Grandview Ausbuilder Pty Ltd v Budget Demolitions Pty Ltd

Affidavit and other evidence

1. The Company relies on the affidavit dated 1 December 2023 of its director, Mr Violi, in support of the application to set aside the Demand. Mr Violi there refers to the fact, now reflected in the withdrawal of the admission in the Commercial List Proceedings, that the relevant payments were made to a bank account in his and his late wife's name, rather than to a bank account in the Company's name. He also refers to the pleadings in the Commercial List Proceedings, including the Commercial List Statement filed by Gemi, and a Second Cross Claim Summons and Second Cross Claim Statement filed by the Company, and observes that the principal cause of action by Gemi and an associated company in the Commercial List Proceedings is to enforce two loans and mortgages, and that the Company's Cross Claim contends that the loans and mortgages were procured fraudulently and without the Company's knowledge or involvement, and the remedies sought in the Commercial List Proceedings including cancellation of those mortgages. Mr Violi states that: "I, in my capacity as the sole director and secretary of [the Company], assert that there is genuine dispute that [the Company] is indebted to [Gemi] as alleged in the [Demand] ... [the Company] is defending all of the allegations in the [Commercial List Statement]".
2. Mr Violi also refers to the Commercial List Response in the Commercial List Proceedings, and the matters on which Mr Epstein had relied to contend that the debt was not disputed, and points out that the admission on which Mr Epstein relied was incorrect, where the relevant account was not the Company's bank account. As I have noted above, the Company has since withdrawn that admission by leave.
3. Mr Violi also referred to the fact that he had then not yet served his affidavit evidence in the Commercial List Proceedings, although he has now done so, and observed that, in relation to the matters in issue: "I will give evidence that one (or more) persons, without my knowledge or consent, arranged for the First Payment to be deposited into the Personal Account and then convinced me to transfer the money, the subject of the First Payment, to the ultimate apparent beneficiary of those moneys, which I did on 3 March 2020 [being the day after I received the First Payment]".
4. Mr Violi also there addressed the circumstances of a second payment which is also in issue in the Commercial List Proceedings. He referred to an aspect of the Commercial List Response in the Commercial List Proceedings, which denied that the amount of $2.5 million, which is the second amount claimed in the Demand, was advanced pursuant to the first loan, and that the Company or Mr Violi had any knowledge that the sum was advanced in payment of the first loan, and said that part of it, $1.2 million, had been paid to a third party, implicitly as part of the alleged fraud. An aspect of that Commercial List Response also referred to orders made by Slattery J on 15 July 2022, but it appears those orders related to a different amount, and possibly a different mortgage, and do not take this matter further.
5. Mr Sommerville, with whom Mr Meyerowitz-Katz appears for Gemi, criticises the suggested lack of a detailed account of the relevant transactions in Mr Violi's affidavit in these proceedings, and suggests that that affidavit asserts a dispute as to the debt claimed by Gemi without providing sufficient evidence of that dispute. That proposition assumes that Mr Violi, who was addressing these matters by a lengthy affidavit that has now been filed in the Commercial List Proceedings, should do so in parallel in this application.
6. Gemi tendered Mr Epstein's affidavit in support of the Demand and also read an affidavit dated 5 April 2024 of Mr Buhagiar, Gemi's solicitor, which refers to the mortgages granted in respect of the properties, although the relevance of that matter to this application ultimately did not become clear.
7. Gemi also tenders a redacted version of Mr Violi's affidavit dated 25 January 2024 filed in the Commercial List Proceedings, from which very substantial parts of the affidavit were redacted. Mr Somerville indicated that that process had been adopted because limited leave had been obtained to rely on that affidavit in these proceedings, to avoid any breach of the Harman undertaking, and that the parts of the affidavit that were tendered were those that were within the scope of that limited leave. Mr Somerville referred to aspects of that affidavit and to the evidence then given by Mr Violi in respect of the transactions, which are said to give rise to the loans which are the subject of the Demand, and vigorously criticised aspects of that evidence.
8. Mr Somerville also submitted that Mr Violi had not there given sufficient explanation of what had occurred with the funds paid by Gemi to the relevant account in order to establish any genuine dispute that the Company retained some part of the funds. I should again pause to note the oddity of the process that Gemi here seeks to adopt. Mr Somerville here tenders an affidavit in the ongoing Commercial List Proceedings, large parts of which were redacted so that they are not available to me, including paragraphs in the middle of passages on which he relied, and then invites me to reach findings as to the adequacy of Mr Violi's explanation of events, a matter which will likely be in issue in the Commercial List Proceedings in due course and as to which a judge in that List, who will hopefully have access to all and not only part of that affidavit, will reach findings in due course. Gemi also seeks to have me reach those findings without Mr Violi having been cross examined in these proceedings as to any aspects of the dispute.
9. Gemi also tendered a letter dated 13 November 2023 between the solicitors which appears to be directed to a dispute as to whether there exists a genuine dispute as to the Company's entitlement to retain, at least while the proceedings are ongoing, any part of the amount paid by Gemi in the proceedings.

Whether a genuine dispute is established

1. I deal with this question briefly, because it is ultimately not necessary to the determination of these proceedings.
2. The Court has power to set aside a creditor's statutory demand under s 459H(1)(a) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) ("Act") where there is a genuine dispute between a company and the issuer of the demand about the existence or amount of the debt to which the demand relates. In Spencer Constructions Pty Ltd v G & M Aldridge Pty Ltd (1997) 76 FCR 452 at 464, the Full Court of the Federal Court observed that a genuine dispute must be bona fide and truly exist in fact, and the grounds for the dispute must be real and not spurious, hypothetical, illusory or misconceived. The threshold to establish a genuine dispute is not high, and it is necessary to bear in mind the observations of Barrett J (as his Honour then was) in Panel Tech Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd v Australian Skyreach Equipment Pty Ltd (No 2) [2003] NSWSC 896 at [18], that: "[o]nce the company shows that even one issue has a sufficient degree of cogency to be arguable, a finding of genuine dispute must follow."
3. Mr Priestley also refers to my summary of the applicable principles in Re Wollongong Coal Ltd (2015) 110 ACSR 134; [2015] NSWSC 1680 at [9]-[22] for the propositions that: "(1) A dispute is "genuine" if it is not "plainly vexatious or frivolous" or "may have some substance" or "involves a plausible contention requiring investigation". A genuine dispute requires that it be bona fide and, to that effect, be premised on sufficiently particularised grounds that are "real and not spurious, hypothetical, illusory or misconceived" and which demonstrate the dispute's "objective existence" and "prima facie plausibility". (2) The test is governed by principles analogous to those which underpin an application for an interlocutory injunction or summary judgment. The court must, however, guard against setting the threshold too low for that is liable to defeat the legislative purpose of the section. (3) The task faced by a company challenging a statutory demand on the genuine dispute ground is by no means at all a difficult or demanding one. Once the company shows that even one issue has a sufficient degree of cogency to be arguable, a finding of genuine dispute must follow and the demand will be set aside. A finding to the contrary could only be arrived at if the contentions advanced are so devoid of substance that no further investigation is warranted. (4) The function of the court is merely to determine the existence of a genuine dispute. While this neither requires nor invites it to weigh or assess the merits of the dispute, the court will not exceed its legitimate function by having regard to evidence which bears upon whether the asserted dispute is genuine."
4. I have reviewed other, more recent, authorities, including observations of the Court of Appeal in Ligon 158 Pty Ltd v Huber [2016] 117 ACSR 495; [2016] NSWCA 330 at [8], and in Grandview Ausbuilder Pty Ltd v Budget Demolitions Pty Ltd (2019) 99 NSWLR 397; [2019] NSWCA 60, in my decision in Re PSR Refining Services Pty Ltd [2023] NSWSC 243 at [19]ff, and I do not repeat that review.
5. I should now add, to the observations made in my oral ex tempore judgment, more detailed reference to the parties' submissions as to this issue. In his opening outline of submissions, Mr Priestley who appears for the Company refers to Mr Violi's evidence in support of this application and submits, inter alia, that: "The whole of the debt comprising the two payments made is disputed. The [Demand] states that both amounts were paid "by the Creditor … to the Company's bank account". The monies were paid into a personally bank account and not into a bank account held by the Company. There is no evidence that any of these funds were ever received by the Company. It is no answer to describe the bank account as the Company's "nominated account". The Company and Mr Violi deny even being aware of the loans at the time of the two payments. The contention that the Company was aware of loan monies as such being paid to it before or after the timing of the payments is much in dispute in the [Commercial List] Proceedings, and the Company's evidence filed in the [Commercial List] Proceedings supports its position. There is therefore necessarily genuine dispute that the Company "nominated" any account for the receipt of these funds. The Company understands that on this application GEMI seeks to rely on particular paragraphs from Mr Violi's Affidavit in chief filed recently in the [Commercial List] Proceedings (Violi Related Proceedings affidavit). This evidence does not demonstrate that the Company received the funds, or that the Company was aware that it had received "loan monies" from GEMI. If it is said to show that some of the funds were used for the Company's purposes, that would not establish an undisputed debt. Again, all of these matters are encompassed in the wider dispute. The fact that the monies were deposited into a bank account held and controlled by Mr Violi, a Director of the Company, cannot characterise the deposit of the funds as creating a debt owed by the Company. Mr Violi had complete discretion as to how to utilise funds received in his personal account. The available evidence does not establish any debt owing by the Company."
6. Mr Somerville in turn makes detailed submissions as to Mr Violi's evidence in the Commercial List Proceedings, to which I have referred above, and submits, as to the second payment made by the Company, only part of which is now in issue, that: "Either it was an advance under a loan from [Gemi] in relation to which the Company was a guarantor (as [Gemi] says), or it was an amount of money of which [Gemi] had been defrauded (as the Company says). In the former case, the Company is now obliged to repay the Second Payment plus interest as a debt due and owing. In the latter case, the Company had no entitlement to receive the Second Payment, and it is obliged to repay at least the $1.3 million of the funds which the Company received and retained for its own benefit: Carpenter v Morris [2023] NSWCA 154 at [69]-[72]. Nothing in the Company's material establishes any conceivable basis on which the Company can claim to be entitled to keep the benefit of those funds. There is no genuine dispute that they are owed."
7. In his outline of opening submissions in reply, Mr Priestley responds that: "(a) that the Company received the monies is in dispute, and the starting position is that these were paid into an account not held by the Company; and, b) that the Company used the monies, or that the monies were used for Company purposes, is in dispute, and in any event any monies so used cannot be quantified on the available evidence."
8. Mr Priestley also responds to Gemi's formulation of a restitutionary claim as follows: "There are a number of difficulties with that position: a) The claim is disputed because, again, that the Company received the monies is in dispute, and that it retained the monies for its own benefit is in dispute; b) The claim is not only dependant on other findings, but falls to be litigated in other proceedings; c) It is not appropriate on this application to determine the claim, or to attempt to determine that the claim is irresistible; d) It is not otherwise for the Company on this application to put forward evidence to establish a basis to defend a claim in restitution; and e) Ultimately [Gemi] may have such a claim of substance, against Mr Violi, or the Company, but that the claim lies against the Company cannot be said to be beyond argument."
9. Mr Somerville indicates in oral submissions that Gemi does not seek to rely on a debt arising from the transaction documents, in order to support the debt claimed in the Demand, because it recognises that a genuine dispute arises from the challenge to the execution of those documents by the Company. It instead asserts only a restitutionary claim, and I will assume, without deciding, that a restitutionary claim may, in a proper case, be characterised as a debt which can support a creditor's statutory demand: see the review of the applicable case law, in the context of a quantum meruit claim rather than a claim for monies had and received, in F Assaf, Assaf's Winding Up in Insolvency, 3rd ed, [3.41]ff. As events have developed, that restitutionary claim is limited to the amount of $1.3 million, being part of the second payment of $2.5 million paid into Mr and Mrs Violi's bank account by Gemi, which Gemi seeks to treat as a receipt by the Company for that purpose.
10. It seems to me that the Company has plainly established a genuine dispute as to Gemi's claim for debt as formulated in that way, not least because a substantial issue arises as to whether such a restitutionary claim exists, not against the Company, but against Mr Violi and Mrs Violi, who were the recipients of the funds, and that depends upon the contested question of the extent to which a payment into their account could be treated as involving a payment at the direction of the Company, where there is a substantial dispute in the Commercial List Proceedings as to whether the Company had any involvement in the transaction, and, therefore, in giving any directions which were involved in it.
11. For that reason, if it were necessary to do so, I would find that a genuine dispute existed in respect of Gemi's claim to a debt founded on a restitutionary claim. However, it is not necessary to reach my decision on that basis, because I am comfortably satisfied that the demand should be set aside for some other reason under s 459J of the Act, and I now turn to that question.

Whether the Demand should be set aside for some other reason

1. Section 459J(1)(b) of the Act permits the Court to set aside a creditor's statutory demand where there is some other reason for it to do so. The Court's power to set aside a creditor's statutory demand under that section exists to maintain the integrity of the process provided under Pt 5.4 of the Act and is to be used to counter an attempt at subversion of the statutory scheme, but is not exercised by reference to subjective notions of fairness: Portrait Express (Sales) Pty Ltd v Kodak (Australasia) Pty Ltd (1996) 20 ACSR 746; [1996] NSWSC 199; Meehan v Glazier Holdings Pty Ltd (2005) 53 ASCR 229; [2005] NSWCA 24; and see my observations as to the scope of the Court's power to set aside a statutory demand on that basis in Re Modern Wholesale Jewellery Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 236 at [24] ("Modern Wholesale").
2. I should again add, to the observations made in my oral ex tempore judgment, more detailed reference to the parties' submissions as to this issue. In his opening outline of submissions, Mr Priestley refers to Modern Wholesale and submits that: "Suing in one place for the debt where the proceedings are defended, then separately pursuing a statutory demand where the debt obligation is disputed, has the clear potential to unreasonably accrue wasted, duplicated costs".
3. He also submits that: "The Company disputes its indebtedness to the GEMI plaintiffs in the [Commercial List] Proceedings. Although Mr Violi and the Company concede that two payments were made into Mr Violi's bank account, the existence, nature and extent of any liability that Mr Violi and/or the Company may have with respect to those payments are all the subject of dispute in those proceedings. In the [Commercial List] Proceedings Mr Violi and the Company bring a Cross Claim seeking declarations, and damages, against the GEMI plaintiffs and others."
4. Mr Somerville responds that: "What occurred here is that [the Commercial List P]roceedings were commenced by [Gemi] and another entity seeking a broad range of relief against the Company and various other persons, and in the course of the proceedings [Gemi] formed the view, based on admissions made by the Company, that a debt owed to the Creditor was not genuinely in dispute. [Gemi] accordingly sent the letter of 20 October 2023 … demanding payment of that debt. The Company then neither paid the debt nor articulated any reason why the debt was not due and payable. … It was clearly open to [Gemi] in those circumstances to infer that the debt was not being paid because the Company was insolvent and did not have the means to pay it. It was accordingly open to [Gemi] to test the Company's solvency by means of a statutory demand - as [Gemi] did. After the Demand was issued, the Company withdrew some of the admissions made in its C[ommercial] L[ist] R[esponse] on which [Gemi] had relied in issuing the Demand. However, as identified above, there remains an undisputed debt of $1.3 million. In those circumstances it was not an abuse of process for the Creditor to persist with the Demand. For the above reasons, this is not a case in which it is appropriate to set aside the Demand for "some other reason". Rather, it is a case in which the Company received $1.3 million to which it was not entitled and which it has been unable to repay. It is an appropriate case for the use of the statutory demand procedure."
5. It seems to me that there are here two parallel, and overlapping, reasons why the Demand should be set aside for some other reason under s 459J(1)(b) of the Act. First, it is now apparent that the primary allegation brought by Gemi against the Company in the Commercial List Proceedings is a knowing receipt and knowing assistance claim, which is there put on the basis that, if the instruments giving rise to the first loan and the first mortgages were not signed by or with the authority of the Company (which is denied by Gemi), then the Company received and became chargeable with the sum of $3,010,000, which was misappropriated from Gemi, and the Company participated with knowledge in a dishonest and fraudulent design. Plainly, that proposition puts in issue the factual circumstances in which Gemi paid $3,010,000 to the Company or to Mr and Mrs Viola, being the same amount as was initially claimed in the Demand, apparently relying, as I noted above, upon restitutionary principles. The circumstances of that transaction are then addressed, whether adequately or not, by Mr Violi in his evidence in the Commercial List Proceedings, to which I have referred above, as well as in his briefer affidavit in this application.
6. Mr Somerville submits, and I will assume, that Gemi has not brought a restitutionary claim against the Company in the Commercial List Proceedings. I accept that, for that reason, it is not possible for Gemi to seek, for example, summary judgment on the basis of that restitutionary claim in the Commercial List Proceedings, so far as it contends there would be no genuine dispute about that claim, had it brought that claim in those proceedings. However, that result reflects Gemi's choice not to bring that claim in the Commercial List Proceedings and instead to split its claims against the Company, so that one claim arising from the relevant transaction, for knowing assistance and knowing receipt, is raised in the Commercial List Proceedings, and another claim is sought to be dealt with by way of the Demand.
7. It seems to me that that approach is an abuse of the statutory demand process, and not less so because it reflects Gemi's choice not to raise the claim in the Commercial List Proceedings, so that all matters arising from the same transaction and the same evidence could be dealt with in those proceedings, rather than to claim the debt in the Commercial List Proceedings and also issue the Demand in parallel to those proceedings.
8. I reviewed the relevant authorities at length in my decision in Modern Wholesale at [24]ff, referring, inter alia, to Perlake Pty Ltd v Finance and Mortgage Corps (NSW) Pty Ltd [1996] 15 ACLC 76, dealing with the position where a creditor's statutory demand was issued for the same debts as were claimed in other proceedings, and to the extent to which that would constitute an abuse of process. In Re Zarzar Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 93, to which I also referred in Modern Wholesale at [30], Barrett J in turn addressed the question of the parallel commencement of proceedings and the issue of a creditor's statutory demand and observed (at [22]): "While there is no explicit rule precluded parallel resort by a creditor to both the statutory demand procedure and debt recovery proceedings, the reality is that it is an abuse of the statutory demand process to continue to press and rely on a demand while at the same time suing for the relevant debt or debts."
9. His Honour went on to identify issues of principle that support that conclusion, which relate to the different purposes of contested proceedings and the statutory demand procedure. I also identified a further reason why the commencement of contested proceedings in respect of a debt and the service of a creditor's statutory demand in respect of the same debt may amount to an abuse of the creditor's statutory demand procedure in Modern Wholesale (at [31]ff), pointing to the duplication and wasted costs which arise from that process.
10. I recognise that, here, Gemi seeks to distinguish that case law, first, on the basis that the claim for debt is not raised in the Commercial List Proceedings, although I pointed above to the fact that the same transaction and the same facts will be an issue in respect of the claim for knowing assistance and knowing receipt in those proceedings. Gemi also submits that where, to its perception, the debt is not disputed (a proposition that I have not accepted above), then it is appropriate to allow it to issue the Demand, and at the same time bring proceedings in respect of the same facts and the same matters in the Commercial List Proceedings, and put the more complex claim for knowing assistance and knowing receipt in those proceedings.
11. I do not accept either proposition. First, the wasted costs and duplication arising from Gemi's approach are the same, where the transaction and the facts giving rise to it are in issue in both the Commercial List Proceedings and in this application to set aside the Demand, notwithstanding that Gemi relies on a restitutionary claim to support the Demand, which it chooses not to bring in the Commercial List Proceedings, and a different claim in the Commercial List Proceedings. Second, the prejudice attached to the process is emphasised by the fact that Gemi here sought to rely on parts of the evidence led by Mr Violi in the Commercial List Proceedings, in order to resist the application to set aside the Demand, and invited me to reach findings as to that evidence, and at least as to the question whether it was adequate to displace the restitutionary claim, where a judge in the Commercial List Proceedings will be required to reach findings as to the same evidence as to the same transactions to determine the knowing assistance and knowing receipt claims in the Commercial List Proceedings. That plainly involves the risk of inconsistent findings, where two judges, albeit for different purposes, are asked to review the same evidence as to the same transactions and to reach conclusions about that evidence. For these reasons, it seems to me that the Demand should be set aside on the basis that it is a subversion of the creditor's statutory demand process to rely on it, in effect, to pursue a debt which arises from the same transaction that is already at issue in the Commercial List Proceedings.
12. I would also reach the conclusion that the Demand should be set aside for some other reason on a second basis. In Re UGL Process Solutions Pty Ltd [2012] NSWSC 1256 ("UGL"), to which I drew the parties' attention, I observed that a statutory demand for a substantially overstated amount would potentially be inconsistent with the proper use of the statutory demand regime, and that is a matter which can also support setting aside the Demand. I addressed the same issue in Re Tetbury Pty Ltd [2017] NSWSC 37 at [43], where I addressed the scope of the Court's power to vary a statutory demand under s 459H(4) of the Act, as Gemi now seeks to have done, and observed that the Court would generally vary a statutory demand: "Unless the demand was so grossly inflated, or comprised matters that were so obviously in dispute, that the service of the demand amounted to an abuse of the regime under Pt 5.4 of the Corporations Act, and should be set aside for some other reason under s 459J of the Act."
13. In Re Granite Power Ltd (admins apptd) [2019] NSWSC 1491 [39], Rees J expressed her agreement with the proposition that "[a] substantial overstatement, where much of the amount is later conceded to be generally disputed" may be an "improper use of the statutory scheme" such that a statutory demand should be set aside under s 459J(1)(b) of the Act. In Re Forte Sydney Construction Pty Ltd [2024] NSWSC 495 at [24] I noted, albeit in a different context, the policy that supports that approach, including that the service of a statutory demand claiming a substantial amount that is not properly due will place the recipient of the demand at risk that it is presumed to be insolvent unless it either pays the inflated amount claimed or incurs the costs of an application to set aside the demand.
14. I recognise that, here, the position has moved adversely to Gemi in the course of these proceedings, once the admissions initially made in the Commercial List Response by the Company were withdrawn with leave. Nonetheless, it seems to me that was a risk which Gemi assumed in serving the Demand where the relevant transactions were in issue in the Commercial List Proceedings, and the fact that the Demand initially claimed $3,010,000, of which Gemi now accepts that only $1.3 million can be pressed, is a further reason to set aside the Demand.
15. For completeness, Mr Priestley, who appears for the Company, also contended that the Demand involved an abuse of process of the kind addressed by the High Court in Williams v Spautz (1992) 174 CLR 509; [1992] HCA 34, where it was served by Gemi at a time that the Company was pressing a claim for security for costs in the Commercial List Proceedings. It is not necessary or appropriate to reach a finding as to that submission given the findings I have reached on other grounds.
16. For these reasons, I order that the creditor's statutory demand for payment of debt issued by Gemi 169 Pty Ltd dated 2 November 2023 be set aside.

Costs

1. I have also now heard Counsel as to costs. Mr Priestley submitted that Gemi should pay the Company's costs of the application on an indemnity basis. Mr Somerville properly accepted that an order for costs on the ordinary basis would follow, but submitted that Gemi should not be liable for costs on an indemnity basis.
2. The circumstances in which the Court will make an order for indemnity costs are well established. I recognise that the Court has power to award costs on an indemnity basis under s 98(1)(c) of the Civil Procedure Act 2005 (NSW) and, in order to establish a claim to indemnity costs, a party must ordinarily show conduct of the other party that is unreasonable or delinquent: Ingot Capital Investments Pty Ltd v Macquarie Equity Capital Markets Ltd (No 7) (2008) 65 ACSR 324; [2008] NSWSC 199. An indemnity costs order does not punish an unsuccessful party for bringing a case that failed but compensates the successful party for incurring costs arising from the other party's unreasonable conduct: Hamod v New South Wales (2002) 188 ALR 659; [2002] FCA 424 at [20].
3. Mr Somerville here points, in response to the application for indemnity costs, to the fact that Gemi had reasonably not pressed aspects of the amount claimed, so as to reduce to the amount claimed to the amount of $1.2 million to which I referred above. I accept that the withdrawal of those amounts was reasonably undertaken, and that Gemi would have acted more unreasonably had it not occurred. It seems to me, here, that there was nonetheless a degree of unreasonableness in Gemi's conduct, from the commencement of the proceedings, because a review of the relevant authorities in respect of overlapping creditor's statutory demands and contested proceedings would have indicated the probability that the Demand would have been set aside for some other reason in any event. It seems to me that whatever justification the Demand might have had was further significantly undermined, when the admissions made by the Company on which Gemi had originally relied were withdrawn with leave of the Court on 11 April 2024.
4. I do not consider that I should make an order for indemnity costs before the date on which those admissions were withdrawn, where there was at least some basis before that date for Gemi to consider that aspects of the transaction were not disputed, although the issue of overlap between the Demand and the Commercial List Proceedings existed. It seems to me that, after that date, when the dispute as to those aspects of the transaction became clear from the withdrawal of the admissions, exacerbating the further issue as to the overlap of issues between the Demand and the Commercial List Proceedings, then it was plainly unreasonable for Gemi to continue to resist the application to set aside the Demand. On that basis, I order that the Defendant pay the Plaintiff's costs of the proceedings on an ordinary basis up to and including 11 April 2024, and on an indemnity basis from that date, as agreed or as assessed.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 23 May 2024