GPT Re Limited v Wollongong City Council & Anor [2006] NSWLEC 303 | Case summary | Zoe

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GPT Re Limited v Wollongong City Council & Anor [2006] NSWLEC 303

[2006] NSWLEC 303

Land and Environment Court (NSW)|2006-06-09|Before: Biscoe J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Land and Environment Court (NSW)

Decision date

2006-06-09

Before

Biscoe J

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment

Source: NSW Caselaw (www.caselaw.nsw.gov.au). Converted to plain text by ZoeLaw. Not the official version.

Reported Decision : 151 LGERA 116

[2007] NSWCA 171; 153 LGERA 450 (CA)

Land and Environment Court

of New South Wales

CITATION : GPT Re Limited v Wollongong City Council & Anor [2006] NSWLEC 303

This decision has been amended. Please see the end of the judgment for a list of the amendments.

PARTIES : APPLICANT:

GPT Re Limited

FIRST RESPONDENT:

Wollongong City Council

SECOND RESPONDENT:

Belmorgan Property Development Pty Limited

FILE NUMBER(S) : 41279 of 2005

CORAM: Biscoe J

KEY ISSUES: Judicial Review :- Validity of development consent - validity of council resolution delegating authority to approve, but not to refuse, development application - validity of deferred commencement conditions - consideration of matters required to be considered under Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 79C – consideration of effect of proposed development on heritage items – whether delegate formed opinion required to be formed under Wollongong Local Environmental Plan 1990 cl 9(3) – whether delegate, as required by SEPP 1 cl 7, was satisfied that objection was well founded and was of opinion that consent was consistent with aims of that policy.

LEGISLATION CITED: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 34AB

Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 (NSW) ss 79C, 80, 80A, 83B, 124

Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) ss 33, 49

Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) ss 7, 21, 22, 355, 373, 377, 378

Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 66D

CASES CITED: Attorney-General (Ex rel Goddard) v North Sydney Municipal Council [1971] 2 NSWLR 373;

Botany Bay Council v Remath Investments Pty Ltd (CA, 16 December 1998, unreported);

Cameron v Nambucca Shire Council (1997) 95 LGERA 268;

Canada Bay City Council v Optus Mobile Pty Ltd [2004] NSWLEC 611;

Centro Properties Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2004) 135 LGERA 257;

Clifford v Wyong Shire Council (1996) 89 LGERA 240;

Currey v Sutherland Shire Council (1998) 100 LGERA 365;

Currey v Sutherland Shire Council [2002] NSWLEC 195;

Everall v Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council (1991) 72 LGERA 369;

The issue in this case concerns the validity of a development consent granted in August 2005 by the Wollongong City Council to Belmorgan Property Development Pty Ltd (Belmorgan) for a $60 million development involving demolition of existing buildings and subsequent erection of a seven storey retail and leisure shopping centre, multiplex cinema and commercial office complex on the corner of Crown and Corrimal Streets in Wollongong. It would result in the most significant change to retailing in the Wollongong City Centre since 1986. The development site is approximately 200 metres from the existing Crown Street Mall shopping heart of Wollongong to the west, and a similar distance from the tourism orientated beach area to the east.
The applicant, which is an owner of the nearby Wollongong Shopping Centre, has applied for a declaration that the consent was invalid and consequential relief. No question arises about the standing of the applicant, which is secured by the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 s 123 (EP&A Act). The council, as first respondent, has entered a submitting appearance except as to costs. Belmorgan is the second respondent.
Belmorgan’s development application was lodged in August 2004 together with an objection under State Environmental Planning Policy No 1 – Development Standards (SEPP 1) seeking a variation of the 15 metre height limit imposed by the Wollongong Local Environmental Plan 1990 (LEP). The objection was necessary because the height of the proposed building ranged from 19.43 metres to 28.85 metres.
The development consent was granted by the council’s general manager pursuant to the EP&A Act s 80(1) under delegated authority contained in a council resolution of 1 August 2005.
The pleaded grounds of invalidity may be shortly stated (putting aside grounds abandoned during the hearing): (a) The council’s said resolution was invalid because it delegated authority to approve the development application but not to refuse it. This is the core of the case, according to the applicant’s oral submissions. (b) Alternatively, when granting consent, council or the delegate deferred essential matters for later consideration which were required to be determined when granting consent. (c) When granting consent, there was no proper, genuine and realistic consideration by council or the delegate in terms of the EP&A Act s 79C, or at all. (d) When granting consent, council or the delegate failed to form the opinion required to be formed under cl 9(3) of the LEP which provides: “ Except as otherwise provided by this plan, the Council shall not grant consent to the carrying out of development on land to which this plan applies unless the Council is of the opinion that the carrying out of the development is consistent with the objectives of the zone within which the development is proposed to be carried out ”. (e) There was no power to grant the consent because there is no evidence that council or the delegate was satisfied and formed the opinion required by cl 7 of SEPP 1. Clause 7 provided that where the consent authority “ is satisfied that the objection is well founded and is also of the opinion that granting of consent to that development application is consistent with the aims of the policy as set out in clause 3 ”, it may grant consent notwithstanding the development standard the subject of the objection referred to in clause 6.
Grounds (b) to (e) above insofar as they are put against the council as distinct from its delegate, depend upon construing the said resolution as a development consent by council itself rather than as a delegation by council of authority to consent. The parties contend for, and I accept, the latter construction. Accordingly, grounds (b) to (e) above insofar as they are put against the council, as distinct from its delegate, do not arise for consideration.
I uphold ground (a) and reject the remaining grounds. My reasons are as follows.

In September 2004, the council established a Design Review Panel. In November 2004 the Panel provided a final report, which contained recommendations in relation to the city context, urban design issues, architectural design issues and landscape design issues.
On 11 October 2004, the Deputy Regional Director of the Department of Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources wrote to the council for the attention of Mr Zwicker, who was the council’s Assistant Manager Development Assessment and Compliance, suggesting that serious consideration be given to various issues. In relation to the City Centre Revitalisation Strategy, the letter stated: A key objective of the strategy is to revitalise the Wollongong City Centre so that its role as the regional capital of the Illawarra is retained and reinforced. Central to this objective is the need to re-enforce the core retail and commercial area. This area is defined in the draft DCP and the subject site lies outside of the core area within a tourism/cultural/recreational precinct which aims to support the core.
The development application was exhibited from 15 September to 15 October 2004 and attracted 17 submissions which included objections to the proposal. In May 2005, council engaged consultants to prepare an independent retail and commercial assessment and review of the proposed development. The review summary said that the benefits of the project were far outweighed by the potential impacts on the CBD and that for this reason it should be declined in its current form and scale.
On 1 August 2005, council’s Environment and Planning Committee received a negative report on the proposal from its Manager Development Assessment and Compliance (Exhibit A tab 60) (Council Report). The Council Report concluded at p 54: The Retail Overview Report – Wollongong City Centre/Crown Street Mall (June 2002) by Leyshon Consulting Pty Ltd (ie on behalf of Wollongong City Centre Management) and the Overview of Wollongong Region Economy Report (June 2002) by Leyshon Consulting Pty Ltd (on behalf of Wollongong City Council) and the Illawarra and South Coast Retail Centres Study February 2004 by HillPDA reinforce the need for the establishment of a discount department store and a multiplex cinema complex within the retail core of the city centre, in order to maintain the retail hierarchy in the city and the region.

The challenged resolution of 1 August 2005 was that: 1. The General Manager be delegated authority to approve Development Application 1565/2004 as per Option 3 of the report. 2. The consent not be issued until Councillors are informed of the conditions. 3. A 2 metre setback be placed on the Crown Street frontage in line with Council policy.
Option 3 in the council Report was approval of the application. Options 1 and 2 were, respectively, redesign of the development and refusal of the application. Option 3 was in the following terms: Approval of the application –This option is not recommended since the proposed centre is outside the retail core of the city centre and is likely to result in two separate shopping centres trading at opposite ends of the city centre. This is likely to result in some decline in the middle section of the retail core particularly in the lower part of the mall. However, the approval of the application would guarantee the provision of a discount department store and a multiplex cinema complex in the city centre, albeit outside the identified retail core of the city.
An amendment that “the General Manager be delegated authority to refuse the application on a number of planning, urban design and economic impact grounds” was put to the vote and lost.
The issues in this part of the case are, first, the proper construction of the resolution; second, the validity of the partial delegation of the council’s determination function (that is, delegation of the power to approve but not to refuse); third, the relevance (if any) of there being an earlier alternative delegation.
The construction of the resolution for which the parties contend, and which I accept, is that it was a purported delegation by the council to its general manager and was not a purported grant of consent by the council itself. A clear distinction is to be drawn between the delegation of a power and the exercise of that power through servants or agents: O’Reilly v Commissioner of State Bank of Victoria (1983) 153 CLR 1 at 30. In Re Reference under Ombudsman Act s 11 (1979) 2 ALD 86 at 94, Brennan J said: But where the relevant power is delegable and has been delegated, the delegate may – without further authorisation – act in effective exercise of the power. His acts are not treated as acts vicariously done by the authority. He is not an agent to exercise the authority’s power; he may validly exercise the power vested in him.
It is also common ground, and I accept, that the resolution, when read with option 3 in the Council Report and the defeated amendment, authorised the general manager to approve the application but did not authorise the general manager to refuse consent.
Beyond that, there is dispute as to the proper construction of the resolution. Belmorgan submits that it should be construed as authorising the general manager to exercise his discretion in any of three ways. First, to approve the development without conditions. Second, to approve the development with conditions determined by him. Third, impliedly, not to exercise his power at all. I agree with the first and second ways. Paragraph 2 of the resolution evidences an assumption or expectation that there would be conditions. In addition, attaching of conditions to the approval is, I think, within the ambit of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 49(4) which confers power on a delegate to exercise any function that is “incidental to the delegated function”.
I disagree that the delegate was authorised not to exercise his power of approval at all. If he did not exercise his power of approval, there would be a deemed refusal under the EP&A Act s 82(1). By this section, a consent authority that has not determined a development application within the prescribed period (40 days under the EP&A Regulation 2000 cl 113(1)(a)), is, for the purpose only of s 97, taken to have determined the application by refusing consent on the date on which the period expires. Section 97 allows the person making the development application to appeal the deemed refusal to the Land and Environment Court.
Thus, if the delegate in the present case did nothing, with the consequence that there was a deemed refusal, the effect would have been the same as refusing consent. Since it is common ground that the challenged resolution did not authorise the delegate to refuse consent to the development application, I am unable to accept that the resolution impliedly gave the delegate authority not to exercise the power of approval with the result that refusal would be deemed. Given the statutory context, an implied authority to do nothing is inconsistent with the express authority to approve but not to reject. It is unlikely to have been the intention of councillors to authorise the delegate to bring about a refusal by doing nothing when they had decided not to grant the delegate a power of refusal.
Furthermore, all that a council is empowered to delegate are its “functions”: Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) s 377. The relevant function in this case is the function of determining a development application by either approving or refusing it: EP&A Act s 80. In my view, inertia in determining a development application within the prescribed time is not a “function” and therefore is not capable of being delegated.
This case is different from a case where an instrument of delegation simply refers to a power “to approve” (for example to approve development applications up to a prescribed value). In the latter type of case, I think that such words, without more, ordinarily would implicitly carry with them the additional words “or refuse”. In the peculiar circumstances of the present case, there was no delegated power of refusal.
The applicant submits that the resolution was an invalid exercise or fetter of power because it authorised the delegate to approve the application but did not authorise the delegate to refuse consent. The applicant submits that the council had a single indivisible function to determine a development application under the EP&A Act s 80(1) granting consent conditionally or unconditionally or by refusing consent. Reliance is placed on Singh v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 90 ALR 397 (FCA / Keely J) and Singh v Castello (Spender J, FCA, 16 July 1990, unreported).
In summary, Belmorgan submits that the council had power to make the resolution for the following reasons: (a) there is no principle of law restricting the terms upon which a delegator may delegate its powers to another person; (b) the applicant’s proposition that a council cannot delegate its powers in the manner contemplated by the resolution has been disputed in two decisions of the Land and Environment Court: Fuller v Bellingen Shire Council (Hemmings J, NSWLEC, 16 June 1988, unreported) and Weal v Bathurst City Council & Ors 107 LGERA 396 (Bignold J); (c) it is consistent with the purpose of the Local Government Act 1993(NSW) and the terms of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) to allow a delegation limited in the manner described in council’s resolution: Lyons v Sutherland Shire Council (2000) 110 LGERA 441 at [66] and [67] and Wyong Shire Council v MCC Energy (2005) 139 LGERA 296 at [13]; (d) to the extent that the Singh cases are authority for the proposition that a delegation cannot be limited, they are distinguishable or wrong in law and should not be followed.
Belmorgan also submits that even if the council’s resolution were invalid, the general manager had an alternative and independent source of power to grant development consent from an earlier council resolution of 7 April 2004 which granted the general manager delegated authority to exercise all functions of the council: Sumar Produce Pty Ltd v Griffiths City Council [2000] NSWLEC 27, Canada Bay City Council v Optus Mobile Pty Ltd [2004] NSWLEC 611; and Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (1996) 91 LGERA 31 at 85 – 89.
In response to the last point, the applicant submits that the challenged resolution carried with it an implied partial rescission of the earlier general authority: Attorney General for NSW v North Sydney Municipal Council [1971] 2 NSWLR 373 at 379; Everall v Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council (1991) 72 LGERA 369 at 375.
In my opinion, the purported development consent was invalid because the delegation of authority to the general manager in the resolution of 1 August 2005 was invalid. My reasons are as follows.
Sections 21 and 22 of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) provide that a council has the “functions” conferred or imposed on it under this Act or any other Act. Section 355 provides that a “function” of a council may, subject to Chapter 12, be exercised by (inter alia) a committee of the council or a delegate of the council. Section 377 is within Chapter 12 and empowers a council, by resolution, to “delegate to the general manager or any other person or body (not including another employee of the council) any of the functions of the council” (with specified exceptions which are not presently relevant). Sub-delegation by the general manager is permitted by s 378(2).
The relevant function of the council in this case is found in the EP&A Act s 80(1) which provides that: A consent authority is to determine a development application by: (a) granting consent to the application, either unconditionally or subject to conditions, or (b) refusing consent to the application.
In making that determination, it is mandatory to take into consideration the matters prescribed by s 79C insofar as they are relevant. Section 79C(1) provides: In determining a development application, a consent authority is to take into consideration such of the following matters as are of relevance to the development the subject of the development application: (a) the provisions of: (i) any environmental planning instrument, and (ii) any draft environmental planning instrument that is or has been placed on public exhibition and details of which have been notified to the consent authority (unless the Director-General has notified the consent authority that the making of the draft instrument has been deferred indefinitely or has not been approved), and (iii) any development control plan, and (iiia) any planning agreement that has been entered into under section 93F, or any draft planning agreement that a developer has offered to enter into under section 93F, and (iv) the regulations (to the extent that they prescribe matters for the purposes of this paragraph),

Within the curtilage of administrative discretion, such as that conferred by the EP&A Act s 80(1), the courts cannot trespass except in accordance with statutory or case-law controls which do not permit review of the merits of the decision. A light control is found in a provision such as s 79C(1), where the decision-maker is told that it does not have a complete discretion under s 80(1) but must “take into consideration” prescribed matters. A decision can be attacked if there is failure to consider those matters, but it cannot be attacked on the ground that insufficient weight was given to those matters: Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd (1986) 162 CLR 24 at 64. A heavier control is where the decision-maker is enjoined not to consent unless satisfied of a prescribed matter. Such a pre-condition is relevantly found in cl 9(3) of the LEP and in cl 7 of SEPP 1 which I have set out earlier and which I address later in this judgment.
The decision-maker must give “proper, genuine and realistic” consideration to the matters prescribed by s 79C: Centro Properties Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2004) 135 LGERA 257 at [37] per McLellan CJ, summarising the principles in Weal v Bathurst City Council (2000) 111 LGERA 181 (CA). However, epithets such as “proper, genuine and realistic” must be applied cautiously lest they “encourage a slide into impermissible merit review”: Kindimindi Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Cove Council (2006) 143 LGERA 277 at [79] per Basten JA, with whom Handley JA and Hunt AJA agreed.
The function of determining a development application under s 80(1) requires either an unconditional or conditional consent or a refusal of consent. Supporting the conclusion that a function such as the s 80(1) function is indivisible are two Federal Court of Australia cases, albeit decided in a different statutory context. The first is Singh v Minister for Immigration, Local Government and Ethnic Affairs (1989) 90 ALR 397. In this case, instruments of delegation purported to empower government officers to accept recommendations of the Immigration Review Panel refusing an application for resident status. The officers were not authorised to grant an application for resident status. Keely J held at 402: In my opinion the respondent Minister was not empowered by those words in s 66D(1) of the Migration Act 1958 and in section 34AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 to delegate to an officer the power to decide against granting resident status to an applicant whilst at the same time deliberately withholding from that officer the power to grant the application for resident status.

Singh was approved and followed by Spender J in the same context in the similarly named case of Singh v Castello (Spender J, FCA, 16 July 1990, unreported) at [32] – [33]. Section 66D(1) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) provided that: “The Minister may either generally or as otherwise provided by the instrument of delegation by writing signed by him, delegate to an officer any of his powers under this Act other than this power of delegation”. Section 34AB of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) provides that: Where an Act confers power on a person or body (in this section called the authority ) to delegate a function or power: (a) the delegation may be made either generally or as otherwise provided by the instrument of delegation; (b) the powers that may be delegated do not include that power to delegate; (c) a function or power so delegated, when performed or exercised by the delegate, shall, for the purposes of the Act, be deemed to have been performed or exercised by the authority; (d) a delegation by the authority does not prevent the performance or exercise of a function or power by the authority; and (e) if the authority is not a person, section 34A applies as if it were.
Also supporting a conclusion that the s 80(1) function is indivisible are the opening words of s 79C that the matters listed therein must be considered (if relevant) when “determining” a development application. It is the whole of the s 80(1) determination function that has to be exercised in accordance with s 79C. That is, by granting consent conditionally or unconditionally or by refusing consent. To limit the conclusion that can be reached is to limit the determination. It is difficult to see how s 79C matters can be properly, genuinely and realistically considered in making a determination if the determination can go only one way. To delegate to the general manager a power to approve only is a limitation on the nature of the opinion that can be formed and, I think, inconsistent with the statutory scheme that the delegate standing in the shoes of the council must make a s 80 determination on relevant matters referred to in s 79C.
It may be unnecessary to go so far, but there is substance, I think, in the applicant’s submission that the delegate had in effect been told to approve the development application. If the delegate had no authority to refuse the application and no authority to do nothing, and thereby to bring about a deemed refusal, it may be said that he had no discretion at all and was in effect being told to approve.
The Singh cases I see as the outworking of a principle that an administrative function to determine an application is generally indivisible, in the absence of a contrary legislative intention, in the sense that the power to grant consent cannot be delegated without the power to refuse consent or vice versa. I respectfully agree with this thread in the fabric of the law and would apply it in the present case. I do not think that the different statutory context of the Singh cases requires them to be distinguished in point of principle. Another difference is that they were concerned with delegation of a power to refuse only, whereas the present case is concerned with a delegation of a power to approve only, but this is not a reason for distinguishing them.
It is not possible, in my opinion, to delegate a function defined only by s 80(1)(a) – that is, the power to approve - without delegating the whole of the function under s 80(1) – including the s 80(1)(b) power to refuse.
My opinion as to the indivisibility of the s 80(1) function takes into account Belmorgan’s submissions to the contrary.
Belmorgan submits that the s 80(1) determination function is divisible because the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 49(2)(a) provides that a delegation “may be general or limited”. This provision is comparable with s 34AB (a) of the Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) which the Singh cases held did not permit divisibility as to outcome. In my view, as the applicant submits, a provision such as s 49(2)(a) contemplates a delegation subject to limitations or conditions as to time, place, manner, subject matter and the like. It does not contemplate a limitation or condition as to outcome, as the council here sought to impose.
Next, Belmorgan submits that the proposition that the council cannot delegate its powers in the manner contemplated by the council resolution has been disputed in two decisions of the Land and Environment Court. It contends that these decisions show a willingness to allow a council to grant a limited delegation and should be preferred to the decisions of single judges in another jurisdiction in the Singh cases (Pancho Properties Pty Ltd v Wingecarribee Shire Council (1999) 110 LGERA 352 and 369-370). The first case is Fuller v Bellingen Shire Council (Hemmings J, NSWLEC, 16 June 1988, unreported). There, the shire town planner was authorised to determine a development application. Subsequently he referred a specific issue of visual impact back to council for its determination. Council thereupon resolved “that the application be approved subject to conditions considered relevant by the Shire Town Planner”. The next day, the shire town planner approved the application subject to a number of conditions. Belmorgan relies on the dictum of Hemmings J that a report submitted by the shire town planner prior to the council’s resolution: …was intended by him to give the Council the opportunity to revoke or limit his general delegation to determine the application….

Fuller is distinguishable. It was not concerned with the indivisibility of the s 80(1) function. Although the resolution in that case was worded as an approval rather than as a grant of power to approve (as in the present case), the judgment recorded the parties’ agreement that it could not be construed as a determination of the application by council. It appears that the resolution was council’s way of saying that it agreed with the shire town planner’s assessment of the visual impact issue. Furthermore, Hemmings J added to the dictum quoted above by saying: “In any event I am satisfied that it did not fetter the exercise of the delegation as he expressly stated that he believed that he still retained the power to disapprove the application”. In the present case there is no suggestion that the delegate did or might have had any such belief.
The second case on which Belmorgan relies is Weal v Bathurst City Council (NSWLEC, 11 June 1999, Bignold J, unreported). In that case, a council resolution directed a council officer to approve a development subject to conditions to be determined by the council officer. Bignold J held that the resolution was not a delegation which fettered the delegate’s discretion, but was a direction to implement the council’s decision.
The decision was the subject of an appeal which did not deal with this aspect (Weal v Bathurst City Council and Anor (2000) 111 LGERA 181). Weal is distinguishable from the present case, where the development application was not determined by the council. Weal was a case where the development application had already been approved by the council and the job of the council officer was to work out conditions.
Next, Belmorgan submits that in deciding whether the power to delegate includes the power to make a resolution in the terms of the challenged resolution, the purpose of the Local Government Act 1993 (NSW) should be taken into account. The Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW), s 33 provides that in the interpretation of a provision of an Act, a construction that would promote the purpose or object underlying the Act is to be preferred. The Local Government Act 1993, s 7 provides that one of its purposes is: “to provide the legal framework for an effective, efficient, environmentally responsible and open system of local government in New South Wales”. Belmorgan submits that an effective, efficient system of local government depends upon councillors being able to delegate their functions to council employees without restrictions and with maximum flexibility. I do not accept the submission. All principles of judicial review are restrictive. Part of the legal framework, as I have held, is that under the EP&A Act s 80, the function of determining a development application, by consent or refusal, is indivisible.
Next, Belmorgan submits that there should be taken into account the Local Government Act 1993 s 355(c) which provides that a function of a council may, subject to Chapter 12 of the Act (which includes s 377), be exercised “partly or jointly by the council and another person or persons”. It argues that this is a recognition that a council’s function may be split or exercised in part. I do not accept the submission for three reasons: (a) first, the whole of s 355 is expressed to be “ subject to ” Chapter 12 of the Act, including s 377, which empowers a council to delegate to the general manager any of the functions of the council. Section 22 provides that a council has the functions conferred or imposed on it by any other Act. The relevant function for the purposes of these proceedings of determining a development application is found in s 80(1) of the EP&A Act . This function (as I have held) is indivisible. Since s 355 is expressed to be “ subject to ” section 377, where a function referred to in s 377 is indivisible, as in the present case, s 355(c) does not permit that indivisible function to be divided. (b) second, I think, as the applicant submits, that it is assumed in s 355(c) that the other person independently has authority to exercise the function. An example of a sensible application of s 355(c) is to a divisible function such as that found in s 24 whereby a council may provide goods, services and facilities. (c) third, s 355(c) is an alternative to s 355(e) which provides that a function of council may be exercised “ by a delegate of the council ”, with no provision for it to be exercised partly or jointly by the delegate and council. I consider that, within s 355, the position of a delegate is covered exclusively by s 355(e).
Next, Belmorgan submits that a restriction of a council’s delegation powers in accordance with the applicant’s submissions would have a serious effect on council operations. In particular, it says, a council should have power to delegate the power to approve, but not refuse, development applications under a particular monetary value in circumstances where the development is not contentious or complies with all relevant conditions. Belmorgan argues that such a delegation allows for the expeditious processing of simple applications without wasting the resources of a council meeting. Belmorgan argues that it does not disadvantage the applicant for development approval because if the delegate is of the view that development consent ought not to be granted, the development application is referred to the councillors for determination. Two judgments, it is said, refer to delegations of this nature: Lyons v Sutherland Shire Council (2000) 110 LGERA 441 at [66] and [67] (Sheahan J), and Wyong Shire Council v MCC Energy (2005) 139 LGERA 296 at [13] (CA). I note that the decision in Lyons was reversed by the Court of Appeal: (2001) 117 LGERA.
Lyons and Wyong are, I think, distinguishable. In the first place, the question of invalidity of the delegation instruments was not in issue in those cases, except that in Wyong there was a limited challenge to the validity of the delegation on the ground that the delegated authority had expired by effluxion of time. Second, in both cases there was delegation to a council officer of a power to “determine” development applications. They were not concerned with delegation of only one part of an indivisible function, as in the present case, but with delegation of the whole function subject to conditions. Thus, in Wyong at 301 [17], Tobias JA said that a general manager’s power pursuant to the Local Government Act 1993ss 378(1) and (2) to delegate or sub delegate any of his functions “included the power to delegate those functions subject to conditions”. Similarly there was reference to the “exclusionary provisions of the delegation” by Ipp AJA in Lyons at [340]. If such an exclusionary provision (condition) applies, then the “delegation does not run”: Lyons at [338] per Stein JA, with whom Rolfe AJA agreed. In Lyons a limitation on the determination delegation was that there was power to grant approval where there was a relevant and well-founded objection. The Court of Appeal at 338 [23] – [26] held that this was a limitation on the whole delegated power of determination (ie determination either way) such that the delegation did not run at all where there was such an objection. It appears that the reference to “grant approval” in the limitation was construed as including the words “or to refuse approval”.
The distinction between impermissible delegation of part of the s 80(1) determination function and delegation of the whole function subject to conditions (for example as to subject matter, amount or whether there are any objections) is consistent with the “general or limited” delegation referred to in s 49(2)(a) of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) which I have considered earlier, and with Lyons and Wyong. In the present case, the council did not delegate its function to determine the subject development application subject to conditions. It purported to delegate only the approval limb of that determination function which, I have held, was indivisible. The type of scenario to which Belmorgan referred in its lastmentioned submission may be substantially dealt with by delegation of the whole function subject to exclusionary conditions.
Next, Belmorgan submits that even if the challenged resolution granting delegated authority was invalid, it did not invalidate the consent granted by council because the general manager had another source of power to grant development consent. This was an earlier resolution of council of 7 April 2004 “that in accordance with the provisions of Section 377 of the Local Government Act 1993, Council delegate to the General Manager all of the functions of Council as provided in the Act, subject to any policies and procedures that may be determined from time to time”. (Exhibit 1 tab 6.1). Belmorgan submits that this necessarily included deciding all development applications submitted to council and that the challenged resolution of 1 August 2005 did not alter this earlier resolution. If the latter was intended to alter the former, Belmorgan says, it would have had to comply with the Local Government Act 1993 s 372(1) which provides that a “resolution passed by a council may not be altered or rescinded except by a motion to that effect of which notice has been duly given in accordance with” the regulations. The relevant regulation was the Local Government (Meetings) Regulation 1999 cl 35 (which was repealed on 1 September 2005), which provided that notice of the time, place and business proposed at a meeting was to be provided three days before the meeting. That notice was duly given, but does not refer to a motion to alter the general manager’s delegated authority (Exhibit A folder 3 tab 60). Belmorgan argues that if councillors had intended to vary the general manager’s earlier delegated authority, they would have given notice in accordance with the statutory requirements.
Belmorgan refers to two cases which considered a situation where there were two sources of power for an administrative act and there was a mistake in one of these sources, and which stand for the general principle that an act is valid even if the incorrect source of power was mistakenly invoked. The first case is Sumar Produce Pty Ltd v Griffith City Council [2000] NSWLEC 27. There, the council had resolved to authorise its Director of Environmental Services to issue a pollution notice pursuant to a resolution in August 1999. A pollution notice was issued in September 1999. The general manager had ongoing authority to issue such a notice pursuant to a general delegation granted to him in 1996. Talbot J held at [27] that even if the resolution to the Director of Environmental Services was invalid, the general manager had authority to issue such a notice. The second case is Canada Bay City Council v Optus Mobile Pty Ltd [2004] NSWLEC 611. In that case, a mayor, purporting to act under a delegated authority which had in fact expired, resolved to list certain properties as heritage items. Lloyd J held that the mayor’s resolution was valid because he also had a general delegated authority to exercise the council’s functions. Belmorgan also referred to Minister for Urban Affairs and Planning v Rosemount Estates Pty Ltd (1996) 91 LGERA 31 at 85-89 where Cole JA, with whom Handley and Sheller JJA agreed, accepted that a mistake in the source of power works no invalidity.
I consider that these cases are distinguishable. The question of implied rescission or amendment of an earlier authority was not there in issue. Also, unlike those cases, in the present case the earlier general resolution was expressed to be “subject to any policies and procedures that may be determined from time to time”. I think that the challenged resolution comes within the ambit of this qualification. In any event, in the present case there is an inconsistency between the earlier general delegation and the subsequent specific challenged delegation, which suggests that the latter was intended to partially rescind the former. There was no such inconsistency in Sumar and Canada Bay. In Sumar, the general delegation was to issue a pollution notice and the subsequent specific resolution authorised the issue of a pollution notice in a particular case. In Canada Bay, the general delegation was to exercise the council’s functions and the subsequent specific resolution authorised the mayor to list certain properties as heritage items (this authority had actually expired when the mayor listed the properties).
A resolution dealing with the same subject matter as an earlier resolution may impliedly rescind that earlier resolution. In Attorney-General (Ex rel Goddard) v North Sydney Municipal Council [1971] 2 NSWLR 373 at 379, Hope J said: “No doubt in appropriate circumstances a second resolution dealing with the same subject matter as an earlier resolution may impliedly rescind that earlier resolution without expressly referring to it”. In Everall v Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council (1991) 72 LGERA 369 at 375, Hemmings J considered cl 25(a) of Ordinance 1 under the Local Government Act 1919 (NSW) (which has since been repealed) which was in similar terms to Local Government Act 1993 s 372 on which Belmorgan relies in the present case. His Honour held that cl 25(a) related solely to procedural matters and did not prevent a council from rescinding its decision on the same subject matter by duly made resolution at a properly convened meeting. Hemmings J said at 376: However, in appropriate circumstances a resolution dealing with the same matter as an earlier resolution may impliedly rescind it without expressly referring to it: Attorney-General ex rel Goddard v North Sydney Municipal City Council [1971] 2 NSWLR 373 at 379. Whilst obiter, I understand Hope J to be also saying that strict compliance with cl 25 as a procedural matter was not necessarily essential to the validity of the resolution having the effect of ‘negativing’ an earlier decision.
In my opinion, the challenged resolution carried with it an implied partial rescission of the earlier inconsistent general authority limited to the subject development application, it being a later and specific purported exercise of power under the Local Government Act 1993 s 377(1).
Accordingly, in my opinion, the challenged council resolution of 1 August 2005 was invalid.

The development consent was a deferred development consent because of its deferred commencement conditions. The applicant pleads that it was invalid because the delegate left for future determination material matters within the EP&A Act ss 79C(1)(b)(c) and (e) which were required to be determined at the time of the granting of consent. In submissions, the applicant also relied on s 79C(1)(a). The pleaded particulars are that: (a) deferred commencement conditions (i)A and (i)B produce the result that council has granted consent without having before it sufficient evidence to understand the extent of contamination on the site and what remediation works are required to be undertaken to ensure that the site is suitable for development in accordance with the consent; (b) deferred commencement conditions (i)C produces the result that council has granted consent without having the final design of the development.
This seems to raise two issues. First, whether the delegate gave consideration to the contamination issue as he was bound to do under s 79C(1). Second, the so called finality principle associated with the leading case of Mison v Randwick Municipal Council (1991) 23 NSWLR 734.
Before addressing these matters specifically, it is convenient to identify the relevant legislation and general principles. These general principles are also applicable to the remaining grounds of validity for which the applicant contends. Legislation and Principles
A deferred commencement consent is permitted under the EP&A Act s 80(3) which provides that: A development consent may be granted subject to a condition that the consent is not to operate until the applicant satisfies the consent authority, in accordance with the regulations, as to any matter specified in the condition. Nothing in this Act prevents a person from doing such things as may be necessary to comply with the condition.
A deferred commencement consent is regulated by clause 95 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Regulation 2000: 95(1) A “deferred commencement” consent must be clearly identified as a “deferred commencement” consent (whether by the use of that expression or by reference to section 80 (3) of the Act or otherwise). (2) A “deferred commencement” consent must clearly distinguish conditions concerning matters as to which the consent authority must be satisfied before the consent can operate from any other conditions. (3) A consent authority may specify the period within which the applicant must produce evidence to the consent authority sufficient enough to enable it to be satisfied as to those matters. (4) The applicant may produce evidence to the consent authority sufficient to enable it to be satisfied as to those matters and, if the consent authority has specified a period for the purpose, the evidence must be produced within that period. (5) If the applicant produces evidence in accordance with this clause, the consent authority must notify the applicant whether or not it is satisfied as to the relevant matters. (6) If the consent authority has not notified the applicant within the period of 28 days after the applicant’s evidence is produced to it, the consent authority is, for the purposes only of section 97 of the Act, taken to have notified the applicant that it is not satisfied as to those matters on the date on which that period expires.
The imposition of deferred commencement conditions does not free a consent authority from its obligation to consider all relevant matters required by s 79C. In Cameron v Nambucca Shire Council (1997) 95 LGERA 268 at 275, Talbot J said: “Section 91AA [the precursor to s 80(3)] does not enable the consent authority to defer consideration of any matter it is required to take into consideration pursuant to s 90 [the precursor to s 79C]. It is only after s 90 matters have been properly considered that the consent authority is in a position to nominate the matters as to which the applicant must satisfy the consent authority before the consent may operate”. In Weal v Bathurst City Council (2000) 111 LGERA 181 (CA), Mason P at [5] and Giles JA at 204 [94] agreed. In Weal the principles which govern the approach that a court should take in the event of a challenge of this kind were the subject of substantial agreement. But the Court of Appeal divided over the application of the principles to the facts of the case. Giles JA concluded that there was not the proper consideration required by s 90(1): at 204 [94]. Priestley JA at 188 to 189 [33] agreed with that conclusion, while agreeing with the general approach of the dissentient, Mason P. As to the principles, Giles JA said at 204 [94]: “I respectfully agree with Talbot J that s 91AA did not free the consent authority from the obligation to consider all relevant matters as required by s 90(1). Section 91AA enabled the consent authority to stipulate for a state of affairs on the basis of which it decided to grant consent, but its consideration had to include an understanding of the state of affairs and an evaluation of the relevant matters with that understanding. The consideration would be given effect in part by a condition of the deferred commencement consent, if that could be done reasonably and consistently with proper consideration“. Mason P said at 186 [17]: I agree that, for this project, proper consideration required an adequate understanding of the state of affairs involving noise and the evaluation of the relevant s 90 matters consistent with that understanding. Generally speaking, understanding the scope of a problem is a prerequisite to addressing its solution (by imposing a condition or, in an extreme case, rejecting the development application). But I respectfully part company with Giles JA at his conclusion that the council's understanding was so deficient as to vitiate the particular consent. In my view, a problem can be recognised and addressed without precise determination of its scope, at least so long as the decision is made in the light of an understanding of the outer limits of the problem and so long as the chosen means ‘take into consideration’ a fair assessment of their potential impact. This is what happened here, for the reasons stated above.
The difficulty of proving that a consent authority has failed to take into account a relevant matter was noted in Weal at [83] by Giles JA: Where there is no direct evidence of the consent authority's consideration of the development application, it may not be easy for a person in the position of Mr Weal to establish that it failed to take into consideration a relevant matter or took into consideration an irrelevant matter. That will often be established only by inference, and the inference should be drawn only after anxious consideration by the Court.
The principles in Weal were conveniently summarised by McClellan CJ in Centro Properties Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2004) 135 LGRA 257 at 266: [36] In Weal v Bathurst City Council (2000) 111 LGERA 181, the Court of Appeal divided over a challenge to a development consent granted with respect to a proposed rail freight terminal. At issue was whether the council had considered the impacts of noise from the proposal.

Insofar as Weal and Centro referred to “proper, genuine and realistic consideration”, a note of caution was sounded in Kindimindi Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Cove Council (2006) 143 LGERA 277 at [79] by Basten JA, with whom Handley JA and Hunt AJA agreed: The danger is that adoption of the epithets such as ‘proper, genuine and realistic’ consideration, may be understood to qualify the statutory terminology in a manner inconsistent with accepted principles in relation to judicial review. As noted in Bruce v Cole , they risk an assessment of the nature of the consideration which will encourage a slide into impermissible merit review. Adoption of the principles set out by McClellan CJ in the Land and Environment Court in Centro Properties Ltd v Hurstville City Council (2004) 135 LGERA 257 at [37], to which this Court was referred by the Appellant, should be applied subject to a similar caution.
The onus is upon a challenger to show that the determination is unlawful and should be declared to be invalid. Where proof of a state of mind is a basis for the challenge (eg failure to consider matters referred to in s 79C(1)), proof of the state of mind may be a matter of difficulty. The challenger must show the mind of the decision-maker by inference and not by suspicion. A finding of breach of a state of mind provision such as s 79C(1) by way of inference should only be come to after anxious consideration. See Parramatta City Council v Hale and Others (1982) 47 LGRA 319 at 345. It has been held in relation to the predecessor to s 79C(1), that the consent authority is invested with the power of determining which of the matters mentioned in the subsection are relevant to the determination of the development application, and is entitled to accord to the matters found to be relevant such weight as it considers appropriate: Randwick Municipal Council v Manousaki (1988) 66 LGRA 330 at 335 per Clarke JA with whom Hope and McHugh JJA agreed. In Currey v Sutherland Shire Council [2002] NSWLEC 195, Lloyd J considered a challenge made to the decision by a delegate to grant approval for a development on a number of grounds, including a failure to take into account relevant considerations. His Honour at [75] dismissed arguments that the delegate had not considered the provisions of a draft LEP because “the applicant has not established any fact from which an inference can be safely drawn that the Director of Environmental Services failed to give consideration to the relevant provisions of the 2000 LEP”. In Fuller v Bellingen Shire Council (Hemmings J, NSWLEC, 16 June 1988, unreported), Hemmings J said: “Consideration and determination of a development application is not necessarily confined to one act or occasion and may involve a lengthy ‘process’… It may extend from the date of the application, including site inspections, discussions and the formulation of conditions or reasons for determination”. In Marnal Pty Ltd v Cessnock City Council (1989) 68 LGRA 135 Hemmings J held that when “the Court is asked to infer from available written material that the Council did not properly address matters said to be relevant to each determination”, it will do so “by way of inference only after ‘anxious consideration’: Parramatta City Council v Hale (1982) 47 LGRA 319 and Boulton v Burwood Municipal Council (1988) 66 LGRA 131 at 134-5. In my opinion, the Council or the Minister was under no duty to set out in writing all that which was taken into account when making any of the relevant determinations”.
For a successful challenge to be made on the basis of failure to take into account a relevant matter, two factual determinations must be made. First, that a mandatory consideration was not taken into account. Second, that the error was material: see Kindimindi Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Cove Council (2006) 143 LGERA 277at 295 [66].
The presumption of regularity may have a role to play. The Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) s 49(5) provides that: “A delegated function that purports to have been exercised by a delegate shall, until the contrary is proved, be taken to have been duly exercised by the delegate”. The presumption of regularity was stated by McHugh JA in Minister for Natural Resources v NSW Aboriginal Land Council (1987) 9 NSWLR 154 at 164 as follows: “Where a public official or authority purports to exercise a power or to do an act in the course of his or its duties, a presumption arises that all conditions necessary to the exercise of that power or the doing of that act have been fulfilled. Thus a person who acts in a public office is presumed to have been validly appointed to that office…And a council which must form an opinion as to whether there will be any detriment upon the granting of a planning permit is presumed to have formed the opinion before granting the permit”. In Hill v Woollahra Municipal Council (2002) 127 LGERA 7 at 23 – 24 [50 – 55] Hodgson JA, with whom Ipp JA and Davies AJA agreed, said: 50. The cases of North Sydney Council v Ligon 302 Pty Ltd (1995) 87 LGERA 435 and Zhang v Canterbury City Council (2001) 51 NSWLR 589 are authority for the proposition that, where a body such as a local council is required by statute to address a question posed by that statute or by an instrument referred to by the statute, it must address that very question. If it does not do so, it will be in breach of the statute, even though it may have adverted to the topic of the question.
However, when a court comes to consider whether or not such a breach has occurred, the court will have regard to the presumption of regularity. This presumption was relevantly stated as follows by McHugh JA in Minister for Natural Resources v NSW Aboriginal Land Council [1987] 9 NSWLR 154 at 164 as follows : Where a public official or authority purports to exercise a power or to do an act in the course of his or its duties, a presumption arises that all conditions necessary to the exercise of that power or the doing of that act have been fulfilled.

… The presumption is a presumption of fact, associated with a reasonable inference based on what ordinarily happens in the ordinary course of human affairs… In deciding whether the presumption of regularity is rebutted, this inference from the ordinary course of human affairs carries some weight, which may vary according to the proved circumstances.
Another consideration relevant to this question is that, so long as the body in question does address the question it is required to address, it does not have to refer explicitly to the statute or instrument that poses the question: the body is required to address the substance of the question, not the fact that the question is posed by particular statute or instrument. Explicit reference to the statute or instrument will help confirm that the body did address the right question, but absence of such reference does not of itself indicate that it did not.
Ligon 302 and Zhang were cases where the questions to be addressed were detailed and quite specific. In Ligon 302 , they were detailed provisions such as privacy, sunlight, daylight and views, building line, maximum size, landscaping and number of storeys. In Zhang , what was required to be considered was a standard that a brothel should not be located within 200 metres of a church or school. In those cases, it was inferred that the body in question had done no more than advert in general terms to the impact of the development, and this was held to be insufficient.
By contrast, in the present case, what had to be taken into account was how excavation may affect certain matters, and advertence in general terms to the impact of the excavation in respect to those matters is substantially in accordance with that requirement.
However, it has been held that the presumption of regularity does not apply where the court is determining a question of power, for example where a local environment plan requires a council to be satisfied as to a prescribed matter before it grants consent: Franklins Ltd v Penrith City Council [1999] NSWCA 134 at [18]. In Franklins at [26] Stein JA, with whom Powell and Giles JJA agreed, cited with apparent approval the dictum in Somerville v Dalby (1990) 69 LGRA 422 at 429 of Hemmings J who said that a consent authority is under “no duty to refer specifically to all matters actually considered or assessed in the determination of a development application. It is usually sufficient to refer only to the most important matters or those having determining weight”. Hemmings J added: “Nor is the consideration of the application by council or its individual members limited to that which occurs at a meeting, or that contained in written reports”. In Everall v Ku-Ring-Gai Municipal Council (1991) 72 LGRA 369 Hemmings J said: at 374 “…the failure to take a relevant matter into account in breach of a statutory duty will not necessarily justify the intervention of the Court. Whether the decision will be set aside will depend upon the seriousness of the breach in relation to the totality of relevant factors which were considered in the determination of the application.”
Against the background of these principles, I turn to consider the deferred commencement conditions on which the applicant founds its invalidity case. Contamination
Deferred commencement conditions (i) A and B provided: (i) The Development Consent shall not operate until Council has been satisfied as to the following matters: A. The preparation of a Site Contamination Impact Assessment Report and Remediation Action Plan by a suitably qualified and experienced site contamination and remediation consultant. This report shall specifically address the exact location, depth and nature of contamination of any underground storage tanks within the site and / or underneath any existing road reserve and what strategies are required to ensure the appropriate removal of any such tanks and whether any further works are required within any road reserve to maintain the structural integrity of any such road reserve. B. The submission of the Site Contamination Impact Assessment Report and Remediation Action Plan to Council within 7 days of completion of the report for Council’s endorsement of any required works within any existing road reserve.
The applicant submits that the development consent was invalid because: (a) the delegate had insufficient evidence before him to understand the extent of contamination of the site and the remediation works required; (b) by adopting deferred commencement conditions in relation to site contamination and impact assessment and remediation, the delegate left for future determination material matters within the EP&A Act ss 79C(1)(a), (b), (c) and (e) which were required to be determined at the time of the granting of consent.
This requires consideration of the leading case of Mison v Randwick Municipal Council [1991] 23 NSWLR 734. In that case the Court of Appeal held a purported development consent invalid because a condition of the consent stipulated that the height of the dwelling-house be “reduced to the satisfaction of the Council’s Chief Town Planner”. The condition was held to preclude the consent from complying with s 91(1)(a) of the EP&A Act, now superseded by s 80(1)(a) (set out earlier) which is in substantially the same form. The section required both a “consent” and a “consent to the application”. Mison contains a bifurcated formulation of principle which focuses on each of those two requirements: (a) there is no “ consent to the application ” if a condition has the effect of significantly altering the development or leaving open the possibility that the development carried out in accordance with the condition will be significantly different to that applied for: per Priestley JA with whom Meagher JA agreed at 737A-D; per Clarke JA at 354; (b) the act of granting consent imports a requirement of finality, so that there is no “ consent ” if the purported consent leaves for later decision an important aspect of the development which could alter it in a fundamental respect: per Priestley JA at 738-739; per Clarke JA, with whom Priestley and Meagher JA also agreed, at 303 - 354.
The NSW Court of Appeal has repeatedly approved the bifurcated Mison principle: Transport Action Group Against Motorways Inc v Roads and Traffic Authority (1999) 46 NSWLR 598 at 628 – 629; Scott v Wollongong City Council (1992) 75 LGRA 112 at 118; Winn v Director-General of National Parks and Wildlife (2001) 130 LGERA 508 at 514 – 515, 546; Warehouse Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Woolworths Ltd (2005) 141 LGERA 376 at 412 [89]; and Kindimindi Investments Pty Ltd v Lane Cove Council (2006) 143 LGERA 277 [24] – [29].
The rationale of the finality principle is that it is designed to protect both the developer and the affected neighbourhood against a consent authority’s reservation of power to alter the character of the development significantly, thus changing the expectations settled by the consent already granted: Scott at 118, Winn at 546 [209].
However, “Mison does not stand for the proposition that any retention of flexibility or any delegation to a third party of the function of supervising a later stage of the development is prohibited": Winn at 515 [17] per Spigelman CJ citing Transport Action at 629 [117] per Mason P. Questions of degree are involved.
It has been said that the ancillary power to impose conditions cannot be exercised in such a manner that the exercise of the power fails to answer the description of a “consent” or a “consent to the application”: Winn at 514 [14] per Spigelman CJ. I understand this to be subject to the process of statutory construction which his Honour emphasised at 541 [15].
The term “principle of finality” is peculiarly applicable to the construction of planning statutes but is no more than a process of statutory construction. Spigelman CJ has cautioned that “such terminology must be approached with care. The issue always turns on the construction of the particular statute”: Winn at 514 [15]. Mison was decided before legislative changes in 1993 which provided for the grant of an “in principle consent”, a label that was changed in 1994 to “deferred commencement” consent. As a matter of statutory construction, it has been held that Mison has no application to the staged development provisions of the Act in their immediately pre September 2005 form: Patrick Autocare Pty Ltd v Minister for Infrastructure, Planning and Natural Resources [2004] NSWLEC 687 at [22] (Cowdroy J). As a matter of statutory construction, it has been accepted that the EP&A Act ss 79C, 80(4), 80A(1)(a) and (g) “mean that, in the particular circumstances dealt with by those provisions, conditions may be imposed that have the effect that the development approved is substantially different from that applied for. In my opinion, the statement in Mison is still correct… but in order for that principle to apply in those circumstances, the alteration must go beyond alterations of the kind contemplated by those sections”: per Hodgson JA in Warehouse Group (Australia) Pty Ltd v Woolworths (2005) 141 LGERA 376 at 412 [89].
In my view, as a matter of statutory construction, the provisions of the EP&A Act which qualify the Mison principle are more numerous than those referred to by Hodgson JA in Warehouse Group, and include provisions introduced into the Act in 2005 after that case was decided. Applying his Honour’s view, the principle in Mison is still correct, but in order for it to apply in the circumstances of these post Mison legislative provisions, the alteration must go beyond alterations of the kind contemplated by those provisions. Current provisions which qualify Mison may include at least some of the following.

In Kindimindi, Basten JA indicated at [54] that when considering whether a consent leaves open the possibility of a significantly different development, an evaluative judgement is required and the whole development must be considered in context.
In the present case, the managing director of Dwyers Motors confirmed to council that the company moved to the site around 1930, that a number of underground petroleum storage tanks were located below the footpath in Crown Street and that their number and location were unknown (Council Report Exhibit A vol 3 tab 60 p 17). On 13 August and 20 September 2004, council requested a Site Contamination Impact Assessment and Remediation Report, as required by SEPP 55 – Remediation of Land, to be prepared prior to the determination of the development application, and noted that as “the site is potentially contaminated” the assessment requirements applicable to the proposal were those contained in SEPP 55 and the Managing Land Contamination Planning Guidelines SEPP 55 – Remediation of Land. These requests required that the report be prepared by a suitably qualified and experienced site contamination consultant, prior to the determination of the development application, and that it address specified matters. Clause 7(1) of SEPP 55 provides: (1) A consent authority must not consent to the carrying out of any development on land unless: (a) it has considered whether the land is contaminated, and (b) if the land is contaminated, it is satisfied that the land is suitable in its contaminated state (or will be suitable, after remediation) for the purpose for which the development is proposed to be carried out, and (c) if the land requires remediation to be made suitable for the purpose for which the development is proposed to be carried out, it is satisfied that the land will be remediated before the land is used for that purpose.
I do not accept the applicant’s submissions that the Mison principle applies to invalidate the development consent because of deferred commencement conditions (i)A and B. Those conditions provided that the development consent shall not operate until council has been satisfied as to a site contamination impact assessment report and remediation action plan that specifically deal with the “exact” location, depth and nature of contamination of underground storage tanks on the site and underneath the road reserve, the strategies for their appropriate removal, and any required works within the road reserve to maintain the reserve’s structural integrity. In context, in my view, these matters are not so important an aspect of the development that a decision on that aspect could alter the proposed development in a fundamental respect. This is because the documents in the council’s possession make plain that the excavation will remove all underground tanks in any event and take them off site. The council had detailed information to understand the extent of contamination on the site and the remediation works required, namely: (a) a stage 1 site investigation prepared by Johnstone Environmental Technology in 2003. This report has attached to it a report by GBG Australia dated 2 October 2003 using ground penetrating radar to locate underground storage tanks (Exhibit A vol 1 tab 5);

The applicant submits that it should be inferred that these documents were not considered by the delegate. I do not accept that submission. Knowledge of relevant material in the possession of a council will generally be treated to be in the possession of the councillors: Schroders Australia Property Management Ltd v Shoalhaven City Council [2001] NSWCA 74 at [66] - [67] per Ipp JA, with whom Spigelman CJ and Sheller JA agreed; Gee v Councillors of the City of Sydney [2004] NSWLEC 581 at [20] per Pain J. In Franklins Ltd v Penrith City Council [1999] NSWCA 134 at [22], [30-34] Stein JA, with whom Powell and Giles JJA agreed, accepted that knowledge of relevant documents in the possession of officers of a council should be imputed to the council when it determined a development application, not limited to officers’ reports to council was said at [31]: “The collective knowledge of the Council is enhanced by the knowledge of its officers properly to be imputed to Council. A host of documentation is relied on by the respondents”. Likewise, in my opinion, knowledge of such material should generally be treated, at least, in the absence of contrary evidence, to be in the possession of a general manager to whom a council has purported to delegate a function. So as to support the conclusion that he applied his mind to that material. In the present case, there is no contrary evidence.
The applicant relied on Minister for Aboriginal Affairs v Peko-Wallsend Ltd [1986] 162 CLR 24 at 65 per Brennan J and at 30 – 31 per Gibbs CJ who said: “Of course the Minister cannot be expected to read for himself all the relevant papers that relate to the matter. It would not be unreasonable for him to rely on a summary of the relevant facts furnished by the officers of his Department. No complaint could be made if the departmental officers, in their summary, omitted to mention a fact which was insignificant or insubstantial. But if the Minister relies entirely on a departmental summary which fails to bring to his attention a material fact which he is bound to consider, and which cannot be dismissed as insignificant or insubstantial, the consequence will be that he will have failed to take that material fact into account and will not have formed his satisfaction in accordance with law.” The applicant submits that application of this dicta should lead to the conclusion that the delegate in the present case failed to consider the material in the said documents because they were not referred to in the Council Report. I do not accept the submission. Peko is, I think, distinguishable. In that case it was proved that a Federal Minister knew only the facts which the department had summarised for him in a report (see at 36). As the report omitted relevant facts, it was held that the Minister had failed to consider those relevant facts and his decision was void.
It may be that if a significant matter was omitted from the Council Report and if the delegate relied entirely on the Council Report, then ignorance of that fact would not protect the decision. However, there is no evidence that the general manager exclusively relied on the Council Report. It appears to have been prepared for councillors rather than for the general manager. I would infer, in the absence of contrary evidence, that the general manager considered both the Council Report and the relevant documents relating to contamination. To put it alternatively and at its lowest, in my opinion the applicant has not discharged its onus of proving that the general manager did not consider them.
The applicant submits that the situation is analogous to that in Weal v Bathurst City Council (2000) 111 LGERA 181. There a majority of the Court of Appeal held that a deferred commencement consent with a condition specifying that the consent not operate until “relevant approvals” were obtained from the Environmental Protection Authority was invalid. Weal (which I have considered earlier) is distinguishable factually and, indeed, weighs against the applicant. The majority there decided that, although the council had adverted to the noise impact of a development, it did not take it into consideration as required by the EP&A Act s 90(1), but left consideration of the issue entirely to the Environment Protection Authority: at 203 [91]. Features of the case which influenced the majority decision and which distinguish it from the present case include the following. There was no evidence that the council had before it any suggestions for alleviating noise impact: per Giles JA (in the majority) at [91]. The relevant condition did not require the applicant to comply with the Environment Protection Authority approval and the consent would continue to operate whether or not the approval was later modified, whether or not the operator of the terminal failed to renew it, and whether or not the operator failed to comply with the requirements of the approval: per Giles JA at [97]. The council knew it was a real possibility, when it made its decision, that there could soon be a change in the Environment Protection Authority’s powers, and it was held that the council was obliged to consider what steps should be taken to guard against the situation that would come about if there was such a change: per Priestley JA at 189 [34].
In Weal, Giles JA at 204 – 205 [96] held that there would have been nothing wrong, in an appropriate case, in a consent authority including as a condition of consent that the necessary approvals be obtained from the Environment Protection Authority, provided that it first gave consideration, in accordance with s 90(1), to the matters to which that approval related. Similarly, in the present case I see nothing wrong in the general manager including a condition that the council had to be satisfied as to the preparation of a Site Contamination Impact Assessment Report and Remediation Action Plan by an appropriately qualified and experienced expert in relation to specified matters, provided that he first gave consideration in accordance with s 79C(1) to the matters to which that Report and plan were to relate - as I think he did.
The applicant would draw an analogy with Cameron v Nambucca Shire Council (1997) 95 LGERA 268, where Talbot J held invalid a deferred commencement consent which had a condition that the applicants submit a traffic impact study. Cameron is distinguishable. There the EP&A Act, s 90(1)(j) (since superseded) required the council to take into consideration the amount of traffic likely to be generated by the development, particularly in relation to the capacity of the road system in the locality and the probable effect of that traffic on the movement of traffic in that road system. Deferred commencement conditions required the undertaking of a Traffic Impact Study by an appropriately qualified consultant prior to the commencement of operations on the site, and, in addition, stipulated that the study was to be prepared in conjunction with council and that the recommendations of the study were to be implemented at full cost to the developer as part of the development work for the total development. Talbot J rejected the applicant’s argument that the council did not give the required consideration to the impact of the development on the local traffic network expected of it under s 90(1)(j). He held that the council did turn its mind to the question of traffic impacts. There were documents and submissions before council which dealt with the issue. However, his Honour held that the council failed to consider the impact of traffic generation on the environment where harm to the environment, was likely to be caused, and the means that could be employed to protect the environment or to mitigate that harm; issues required to be considered pursuant to s 90(1)(b). Talbot J held at 274: “It is one thing to consider the amount of traffic likely to be generated and the probable effect of that traffic on the road system pursuant to s 90(1)(j), but it is quite another to accept that harm is likely to be caused without considering the means that may be employed to mitigate the harm”. In contrast, in the present case there were documents and submissions before council dealing with not only the issue of contamination, but also possible remedial action.
The applicant refers to Botany Bay Council v Remath Investments Pty Ltd (CA, 16 December 1998, unreported), where the Court of Appeal held that a condition requiring remediation of contaminated land lacked finality on the question of whether the proposed remediation works would create excessive vibrations. It was held that the documentation provided by the applicant was “not suitable to direct a reasonably intelligent and informed mind to the possible vibrations consequences of the proposed remediation work, or to provide objectors and potential objectors with the real opportunity to make submissions on impacts”. I consider that the case turned on its own facts and is distinguishable.
In Cameron (above) condition of consent was that a regime of remediation works be completed before the development was occupied and that no work was to commence until evidence was submitted to council which indicated that the site was suitable for the proposed use. Talbot J held at 278: There is no obligation upon a consent authority to resolve all of the issues before granting a consent. In the present case, the Council went beyond its minimum obligation to consider the question of site contamination and imposed appropriate conditions to ensure that the issue was fully explored and managed.
I accept Belmorgan’s submission that these comments are equally applicable to the actions of the council in the present case. Two metre setback
Deferred commencement condition (i)C provided for a two metre building line setback from the northern property boundary off Crown Street for the ground floor and first floor levels of the building. This flowed from paragraph 3 of the challenged resolution which provided that “a 2 metre setback be placed on the Crown Street frontage in line with Council policy”.
The applicant submits that this left for future determination a matter which could operate to significantly change the development. It was also submitted that it was unclear to which council policy the resolution referred. I think it is reasonably apparent that it referred to Development Control Plan/Technical Policy 94/28, which provides that the maximum building height along Crown Street between Corrimal Street and Harbour Street is 15 metres or 5 storeys, and requires new buildings fronting Crown Street east of Corrimal Street to comply with the street profile in figure 3 of the policy. Figure 3 provides for a 5 metre setback from the street, an 8 metre street frontage height and a building envelope above 8 metres at 50 degrees. In response to council’s request of 20 September 2004 (Exhibit A vol 2 tab 28) to redesign the development to incorporate a 5 metre minimum setback off Crown Street for the third and above floor levels of the development, a zero building line setback for the ground and upper levels of the building, and further 10 metre building setback for the third and upper levels for the eastern façade, Belmorgan advised that the suggestion to provide a 5 metre setback was being considered and that the 10 metre setback to the eastern façade was unachievable and jeopardised the development (Exhibit A vol 3 tab 34).
On the basis of this response, the applicant submits that it was unclear whether the redesign required by the deferred commencement condition would be achievable, and that the Court should conclude that compliance with the condition could significantly change the development such as to render the consent invalid.
I accept Belmorgan’s submission that the effect of this setback on the design of the development is very minor. That is to say, the restaurants on the northern boundary have had the depth of their internal dining areas reduced by 2 metres with a corresponding increase in their external dining space (Exhibit 2). This design change, in the context of a development situate on land of 11,795 square metres (Exhibit 1 vol 1 tab 2 page 6) occupying a gross floor area of 28,355 square metres at a cost of $60 million (Exhibit A vol 1 tab 1), is very minor.
This minor alteration of the dimensions of the restaurants on the ground level is not, in my opinion, an important aspect of the development such that a decision on this aspect could alter the proposed development in a fundamental respect. In addition, in my view and as Belmorgan submits, the two metre setback condition complies with the EP&A Act s 80(4), which provides that a consent may be granted subject to a condition expressed in a manner that identifies one or more express outcomes and clear criteria against which achievement of the outcome must be assessed. Here the outcome was the two metre setback and the criteria were set out in par (i)C of the deferred commencement conditions.
Accordingly, I reject this alleged ground of invalidity.

The applicant submits that the consent was granted without the delegate having given any proper, genuine and realistic consideration to the effect of the proposed development on heritage items, as required by the LEP cl 29C and the EP&A Act ss 79C(1)(a)(b)(c) and (e). At the time of the determination, clause 29C of the LEP (now amended) provided that: The Council must take into consideration the likely effect of the proposed development on the heritage significance of a heritage item, heritage conservation area, archaeological site or potential archaeological site, and on its setting, when determining an application for consent to carry out development on land in its vicinity.
The applicant points to concerns that were expressed in relation to heritage items in a letter from DIPNR to council of 11 October 2004 (Exhibit A vol 3 tab 38), in a letter to council of 15 October 2004 from ADM Projects (Exhibit A vol 3 tab 38) and in an objection of 15 October 2004 from the applicant and Lend Lease Retail. The applicant says that notwithstanding these various communications there is no reference to cl 29C in the Council Report, no evaluation of heritage impact in the Council Report, and no evidence that council was informed of the nature and extent of heritage impacts.
I do not accept the applicant’s submission. As Belmorgan pointed out, page 7 of the Town Planning Report which accompanied the development application records that there are no heritage items on site (Exhibit A vol 1 tab 2 page 7). The only two heritage items in the vicinity of the development are the existing three storey building on the corner of Corrimal Street (48-50 Crown Street) known as the Comelli Bros Building and California Flats at 7-9 Burelli Street. These buildings are described in Part 1 of Schedule 1 of the LEP as items of local significance. They are also referred to at pp 10, 12 and 23 of the Town Planning Report. That report set out cl 29C of the LEP (although it referred to it as cl 12). Appendix 13 to the Town Planning Report contained a site analysis which identified the heritage buildings as a constraint on the site (Exhibit A vol 1 tab 5). The issue was referred to in a number of letters and reports from third parties (Exhibit A vol 3 tab 38). The heritage issue was the subject of a Heritage Referral Assessment Report, which concluded that the development would have no impact on the heritage items (Exhibit 1 tab 7.22). This Report was thoroughly reviewed by council staff, including Mr Zwicker (Exhibit 3). The Council Report referred to the “heritage listed” Comelli Bros Building.
The applicant submits it should be inferred that the delegate did not consider the heritage material in the council file. I disagree. This is essentially the same argument as I have earlier rejected in the context of deferred commencement conditions (i)A and B, by reference to Schroders Australia Projects Management Ltd v Shoalhaven City Council [2001] NSWCA 74 at [67] and Gee v Councillors of the City of Sydney [2004] NSWLEC 581 at [20].
I am not satisfied that the applicant has proved that the delegate failed to give proper and genuine consideration to the potential impact on heritage items. Accordingly, I reject this alleged ground of invalidity.

Clause 9(3) of the LEP provides: Except as otherwise provided by this plan, the Council shall not grant consent to the carrying out of development on land to which this plan applies unless the Council is of the opinion that the carrying out of the development is consistent with the objectives of the zone within which the development is proposed to be carried out.
The objectives of zone 3(a) at the relevant time were: (a) to focus and consolidate retail and business development in accessible locations, and (b) to allow development for other purposes if those purposes will not prejudice the objective referred to in par (a) from being achieved or significantly detract from the character of the locality or the operation of any existing or proposed development nearby
The applicant submits that the delegate had to address these objectives in order to form the opinion required by cl 9(3) of the LEP, before embarking on a consideration of the merits of a development application. The applicant submits that neither the report of 1 August 2005, nor the minutes of that date, make any reference to cl 9(3). Consequently, the applicant says the Court should find that the delegate failed to form the opinion required to be formed under cl 9(3) and, hence, that a precondition for approval was not met. I was referred to Clifford v Wyong Shire Council (1996) 89 LGERA 240; Currey v Sutherland Shire Council (1998) 100 LGERA 365; Franklins Ltd v Penrith City Council & Anor [199] NSWCA 134; and Manly Council v Hortis (2001) 113 LGERA 321.
In my opinion, the applicant has not discharged its onus of proof. There was sufficient information before the delegate to allow him to form the opinion that the carrying out of the development was consistent with the objectives of zone 3(a). Page 21 of the town planning report which accompanied the development application set out the objectives of the zone and the reasons why the development was consistent with those objectives. (Exhibit A vol 1 tab 2). Many documents in the council files refer to the effect of the development. As I have held earlier, it should be inferred that such material was in the possession of the delegate, in the absence of contrary evidence.
Furthermore, cl 9(3) applies to all developments in all zones under the LEP. The inference should be drawn that cl 9(3) had been applied by the council regularly and that it was taken into account in this development application. A similar inference was drawn with respect to a similar clause in Schroders Australia Property Management Ltd v Shoalhaven City Council and Anor [2001] NSWCA 74 at [60] by Ipp AJA, with whom Spigelman CJ and Sheller JA agreed, at [60]: Regard must be had to the context in which councillors would have read the GSA report. At the outset, there can be no doubt that councillors would have recognised the consistency issue as an important question. Pearlman CJ correctly observed in this regard: Clause 9(3) of the LEP is a conventional type of clause. It has appeared in the LEP since the LEP’s adoption in 1985 (although it was amended in a minor way by Amendment No 70 in 1993). It applies to all development in all zones under the LEP. The inference must be drawn that cl 9(3) had been applied by the Council regularly and frequently.
In Noble v Cowra Shire Council (2003) 129 LGERA 120, Bignold J analysed Schroders and other cases. His Honour drew a distinction between general pre-conditions such as cl 9(3), which are considered by the council in every development application and special pre-conditions which arise less frequently. His Honour held at 142 [74] that: The inference that the council did take [cl 9(3)] into account would have been available simply based upon the general application of the provision in the LEP for more than the past decade and the consequential inference that in the course of determining development applications throughout that period the Council would have routinely been aware of, and taken into account the requirements of, cl 9(3)….
For these reasons, I reject this alleged ground of invalidity.

Paragraph 11 of the applicant’s Points of Claim pleads: The purported objection under SEPP 1 was not capable of dispensing with the provisions of clause 12A and Schedule 2A of the LEP because there was not at any material time a relevant state of satisfaction reached by the Council or any other person who considered and had power to determine that the objection was well founded or opinion formed that granting of consent to the development application is consistent with the aims of SEPP1, as set out in clause 3, as required by clause 7 of SEPP1.
Clauses 3, 6 and 7 of SEPP 1 provide: 3. This Policy provides flexibility in the application of planning controls operating by virtue of development standards in circumstances where strict compliance with those standards would, in any particular case, be unreasonable or unnecessary or tend to hinder the attainment of the objects specified in section 5(a)(i) and (ii) of the Act. 6. Where development could, but for any development standard, be carried out under the Act (either with or without the necessity for consent under the Act being obtained therefor) the person intending to carry out that development may make a development application in respect of that development, supported by a written objection that compliance with that development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary in the circumstances of the case, and specifying the grounds of that objection. 7. Where the consent authority is satisfied that the objection is well founded and is also of the opinion that granting of consent to that development application is consistent with the aims of this Policy as set out in clause 3, it may, with the concurrence of the Director, grant consent to that development application notwithstanding the development standard the subject of the objection referred to in clause 6.
The applicant’s point is directed to whether the consent authority’s power to grant consent under cl 7 of SEPP 1 was enlivened by the pre-conditions that it was “satisfied” and held the “opinion” referred to in cl 7. As was said in a similar context in Franklins Ltd v Penrith City Council [1999] NSWCA 134 at [28]: “The existence of the mental state of satisfaction is an essential condition or preliminary to the exercise of the power”. Perhaps it can be categorised as a jurisdictional fact. “A criterion expressed in terms of the opinion or satisfaction of a decision-maker may be a jurisdictional fact of a special kind, one more readily established… The Court may subject the opinion to judicial review”: Woolworths Ltd v Pallas Newco Pty Ltd (2004) 61 NSWLR 707 at 714 [25] per Spigelman CJ. The threshold enquiry of whether a consent can be granted (as distinct from whether it should be granted) is a threshold jurisdictional question: Ibid at 734 – 735 [141] per Handley JA.
The “objects specified” in ss 5(a)(i) and (ii) of the EP&A Act (to which cl 3 of SEPP 1 refers) are to encourage: (i) the proper management, development and conservation of natural and artificial resources, including agricultural land, natural areas, forests, minerals, water, cities, towns and villages for the purpose of promoting the social and economic welfare of the community and a better environment, (ii) the promotion and co-ordination of the orderly and economic use and development of land…
SEPP 1 prevails in the case of any inconsistency between it and any other environmental planning instrument, whenever made: cl 5. By cl 6, where development could, but for any development standard, be carried out under the EP&A Act, the person intending to carry out that development may make a development application in respect of that development, supported by “a written objection that compliance with that development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary in the circumstances of the case, and specifying the grounds of that objection”. In accordance with cl 7, where the consent authority “is satisfied that the objection is well founded and is also of the opinion that granting of consent to that development application is consistent with the aims of this Policy as set out in cl 3” it may grant consent to that development application notwithstanding the development standard the subject of the objection referred to in cl 6.
The assessment of the SEPP 1 objection in the Council Report was as follows (Exhibit A vol 3 tab 60 p 9): However, the proposed centre comprises a 5 storey monolithic structure spread over the majority of the site as well as 2 commercial office levels on top of the 5 storey podium, situated towards the southern (Burelli Street) frontage of the site. The proposed building ranges in height from 19.43 metres up to 28.85 metres.

Minutes of the council meeting record two councillors referring to the SEPP 1 objection and to the recommendation in the report that it was not supportable. (Exhibit A vol 3 tab 28).
The applicant submits that there is no evidence that the delegate held the requisite satisfaction that the objection was well founded, and no evidence that the delegate formed the necessary opinion that granting of consent was consistent with the aims of SEPP 1.
The applicant refers to the classic statement of the approach to be taken when considering an objection under SEPP 1 by Cripps J in Hooker Corporation Pty Ltd v Hornsby Shire Council (1986) 130 LGERA 438 at 441: It has been established by a series of decision in this Court that generally in order to maintain an objection that compliance with a standard is unreasonable or unnecessary, it is first necessary to discern the underlying object or purpose of the standard. To found an objection it is then necessary to satisfy the Court that compliance with the standard is unnecessary or unreasonable in the circumstances of the case. Although the Court has urged a generous application of SEPP No 1 and has repeatedly declined to attempt exhaustively to define the limits of the dispensing power and, in particular, what is embraced by the expression ‘circumstances of the case’, it is now established that it is not sufficient merely to point to what is described as an absence of environmental harm to found an objection. Furthermore, the objection is not advanced, in my opinion, by an opinion that the development standard is inappropriate in respect of a particular zoning. The Court must assume a development standard in a planning instrument has a purpose…. Furthermore it is now established that although the discretion conferred by SEPP No 1 is not to be given a restricted meaning and its application is not to be confined to those limits set by other tribunals in respect of other legislation, it is not to be used as a means to effect general planning changes throughout a municipality such as are contemplated by the plan-making procedures set out in Part III of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act .
The applicant refers to Winten Property Group Limited v North Sydney Council (2001) 130 LGERA 79 at 89 [26] per Lloyd J: In applying the abovementioned judgment, it seems to me that SEPP 1 requires answers to a number of questions (not necessarily in the following order). First, is the planning control in question a development standard? Second, what is the underlying object or purpose of the standard? Third, is compliance with the development standard consistent with the aims of the policy, and in particular, does compliance with the development standard tend to hinder the attainment of the objects specified in section 5(a)(i) and (ii) of the EP&A Act ? Fourth, is compliance with the development standard unreasonable or unnecessary in the circumstances of the case? (In relation to the fourth question, it seems to me that one must also look to see whether a development which complies with the development standard is unreasonable or unnecessary, as noted by Cripps J in the Hooker Corporation case). Fifth, is the objection well-founded?
The applicant submits that even if the available evidence founds an inference as to the existence of the requisite satisfaction and opinion preliminary to the exercise of power by the delegate, the court would find that the SEPP 1 objection was not the subject of any proper, genuine and realistic consideration. It was submitted that the delegate simply failed to have regard to the purpose of the height standard and to whether compliance with the height standard was unreasonable and unnecessary in the circumstances of the case, or hindered the attainment of the object of the EP&A Act s 5(a)(ii) (namely, the promotion and coordination of the orderly and economic use and development of land).
In my opinion, the applicant has not discharged its onus of proving that the delegate did not have the mental state of satisfaction and did not have the opinion required by cl 7 of SEPP 1. I do not think that there is any evidence to support the applicant’s contentions. There is no onus on the respondents to prove the contrary. However two considerations in particular weigh against the applicant. First, there was material before the delegate which referred to the provisions of SEPP 1 and the necessity to allow an objection under that instrument. That material included pages 6 to 9 of the Council Report (Exhibit A vol 3 tab 60), the town planning report (Exhibit A vol 1 tab 2) and the SEPP 1 objection (Exhibit A vol 1 tab 5). Submissions concerning the Draft State Environmental Planning Policy (Application of Development Standards) 2004 gave further reasons in support of the objection to the application of height standards (Exhibit A vol 2 tab 9). Second, SEPP 1 is a commonly used planning instrument of which the general manager was likely to have been aware. In Franklins Ltd v Penrith City Council [1999] NSWCA 13 at [26] Stein JA, with whom Powell and Giles JJA agreed, indicated that it may be reasonable to assume (as he said with the concurrence of Mason P and Handley JA in Currey v Sutherland Shire Council (1998) 100 LGERA 365 at 373) that councillors may have a general knowledge of their principal planning instrument. I think that the same may reasonably be said of SEPP 1.
I do not think that the presumption of regularity has a role to play here because the Court of Appeal has held that the presumption has no application where the Court is determining a question of a council’s power, for example where a local environment plan requires a council to be satisfied as to a prescribed matter before it grants development consent: Franklins Ltd v Penrith City Council [1999] NSWCA 134 at [28] per Stein JA with whom Powell and Giles JJA agreed. The result, it has been said, appears to be that the presumption of regularity is applicable where the council is required to take a matter into account, but not where a council must form an opinion about a matter before granting development consent: Noble v Cowra Shire Council (2003) 129 LGERA 120 at [75] – [77].
Accordingly, I reject this alleged ground of invalidity.