The submissions made to the Tribunal
38 It is convenient now to set out in a little more detail the submissions made by the parties to the Tribunal on the critical issues relevant to this appeal.
39 Mr Grant submitted to the Tribunal that he obtained no tax benefit in relation to the IET Schemes because the persons who caused the IETs to earn income - which did not include himself - would not have been willing to share income with Mr Grant in the event that such income was subject to taxation.
40 Alternatively, Mr Grant submitted that, if the Commissioner was correct that he would have obtained a tax benefit by virtue of the IET Schemes, the maximum amount he would have received is the sum of what he was in fact paid by way of loan during the relevant years. On that premise, he submitted, the IETs would first have been distributed to Mr Grant's trust entities, and then distributed to Mr Grant, his de facto spouse and the balance to a company related to Mr Grant, such that Mr Grant would have received income at a level that attracted income tax at the prevailing company tax rate. This was referred to as the Distribution Formula. It was uncontroversial that trusts connected with Mr Grant received moneys originating in the profits of the IETs between 1997 and 2000. Mr Grant, however, contended that those receipts were loans and that they were forgiven when he left the firm.
41 As to the IET Schemes, Mr Grant's outline of closing submissions dated 22 September 2022 contained the following submission, which was heavily footnoted to the evidence and his Amended Statement of Facts Issues and Contentions (SFIC), his response to the Commissioner's Amended SFIC, and the transcript of the hearing:
Mr Grant was not a promoter of tax arrangements, or an architect of the Practice Trust Scheme or the IET Schemes, and had limited understanding of the NVI Scheme. That was borne out of his lack of understanding of which entities had made loans under the IET Schemes, which resulted in errors in the Lombard Trust's, and the SNAG 2 Financial Trust's, financial statements between 1997 and 2000.
(Footnotes omitted.)
42 Having set out the Commissioner's contentions in relation to the question of tax benefit and the IET Schemes at some length, Mr Grant's submission continued:
In relation to the matters relied upon by the Commissioner in respect of IET Schemes, in addition to the matters listed [above] the following matters should be noted. First, unlike the Practice Trust Scheme where monies were distributed to the SNAG Trust by the CHPT prior to those monies passing through the Practice Trust Scheme, the IET Schemes involved monies earned by the IETs passing through the IET Schemes without being first distributed to trusts associated with Mr Grant.
Secondly, the Commissioner's asserted tax benefit appears premised on income tax planning arrangements generating income from Promotional Activities for the IETs, which would have been distributed to Mr Grant or trusts associated with Mr Grant. But again, Mr Grant was not involved in the Promotional Activities.
Mr Grant's evidence … shows - that the Promotional Activities involved lump sum billing. The only two Promotional Activities matters which recorded Mr Grant as apparently having no involvement (which Mr Grant explained in his oral evidence), and the other matter involved 2.5 hours of work undertaken by Mr Grant at an hourly rate.
Given the large number of 'Promotional Activities' matters provided to the Tribunal by the Commissioner, Mr Grant's answers in cross-examination support firmly that he had no involvement in promoting any 'tax arrangements or products'.
Accordingly, it is doubtful that Mr Grant would have earned income through the IETs in the absence of the IET Schemes, because the Firm's fee earner was not Mr Grant in respect of 'Promotional Activities' and a lack of tax deductibility in respect of such income does not lead to the inference that the relevant fee-earning partners would have been willing to share that income with Mr Grant. That is supported by the fact that Mr Grant was asked to leave the Firm in 1999, and that if he didn't then he (ie, his associated trusts) would be excluded from the Practice Trust and the IETs.
…
Moreover, as noted above:
(a) unlike other Principals of the Firm, Mr Grant was not a promoter of the IET Schemes (or other taxation products or arrangements);
(b) there is good reason to infer that any income earned by the IETs would not have been distributed to Mr Grant if those monies remained taxable in the hands of the person or entity that received them, given Mr Grant's:
(i) lack of involvement in the in the tax arrangements and products promoted by CHCPLL (or the Firm) whilst Mr Grant was a Principal of the Firm; and
(ii) being invited to leave the Firm on 30 June 1999
(Footnotes omitted.)
43 Again, each of those submissions was relevantly footnoted - and there was no suggestion made by the Commissioner before us that they were not borne out by the citations.
44 In his reply submissions before the Tribunal, Mr Grant contended repeatedly that he was not involved in the promotional activities of the IETs, that he was not involved with generating income for them and that the evidence (again, heavily referencing that evidence in footnotes) "firmly supported" that proposition.
45 The Commissioner contended otherwise. In his Amended SFIC, by way of example only, the Commissioner expressly relied on Mr Grant's "personal involvement in the Promotional Activities" (a defined term that referred to "tax planning arrangements and products"), Mr Grant's "role as a director of the relevant trustees for the 2000 IETs" and "the control exercised by [him] … over the 2000 IETs".
46 It is also clear that senior counsel for the Commissioner before the Tribunal understood that it was central to the Mr Grant's case that he had not derived a tax benefit in connection with the IET Scheme because it was not reasonably to be expected that any IET income would have been included in his assessable income for the relevant years because he had no relevant involvement in IET income generating activities. For example, Mr Grant was cross-examined before the Tribunal as follows:
[Ms Wheatley KC] Now Mr Grant, you had said previously that you had no involvement in the promotion of IET Schemes and the like. Is that correct?---I didn't go to accountant's offices and promote them or give talks on them, no.
Did you - again, to the best of your recollection, do any work on files within the firm relating to such Schemes?---No, I didn't. We've obviously spoken about that Cam Stewart one.
In terms of the creation of the trusts and the associated entities, Mr Grant, in relation to the IET Schemes, were you involved in that?---No, I didn't create any of the documents.
In relation to director's resolutions and trustees resolutions, did you draft any of them?---No.
47 And the issue was squarely addressed in the Commissioner's written closing submissions, including as follows:
In circumstances where the trusts Mr Grant controls or controlled were entitled to approximately a one-quarter share of the income of the IETs in the 1997 to 2000 income years and Mr Grant's direct involvement in and for the IETs (executing various resolutions and the like) and acting for the loss entities by way of powers of attorney, Mr Grant's claims that he "did not participate personally in the conduct of the Promotional Activities" carried on by the IETs do not detract from his direct involvement in the NVI Schemes. Whether or not Mr Grant participated personally in the promotional activities is not to the point. The Commissioner submits that the Tribunal would find that Mr Grant did participate in the activities of the IETs and the NVI Scheme.
(Footnotes omitted.)
48 Mr Grant gave evidence that in 2004 (after he no longer believed that he had any accrued personal losses available to him to offset against income), he obtained advice from his accountant as to how he might distribute trust income, and was advised to make distributions "to beneficiaries to pay the lowest tax impost".
49 Regrettably, as will be apparent when we turn to them below, not a word of any of the competing submissions or evidence - on matters self-evidently critical to the outcome - were dealt with by the Tribunal in its reasons.
50 Nor was Mr Grant's alternative submission that to the extent that the Commissioner was correct in asserting that Mr Grant had obtained a tax benefit by virtue of the Practice Trust Scheme and IET Schemes, the maximum tax benefit was the monies that passed into bank accounts of his associated trust entities from the IETs, being the extent of the monies lent to Mr Grant's entities after such monies had passed through the IET Schemes.
51 The evidence about the Distribution Formula and the submissions made in respect of it were dealt with by the parties at the hearing before the Tribunal mainly under the rubric of the Practice Trust Scheme.
52 We turn to that evidence and those submissions now.
53 Mr Grant tendered two expert reports by Mr Paul Laxon OAM. Mr Laxon retired as the Queensland Managing partner of Ernst and Young (EY) in 2018. He was EY's Oceania Energy and Infrastructure tax leader and was a former leader of the Taxation practice of EY. When he was an employee of EY, he was an Affiliate of the Institute of Chartered Accountants and a Fellow of the Tax Institute of Australia.
54 Mr Laxon's first report was relevantly as follows:
Background
I have been requested to provide on opinion for the income years 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001 on:
1 Whether it is reasonable to expect that, if the scheme identified by the Commissioner of Taxation (called the NVI scheme) in his Statement of Facts Issues and Contentions (SFIC) had not been entered into, would the relevant income have been included in Mr Grant's assessable income; and
2 lf Mr Grant didn't derive the income, who could reasonably be expected to have derived it?
To assist in this matter I have been provided with, inter alia, the following information:
1 SFIC file reference 17010092 prepared by Kurt Bragg Australian Government Solicitor;
2 A guideline for expert evidence in the AAT.
…
The genesis of the questions I have been asked to opine on is the dispute between the Commissioner of Taxation and Mr Grant regarding the application of Part IVA of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) (ITAA1936). Relevantly, those provisions require, inter alia, the identification of a "taxpayer" in respect of whom a determination is made under section 177F (ITAA1936). As is relevant here, such a determination is made to include a whole or part of an amount in "the taxpayers" assessable income for the relevant year of income which has not been so included as a result of the "scheme" with the requisite "purpose" and "tax benefit" having been entered into.
Opinion
I do not believe it is reasonable if the NVI scheme identified by the Commissioner of Taxation had not been entered into, that the relevant income would wholly have been included in Mr Grant's assessable income. A more likely scenario would be that the income would have been primarily included in the assessable income of other trust beneficiaries (including corporate beneficiaries).
Reasons for Opinion
In providing this opinion I have relied upon how I would have advised Mr Grant to structure his affairs, as well as how I have observed professionals in professional advisory practices structure their affairs.
Specifically, a common focus of professionals in legal, accounting and advisory practices when structuring their affairs is asset protection given the increasingly litigious nature of our society. Such a focus invariably leads to distributing income derived by professional practice and practice service trusts to taxpayers other than the practice professional himself (in this case). Such an approach is directed at the accumulation of assets/wealth in persons/entities other than the professional himself.
A secondary objective in advising on structuring such a professional's affairs is seeking to achieve an effective tax rate on practice and service income below the individual's marginal tax rate and specifically no greater than the prevailing corporate tax rate. That process of using discretionary trusts to split income is common and arguably accepted by the Commissioner in the context of professional practices (see for example Taxation Ruling TR 2006/2 in the context of Service Trust arrangements).
The acceptability by the Commissioner of the validity of asset protection motivations is also evident in the context of Everett assignments, and numerous rulings issued by the ATO confirming the acceptability of such arrangements and the non-application of Part IVA of the ITAA 1936. Everett assignments involve the assignment of interests in a (professional) partnership to another entity typically associated with and controlled by the Partner, such as a corporate entity or trustee of a discretionary trust. A secondary objective in such transactions is the effective "splitting of income' with resulting lower income tax impost than would otherwise be the case.
Given the above objectives and principles, if I were advising Mr Grant in relation to the distribution of the net income of relevant trusts (and absent the schemes having been entered into as set out in the SFIC) as noted in paragraphs 170 and 175 (and noting that no part of such income comprises personal exertion income) I would have suggested the trustee make the following distributions:
a. In 1997 in respect of net income of $491,352 I would have recommended the trustees pay:
i. $80,000 to Steven Grant (tax payable on $50,001 and over, $14,102 plus 47 cents for each $1 over $50,000, = $14,102 plus ($30,000 x 47%) = $28,202. $28,202/80,000 = average tax rate of 35.25% - company tax rate 36%);
ii. $80,000 to his partner; and
iii $331,352 to a company (tax payable 36% = $119,460);
If the prior year loses of $345,845 are allowed (ATO's SFIC, para 175.), in respect of the balance of the net income of $145,507 I would recommend:
iv. $72,753.50 to Steven Grant, and
v. $72,753.50 to his partner.
b. In the above & below I have assumed his partner had no other income. The taxable income figures are from the ATO's SFIC, paras 170 & 175.
c. In 1998 in respect of net income of $1,005,669 I would have recommended the trustees pay:
i. $80,000 to Steven Grant (tax payable on $50,001 and over, $14,102 plus 47 cents for each $1 over $50,000, = $14,102 plus ($30,000 x 47%) = $28,202' $28,202/80,000 = average tax rate of 35.25% -company tax rate 36%);
ii. $80,000 to his partner; and
iii. $845,669 to a company (tax payable 36% = $294,328).
d. In 1999 in respect of net income of $1,123,823 I would have recommended the trustees pay:
i. $80,000 to Steven Grant (tax payable on $50,001 and over, $14,102 plus 47 cents for each $1 over $50,000, = $14,102 plus ($30,000 x 47%) = $28,202. $28,202/80,000 = average tax rate of 35.25% -company tax rate 36%);
ii. $80,000 to his partner; and
iii. $963,823 to a company (tax payable 36% = $334,500)
e. In 2000 in respect of net income of $260,191 l would have recommended the trustees pay:
i. $70,000 to Steven Grant (tax payable on $50,001 and over, $14,102 plus 47 cents for each $1 over $50,000, = $14,102 plus ($20,000 x 47%) = $23,502. $23,502/$70,000 = average tax rate of 35.25% -company tax rate 30%);
ii. $70,000 to his partner; and
iii $120,191 to a company (tax payable 34% = $40,864.94)
f. In 2001 in respect of net income of $69,253 I would have recommended the trustees pay:
i. $69,253 to Steven Grant (tax payable on $60,001 and over, $15,580 plus 47 cents for each $1 over $60,000, = $15,580 plus ($9,253 x 47%) = $15,480. $15,480/$69,253 = average tax rate of 22% - company tax rate 30%).
g. In 2002 in respect of net income of $140,138 I would have recommended the trustees pay:
i. $70,069 to Steven Grant (tax payable on $60,001 and over, $15,580 plus 47 cents for each $1 over $60,000, = $15,580 plus ($10,069 x 47%) = $20,312.43. 20,312170,100 = average tax rate of 29% -company tax rate 30%); and
ii $70,069 to his partner.
The aim of the above would be to ensure the average tax rate paid in each year was similar to the corporate tax rate.
(Footnote omitted.)
55 Mr Laxon's supplementary report was relevantly as follows:
I have been provided with the following:
- GA - Respondent's Amended Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions for September 2020;
- GB - Applicant's Further Amended Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions 19 October 2020;
- GC - Applicant's Response to Respondent's Amended Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions 8 May 2021;
- GD - Respondent's Response to Applicant's Amended Statement of Facts, Issues and Contentions 30 July 2021; and
- GE - Respondent's Response to Applicant's Request for Particulars 31 July 2020.
…
CHANGES TO MY ORIGINAL REPORT
- Have you ever advised persons engaged in professional advisory practice, such as doctors or lawyers, to utilise discretionary trusts to structure their affairs?
Yes. I have advised numerous practice professionals including Partners at EY who sought my advice during my time as EY tax practice Leader in Queensland from 2010 to 2015, and then as Queensland Managing Partner from 2015 to 2018.
- If so, have you ever advised as to how they might distribute income derived from such trusts on a tax-effective basis, in the manner in which you suggest commencing on page 2 of your previous report?
Yes. The distribution of income consistent with an overarching asset protection objective and to achieve an efficient economic outcome was commonly sought advice provided to my Partners and other professional services clients.
- In your previous report, you state at paragraph on page 3 that you assume that Mr Grant's partner had no other income during the relevant years. If Mr Grant's partner had had an income of $50,000 or $80,000 in each of those years, how (if at all) would the advice you describe beginning on page 2 of your previous report have changed in respect of distributions by the relevant trustee?
I would have advised Mr Grant to distribute to his partner, so much of the net income of the trust so that the average rate of tax payable by his partner was no more than 36% (the prevailing corporate tax rate at the time). For example, If Mr Grant's partner had a taxable income (absent the trust distribution) of $50,000 then I would have advised Mr Grant to distribute $30,000 to his partner and the remainder of the trust's net income to be distributed to a company.
- In your previous report, you do not suggest that the relevant trusts should accumulate income. Why is that?
Net income of a trust to which no beneficiary is presently entitled is potentially taxed at the top marginal individual tax rate (which was in excess of the prevailing corporate tax rate) pursuant to Section 99/99A of the Income Tax Assessment Act (and the relevant provision in the Income Tax Rates Act 1986- "Rating Act").
…
56 Mr Laxon was not cross-examined.
57 Mr Grant subsequently adopted a method of distribution of trust income in line with that advice, so that the tax rate "across the board" did not exceed the company tax rate.
58 Mr Grant's evidence along those lines included the following.
59 First, in one of his statements to the Tribunal, he said as follows:
TAKING ADVICE AND GIVING TAX ADVICE
ln the years:
9.1 1997 and 1998 - Davey & Co Accountants;
9.2 1999 and 2000 - Chris Newman, Newmans Accountants;
9.3 2001to 2003 - Kel Peters, Accountant;
9.4 2004 and subsequent - John Biggs Accountants.
I took advice from each of the above in respect of my related Trusts and Company's tax returns. John Biggs gave me advice in 2004 and subsequently about making distributions from the Grants Lawyers Trust and the SG Practice Trust (which I had by then established) to beneficiaries to pay the lowest tax impost.
I typically met with the advisors in March/April each year to talk about my financial position, the preparation of accounts and the like. I also had conversations by telephone as the close of a financial year approached.
Since 2004 I personally gave advice to professional clients that operated through a Trust about the flexibility of the income distribution which can be made by a Trust including making distributions to family members and to any available company so that the marginal tax rate "across the board" did not exceed the company tax rate.
ln the 2004-2019 tax years the Grants Lawyers Trust (GLT) and my interest in the Merthyr Law business operated through the SG Practice Trust (subsequently renamed the MD & NV Trust) (SGPT).
ln those years the trust made distributions to other trusts that I controlled, to my sister Nicole Grant, my partners and to the AMDG Finance Ltd Partnership so that the marginal tax rate "across the board" did not exceed the company tax rate at the time.
The returns for the GLT for 2004 and 2006 are attached & marked SG1.
I did not accumulate income in any trust because the highest marginal tax rate would apply to any undistributed net income of the trust.
60 Mr Grant was not cross-examined about that evidence. It was also raised as an issue in his Amended SFIC under a heading which reads "Tax that would have been paid if no 'scheme'" and picks up Mr Laxon's uncontested evidence.
61 Mr Grant's closing written submissions to the Tribunal summarised the case contended for and the relevance of that evidence in particular (among other evidence) to both the Practice Trust and IET Schemes as follows:
In summary, the following objective matters are relevant to any alternative postulate concerning income distribution from monies that were, or which might have been, paid to the SNAG Trust, the Lombard Trust or the SNAG 2 Finance Trust, and ultimately distributed to Mr Grant, had the Practice Trust Scheme and IET Schemes not existed:
(a) owing to the Firm's misfortunes in 1990, Mr Grant did not want to accrue assets or income in his own name, a matter which underpinned the Restructure;
(b) in accordance with that premise, Mr Grant subsequently accrued assets in companies and trusts, rather than in his own name;
(c) in the 1994 to 1996 income tax years the CHPT distributed income to the SNAG Trust, which distributed income to CHOUT by reason of CHOUT having accrued tax losses (and Mr Grant and the Firm's other Principals having assumed CHOUT's debts);
(d) the SNAG Trust utilised the Practice Trust Scheme and the IET Schemes between 1997 and 2000, on the basis that Mr Grant believed that those schemes were lawful;
(e) Mr Grant sought to utilise the Accrued Personal Losses in the years 2000 to 2002, upon the belief that those losses were still available;
(f) the Restructure involved applying to the QLS for permission to engage in a Unit Trust structure which passed income to discretionary trusts that permitted the Firm's Principals to share income with (inter alia) their spouses;
(g) each of the Lombard Trust Deed, the SNAG Trust Deed and the SNAG 2 Finance Trust Deed named Mr Grant and his spouse as a primary beneficiary, the SNAG 2 Finance Trust Deed also expressly including "de facto partner" (although, it is submitted, being surplusage);
(h) Mr Grant had a de facto partner in each of the 1997 to 2002 income tax years with whom he could have shared income distributed by the SNAG Trust, the Lombard Trust or the SNAG 2 Finance Trust;
(i) there existed at least two companies to whom Mr Grant could have distributed income - Wood Duck Pty Ltd and A Tough Row to Hoe Pty Ltd;
(j) the unchallenged expert opinion from a vastly experienced accountant is that the distribution of income from discretionary trust to spouses and to companies in order to achieve a tax rate "across the board" no higher than the prevailing corporate tax rate is a frequent practice that he had advised;
(k) Mr Grant, soon after leaving the Firm:
(i) received and followed accountants' advice to distribute income derived from Grants Law Trust in the manner that he says he would have distributed trust derived income in the 1997 to 2002 income years, if the Practice Trust Scheme and the IET Schemes had not existed; and
(ii) himself provided such advice to others.
(Footnotes omitted.)
62 The Commissioner's submissions to the contrary, including dealing with Mr Laxon's evidence, occupy more than seven pages, and appear in his outline of final submissions before the Tribunal under the heading "Mr Grant's Counterfactual", and include the following:
…
The Commissioner in response submits that Mr Grant's counterfactual does not rise beyond mere speculation as it is not supported by the substratum of foundational facts. Mr Grant does not have a history of distributing income to himself up to a certain level, his spouse/partner (again to a certain level), or other corporate beneficiaries so that the tax rate paid is only that of the corporate rate.
…
A flaw in Mr Grant's counterfactual in respect of the Practice Amounts is that it is not expressed to be constrained by or to take into account any limitation on profit sharing of the income of the Practice Trust as approved by the QLS. He has provided no objective evidence in support of any such arrangement available to him. There is no evidence regarding the entity "Rosefall Pty Ltd" or of "some other entity controlled by the Applicant". That evidence would have needed to explain how the constraints of the QLS approval could be overcome. As was the case in FCA Hart, an important factor supporting the Commissioner's counterfactual is a presumption that Mr Grant, as a solicitor of long-standing, would not knowingly break the law. That conclusion necessarily precludes distributions of trust income from the SNAG Trust beyond the entities approved by the QLS, and the evidence does not reveal a history of payments being made to other persons in the pool of entities approved by the QLS, other than to Mr Grant himself. The Commissioner makes this submission despite Mr Grant accepting in cross-examination that the distributions that had already been made and beneficiaries appointed by the terms of the Practice Trust Deed and the SNAG Trust Deed were beyond the terms of the 29 January 1993 QLS approval to share receipts.
(Footnotes omitted.)
63 On the question of Mr Grant's evidence about what he did after the income years under review, the following submission was made:
To the extent that Mr Grant seeks to rely on events after the income years under review, that cannot assist his counterfactual. Events after the relevant income years do not provide a foundation for a counterfactual, because the foundational facts are properly facts that occurred prior to the relevant income years, rather than after the relevant income years. Thus, the distributions of the Grant's Lawyers Trust in the 2004 and 2006 income years that Mr Grant refers to in his Supplementary Statement dated 27 October 2021 do not assist him.
Accordingly, it is reasonable on the evidence to expect that, in the absence of the NVI Schemes, Mr Grant would have taken a financial benefit from the income generated by the Cleary Hoare legal practice attributable to his share, by reason of him holding special units in the Practice Trust. That expectation is reasonable, "he had to live" and he was effectively using those funds for his personal expenses. That the application of the Commissioner's counterfactual may be unpalatable to Mr Grant and something that he would prefer not to have done because tax would be payable on such amounts, does not render it unreasonable or a mere possibility.
(Footnotes omitted, original emphasis.)
64 The submission continued:
Mr Grant has not articulated any commercial purpose for the steps that comprise the NVI Scheme. To the extent that Mr Grant might assert that it is commercially naïve to contend that the income of the SNAG Trust or SNAG No 2 would have been distributed to him personally, that it was sound commercial practice to keep assets and risk separated, and that it was a fundamental principle of asset protection that the person at risk does not accumulate wealth or derive income, this is not supported by evidence. In this regard, it was also observed in FCA Hart that there is an important distinction between asset protection by the legal and equitable ownership of tangible assets and the protection of more transient year-by-year cash or chose in action assets, received by way of income, a loan or otherwise.
As to any asserted purpose of asset protection, assessed objectively, the structure of the Practice Trust, including the manner in which ordinary unitholders were either discretionary trusts with corporate trustees or corporate entities, already gave a significant degree of protection against potential claims.
Mr Grant's assertion that the income would not have been distributed to him or anyone else so as to cause them to have a higher marginal tax rate than the corporate tax rate cannot be accepted as Mr Grant has no proven past history of distributing to any other family members or other entities and no evidence of other history to rely upon. That is, it is mere speculation by Mr Grant to suggest this distribution. This notion of speculation is further supported by the introduction by Mr Grant in the Applicant's Opening of another entity, Rosefall Pty Ltd, an entity not previously raised by Mr Grant.
Further, as to Mr Grant's suggestion that it is naïve to suggest that he would have received all of the income personally, naivety and commerciality have little or no part to play unless there is shown to be a sound commercial basis for an alternative transaction taking place without tax consequences. As Bromwich J put it in FCA Hart, "if the choice was between not having the use and benefit of any money at all, ever, or only having it net of tax, then the net income was the better, and indeed necessary-for living, outcome than no money at all."
(Footnotes omitted.)
65 The Commissioner then turned to Mr Laxon's evidence:
In support of his applications for review, Mr Grant relies upon the expert report and supplementary expert report of Mr Paul Laxon dated 30 January 2020 and 27 October 2021 respectively.
Mr Laxon's expert report at page 1 under the heading 'Opinion' states his opinion [which is then set out].
Mr Laxon then gives his reasons for his opinion [which is then set out].
Mr Laxon opines (at p 2) that asset protection is a "common focus" of professionals in legal, accounting and advisory practices, which "invariably leads to distributing income by professional practice and practice service trusts to taxpayers other than the practice professional". He also states (at p 2) a secondary objective as being to achieve an effective tax rate on practice and service income that is no greater than the corporate tax rate.
On the basis of his general observations, he then states (at pp 2-3) that if he "were advising Mr Grant in relation to the distribution of the net income of relevant trusts (and absent the schemes having been entered into as set out in the SFIC) as noted in paragraphs 170 and 175…" that he "would have suggested that the trustee make the following distributions: …". Mr Laxon then sets out a proposed distribution in each income year such that no single taxpayer pays more than the company tax rate, in a manner equivalent to that proposed by Mr Grant in the AASFIC at Part F in paragraphs [1] to [6].
There are three reasons why Mr Laxon's evidence should be given no weight.
First, it lacks precision. Neither the "relevant income" nor the "other trust beneficiaries" are defined or otherwise identified. It is unclear, for instance, whether Mr Laxon refers to Mr Grant's share of the income of the Practice Trust or the income of the SNAG Trust and whether Mr Laxon meant to include Mr Grant's share of the income derived by the IETs. That is, the observations are at such a high level of generality as to be unhelpful.
Secondly, the report does not provide any rationale for the opinion it contains that is referable to the underlying substratum of foundational facts. The report is not based on a history of distributions to a particular person or entity that falls within the class of persons approved by the QLS or any other pertinent circumstances. It is not based on a history of distribution in each income year such that no single taxpayer pays more than the company tax rate. It is not open to Mr Laxon to simply "swear the issue" by providing what he may consider to be a complete answer to the question in issue based on his speculation as to what might have occurred without drawing an opinion from the foundational facts. This is exactly what Greenwood J in McCutcheon and the Full Court in RCI warned would not be sufficient to discharge the onus. Mr Laxon's supplementary expert report does not remedy these matters. The report is thus speculation.
Thirdly, Mr Laxon's evidence does not assist the Tribunal because it is an opinion as to how he would have advised Mr Grant in the absence of the NVI Schemes, not an opinion as to what would have happened in the absence of the schemes. It is thus not, in the words of the High Court in Peabody "a prediction as to events which would have taken place if the relevant scheme had not been entered into or carried out".
As Mr Laxon's reports provide no more than imprecise speculation, the reports are not relevant to resolving the issues in dispute. The Commissioner submits that the Tribunal would find that Mr Laxon's reports, although permitted into evidence in the Tribunal (it not being bound by the rules of evidence) is not actually relevant to the issues that the Tribunal must decide and therefore it is submitted that the Tribunal would find that it affords no weight to the evidence of Mr Laxon.
(Footnotes omitted.)
66 The Commissioner's submissions then returned to Mr Grant's evidence on the topic:
Mr Grant, himself also seeks to give similar evidence. That evidence, suffers from the same difficulty, it is not referable to the underlying substratum of foundational facts.
Thus, it is submitted that Mr Grant's speculative counterfactual is not sufficient to discharge his onus. It is not a reasonable prediction of what would have happened or what might reasonably be expected to happen had the NVI Schemes not been carried out.
In all of the circumstances, it is submitted that the Tribunal would find that Mr Grant has not discharged his onus to establish that the Practice Amounts and the IET Amounts did not constitute a tax benefit that he enjoyed in the relevant income years, for the purposes of s 177C(1) of the ITAA 1936.
(Footnote omitted.)
67 Mr Grant's reply submissions respond at some length to the Commissioner's submissions about Mr Laxon's and Mr Grant's evidence about the "counterfactual". Each of the paragraph numbers mentioned in the following passages is quoted above:
As to ROFS [302] - [306] again this appears to be a reiteration of the Commissioner's arguments under s 97 of the ITAA 1936 and s 6-5 of the ITAA 1997, and pays too little or no regard to the matters set out at AOFS [217] - [221], and [133] - [135] above.
As to ROFS [307] - [313]:
(a) in his Amended Expert Report, Mr Laxon identifies that he is asked to opine on the relevant income if the scheme identified by the Commissioner - the NVI Scheme (which encompasses both the Practice Trust Scheme and the IET Schemes) - had not been entered into;
(b) notes that assessments were made to include a whole or part of an amount in the taxpayer's assessable income for the relevant year of income which has been so included as a result of the scheme;
(c) said, in the context of the matters above, "I do not believe it is reasonable if the NVI Scheme identified by the Commissioner… had not been entered into, that the relevant income would have been included in Mr Grant's assessable income. A more likely scenario would be that the income would have been primarily included in the assessable income of other trust beneficiaries (including corporate beneficiaries)"; and
(d) said further that, if he were advising Mr Grant, he would have advised distribution between Mr Grant, "his partner" and "a company", in order to diminish the income tax burden.
Accordingly, it is plain that Mr Laxon:
(a) was referring to the income assessed against Mr Grant by the Commissioner on account of the NVI Scheme which, again, encompassed both the Practice Trust Scheme and the IET Schemes; and
(b) was speaking of advice he would have provided as to prospective beneficiaries for distribution. Moreover, it is plain that Mr Grant had a de facto partner in each of the 1997 to 2002 income years, and controlled at least two companies to whom distributions might have been made - Wood Duck and A Tough Row to Hoe - such that the prospective beneficiaries identified by Mr Laxon had actual counterparts at relevant times.
As to ROFS [314]-[316], Mr Laxon does not "swear the issue"; rather, Mr Laxon says what he would have advised Mr Grant as to appropriate distributions in the 1997 to 2002 income years. It remains for the Tribunal to determine whether Mr Grant would likely have received such advice, and whether Mr Grant would have likely followed it. Contrary to the Commissioner's apparent suggestion, for Mr Laxon to determine what Mr Grant would have done based on any historical conduct on the part of Mr Grant, or to give an opinion about "what would have happened in the absence of the schemes", would have been an untoward intrusion on the Tribunal's task.
As to ROFS [317], it is entirely proper for Mr Grant to say what he would have done in the absence of the Practice Trust Scheme and the IET Schemes. Again, it is the Tribunal's task to determine what would have happened but for the scheme, having regard to all the evidence.
Mr Grant refutes ROFS [318]-[319], for the reason outlined at [113]-[140] above.
68 As to the Commissioner's submission that no regard should be had to Mr Grant's evidence on how he conducted his affairs after the income years under review, he made submissions in reply, which included the following:
ROFS [301] is wrong. As stated at AOFS [214], between 1994 and 2002 Mr Grant caused trust distributions to be made on a tax-effective basis that Mr Grant believed was lawful, and also believed that he had not exhausted the Accrued Personal Losses prior to the 2002 income year. Accordingly, there is no basis to "criticise" Mr Grant on the basis of no earlier history of distributions to other persons in order to limit income tax payable to the prevailing corporate tax rate. What is relevant is what Mr Grant did after he believed the Accrued Personal Losses had been exhausted. In that regard, Mr Grant's unchallenged evidence is that:
(a) Mr Grant's law firm operated through a trust structure;
(b) he was advised to make distributions from trusts to beneficiaries to pay the lowest income tax impost; and
(c) he followed that advice in the 2004 to 2019 income years.
That Mr Grant would receive, and follow, advice from tax practitioners as to steps to reduce income tax in the 1997 income year and subsequently sits comfortably with the utilisation of the Practice Trust Scheme and IET Schemes in the 1997 to 1999 income years by Mr Grant's associated entities.
69 We turn now to the Tribunal's reasons.