was an expression of his disgust and contempt for the victim. 277 In Edwards v The Queen (1993) 178 CLR 193 at 208-9 Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ explained: There is a difference between the mere rejection of a person's account of events and a finding that a person has lied. A lie is a deliberate untruth. To conclude that a statement is a lie is to conclude that the truth lies elsewhere. In some circumstances, a finding that a person lied will necessarily involve acceptance of the contrary. However, the fact that a person has lied does not of itself establish a specific contrary proposition. Ordinarily, the telling of a lie will merely affect the credit of the witness who tells it. A lie told by an accused may go further and, in limited circumstances, amount to conduct which is inconsistent with innocence, and amount therefore to an implied admission of guilt. In this way the telling of a lie may constitute evidence. When it does so, it may amount to corroboration provided that it is not necessary to rely upon the evidence to be corroborated to establish the lie. At one time it was thought that only a lie told out of court could amount to an implied admission, but the distinction is not logically supportable and is no longer drawn. When the telling of a lie by an accused amounts to an implied admission, the prosecution may rely upon it as independent evidence to "convert what would otherwise have been insufficient into sufficient evidence of guilt" or as corroborative evidence. But not every lie told by an accused provides evidence probative of guilt. It is only if the accused is telling a lie because he perceives that the truth is inconsistent with his innocence that the telling of the lie may constitute evidence against him. In other words, in telling the lie the accused must be acting as if he were guilty. It must be a lie which an innocent person would not tell. That is why the lie must be deliberate. Telling an untruth inadvertently cannot be indicative of guilt. And the lie must relate to a material issue because the telling of it must be explicable only on the basis that the truth would implicate the accused in the offence with which he is charged. It must be for that reason that he tells the lie. To say that the lie must spring from a realization or consciousness of guilt is really another way of saying the same thing. It is to say that the accused must be lying because he is conscious that "if he tells the truth, the truth will convict him". (Footnotes omitted.) 278 The evidence is not sufficient to persuade me that the reason Mr Greiss gave for approaching the ramp was a fabrication, but I am satisfied that the evidence is sufficiently cogent to enable me to conclude that he lied about not spitting at the time he was first alleged to have spat. 279 Here, Mr Greiss's denial that he had spit at the top of the stairs on the mezzanine was not an inadvertent or innocent mistake but a deliberate untruth about a material issue. He offered no innocent explanation for the untruth, either directly in his evidence or indirectly through his counsel. In these circumstances I am persuaded that he was lying and that his lie was actuated by his consciousness that he had indeed spat towards the victim or in her direction. 280 In coming to this conclusion I am fortified by his and Mr Petras's contemporaneous statements and behaviour during the escort conversations. 281 The hearsay rule, contained in s 59(1) of the Evidence Act, provides that evidence of a previous representation (that is, a previous out of court representation) is not admissible to prove the existence of a fact that it can reasonably be supposed the maker of the representation intended to assert by the representation (the asserted fact). There are numerous exceptions, however. One of those exceptions, contained in s 60, allows evidence of a previous representation to be admitted because it is relevant for a purpose other than proof of an asserted fact (a non-hearsay purpose), regardless of whether the person who made the representation had personal knowledge of the asserted fact. Another, contained in s 81, is evidence of an admission. 282 "Admission" is defined in the Dictionary to the Evidence Act as: a previous representation that is: (a) made by a person who is or becomes a party to a proceeding …; and (b) adverse to the person's interest in the outcome of the proceeding. 283 The statement made to Ms Ryan by Mr Greiss ("Yeah, I did spit") was plainly adverse to his interest in the outcome of the proceeding, particularly since (despite his denial) it was a direct response to Ms Ryan's statement that "he spat towards the victim". On any view of the matter it was a statement against interest. The same must be said of the comment he made immediately after spitting towards Ms Ryan. 284 Section 81 provides: Hearsay and opinion rules: exception for admissions and related representations (1) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of an admission. (2) The hearsay rule and the opinion rule do not apply to evidence of a previous representation: (a) that was made in relation to an admission at the time the admission was made, or shortly before or after that time; and (b) to which it is reasonably necessary to refer in order to understand the admission. 285 It follows that Mr Petras's statements ("He spat on an escort"; "He should spit on you") were also admissible to understand the later admission by Mr Greiss ("Here's another one for ya"). 286 In any event, no objection was taken to the tender of the evidence which included these statements. 287 Even so, in closing submissions counsel for Mr Greiss argued that Mr Petras's statement that Mr Greiss "spat on" the victim was not admissible against Mr Greiss as evidence of the truth of the asserted fact because Mr Greiss did not consent to its use and he did not have Mr Greiss's authority to make such an admission, relying on ss 83 and 87 of the Evidence Act. I reject the submission. 288 First, absent an order under s 136 limiting the use to which the evidence can be put, evidence which is admissible for a non-hearsay purpose is admissible for all purposes (see, for example, Moran v Amoret Installations Pty Ltd [2000] NSWCA 106 per Heydon JA (at [7]) with whom Meagher and Giles JJA agreed at [21] and [22] respectively). I did not understand any such order to have been made at the time the evidence was admitted. 289 Second, s 83 is irrelevant as Mr Petras is not a party to the proceeding. Read with the definition of "admission" in the Dictionary, s 83 provides, in effect, that s 81 does not prevent the application of either the hearsay rule or the opinion rule to evidence of an admission by one party if another party consents. Its purpose is to ensure that evidence of an admission by one defendant cannot generally be used against another defendant in the same proceeding: see Odgers S, Uniform Evidence Law (18th ed, Lawbook Co, 2023) p 652 [EA.83.60]; Lym International Pty Ltd v Marcolongo [2011] NSWCA 303 at [125] (Campbell JA, with whom Sackar J agreed at [272]); Richards v Macquarie Bank Ltd (No 3) [2012] FCA 1523; 301 ALR 653 at [41] (Reeves J). It has no application to the present circumstances. 290 Third, s 87 is also irrelevant as it relates to admissions made under the authority of a party or in furtherance of a common purpose with a party and the respondents never submitted that Mr Petras's statement constituted an admission by Mr Greiss or that it was made in furtherance of a common purpose. 291 In submissions in reply, however, counsel for Mr Greiss submitted that the circumstances in which the statement was made make it unreliable and therefore "[t]he evidence of Mr Petras's representation should be limited pursuant to s 136 so that it is not evidence of the truth of the asserted fact". For the following reasons I decline to do so. 292 First, I do not accept that the evidence is unreliable. It was a spontaneous, voluntary, unguarded statement made soon after the incident allegedly occurred. The evidence indicates that Mr Petras was standing close to Mr Greiss at the time and so was in a position to confirm or deny the truth of the allegation. 293 Second, s 136 gives the Court a discretion to limit the use to be made of evidence if there is a danger that a particular use of the evidence might be unfairly prejudicial to a party or misleading or confusing. No submission was made that it might be unfairly prejudicial to Mr Greiss or misleading or confusing such as to warrant the exercise of the discretion in his favour. The mere fact that the evidence would not otherwise have been admissible for a particular use does not justify the exercise of the discretion: Odgers at 1332. 294 In any event, as McHugh J said in Papakosmas v The Queen (1999) 196 CLR 297 at [91]-[92] (footnotes omitted): Evidence is not unfairly prejudicial merely because it makes it more likely that the defendant will be convicted. In R v BD [(1997) 94 A Crim R 131 at 139], Hunt CJ at CL pointed out: "The prejudice to which each of the sections [ss 135, 136 and 137] refers is not that the evidence merely tends to establish the Crown case; it means prejudice which is unfair because there is a real risk that the evidence will be misused by the jury in some unfair way." (Footnote omitted.) In its Interim Report, the Australian Law Reform Commission explained: "By risk of unfair prejudice is meant the danger that the fact-finder may use the evidence to make a decision on an improper, perhaps emotional, basis, ie on a basis logically unconnected with the issues in the case. Thus evidence that appeals to the fact-finder's sympathies, arouses a sense of horror, provokes an instinct to punish, or triggers other mainsprings of human action may cause the fact-finder to base his decision on something other than the established propositions in the case. Similarly, on hearing the evidence the fact-finder may be satisfied with a lower degree of probability than would otherwise be required." 295 Similarly, in the context of a civil trial, Hunt AJA observed in Ainsworth v Burden [2005] NSWCA 174 at [98] that "[it] is not unfairly prejudicial to a party if the material tendered by his opponent merely proves or strongly supports the opponent's case". 296 In any event, even if I were to limit the use to which Mr Petras's statements could be put to the non-hearsay purpose, that would not assist Mr Greiss. The significance of Mr Petras's statements are that they were made in Mr Greiss's presence and within his hearing and he did not repudiate or distance himself from them. I reject the submission for Mr Greiss that no weight should be put on his failure to deny Ms Ryan's comment that he spat towards the victim when he approached her after the victim's group had left the scene or after she repeated the comment during their contretemps. His silence is telling. He made no attempt to explain it at the time although he had more than one opportunity to do so. 297 Mr Greiss submitted that, as the conversation with Ms Ryan occurred soon after his attention had been drawn to the Ryan tweet, he could not have been expected to have formed a rational argument about it in that time and in the circumstances. He argued that it was "unrealistic" to expect him to deny that either the conduct occurred as described in the tweet or Ms Ryan's statement during the contretemps on the footpath. He pointed out that "silence is not evidence of an admission, unless there are circumstances which render it more reasonably probable that a man would answer the charge made against him than he would not": Wiedemann v Walpole [1891] 2 QB 534 at 539 (Bowen LJ), endorsed by the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Mundey v Askin [1982] 2 NSWLR 369 at 373 (Moffitt P, Reynolds and Samuels JJA). He also referred to Thatcher v Charles (1961) 104 CLR 57, seeking implicitly, if not explicitly, to draw an analogy with the circumstances in the present case. 298 I do not accept these submissions. No rational argument was called for. If Mr Greiss did not spit in the victim's direction, all he needed to say was: "I did not spit towards her" or "I may have spat but not towards her" or "I did not do what you accused me of doing" or words to that effect. If Ms Ryan's comment were false, it was scarcely unrealistic to expect Mr Greiss to deny it. Mr Greiss was no shrinking violet. He had no compunction about speaking to Ms Ryan. After all, it was he who approached her. Nor did he have any compunction about telling Ms Ryan what she should have reported, namely that the victim was "an escort". These are circumstances which "render it more reasonably probable than not that he would [have] answer[ed] the charge made against him" if it were false. 299 Yet, rather than correcting Ms Ryan, Mr Greiss effectively confirms what she said. When Mr Petras asked Ms Ryan why she called him a grub and she replied, "because he spat towards the victim", Mr Greiss volunteered: "Yeah, I did spit". When encouraged by Mr Petras to spit on Ms Ryan, he spits again, this time saying: "Here, another one for ya". 300 Despite Mr Greiss's denial in cross-examination, taken in context I am comfortably satisfied that his response to Ms Ryan's explanation ("Yeah I did spit") was an admission, not merely that he spat but that he spat towards the victim, and that his denial was dishonest. I find that Mr Greiss's refusal to acknowledge that his remark which immediately preceded his spit towards Ms Ryan referenced his earlier spit ("Here, another one for ya") was also dishonest. While he claimed not to know what he meant by that, that claim is not credible. 301 Thatcher v Charles was a very different case. The circumstances are not remotely similar. That case was relevantly concerned with the defendant's failure to reply to comments made by a woman shortly soon after he reversed his car into her six year old daughter. The comments were: "Why did you do it? You drive too fast around here. We have always said you would collect somebody". Two passages in the judgments were cited by Mr Greiss's counsel in submissions. The first was from the judgment of Fullagar J (at 61), with whom Kitto J agreed (at 63): … I do not think, generally speaking, that evidence of statements made to a person and not denied by him is admissible unless it is fairly open to a jury to infer an admission of a relevant fact from the silence of that person. Here it was, I think, out of the question for the jury to infer any admission… [T]he defendant (who denied the conversation) said that he was "very upset" after the accident - as he would naturally be - and the mother was most probably even more upset. He would naturally be most unwilling to enter into an argument with her. In the circumstances, it would be most unfair to treat his silence as an admission ... 302 The second was from the judgment of Windeyer J at 70: [S]urely little if anything should be inferred against a man, who had just had the misfortune to run down a child, because he made no answer to the recriminations of a distraught mother?". 303 In contrast, in the present case, for the reasons given above, it is fairly open to infer an admission from Mr Greiss's silence.

Conclusion 304 For these reasons I am persuaded that Mr Greiss spat towards the victim. I do not think that there is any material difference between the adverb "towards" and the adverbial phrase "in her direction". In substance, they mean the same thing. But I am not persuaded that he stared her down. 305 It follows that the substantial truth of imputations (1), (2), (3), and (4) is not made out. As Ms Ryan conceded that it was false to say that Mr Greiss spat at the victim, the substantial truth of imputations (5) and (6) is not made out either. 306 Accordingly, the justification defence fails.

The law 307 Section 26 of the Defamation Act provides that: (1) It is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves that - (a) the matter carried one or more imputations that are substantially true (contextual imputations), and (b) any defamatory imputations of which the plaintiff complains that are not contextual imputations and are also carried by the matter do not further harm the reputation of the plaintiff because of the substantial truth of the contextual imputations. (2) The contextual imputations on which the defendant may rely to establish the defence include imputations of which the plaintiff complains. 308 The effect of the section is that a defendant can defeat an action in defamation "if its substantially true contextual imputation(s) outweigh the plaintiff's defamatory imputations": Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd v Kermode (2011) 81 NSWLR 157 at [85] (McColl JA, Beazley JA and Giles JA agreeing at [1] and [2] respectively). 309 The following principles are largely taken from the respondents' submissions. I do not understand them to be controversial. 310 First, a contextual imputation need not differ in kind from the pleaded imputations, only in substance: Fairfax Media Publications v Zeccola (2015) 91 NSWLR 341 at [69]-[84] (McColl JA), [112] (Macfarlan JA), [114] (Sackville AJA). See also Crosby v Kelly [2013] FCA 1343 at [28] (Rares J). 311 Mr Greiss submitted that, while the difference in substance test may be a useful guide, to treat it as a sufficient criterion involves effectively substituting a different formulation for the statutory language and is not a proper approach to statutory interpretation, citing Nassif v Seven Network (Operations) Ltd [2021] FCA 1286 at [128]-[132] (Abraham J). In Nassif at [128]-[132], however, Abraham J offered no such opinion. There, her Honour was addressing a submission made by counsel that Zeccola was wrongly decided, at least to the extent that it is to be taken as standing for the proposition that a difference in substance is sufficient and not merely necessary. While her Honour thought there was "some merit" in the submission, she did not decide the point because it was unnecessary to do so (at [132]). Counsel for Mr Greiss submitted that Zeccola was plainly wrong. As Abraham J observed at [130], however, Zeccola has been repeatedly cited with approval by courts around the country, including intermediate appellate courts in both New South Wales and Victoria. As a single judge I ought not depart from a decision of an intermediate appellate court of another jurisdiction unless I am convinced that it is plainly wrong: Farah Constructions Pty Ltd v Say-Dee Pty Ltd (2007) 230 CLR 89 at [135] (Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Callinan, Heydon and Crennan JJ). I am far from convinced that that is so in this instance. 312 Second, the task of the court is to assess the publications "as a whole, identifying its emphases and tonalities, and considering the latitude it gives to the ordinary reasonable person to draw defamatory inferences": Russell v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2023] FCA 38 at [19] (Lee J). See also Trkulja v Google LLC (2018) 263 CLR 149 at [32] (Kiefel CJ, Bell, Keane, Nettle and Gordon JJ). 313 Third, as Lee J went on to observe in Russell (at [20]), the court is obliged to "focus on the impression the ordinary reasonable person gleans from a matter, particularly in the context of publications made and viewed online [and] where the Court is concerned with questions of meaning, context is everything". Further, "[t]he reader's interaction with publications on available platforms is often transient". 314 Fourth, for the purpose of determining whether the defence is capable of being made out the Court must focus on the facts, matters and circumstances said to establish the truth of the contextual imputation rather than the terms of the contextual imputation itself": John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Blake (2001) 53 NSWLR 541 at [5] (Spigelman CJ, Rolfe AJA agreeing at [70]). While counsel for Mr Greiss argued that Blake does not apply to s 26 of the Defamation Act (as it stood at the time of the publication of the matters), it being a decision under s 16 of the Defamation Act 1974 (NSW), it has been applied to s 26 by multiple appellate courts, most recently in Fairfax Digital Australia & New Zealand Pty Ltd v Kazal [2018] NSWCA 77 at [98] (Gleeson JA, with whom Meagher JA agreed at [35]), and numerous single judges of this Court, most recently Lee J in Palmer v McGowan (No 5) [2022] FCA 893 at [321]. That may be thought to be unsurprising. After all, as Applegarth J observed in Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Weatherup [2018] 1 Qd R 19 at [46] (Fraser JA and Douglas J agreeing at [1] and [2] respectively), cited with evident approval in Kazal, the focus on the facts, matters and circumstances to establish the substantial truth of contextual imputations reflects the language of s 26. 315 Fifth, "a defence of contextual truth must defeat the whole defamatory matter (cause of action) of which the plaintiff complains, that is to say all of the plaintiff's stings": Kermode at [78] (McColl JA).

The issues 316 It follows that the issues for resolution are as follows: (1) whether the first and third matters carried the alleged contextual imputation; (2) if so, whether the contextual imputation differs in substance from the imputations pleaded by Mr Greiss (the pleaded imputations); (3) if so, whether it is substantially true; and (4) whether, having regard to the contextual imputation, the publication of the pleaded imputations caused no further harm to Mr Greiss's reputation.

The allegation 317 The respondents plead in relation to each of the first and third matters an additional imputation to the effect that Mr Greiss behaved disgracefully outside court to the woman Mr Hayne had been sentenced for raping (see paras 15A and 15B of the further amended defence). The particulars given for the additional (contextual) imputation were: 1. In March 2021, Mr Jarryd Hayne was found guilty of two charges of sexual assault without consent (Hayne Proceedings). Mr Hayne was to be sentenced on 6 May 2021. 2. On 6 May 2021, the applicant attended Newcastle Court House to support Mr Hayne and his family at the sentencing hearing. 3. At the sentencing hearing, Mr Hayne was sentenced to 5 years and nine months in gaol. 4. The applicant did not consider the sentence to be justified, for reasons including that he alleged the Victim was an escort. 5. After the sentencing hearing occurred, the applicant stood with other supporters of Mr Hayne outside of the court building in an area next to a walkway, which walkway hugged the court building (Walkway). 6. When the victim in the Hayne Proceedings (Victim) left the court building, she left via the Walkway. 7. The Applicant faced the Walkway and stared at the Victim and spat in her direction as she passed by him to exit the court precinct. 8. After the Victim had left the Court precinct the Applicant described her as an "escort" to a member of the media. 9. The imputations pleaded in paragraphs 5(a)-(d), 8(a)-(b) and 11(a)-(c) of the ASOC are substantially true by reason of the facts, matters and circumstances set out in particulars 1 to 8 above.

Was the contextual imputation conveyed? 318 I am satisfied that the contextual imputation was conveyed. Ordinary decent people would regard any expression of contempt for a sexual assault victim as disgraceful, particularly when, as in the case of the first matter, they were informed that the sexual assault was "brutal" and that "the vile act" of Mr Greiss spitting in the victim's direction had occurred "just hours after she declared that [her assailant] had destroyed her life …".

Does the contextual imputation differ in substance from the pleaded imputations? 319 The respondents submitted that: The contextual imputation differs in substance from any of Mr Greiss' imputations which focus on specific acts. In contrast, the contextual imputation is a general charge against Mr Greiss reflective of the gravity of his alleged conduct against a rape victim: Cornwell v Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 255 at [60]-[63]. Such a general charge will differ in substance from a specific imputation also conveyed by the same matter and may arise just from the gravity of the specific imputation: Abou Lokmeh v Harbour Radio [2016] NSWCA 228 at [33] and [45]. Indeed, even without the reference to "disgusting scenes" the single act of spitting towards a rape victim is sufficiently serious to support a general meaning of disgraceful behaviour. An ordinary reasonable reader would view the conduct as described as embracing disgraceful behaviour outside of the Court. It is in no way determinative of the questions of whether the contextual imputation is conveyed or differs in substance that it does not plead any further or different conduct engaged in by Mr Greiss. (Original emphasis.) 320 I accept the submission. 321 In Abou-Lokmeh v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2016] NSWCA 228 at [32]-[35] McColl JA, with whom Gleeson and Payne JJA agreed at [108] and [112] respectively, observed: 32 The "differ in substance" test can also be satisfied by a defendant pleading a contextual imputation in general terms in the sense permitted by Maisel. 33 Hunt J explained the Maisel approach in the contextual truth context in Allen as follows: "If the matter complained of conveys to the same ordinary reasonable reader two imputations at the same time, one of a general nature (of a Maisel type) and another of a specific nature which, even although related to the same subject matter of the general imputation, differs in substance from it, the policy behind s 16 requires that the defendant be permitted to plead the former as a contextual imputation to the plaintiff's cause of action based upon the latter." 34 The "policy" of which Hunt J was speaking was that introduced by the contextual truth defence. Under that defence as available both pursuant to s 16 of the 1974 Act and s 26 of the 2005 Act, a plaintiff cannot by selective pleading of a less serious imputation, when a more serious one is carried by the matter complained of, prevent a defendant from seeking to justify that more serious imputation. That had been the position at common law. 35 The requirement that the contextual imputation(s) be conveyed at the same time as the plaintiff's imputation(s) is to enable the tribunal of fact to "weigh or.. measure the relative worth or value of the imputation or imputations for which each party contends". (Footnotes omitted.) 322 While counsel for Mr Greiss submitted that Abou-Lokmeh was also wrong, I am bound by it. I note that an application for an extension of time to apply for special leave to appeal to the High Court was refused: Abou-Lokmeh v Harbour Radio Pty Ltd [2017] HCASL 18. 323 In any event, particular 7 is that Mr Greiss "stared at the [v]ictim …." whereas none of the pleaded imputations invoke this meaning. As I observed above, to stare someone down is different from staring at them. Further, particular 9 is not captured by any of the pleaded imputations. For these reasons the additional imputation captures a broader range of conduct than does the pleaded imputation. 324 Mr Greiss also submitted that the contextual imputation is not carried in addition to the pleaded imputations because there is nothing in the article to provide the basis for any imputation that Mr Greiss behaved disgracefully towards the victim, other than by staring her down and spitting towards her. He submitted that "the evidence relied on to prove the contextual imputation must comprise matters that were communicated to the reader". 325 I reject this submission. As the respondents submitted, it is contrary to longstanding authority. In Habib v Nationwide News Pty Ltd (2010) 76 NSWLR 299 at [313]-[316] the New South Wales Court of Appeal explained: 313 The general rule is that an imputation must be justified by reference to the facts in existence at the time of publication. However the general rule may be departed from in circumstances where an imputation amounts to a general charge against the character of the plaintiff: P Milmo and W V H Rogers, Gatley on Libel and Slander 11th ed (2008) Sweet & Maxwell at [11.8]; see also Anderson v Mirror Newspapers Ltd (No 2) (1986) 5 NSWLR 735 at 737 per Hunt J; John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v Jones [2004] NSWCA 205 at [9] per Spigelman CJ and at [79] per Hodgson JA. 314 The permissible grounds for departure from the general rule to which Gatley on Libel and Slander refers were established in two cases involving Mr Maisel. He sued the Financial Times for defamation, alleging that an article it published setting out the circumstances of his arrest on a charge of fraud conveyed the imputation that "he was a man of dishonest character and unfit to be a director". The newspaper sought to justify the imputation by relying on dishonest acts other than those referred to in the article. The plaintiff moved to strike out those particulars of the justification defence arguing that the defendant could not justify the defamation by matters not referred to in the article. The House of Lords rejected that argument, saying that where a plaintiff pleaded that the defendant published an imputation alleging "general dishonesty", the defendant was entitled to give particulars demonstrating why that was true and were not confined to the facts in the article: Maisel v Financial Times Ltd (No 1) (1915) 112 LT 953 at 955; 84 LJKB 2145 at 2147. That case established the entitlement of the respondent in this case (which the appellant did not dispute) to plead substantial truth in respect of a wide variety of matters, none of which, as earlier observed, sought directly to justify the principal sting of the matter complained of. 315 After the House of Lords' decision, further pleadings were then exchanged in Mr Maisel's action. The plaintiff amended his imputations to include one asserting that "his character and reputation were such that he was likely to have misappropriated funds of companies with which he was connected". The defendant filed an amended defence pleading justification and relied in its particulars on events which had taken place after the date of publication of the matter complained of. The plaintiff sought to strike out the particulars of post-publication facts. He was unsuccessful: Maisel v Financial Times Ltd [1915] 3 KB 336. Lord Cozens-Hardy MR said (at 339 - 340): "In a general allegation by way of justification of general character and general tendency, which are the only words I can think of at the moment as the meaning of the word 'likely', I do not see how you can exclude events which happen, I will not say years later, but within a reasonable time from the date of the publications. I instance a case which seems to me to be rather analogous; an allegation that the plaintiff was addicted to drink and would get drunk if he could. Could you exclude evidence that the day after publication of that libel he had been found suffering from delirium tremens? It seems to me you could not in answer to a general allegation of what the man was likely to have done if he could." (Emphasis added) 316 Pickford LJ said (at 340) that there could be no direct answer to the question whether particulars of justification alleging facts which occurred after the libel could be allowed. In his view, it depended on the nature of the libel and on the nature of the acts. Dealing with the case in hand, he said (at 341): "…the innuendo of the plaintiff … alleges that this libel has three meanings …: that he was of a character and reputation such that he was likely to have misappropriated; that he would have misappropriated if he had had the opportunity and that he was an unfit person to be a director - the third one I have left out. That being the meaning as alleged and the defence of justification which is set up, it seems to me that it is impossible to exclude, by one general proposition, any particulars of acts that took place after the libel. The allegation is that he was of a character to misappropriate funds and that he would misappropriate funds if he got the chance. It seems to me that it cannot be irrelevant to show that very shortly after the libel, as soon as he did get the chance, he did misappropriate." (Emphasis added) 326 Here, the additional matters relied upon include conduct which occurred both at the time, and within minutes of, the matters reported in the publications in issue.

Was the contextual imputation substantially true? 327 For the reasons given earlier I am satisfied that the additional imputation is substantially true. I accept the respondents' argument that it does not matter for this purpose that the victim did not hear what Mr Greiss said to the journalists or that the victim did not witness the spit. As the respondents put it, urging a large contingent of journalists to print that she is an escort, even just proclaiming it in a public place, is conduct "to" the victim in that it is conduct that relates to the victim, just as the spit was a sign of Mr Greiss's hostile attitude to, and contempt for, the victim.

Have the respondents proved that such of Mr Greiss's imputations as are not found to be substantially true did no further harm to his reputation? 328 In circumstances in which I am satisfied that Mr Greiss spat towards the victim as a gesture of his contempt for her and publicly denounced her as a prostitute signifying that she was a person of little worth, I am persuaded that no further harm was done to his reputation by the imputation that he stared the victim down. I would add that if I am wrong to conclude that Mr Greiss spat towards the victim, the outcome would be no different as, regardless, I am satisfied that it was a gesture of his contempt for her.

Conclusion 329 It follows that I would uphold the defence to the first and third matters of contextual truth.

The law 330 Section 31 of the Defamation Act relevantly provides that it is a defence to the publication of defamatory matter if the defendant proves three things: first, that the matter was an expression of the opinion of the defendant or the defendant's employee or agent, rather than a statement of fact; second, that the opinion related to a matter of public interest; and third, that the opinion was based on proper material. If those three matters are proved, the defence will be defeated if the plaintiff proves that at the time of publication the opinion was not honestly held by the defendant or the defendant did not believe it was honestly held by the defendant's employee or agent (s 31(4)). Here, Mr Greiss did not file a reply so s 31(4) is irrelevant. 331 An opinion, like comment, is "something which is or can reasonably be inferred to be a deduction, inference, conclusion, criticism, remark, observation," or something of like kind: John Fairfax Publications Pty Ltd v O'Shane [2005] NSWCA 164; (2005) Aust Torts Reports ¶81-789 (at [25] per Giles JA, quoting Milmo P and Rogers W V H (eds), Gatley on Libel and Slander (10th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, 2004) at [12.6]); Stead v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Ltd [2021] FCA 15; 387 ALR 123 at [128] (Lee J). 332 As Giles JA observed in O'Shane at [27] in relation to the common law defence of fair comment, there is no bright line between a comment (now opinion) and a statement of fact; the context and circumstances in which the words are used are important in determining the appropriate characterisation. His Honour explained at [28]-[29]: 28 To illustrate the distinction, the bald statement "X murdered his father" is likely to be regarded as a statement of fact. The same words may be regarded as comment if facts are set out from which can come the inference that X murdered his father, the statement that X murdered his father being the author's conclusion from the facts. That X murdered his father is likely to be regarded as comment if facts are set out from which can come the inference that X murdered his father and the words are, "In my opinion, therefore, X murdered his father". When the words are less words of fact and more words of evaluation, for example "X is a disgrace to humankind", they are still likely to be regarded as a statement of fact if made as a bald statement, but more readily to be regarded as comment if made after and as a conclusion from a statement such as that that X murdered his father. 29 These are but illustrations, and the characterisation in each case depends on more than the mere words. In any given case, the question is whether the words would be regarded by the ordinary reasonable reader as comment or statement of fact, and the defendant must satisfy the tribunal of fact that they would be regarded as comment. All the circumstances are to be taken into account, and it must be remembered that the ordinary reasonable reader does not parse and pore over the published matter as the lawyers are inclined to do at trial (cf Comalco Ltd v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1985) 64 ACTR 1 at 40, speaking of the more ephemeral television broadcast). (Emphasis added.) 333 As the text of s 31 makes clear, the defence is concerned with whether the defamatory matter and not any of the imputations is an expression of opinion: Feldman v Polaris Media Pty Ltd (2020) 102 NSWLR 733 at [65]-[66] (White JA). 334 It follows, as Lee J explained in Stead at [131], that: [T]he correct approach [is] to determine whether the matter would have been understood by the ordinary reasonable reader to be an expression of opinion rather than a statement of fact; and although this contextual inquiry necessarily requires consideration of the meanings found to be conveyed, it is not constrained or dictated by their terms so as to transform the inquiry into a consideration as to how each imputation would be understood. 335 In the form in which it appeared at the time the matters in the present case were published, s 31(5) relevantly provided that, for the purposes of the section, an opinion is based on proper material if it is based on material that is substantially true. That material must be contained in the publication itself or otherwise be apparent to the reader: The Herald & Weekly Times Pty Ltd v Buckley (2009) 21 VR 661 (Nettle, Ashley and Weinberg JJA) at [83]-[84]. 336 Subsection (6) provides: An opinion does not cease to be based on proper material only because some of the material on which it is based is not proper material if the opinion might reasonably be based on such of the material as is proper material. 337 The effect of subs (6) is that an opinion is based on proper material even if some of the material on which it is based is not substantially true provided that it might reasonably be based on that material which is substantially true.

The allegations 338 The respondents alleged that the first and second matters were expressions of the opinion of Seven or one of its employees and the third was an expression of Ms Ryan's opinion. They also alleged that each opinion related to a matter of public interest and was based on proper material or, to some extent, was based on proper material and represented opinion which might reasonably be based on such material. 339 The respondents pleaded that the expression of opinion in the first matter (the 7NEWS.com.au article) was based on the following facts and matters stated and/or referred to in it: (a) "… Jarryd Hayne supporter SPITS towards rape victim"; (b) "Chaos has erupted outside a NSW Court moments after Jarred Hayne was jailed for the brutal sexual assault of a young woman"; (c) "As Hayne's victim left the Newcastle District Court, one of his supporters allegedly stared her down and spat in her direction on Thursday afternoon"; (d) "One of his supporters stared his victim down and spat in her direction"; and (e) the photograph of [Mr Greiss] taken outside the court building following Mr Hayne's sentencing. 340 The expression of opinion in the second matter (the Facebook post) was said to be based on the following "facts and matters stated and/or referred to" in it, namely: (a) "Chaos erupted after disgraced NRL player Jarryd Hayne was handed a lengthy prison sentence"; (b) "'Grub' spits at rape victim outside court"; and (c) the photograph of [Mr Greiss] taken outside the court building following Mr Hayne's sentencing. 341 And the expression of opinion in the third matter (the Ryan tweet) was said to be based on the following "facts and matters stated and/or referred to" in it: (a) "One of his supporters stared his victim down and spat in her direction"; and (b) the photograph of [Mr Greiss] taken outside the court building following Mr Hayne's sentencing. 342 The "facts and matters stated and/or referred to" in the three publications are said to be "proper material" because each of those facts and matters was substantially true. 343 The respondents also pleaded that: Each of the matters complained of related to the following subjects, each of which, by its very nature, was of proper and legitimate interest to the recipient of those words: (a) attitudes towards and treatment of sexual assault victims; (b) the treatment of women; (c) the safety of witnesses in the court precinct; and (d) the sentencing of Mr Hayne, a high-profile sportsperson.

The issues 344 There is no dispute that the matters complained of related to a matter of public interest. The dispute turned on other elements of the defence. With respect to each of the matters, the issues concerned: (1) whether the matter conveyed an expression of opinion by Seven or of one of its employees rather than a statement of fact; (2) if so, whether the opinion was based only on proper material, being material that was substantially true; and (3) if not, whether the opinion was partly based on proper material, being material that was substantially true and the opinion might reasonably be based on as much of the material as was proper material.

Consideration 345 Mr Greiss submitted that all three matters would be understood by ordinary reasonable readers as news reports, that they would have understood that they were being informed about what in fact took place at the courthouse and "not merely" given the authors' opinions. 346 It is true, as the respondents submitted that all the matters contain expressions of opinion. The phrase "[d]isgusting scenes" in the headline of the first matter is an opinion based on an assessment of the conduct of Mr Hayne's supporters outside court after the sentence was handed down. The reference to "vile act", is an opinion of the author, Eamonn Tiernan, about Mr Greiss's conduct towards the victim of a sexual assault. Ms Ryan's characterisation of Mr Greiss's conduct as "foul behaviour" and of him as a "grub" on account of engaging in that conduct are both expressions of opinion. But the defence is not concerned with whether the matter contains expressions of opinion. As Lee J observed in Stead at [130] and the terms of the section indicate, "the statutory defence requires that it is the matter that was an expression of opinion" (original emphasis). 347 The character and primary purpose of the first matter was to report on the events that occurred at the Newcastle courthouse on the occasion of Mr Hayne's sentencing. I accept Mr Greiss's submission that the use of adjectives such as "disgusting" or "vile" to characterise conduct the subject of a news report does not detract from that fact. Read as a whole and in context I do not consider that the ordinary reasonable reader would regard the first matter as a mere expression of the author's opinion. It was a news article, which reported on the events that took place at the courthouse in connection with the sentencing of Mr Hayne. It would not be treated as an opinion piece. 348 The second matter was a social media post promoting the news article and containing an embedded link to it. Its most prominent feature was the photograph of Mr Greiss taken by Ms Ryan, which also appeared in her tweet, which was captioned "'GRUB' SPITS AT RAPE VICTIM OUTSIDE COURT". The respondents only addressed this feature. They submitted that it is "relevantly an expression of [their] opinion… because it does not merely present Mr Greiss'[s] conduct as a fact but concludes that the conduct makes Mr Greiss a 'grub'" (original emphasis). 349 I do not accept the respondents' submission. This was a "bald statement", akin to the example given by Giles JA in O'Shane at [28] ("X is a disgrace to humankind"), and likely to be treated as a statement of fact, rather than an expression of opinion. It would not be regarded by the ordinary reasonable reader as merely a comment on his character or conduct. In any case, I am not satisfied that the second matter was based on proper material because I am not satisfied that Mr Greiss spat at the victim. 350 On the other hand, I am persuaded that the third matter (the Ryan tweet) would be seen as an expression of opinion about Mr Greiss's behaviour and character. Mr Greiss submitted that this was a tweet by a journalist, who readers would have understood was on the scene reporting on events. But the tweet was sent from her personal Twitter account and the evidence does not indicate that she identified herself as a journalist. While some readers would presumably know she was a journalist, there was no evidence before the Court that in her Twitter profile she described herself at the time as a journalist and she made no mention of that in the tweet. 351 The next question, then, is whether the tweet was based on proper material. 352 In their submissions the respondents relied on "Facts 1 [Mr Greiss's continual focus on the victim], 2 [Mr Greiss stared at the victim], 5 [the CCTV footage of the first spit], 6 [Mr Greiss spitting in the victim's direction] and 7 [Mr Greiss intending that his spit was a sign of disgust and contempt for the victim]" to support their argument that the opinions expressed in the matters complained of were based on proper material. There are two difficulties with these submissions. 353 First, the defence is confined to material contained or referred to in an impugned publication or to matters which are widely known. The respondents do not claim that any of these facts were widely known and, with the exception of Fact 6 none of these facts was contained, or referred to, in any of the impugned publications. 354 Second, the submissions stray beyond the particulars. The particulars were confined to "facts and matters stated and/or referred to" in each of the matters complained of. The only one of these facts answering that description is Fact 6 and then only in relation to the first and third matters. 355 As I am satisfied, however, that Mr Greiss spat towards the victim I find that the third matter, the Ryan tweet, was based on proper material. Having regard to s 35(6) of the Defamation Act, the fact that the statement that he stared the victim down was not based on such material is no obstacle. 356 Consequently, I would uphold the defence of honest opinion with respect to the third matter but not otherwise.

RELIEF 357 As the justification defence was not made out, the defence of contextual truth was only pleaded in relation to the first and third matters and I am not satisfied that the defence of honest opinion is established in relation to the second matter (the Facebook post), it is necessary now to turn to the question of relief for the damage, if any, occasioned to Mr Greiss by the publication of the Facebook post.

The claim 358 In his originating application Mr Greiss applied, not only for damages, but orders requiring the respondents to remove the matters complained of from the websites and social media accounts on which they were published and any matter to the same effect from any internet site, including social media accounts, within the respondents' control; and permanent restraining orders. 359 The only relief pressed, however, is the damages claim. Mr Greiss seeks ordinary compensatory damages and aggravated damages. His claim is limited to non-economic loss.

The legislation 360 Section 34 of the Defamation Act provides that in determining the amount of damages to be awarded in any defamation proceedings, the court is to ensure that there is an appropriate and rational relationship between the harm sustained by the plaintiff and the amount of damages awarded. Section 35(1) imposes a ceiling on the amount of damages for non-economic loss that may be awarded, which must be adjusted annually in accordance with s 35(3). The current maximum, gazetted on 9 June 2023 in NSW, effective from 1 July 2023, is $459,000. 361 Formerly, s 35(2) provided that a court could order a defendant to pay damages in excess of the maximum if satisfied that an award of aggravated damages was warranted. Now, it provides that the maximum is only to be awarded in "a most serious case". And two additional subsections have been inserted: s 35(2A), which provides that s 35(1) does not limit the Court's power to award aggravated damages if an award of aggravated damages is warranted, and s 35(2B), which requires any award of aggravated damages to be made separately to any award of damages for non-economic loss to which s 35(1) applies.

Non-economic loss - general compensatory damages 362 Where a publication is found to be defamatory, damage is presumed, and the presumption is effectively irrebuttable or, at least, difficult to displace: Bristow v Adams [2012] NSWCA 166 at [20]-[31] (Basten JA). 363 An award of damages for defamation serves three overlapping purposes: consolation for the personal distress and hurt caused to the applicant by the publication; reparation for the harm done to the applicant's reputation; and vindication. The first two purposes are concerned with the wrong done to the applicant. The third is concerned with the attitude of others to the applicant. At the very least the sum awarded must be the minimum necessary to signal to the public the vindication of the applicant's reputation. The gravity of the libel and the social standing of the parties are relevant to the amount required to vindicate the applicant as are the mode and extent of publication and the failure to apologise or retract the defamatory statements. See, for example, Carson v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1993) 178 CLR 44 at 60-61 (Mason CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron JJ) and Herald and Weekly Times Ltd v McGregor (1928) 41 CLR 254 at 263 (Knox CJ, Gavan Duffy and Starke JJ). 364 In determining the damage to an applicant's reputation, the Court should also take into account "the grapevine effect" of publication of defamatory material: see Channel Seven Sydney Pty Ltd v Fisher [2015] NSWCA 414; (2016) Aust Torts Reports ¶82-257 at [108] (Simpson JA and Tobias AJA); Rader v Haines [2022] NSWCA 198 at [41]-[42] (Brereton JA, with whom Macfarlan JA and Basten AJA agreed at [1] and [90] respectively). As Dixon J explained in Wilson v Bauer Media Pty Ltd [2017] VSC 521 at [59] in a passage not disapproved on appeal: This phenomenon is no more than the realistic recognition by the law that, by the ordinary function of human nature, the dissemination of defamatory material is rarely confined to those to whom the matter is immediately published. It is precisely because the "real" damage cannot be ascertained and established that damages are at large. It is often impossible to track the scandal and to know what quarters the poison may reach. The award of damages must be sufficient to ensure that, the damage having spread along the "grapevine", and being apt to emerge "from its lurking place at some future date", a bystander will be convinced "of the baselessness of the charge". 365 Damages for injured feelings include the hurt, anxiety, loss of self-esteem, sense of indignity and outrage the applicant feels about the publication(s): Carson at 71 (Brennan J). In Cassell & Co Ltd v Broome [1972] AC 1027 at 1125 Lord Diplock remarked: The harm caused to the plaintiff by the publication of a libel upon him often lies more in his own feelings, what he thinks other people are thinking of him, than in any actual change made manifest in their attitude towards him. A solatium for injured feelings, however innocent the publication by the defendant may have been, forms a large element in the damages.

Aggravated damages 366 Aggravated damages may be awarded where the circumstances of the publication of the matter(s) complained of or the conduct of the respondent(s) then or thereafter "make the injury to the plaintiff worse" (Waterhouse v Broadcasting Station 2GB Pty Ltd [1985] 1 NSWLR 58 at 74G per Hunt J), but only if the respondents' conduct was improper, unjustifiable or lacking in bona fides (Waterhouse at 75C-D). In determining whether aggravated damages should be awarded the Court is entitled to have regard to the whole of a respondent's conduct from publication to the time of judgment: Praed v Graham (1889) 24 QBD 53 at 55 (Lord Esher MR, Lindley and Lopes LJJ agreeing).

Mitigation of damages 367 It is well-established that a defendant may rely on particular acts of misconduct in mitigation of damages where they formed part of an unsuccessful plea of justification and, since Burstein v Times Newspapers Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 579, also facts that fall within the "directly relevant background context" of the defamatory publication. 368 Here, the respondents contended that any award of damages should be mitigated by the truth of any imputations found to be substantially true; evidence directed to the justification defence or directly relevant background context; and the substantial truth of the contextual imputation. In the circumstances, the respondents submitted that zero damages should be awarded, as McCallum J did in Dank v Nationwide News Pty Ltd [2016] NSWSC 295 at [74]-[77]. In doing so, her Honour cited Pamplin in which the Court of Appeal of England and Wales dismissed an appeal from a verdict of a halfpenny. 369 In Pamplin at 120, Neill LJ observed that a defendant is entitled to rely in mitigation of damages on any evidence which is properly before the court including evidence which has been primarily directed to a plea of justification or fair comment. Where the defendant has failed to establish either defence, his Honour said: [T]he defendant may be able to rely on such facts as he has proved to reduce the damages, perhaps almost to vanishing point. Thus a defence of partial justification, though it may not prevent the plaintiff from succeeding on the issue of liability, may be of great importance on the issue of damages. 370 It is well established that a court may award nominal damages where no real damage has occurred or contemptuous or derisory damages such as the jury did in Mr Pamplin's case. A recent discussion of these concepts appears in Palmer at [499]-[508] (Lee J). 371 In Dank at [75] McCallum J doubted that it was necessary to fix a nominal sum since the enactment of the Defamation Act because it "expressly contemplates the possibility that, even where no defence to a defamatory publication has been established, the judicial officer may determine that no amount of damages should be awarded". Her Honour was referring to s 22(3) of the Defamation Act which provides that in defamation proceedings tried by jury, "[i]f the jury finds that the defendant has published defamatory matter about the plaintiff and that no defence has been established, the judicial officer and not the jury is to determine the amount of damages (if any) that should be awarded to the plaintiff and all unresolved issues of fact and law relating to the determination of that amount" (emphasis added). 372 Mr Greiss submitted that McCallum J was wrong in Dank. It is unnecessary for me to consider that submission, however, because I am not persuaded to award Mr Greiss nothing.

The evidence 373 I referred to some of the evidence above in my recitation of the undisputed facts.

Mr Greiss 374 In addition to those matters, Mr Greiss gave the following evidence. 375 On their drive home from Newcastle, Mr Petras showed him the Facebook post and the embedded article. His former partner also called him about the "publications and comments" that were being put up about him. When asked about how he felt he replied: It was embarrassing. It was - it was an overwhelming feeling of let down and shame. Shame. Because it's not the way we were brought up. It was something way beyond comprehension. Like, I couldn't - I was never in that position in my life before. I've never been accused of something like this, or - I didn't know how to feel. Later on I was just - I just felt let down. I just felt really let down. 376 When he saw the Facebook post he felt "outraged", "very angry" and "very upset". When he arrived home he started reading the comments on social media. They continued for "weeks after" and he continued to read them "all the time". When asked about how reading the comments made him feel he replied: I was angry. I came to a point where I just couldn't think clearly. This was the only thing that was in my head. I was thinking about it day and night. I just kept reading and reading and I had no way of defending myself. No way of letting people know what really happened that day. I felt helpless. Very helpless. 377 While some of his friends reached out to show him support, the majority contacted him to express their "hatred". He recalled that: They didn't want to see me, they didn't want to pick up my calls. People that I talk to on a regular basis didn't want to talk to me. They ignored my calls, they don't return messages, avoid me. A few times they were meant to go out and they knew that I was coming, they wouldn't come out. They wouldn't want to see me. These are close people that I grew up with. … I felt alone. I felt neglected. I felt alienated. I felt avoided and hated. 378 Although his father was "very, very upset", he was more understanding than his mother who refused to speak to him for a while and removed his photo from her office. He testified that the fact that his own mother did not believe him was "probably the worst thing that could [have] happen[ed] out of this". An aunt told him that he had brought shame on the family, which made him "very upset". Evidently, his infamy was not confined to Australia. One of his cousins, who lived in England, sent him a message saying that he was "a TV star" there and that he had newspaper clippings of him hanging on his wall. 379 After the publications, he cut back on volunteer work at his local church because his "face was everywhere"; he was being called "the grub", who spat at a woman; and he did not want to be confronted or harassed. He also switched his shift at work to the night shift. 380 On 31 May 2021 a threatening handwritten note was left on the windscreen of his car. The note, which he produced, read: GRUB TOLD YOU WE FIND YOU SOON WE TOOK LONGER CAUSE THEY SAID YOU LIVE AT DRUITT …. THEY DON'T KNOW YOU MOVED BUT WE DO. SEE U SOON I WILL SPIT ON YOUR GRAVE DOG 381 The next day his car was "shot at" while parked outside a friend's house. His then partner left him to stay with her mother, telling him she did not feel comfortable with him spending time with their son because it was "too dangerous". He, himself, stayed in a hotel for two weeks. At this time, he felt "very scared" and "lonely". 382 He testified that he felt "very angry", "outraged" and "shocked" that Seven was maintaining that what they published about him was true. 383 He gave evidence about the steps he had taken to try and prove that he did not do what he was alleged to have done. He said he applied for a "Freedom of Information report" by which he obtained a "police report" and the CCTV footage (Exhibits B, C and D). 384 He testified that Ms Ryan did not make any approach to him outside of the courthouse before posting the third matter complained of. 385 He was taken to Seven's response, on 21 August 2021, to the concerns notices sent by his lawyers on 4 and 28 June 2021. He said that he was "shocked" and "couldn't believe" some of Seven's contentions in their response, including that he "filmed people … leaving the court complex", "spat … in the direction of the victim", was "motivated by his animus towards the victim" and that Seven and other media companies had "vision of the incidents" which he took to mean vision of him spitting at the victim.

Mr Mateo 386 Mr Mateo testified that Mr Greiss was "shocked", "upset" and "angry" when he saw the Ryan tweet and "pretty distraught" about the reactions of his family. In conversations since then, he said Mr Greiss has not been himself, has not been "as social" and remains "quite upset".

Mr Iuta 387 Mr Iuta testified that Mr Greiss was "very distraught" and "upset" when he saw the Ryan tweet. He said that Mr Greiss is depressed and that the events of 6 May 2021 have "probably taken a toll on his life".

Kirollos Greiss 388 Mr Greiss's younger brother, Kirollos, was the only member of his family to give evidence. He provided an affidavit on which he was cross-examined to no apparent effect. This is the substance of his evidence. 389 Although they grew up together in Western Sydney, Kirollos now lives in Melbourne with his family, he does not see Mr Greiss very often and they do not talk as often on the phone. They see each other when they both travel to Wagga Wagga to visit their parents to celebrate "holiday events", like Christmas and Easter. Before the events on 6 May 2021, Mr Greiss would often post on social media about his son and the activities they would do together. 390 On 7 May 2021 his wife sent him a text message with a link to the 7News article (the first matter). He responded: Oh gosh. Why is he so involved in this. He'll probably be charged. Prob pissed off about a fake rape allegation. 391 After reading the article and watching the video in the article he felt "shocked" and was "in disbelief of the acts that Mina had reportedly done". It appeared to him that Mr Greiss had been accused of intimidating and spitting at the victim. He tried to call Mr Greiss and sent him a text message but Mr Greiss did not respond. He felt "very angry" and "ashamed" that Mr Greiss had "damaged the family name and family's reputation". As he could not contact Mr Greiss, he believed that "he had in fact spat at and intimidated the victim". He also recalled seeing the Ryan tweet. 392 A few days after first reading and watching the news stories about Mr Greiss, Kirollos managed to speak to his brother on the phone. He asked him what he did, what had happened. His brother replied: "Please do not believe any of it, I didn't spit at her. She was getting escorted by police, she was far away from me". 393 Kirollos deposed that he did not believe Mr Greiss's account of events and there was "no evidence" that he could rely on to prove that Mr Greiss did not spit at the victim, especially since there were "several media articles from reputable sources" that reported Mr Greiss had spat at the victim. He also recalled seeing video footage of Mr Greiss spitting towards the ground facing a camera operator. 394 In about April 2022, when he last saw Mr Greiss in person at their parents' home in Wagga Wagga, Mr Greiss told him that he was instructing his solicitors to bring proceedings against Seven. Kirollos asked him why he was pursing the matter. Mr Greiss replied in words to the following effect: You do not know what I have been through with this, I have been threatened, received all these messages on social media. I don't want to go out in public at all … I have felt depressed, I have been recognised on the street and I have been scared to go out in public. 395 Mr Greiss showed him a number of the messages and comments he had received. 396 During the times Kirollos attended family events with Mr Greiss since May 2021, he has noticed that Mr Greiss is "more reserved and quiet" rather than his usual "confident and outgoing" self.

Mustafa Zahid 397 At the time he provided his affidavit Mr Zahid had known Mr Greiss for around 11 years. Early on in their friendship they played sports together. 398 From about 2011 onwards, Mr Zahid would often meet with Mr Greiss and others for dinner, lunch or for a barbeque. They would meet regularly on weekends or on week nights after work and became very close. They have many mutual friends. Within the group, Mr Greiss is known as a "religious person and as someone with strong personal integrity". 399 Mr Zahid recalled seeing a post on Twitter about Mr Greiss which accused him of spitting at Mr Hayne's victim. He called Mr Greiss immediately and they had a conversation to the following effect: Mr Zahid: Mina, is it true what they are saying? I cannot believe this. Mr Griess: No, they are twisting things. I did not spit at the lady. Mr Zahid: Why are they saying that you did? Mr Greiss: I did not spit at her. I may have spat at the ground after, but not at the lady at all. I don't want to talk about it. 400 During this conversation Mr Greiss sounded "extremely stressed and agitated" and was "very embarrassed of the news publications about him". 401 After this conversation, Mr Zahid did not hear from Mr Greiss for several weeks. He tried to reach out to him but he would not reply to Mr Zahid's calls or text messages. 402 In the following weeks, their mutual friends discussed Mr Greiss and the actions he was accused of. They shared "news stories and news footage concerning him". Mr Zahid did not believe the stories but several of their mutual friends did and said things to the effect of "it's on the news, look what he did". 403 In about June or July 2021, Mr Greiss attended a few more gatherings with their social group. Mr Zahid noticed that he was "more reserved and quiet". He recalled that at one gathering one of their mutual friends jocularly called Mr Greiss a "grub" and Mr Greiss became "extremely upset". 404 About a year later in June or July 2022, Mr Greiss told Mr Zahid about the "threats and abusive comments" he had received on social media, the "written threat" left on his car. He also told him that several friends and family members had "stopped contact with him". 405 Mr Zahid noticed that Mr Greiss's "personality has changed since the news stories were published about him". He has observed Mr Greiss to be "depressed, anxious and stressed".

Amber-Joy Pulisi 406 Amber-Joy Pulisi is a family friend of Mr Greiss who has known him for about 20 to 25 years. They met as teenagers, through a mutual friend at school. Since they have both had children they do not meet up as much, although Ms Pulisi often sees Mr Greiss at the local shops or around the local area. 407 Before May 2021 they would see each other around three to four times a year. Mr Greiss was "well known in the local community and had a good reputation as someone who was outgoing, sociable, honest and respectful". 408 Ms Pulisi saw a Facebook post about a news story involving Mr Greiss "spitting at and yelling abuse at a woman who was the victim in Jarryd Hayne's court case". She was "shocked" as she "did not believe that [he] would do such a thing". She "did not want to talk to [him] about it because [she] was upset at the story and the possibility that it was true". She spoke to her sister and other members of her family, who knew Mr Greiss, and recalled that they were "shocked". 409 At this time, Ms Pulisi sent text messages to Mr Greiss but he did not reply. She did not see him in the local area or at the local shops. 410 Later in May or June 2021, Ms Pulisi called Mr Greiss and they had a conversation to the following effect: Ms Pulisi: Mina what happened? I do not see you at all anymore. Mr Greiss: I am scared at the moment, I don't want to come out. People are judging me. 411 During the conversation, Ms Pulisi observed that Mr Greiss was "very quiet" and "sounded down". This was the "complete opposite" of the person she knew.

Lauren Llewelyn 412 Ms Llewellyn is a friend of Mr Greiss who has known him for about 20 years. They met while Ms Llewellyn was living and working in Canberra in about 2002. Mr Greiss would travel to Canberra on weekends either with his friends or by himself. They briefly dated at this time. 413 Ms Llewellyn deposed that they have kept in "regular contact". If Mr Greiss travelled to Canberra he would contact her to catch up and she would do likewise if she travelled to Sydney. Throughout their friendship, she has known Mr Greiss to be a "vibrant and confident person who is caring, generous and supportive of his friends". She observed that Mr Greiss was a "very religious person" and "very family-orientated". 414 In or about May 2021 Ms Llewellyn noticed a Facebook post from "a news page", she could not recall which, that reported that Mr Greiss had spat at Mr Hayne's victim. She also saw many abusive comments posted by other Facebook users in relation to the article. Her initial reaction was "anger, hurt and disgust". She was "furious" that a person she had trusted and known for a long time could do such a thing. At the same time she felt "conflicted" because she "could not believe that [he] would spit at the victim of a serious crime or degrade another person". Since the stories were published by a "reputable news outlet", however, she found it "difficult not to take them seriously". 415 She decided to avoid further contact with Mr Greiss. She was concerned that if she "defended him" she would "become a target for the online abuse" she saw directed at Mr Greiss. In about June 2021, Mr Greiss told her that he was travelling to Canberra and wanted to catch up. She refused to see him, offering an excuse as she wanted to continue to distance herself from him. 416 In August 2022 Mr Greiss phoned her and they had a conversation in which Mr Greiss asked her for "help" in his court proceedings against Seven. During this conversation, she noticed that Mr Greiss sounded "very withdrawn". While he was usually "joking" during their "light-hearted conversations" he "appeared different in the way he was talking". She became "very upset due to his change in personality". She did not know whether they will "have the same friendship [they] had before the publications".

Non-economic loss 417 The libel involved in the second matter was serious. A considerable number of people are likely to have seen the publication. Publication on social media, particularly having regard to the manner of publication (with the large photograph of Mr Greiss and the caption attached to it) was calculated to bring him into disrepute. The barrage of disparaging social media posts that followed publication were perhaps a natural and certainly foreseeable consequence of it. I also take into account that it was accessible for a period of three and a half months. 418 Having regard to my findings concerning Mr Greiss's conduct, however, in particular the substantial truth of the imputation that he spat towards the victim (rather than at her) as she left the courthouse after the sentencing, his overt hostility to and contempt for the victim, and his generally disgraceful behaviour in front of journalists and television cameras on a public street soon afterwards, I would award him a nominal sum for the damage to his reputation and as vindication. 419 As I indicated earlier, however, I am not at all disposed to award him nothing. That is because I accept the evidence as to his hurt feelings. No real challenge was made to any of that evidence. I am satisfied that, as a result of the publication of the Facebook post (and, though it is not presently relevant, the other two matters), Mr Greiss felt embarrassment, shame, anger and distress. He was vilified in social media and ostracised by members of his own community. He withdrew into himself to some extent. He was given reason to fear for his safety and that of his child. While I did not find him a credible witness in relation to the events at the courthouse, his description of the effect of the publications appeared genuine and it was supported by others whose credit was not impugned. 420 On the other hand, there is no evidence that Mr Greiss has developed any psychiatric illness or disorder. He did not testify that he had sought or obtained professional help of any kind or that he required it. Mercifully, the threatening letter and the attack on his car appear to have been one-off events.

Quantum 421 In all the circumstances, I regard a sum of $35,000 as an appropriate amount to compensate him for his non-economic loss.

Aggravated damages 422 In his amended statement of claim Mr Greiss relied on a host of matters in support of his claim for aggravated damages, most of which were directed to the publications as a whole, without discrimination: (1) the respondents' failure to give Mr Greiss an opportunity to respond to the allegations made against him before publication; (2) the respondents' conduct in refusing to meet the requests made on behalf of Mr Greiss in the concerns notices; (3) the respondents' conduct in failing to apologise to Mr Greiss for the publication of the matters; (4) the respondents' conduct in failing to apologise to, despite having access to video footage which demonstrated that the victim had left the court premises and was nowhere near Mr Greiss when he spat; (5) the respondents' conduct in inciting hatred against Mr Greiss, as evidenced by the comments responding to the second and third matters, by describing him as a "grub"; (6) Ms Ryan's conduct in inciting hatred against Mr Greiss by encouraging people to "share" the third matter "far & wide"; (7) Seven's conduct in promoting the article on social media, including on Facebook and Twitter, and describing Mr Greiss's "alleged conduct" as a "vile act"; (8) the following conduct of the respondents through their lawyers: (a) asserting in correspondence on 20 August 2021 that they had "vision" of the alleged spitting incident as well as several eyewitness accounts confirming it; (b) conceding in correspondence on 22 September 2021, after Mr Greiss had asked for a copy of the video footage, that they did not have video footage of the alleged spitting incident; (c) asserting in an email to Mr Greiss's lawyers on 24 February 2022 that any defamation proceeding he might bring was "unlikely to succeed" despite being told by Mr Greiss's lawyers six days earlier that they had watched CCTV footage from the Newcastle courthouse which directly contradicted the assertions made by the respondents' lawyers in their letter of 20 August 2021; (d) persisting with an unmeritorious truth defence when in possession of contemporaneous police documents which contradicted their defence; (e) seeking leave to amend their defence on 3 February 2023 to plead the contextual truth defence, in the face of those documents and the available CCTV footage, which was "in bad faith". 423 His submissions, however, were confined to what was described as "three main factors". In the absence of any submissions on the other factors, I do not propose to address them. The first of the three was Ms Ryan's "improper and unjustifiable" conduct in publishing the third matter and inciting hatred for Mr Greiss by encouraging her tweet to be "share[d] far and wide". Having regard to my findings on liability, it is irrelevant. Ms Ryan's conduct can be put to one side as she was not a publisher of the second matter and the allegation is only made against her. The second factor was the response to the concerns notice. The third was the maintenance of the justification defence in light of the CCTV footage and worse still, after the respondents obtained documents on discovery and under subpoena from the NSW police. 424 In relation to the second factor, Mr Greiss submitted that the response to the concerns notice was improper because, in seeking to discourage Mr Greiss from commencing proceedings the respondents made two factually incorrect assertions. The first was that Mr Greiss filmed the victim as she left the courthouse with the intention of intimidating and harassing her, something that not only did not occur, but which the respondents did not attempt to prove. The second was that the respondents had "vision of the incidents", which included the alleged spitting at the victim, a matter they admitted was untrue a month later. In written submissions Mr Greiss intimated that this assertion must have been made without instructions as Ms Ryan gave evidence that she never saw Mr Greiss filming the victim and was not aware of any video footage of the alleged spitting incident apart from the courthouse CCTV. Mr Greiss testified that he was angry and outraged by the respondents' assertions. 425 The complaint relates to a letter from the respondents' lawyers, Addisons, dated 20 August 2021, to Mr Greiss's lawyers, Antunes. The letter began with a denial that Mr Greiss had been defamed as alleged in previous correspondence or in a draft statement of claim and concluded with advice that "steps [had] been taken" to remove the offending material "as a gesture of goodwill and without admissions". 426 In the penultimate paragraph the author wrote that Seven and other media companies which attended the sentencing hearing had "vision of the incidents referred to above as well as several eyewitness accounts confirming those matters", indicating that the respondents would be entitled to rely on such material if proceedings were commenced against them. The word "incidents" was presumably a reference to the three matters described above. The first was that Mr Greiss had "filmed those leaving the court complex on Hunter Street Newcastle, including the victim…". The second was that Mr Greiss had "spat outside the court complex in the direction of the victim within sight of many of those in his vicinity" and "spat again" when "walking away from the Court complex", "this time in the direction of the camera operator who was filming". The third was that Mr Greiss had "confronted several journalists outside the court demand[ing] to know why they had not reported that the victim was an "escort", "despite there being no evidence or other indication of the truth of such a claim aired in the proceeding [which I take to be a reference to the sentencing hearing] or elsewhere". 427 By a letter dated 26 August 2021 Antunes asked to see the footage and Addisons replied on 22 September 2021 in the following terms: Our clients wish to clarify that they do not have footage of Mr Griess spitting in the direction of the victim referred to at point 2 of our letter of 20 August 2021. We apologise for any misunderstanding the wording in our letter may have caused. However, our clients have several eyewitness accounts of each of the incidents set out at points 1 to 3 of our letter, as well as footage of Mr Greiss' conduct described in the remainder of point 2 and point 3 of our letter, and photographs of Mr Greiss filming outside court. Our clients also have footage of a confrontation between Ms Ryan, your client and someone who appears to be an acquaintance of Mr Greiss, where the following exchange took place confirming Mr Greiss'[s] conduct … 428 There followed a portion of a transcription of the third escort conversation. 429 While the language used in the letter was unfortunate and certainly careless, having regard to the gravity of the consequences of such a finding, I am not persuaded that the respondents' conduct in these respects was improper, unjustifiable or lacking in bona fides. 430 The third matter is the respondents' conduct in maintaining the justification defence after they had received contemporaneous police records and seeking to amend their defence in the light of them and the CCTV footage. There are several difficulties with this submission. First, the police records do not exclude the possibility that Mr Greiss spat towards or in the direction of the victim. Second, the CCTV footage confirms that Mr Greiss spat before the encounter with the journalists. Third, the video recordings of the third escort conversation include Mr Greiss's admission that he spat towards the victim and the statements of Mr Petras, both of which provided support for the respondents' case. Fourth, the journalists' belief that Mr Greiss was staring the victim down was based on a misconception. In these circumstances, I do not accept that the respondents' maintenance of the justification defence was improper, unjustifiable or lacking in bona fides.

Interest 431 The originating application in the present case included a claim for interest. Section 51A(1) of the FCA Act requires the Court to include "upon application" interest in the sum for which judgment is given unless good cause is shown to the contrary. No good cause was shown here. For the reasons I gave in Duma v Fairfax Media Publications Pty Limited (No 3) [2023] FCA 47 at [595]-[599], I would award pre-judgment interest at the rate of 3% per annum for the period from the date of the publication of the second matter to the date of judgment which, by my reckoning is $2,937.12, which I propose to round up to $2,940.

CONCLUSION 432 There should be judgment for Mr Greiss against Seven in the sum of $37,940. 433 Unless the parties agree on the appropriate costs order, I will hear from the parties on costs. I certify that the preceding four hundred and thirty-three (433) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Katzmann.