Winn v Director General of National Parks and Wildlife and Ors - [2001] NSWCA 17 - NSWCA 2000 case summary — Zoe

NSWNSWCA

Winn v Director General of National Parks and Wildlife and Ors

[2001] NSWCA 17

Court of Appeal (NSW)|2000-07-05|Before: Spigelman CJ, Powell JA, Stein JA, Talbot J, Ms P, Commission J

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At a glance

Source facts

Court

Court of Appeal (NSW)

Decision date

2000-07-05

Before

Spigelman CJ, Powell JA, Stein JA, Talbot J, Ms P

Source

Original judgment source is linked above.

Judgment (58 paragraphs)

[1]

Introduction 128 This is an appeal from a decision of Talbot J given in the Land and Environment Court on 20 December 1996. 129 His Honour dismissed an application for relief brought in Class 4 of the Court's jurisdiction. The case concerned mineral sands mining of the Tomago sandbeds for rutile and zircon.

[2]

The parties 130 The litigation involves multiple parties, some of whom are no longer participants. The first respondent, the Director General of the National Parks and Wildlife Service, is the licencing authority under wildlife legislation and issued certain licences to the mining operator. He has taken no active part in the proceedings. 131 The second and third respondents are mining companies, one being the holder of mining leases and the other the operator of the sand mining project. I will refer to them as RZM. 132 The fourth and fifth respondents, the Director General of Mineral Resources and the Minister for Mineral Resources (the Minister), have powers and discretions under the Mining Act 1992 and its predecessors, and made decisions to grant mining leases. They were joined in the proceedings on the application of RZM. 133 The sixth respondent, the Director General of the Department of Land and Water Conservation, took over the land management powers in relation to the sandbeds from the Hunter Water Corporation in 1995 and issued a permit to RZM for extraction from the sandbeds. He filed a submitting appearance. 134 The appellant is Mr Paul Winn, an interested member of the public.

[12]

The granting of the development consents 146 The land was zoned special uses under the Port Stephens Interim Development Order 23 (the IDO). Mineral sand mining was a permissible use with the consent of the Council but subject to the concurrence of the PEC, and with any conditions that the PEC stipulate. The most relevant consent, granted on 7 June 1978, followed the lodging of a development application by RZM with the Council on 1 February 1978. At that time there had been some previous sandmining of the sandbeds by RZM and an earlier development consent had been granted in 1971. For a period of around 12 months (from January 1977) RZM and the Board negotiated the terms of conditions of authority for mining in the aquifer. Agreement had been reached by the time RZM lodged its development application with the Council. RZM had already applied for a mining lease over the area included in the development application. The development application was accompanied by a letter from RZM outlining details of the proposed mining and a map of the mining lease applications and proposed mining paths. 147 The Council referred the application to the PEC. RZM made submissions to the PEC for its concurrence, including the provision of a statement of environmental factors. In the meantime ML594 was granted by the Minister on 3 May 1978. Some days thereafter the PEC wrote to the Council indicating its concurrence to the proposed mineral sand mining subject to three conditions. The third condition was that the 'conditions of authority', referred to above, become 'part of the development consent'. 148 On 7 June 1978 the Council wrote to RZM indicating that its application had been approved subject to the conditions in schedule 1. The schedule required compliance with the PEC's conditions and enclosed a copy. The conditions comprise 67 conditions identical to the 'conditions of authority' negotiated earlier between RZM and the Board. The appellant contends that RZM has breached a number of these conditions. 149 The heading of the letter notifying the grant of consent identifies certain Portions of land and 'Mining Lease No 594'. It should be noted that ML594 also included the terms of the conditions of authority earlier mentioned. 150 It is important to understand that apart from the 1978 development consent (and the 1979 consent relating to ML744) no other planning consents have been issued. It should also be mentioned that the sixth respondent granted a Regulation 27 permit to RZM on 9 August 1995 pursuant to the Hunter Water Board (Special Areas) Regulation 1989.

[13]

Legislative Framework 151 When RZM originally applied for a mining lease over what ultimately became ML594 the Mining Act 1906 was in force. However, the Mining Act 1973 repealed the 1906 Act. The 1973 Act commenced on 29 March 1974. By the transitional provisions of the 1973 Act, Part 6 (including s 116) did not apply to the mining lease application. Accordingly, it was unnecessary to obtain development consent before the granting of a mining lease where the application was lodged before the commencement of the 1973 Act, as was the case. 152 In its original form s 116 relevantly provides as follows: (1) Where the consent of an authority is necessary under a scheme to the use of land for the purpose of obtaining minerals the Minister shall, before a mining lease over the land is granted by instrument in writing served - (a) on the applicant for the mining lease, require him, within such time as is specified in the instrument, to make the appropriate application to the appropriate authority for that consent; and (b) on the authority concerned - (i) notify the authority that the applicant for the mining lease has been required to apply for the consent of the authority and state, in the instrument, the conditions proposed to be included in the mining lease, if granted; and (ii) inform the authority that proposals for the inclusion in the mining lease, if granted, of conditions (including prescribed conditions) which the authority wishes to have included in the lease should be lodged with the Under Secretary within such period as is specified in the instrument. … (3) Any condition (being a prescribed condition) imposed by an authority, or a body hearing an appeal from an authority, as a condition of, or in connection with, the consent given to a person applying for that consent pursuant to a requirement by the Minister under subsection (1)(a), is void and the consent to the use of the land concerned for the purpose of obtaining minerals shall be deemed to have been given free of the condition. (4) Subject to subsections (5) and (7), where - (a) pursuant to a requirement of the Minister under subsection (1)(a), an applicant for a mining lease over land obtains the consent of an authority, or of a body hearing an appeal from the authority, to the use of the land for the purpose of obtaining minerals; and (b) the mining lease is granted to that applicant, nothing in or done under Part XIIA of the Local Government Act, 1919, or an ordinance, order or proclamation made for the purposes of that Part, shall operate so as to prevent the registered holder of the mining lease from carrying on mining operations in the mining area, and to the extent that anything in, or done under, that Part or such an ordinance, order or proclamation would so operate, it shall be of no force or effect in relation to the mining area or the registered holder of the mining lease. (5) Subsection (4) does not operate so as to exempt the registered holder of a mining lease -

[20]

153 With the passing of the EPA Act in 1979 consequential amendments were made to the Mining Act 1973. Section 116(1) substituted reference to where a development consent was necessary under the new planning legislation, in lieu of the reference to consent under a scheme. Upon the amendment ss (1) provided: Where the consent of an authority is necessary under the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act, 1979, to the use of land for the purpose of obtaining minerals the Minister shall, before a mining lease over the land is granted, cause an instrument in writing to be served - 154 Similar amendments were made to ss (4). 155 In 1983 the following words were inserted in ss (1) after the word 'granted' - 'to the applicant for the mining lease (being an applicant who has not already obtained that consent)'. 156 Also in 1983 ss (3A) was inserted into s 116. This provided: Where a mining lease is granted over any land to a person, any condition (being a prescribed condition) imposed by an authority, or a body hearing an appeal from an authority, as a condition of, or in connection with, a consent to the use of the land for the purpose of obtaining minerals given to the person before the grant of the lease (otherwise than pursuant to a requirement under subsection (1) (a)) is void and the consent to that use of the land shall be deemed to have been given free of the condition. 157 The Mining Act 1992 repealed the 1973 Act. None of the subject mining leases were granted under the 1992 Act. However, its transitional provisions, and the successor to s 116 (ss 65 and 74), are relevant. Schedule 6 to the 1992 Act contains the savings and transitional provisions. Clause 4(2) provides: A mining lease or mining purposes lease granted under the Mining Act 1973 … and in force immediately before the relevant commencement is taken to be a mining lease granted under this Act. 158 Clause 8 provides: Sections 65 and 74 of this Act apply to and in respect of a mining lease granted in accordance with section 116 of the Mining Act 1973 … before the relevant commencement in the same way as they apply to and in respect of a mining lease granted in accordance with this Act. 159 Section 65 applies to land for which development consent is required before it may be used for the purpose of obtaining minerals. It relevantly provides as follows: (2) The Minister must not grant a mining lease over land to which this section applies unless an appropriate development consent is in force in respect of the land. (3) If a mining lease is granted over land for which an appropriate development consent has been given: (a) any condition (being a special purpose condition within the meaning of Division 2 of Part 2 of Schedule 1) imposed on the development consent by a consent authority, or by a body hearing an appeal from a consent authority, is void, and (b) the development consent (to the extent only to which it relates to the use of the land concerned for the purpose of obtaining minerals) is taken to have been given free of the condition. 160 Section 74 provides: (1) While a mining lease has effect: (a) nothing in, or done under, the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979 or an environmental planning instrument operates so as to prevent the holder of the mining lease from carrying on mining operations in the mining area, and (b) to the extent to which anything in, or done under, that Act or any such instrument would so operate, it is of no effect in relation to the holder of the mining lease. (2) Subsection (1) ceases to apply to a minimum lease over land for which development consent to the use of land for the purpose of obtaining minerals is required if mining operations under the lease have not begun within 5 years after the date on which the development consent is given.

[21]

Judgment at first instance 161 In a judgment necessarily of some considerable complexity and length, his Honour made a large number of findings, many of which are challenged. 162 His Honour found that RZM's letter of 1 February 1978 accompanying the development application was only relevant to identify the land the subject of the consent by reference to the attached plan. Beyond the intention to carry out a development for sand mining, the consent was not confined by anything said in the letter. These findings are challenged. 163 Condition 64 of the development consent granted on 7 June 1978 provided: The registered holder shall mine the subject area once only, unless with the consent in writing of the Minister for Mines and the Board first had and obtained and subject to such conditions as they may stipulate. 164 Talbot J found that condition 64 did not prevent re-mining or deep mining. It did not impose a requirement for further consent from the Council. It merely required that the Minister and the Board be given the opportunity to intervene and impose conditions. Accordingly, no question of certainty or finality of the consent arose. This finding is disputed. 165 His Honour found that by 1992 when s 116 was repealed, it had the effect of rendering void any prescribed condition in a development consent irrespective of whether the consent was issued following a requirement of the Minister under s 116(1)(a). His Honour stated that it was not until ss (3A) was inserted in 1983 that the conditions imposed in a consent, granted otherwise than in accordance with s 116(1)(a), were voided. His Honour noted however that ss (3A) only applied if the consent was given before the grant of the lease. Talbot J continued that under s 116(4), once consent was obtained and the lease granted, nothing in or done under the EPA Act operated to prevent mining operations. After 1983, ss (4) applied irrespective of whether the consent was obtained pursuant to a requirement under s 116(1)(a). However, since ss (4) referred to 'an applicant for a mining lease' the consent was required prior to the grant of a mining lease. 166 His Honour noted the similarity between s 116 of the 1973 Act and ss 65 and 74 of the 1992 Act. He turned to the transitional provisions in the 1992 Act and held that cl 4(2) had general application to all leases under the 1973 Act, which are taken to have been granted under the 1992 Act. Clause 8 was more specific and brought within the application of ss 65 and 74 only those leases granted in accordance with s 116 of the 1973 Act. His Honour noted that s 116 did not apply to all leases granted under the 1973 Act. If cl 8 was construed strictly, ss 65 and 74 would apply only to those leases granted 'in complete agreement with s 116'. Talbot J concluded: It would not be inconsistent with the legislative scheme to accept any lease granted after a necessary land use consent had been given, irrespective of a requirement under s 116(1)(a), as being a lease granted in accordance with s 116 for the purpose of cl 8. 167 Talbot J's construction of cl 8 is contested. 168 Addressing s 65 his Honour noted that it only had effect on a special purpose condition if 'a mining lease is granted over land for which an appropriate development consent has been given'. The section is clearly prospective and has effect only in respect of leases granted under the 1992 Act. He continued that cl 8 should be construed with s 65 in mind, so that s 65 would apply to 1973 Act leases as if they were granted over land for which an appropriate consent has been granted. 169 In rejecting the appellant's submission on cl 8 his Honour said: It would be an unfortunate result if a lessee had the benefit of s 116(3A) and (4) at the date of repeal in 1992 but, because of a constrained application of cl 8, it thereafter did not have the benefit of s 65. Conditions declared to be void at one instance would be reinstated the next. Either the conditions became void after 1983, and a consent to the use of the land was deemed to have been given free of the conditions thereafter, or s 65 had that effect. 170 This statement is also contested. 171 His Honour noted that s 74 applied whenever a mining lease 'has effect'. It was therefore difficult to see how cl 8 achieved anything further in regard to s 74. Clause 8 should not be read as limiting the effect of cl 4(2). Section 74 applied to any lease granted under the 1973 Act, and in force at the commencement of the 1992 Act, by dint of cl 4(2) alone. This conclusion is disputed. 172 His Honour held that the orders sought by the appellant would effectively 'prevent' the holder of the mining lease from carrying on mining operations contrary to s 74(1)(a). This provision took away the power under s 124 of the EPA Act to grant any remedy which would prevent mining. 173 Talbot J turned specifically to the mining leases. With respect to ML594, it was not granted in breach of s 116 because it was applied for under the 1906 Act and quarantined from s 116 of the 1973 Act. His Honour added that equally it could not be said that the lease was granted in accordance with the procedures required by s 116(1). This was because there was no evidence of a requirement by the Minister to make an application for consent. Further, since the grant of the lease predated the development consent, it would not be a consent given before the grant of the lease for the purpose of ss (3A). Accordingly, his Honour concluded that none of the conditions of the 1978 consent could be regarded as 'prescribed' conditions as a consequence of the grant of ML594. The appellant relies on these findings and no notice of contention has been filed. 174 His Honour noted that the respondents relied solely on s 116(4) with regard to ML594 to support an argument that it was granted in accordance with s 116. However, Talbot J held that ss (4) never applied to ML594 because the development consent was issued after the lease was granted. The 'applicant' for the mining lease never obtained it. Therefore, cl 8 did not have the effect of applying s 65 to ML594. Any prescribed conditions or special purpose conditions in the 1978 consent were not rendered void by s 116 or s 65. The appellant supports these findings and again no contention has been filed. 175 However, Talbot J found that the effect of cl 4(2) and s 74 is that, because ML594 was in force, the mining lease is taken to be granted under the 1992 Act. Therefore s 74 applies and operates to negate the power of the Land and Environment Court to make an order which would prevent the leaseholder from carrying on mining operations. 176 Mining Lease 744 was however in a different category to ML594 since it was granted subsequent to development consent issued on 28 March 1979. The 1979 consent was the grant of an appropriate application under s 116. Irrespective of any conflict between cll 4 and 8, ss 65 and 74 applied to ML744. 177 Dealing with the excision leases, his Honour held that s 116(1) did not apply because consent was unnecessary having already been obtained, viz. the 1978 and 1979 consents. Subsection (3A) applied and the leases were granted in accordance with s 116 for the purpose of cl 8. His Honour rejected the appellant's argument that s 116(7) meant that ss (4) did not apply because mining 'under' those leases did not commence within 5 years from the date of the consent. Talbot J found nevertheless that s 74 applied to the leases because, when it came into force, they had effect. 178 Talbot J then considered the relevance of s 65 of the 1992 Act. He reiterated that cl 8 did not apply to ML594, and s 65(3) applied only if a lease is granted over the land after the commencement of the 1992 Act. Therefore, none of the conditions relating to ML594 can be treated as special purpose conditions. On the other hand, cl 8 applied to MLs 744, 1170, 1222 and 1226 and any special purpose conditions were void. However, the consents obtained were 'appropriate' consents within s 65. His Honour rejected the appellant's submission that there must be reasonable concordance between the lease and the consent. His Honour concluded: A development consent, by its nature, is to be considered as "appropriate" if it authorises, in general terms, that which is specifically authorised under the lease. The consents were given in response to applications to carry out mineral sands mining. The applications for consent were considered on the basis that mining leases would be, or had been, granted and that certain conditions of authority had been, or would be, imposed by mining leases. The dominant characterising purpose which can be commonly inferred from the applications, and the consequent consents, is mineral sands mining. That dominant purpose has been carried forward into the mining leases. 179 This conclusion is contested. 180 Talbot J found that all of the consent conditions relied on by the appellant were special purpose conditions within cl 15, schedule 1 of the 1992 Act, being conditions concerning the preparation of land for mining, mining methods or rehabilitation. Again, the appellant contests this conclusion.

[22]

181 Returning to s 74, his Honour considered the appellant's submission on ss (2). Talbot J noted that the excision leases were granted more than 5 years after the consents and that mining operations under the leases did not commence within 5 years of the grant of consents and therefore s 74(1) did not apply. However, his Honour found that mining operations 'of the type subsequently authorised by the mining leases' did commence within 5 years after the consents were issued. The expression 'mining operations under the lease' was to be regarded as referring to the operations described in the lease rather than operations carried out pursuant to the lease. The 1978 and 1979 consents covered the whole of the area of the excision leases and mining operations had continued throughout those areas, given the ongoing nature of mining to utilise areas progressively. The Court was satisfied that mining operations under the excised leases began within 5 years after the date on which the consents were issued and s 74(1) applied. The appellant challenges these findings. 182 His Honour dealt with the appellant's case under wildlife legislation. Although there are grounds of appeal relating to these issues, counsel for the appellant, Mr Robertson, did not press them on appeal as he conceded that they did not add to the appellant's case for relief. In addition no ground of appeal is pressed relating to his Honour's conclusion on the applicability of Part 5 of the EPA Act. 183 Talbot J then considered the appellant's claim of breach of conditions relating to ML594, given his earlier findings that those conditions remained in the 1978 consent, notwithstanding relief was constrained by s 74 of the 1992 Act. He first dealt with Condition 1, the aquifer condition, which provides: The registered holder shall abide by the provisions of the Catchment Area By-Laws applying to the Catchment Area of the Tomago Sandbeds Water supply works and shall conduct operations in such a manner as not to cause any detrimental effect to the aquifer or the Board's assets. As there may be a time interval before some of these effects are recognised and assessed, the mining of the subject area shall be considered as a trial and for this reason the rate of mining shall be limited to the maximum rate of progress hereinafter stipulated. 184 Of this condition his Honour said: The second sentence of the condition clearly recognises that there will be some impact on the aquifer as a consequence of the mining operation although the effects may not be recognised immediately. Accordingly it is only when the relevant detrimental effects are recognised and assessed that operations are to be controlled in accordance with the conditions.

[23]

and By adopting the purposive approach, it is reasonable to construe condition 1 in the context of the nature of the development and mining authorised by the consent and the lease in conjunction with the authority and controls imposed by the Regulation 27(1) Permit. It would be a curious result if the effect of condition 1 was to prohibit any interference with the aquifer in circumstances where that interference has been specifically the subject of a permit by the authority relevantly concerned with the management and protection of the aquifer as a source of potable water supply. 185 His Honour proceeded to find that there was no evidence that established a direct detrimental impact upon the actual supply of water to any of the points presently used by the Board (my emphasis). 186 Accordingly, he found that there was no breach of the aquifer condition. 187 His Honour then referred to the pollution conditions, in particular condition 20, which provides: The registered holder shall conduct tests of the dredge pond water as required by the Minister and the Board and shall so conduct operations that there is no increase above that existing naturally in the local ground water prior to mining operations in the saline, iron or other deleterious content of the water caused by the mining process or by the addition of any oils or greases or other substances which may be used either directly or indirectly in the mining process. Suspended solids in the pond water shall not exceed the limit set from time to time by the Minister and the Board. Furthermore no deleterious material including organic matter will be permitted to float on the surface of the pond. 188 In this regard his Honour said that: The Court accepts the submission on behalf of the second and third respondents [RZM] that conditions 20 and 30 should be construed so that the prohibition contained in them does not apply to the necessary and inevitable consequences of a well managed dredging operation. 189 In dealing with an additional pollution condition (No 30) his Honour said: Once again, the approach taken by the applicant in construing the effect of the conditions is to apply a constraint on the mining operation which would amount to a prohibition in direct conflict with the permissive nature of the instruments within which the conditions are found. The conditions must be read as being sufficiently broad to allow the operation to be undertaken. The narrow approach taken by the applicant is not, in the circumstances, justified. 190 Again, the judge found no breach of the pollution conditions. 191 Talbot J dealt briefly with discretion, acknowledging that it was unnecessary to do so since relief was to be refused. He made remarks which indicated that, for various reasons, he would not in any event have been minded to grant relief. These remarks are relied on by the respondents in opposition to any remitter to the Land and Environment Court.

[24]

Issues to be determined 192 It will be apparent from the above summary of his Honour's 68 page judgment that the Court was faced with many complex factual and legal issues. Therefore, it is unsurprising that numerous issues present themselves for consideration on the appeal. I will endeavour to deal with them in a logical sequential order, although this will not always be possible. 193 The first issue is the ambit of the development consent of 7 June 1978. Did it incorporate the contents of RZM's letter lodged with the development application or any other extrinsic documents? The answer to this question may have relevance to the issue of whether the 1978 consent extends to re-mining and/or deep mining and the construction to be given to condition 64. The question may also have implications for whether development was carried on without consent (s 76 EPA Act), when consent was required, or whether there was a breach of the conditions of ML594. Allied to these issues is whether the 1978 consent confined the depth of mining and the mining method. There is also an issue of the construction of conditions 1 and 17. 194 The next group of issues concern s 116 of the Mining Act 1973: whether there was a non-compliance with s 116(1)(a) regarding ML594 and whether RZM has immunity from the EPA Act. Also to be considered are the 1983 amendments to s 116, including ss (3A), and its effect. 195 The issues arising under the 1992 Mining Act focus mainly on the effect of the transitional provisions (cll 4 and 8) on the leases, and on the applicability and effect of ss 65 and 74. 196 It will also be necessary to examine the appellant's claim of breach of development consent conditions, breach of conditions in the mining leases and breach of the Regulation 27 permit. The last mentioned breaches arise from the leave granted under s 25 of the EOP Act. With regard to these alleged breaches, there is an argument as to whether, assuming breach, any relief could be granted. 197 Finally, depending on the answers to many of the above questions, it may be necessary to consider whether the case should be remitted to the Land and Environment Court for further hearing on discretion and on the form of any orders for reinstatement or rehabilitation of the subject land.

[26]

200 When one examines the consent here in question, it is apparent that it is deficient in one respect only. It does not state the use which is being approved. The instrument of consent describes the location of the land the subject of the approval, and also refers to ML594, which had by that time been granted. It states that 'the application to use the above land has been … approved, subject to any conditions that may appear in Schedule 1'. Reading the 67 conditions leaves no doubt as to the nature of the development being approved, and by necessary implication, the description of the development 'Mineral Sands Mine' in the development application is incorporated. 201 The submission of Mr Robertson goes further. He submits that the consent incorporates, by necessary implication, the letter from RZM to the Council dated 1 February 1978, which accompanied the formal development application form. This letter (and an enclosed plan) described the proposal in some detail. It is submitted that it is necessary to incorporate the contents of the letter, indeed also a subsequent letter to the PEC in support of obtaining its concurrence, in order to determine the scope of the consent. I do not agree. Leaving aside the necessary incorporation of the description of the development from the development application, as a mineral sands mine, nothing further is needed. 202 The consent and its conditions are sufficient to delineate what it was that the Council was approving. There is no justification or necessity to refer to the letter which accompanied the development application, or any other extrinsic documents, in order to construe the consent. 203 The next question is whether the consent included re-mining and deep mining. On behalf of RZM, Mr Walker SC submits that they are clearly species of the genus 'mining'. Therefore, consent to a mineral sands mine includes re-mining and deep mining. Condition 64, set forth earlier (para 37) does not prohibit mining the land more than once providing RZM obtains the consent of the Minister and the Board. In that event, it may mine the land more than once. Mr Walker also calls condition 17 in aid of the inclusion of deep mining. 204 The appellant submits that Talbot J was wrong to find that condition 64 did no more than require that the Minister and the Board be given the opportunity to intervene and impose conditions on re-mining. Mr Robertson submits that on an application of the ordinary and natural rules of construction, the words in the condition plainly prohibit re-mining. The prohibition acknowledges that permission may be granted by third parties (the Minister and the Board) if re-mining is to take place, that is, mining more than once. The premise of the condition is that a further development consent may be necessary. Mr Robertson further submits that the consent gave no approval to deep mining. In this regard he also relies on condition 17 as well as condition 1, in addition to condition 64. 205 In general terms what occurred was that RZM carried out mining of the subject land. This operation has been referred to as shallow mining, to a depth of a maximum of minus RL3m. The mined area was then rehabilitated. RZM then re-mined the same area (from 1986 to 1990) and later (from August 1990) carried out deep-mining to a depth of up to 12m in excess of shallow mining. 206 The consent does not define any of the terms - shallow mining, re-mining or deep mining. It refers only to 'mining'. However, the plain words of condition 64 provide that the leaseholder 'shall mine the subject area once only'. This statement is then qualified, 'unless' the consent to do so has been obtained from the nominated third parties. It is plain that the Council could not delegate its statutory role as consent authority to a third party if the effect of doing so is to fundamentally alter the ambit of the approval. Mining the land more than once would do this. It would offend the principle in Mison v Randwick Municipal Council (1991) 23 NSWLR 734 at 740 and 741. 207 In essence, the principle is that where a condition has the effect of significantly altering the development or to leave open the possibility that the development carried out in accordance with the condition will be significantly different to that applied for, then it is not a consent to the application. If the consent leaves for later decision an important aspect of the development which will alter it in a fundamental respect, the consent cannot finally determine the application. See in particular the judgments of Priestley JA and Clarke JA. 208 There have been many similar decisions in different Australian jurisdictions. The judgment of the Chief Justice refers to some, to which I would add further examples: Lend Lease Management Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1986) 68 LGRA 61 at 86 (Cripps J), Jungar Holdings Pty Ltd v Eurobodalla Shire Council (1990) 70 LGRA 79 at 89 (Hemmings J), Malcolm v Newcastle City Council (1991) 73 LGRA 356 at 365 and Byron Shire Businesses for the Future Inc v Byron Council (1994) 84 LGERA 434 (Pearlman J).

[28]

212 In my view, the words in condition 64 following 'once only' were beyond the power of the council to impose. It does not follow, in my opinion, that other conditions are similarly invalid or that the whole consent falls, see, for example, Randwick Municipal Council v Pacific-Seven Pty Ltd (1989) 69 LGRA 13. The invalid rider to condition 64 may be severed and the consent remain valid and operative. A condition (or part of one) may be severable where it is superimposed on a consent if it is incidental, trivial, unimportant or mere surplusage. If a condition is fundamental to the whole of the consent, it cannot be severed and the whole consent is invalid. That is not the situation here. 213 A prime example of the concept in practice is Kent City Council v Kingsway Investments (Kent) Ltd:Same v Kenworthy [1971] AC 72. Lord Reid [at 90] stated: Suppose that a planning authority purports to impose a condition which has nothing whatever to do with planning considerations, but is only calculated to achieve some ulterior motive thought to be in the public interest. Clearly in my view the condition should be severed and the permission should stand. But suppose, on the other hand, that a condition, although invalid because ultra vires or unreasonable, limits the manner in which the land can be developed, then the condition would not be severable, for if it were simply struck out the result would be that the owner could do things on his land for which he never in fact obtained permission, and that would be contrary to the intention of the statute. Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest [at 102-103] stated that: There might be cases where permission is granted and where some conditions, perhaps unimportant or perhaps incidental, are merely superimposed. In such cases if the conditions are held to be void the permission might be held to endure just as a tree might survive with one or two of its branches pruned or lopped off. It will be otherwise if some conditions is seen to be a part, so to speak, of the structure of the permission so that if the condition is hewed away the permission falls with it. 214 Lord Morris cited Hall & Co Ltd v Shoreham-by-Sea Urban District Council [1964] 1 WLR 240, where Wilmer LJ pointed to a contrast where one or two conditions might be held to be ultra vires and it being difficult to justify finding the whole permission failed, and where conditions are 'fundamental to the whole of the planning permission', resulting in the failure of the whole permission. In Hall Pearson LJ also differentiated between those conditions which are essential or at least important, and those which are trivial or at least unimportant. 215 Lord Upjohn stated that 'it is of cardinal importance to note that the invalid conditions went to the root of the planning permission itself and severely restricted the permission applied for' with respect to those cases where the whole permission failed.

[31]

218 I do not accept that because the PEC approved the regime which had been worked out by the two statutory authorities, it was a valid exercise of power for the council to include the rider to condition 64. Plainly the council was the consent authority, not the PEC. I see nothing in IDO 23 which permits the PEC to require that the council impose a condition which offends the principle of finality and certainty. The concurrence power of the PEC does not assist. 219 The introductory words to the conditions in the development consent specify that the conditions are intended to protect the interests of the Board as they may be affected by mineral extraction from the Tomago sandbeds. Condition 1 is emphatic that the leaseholder must conduct its mining operations in such a manner as not to cause any detrimental effect on the aquifer. The condition stresses the experimental nature of the mining, 'a trial', given the time interval between mining and the assessment of its effects. Accordingly, the 'rate of mining' shall be limited to what is thereafter stipulated in the conditions. In my view, condition 1 assists the appellant's construction of condition 64. 220 Condition 17 is relied on by both sides. It is necessary to reproduce it in full. It provides: (a) Mining shall be restricted in depth from the surface down to such depth below the surface as may be approved from time to time by the Minister and the Board. (b) Mining shall not be permitted at levels below those stipulated by the Board related to areas defined by the Board. These levels will be determined by the Board having regard to the estimated highest groundwater level and capillary zone adopting such factor of safety as may be considered appropriate by the Board. Deposition of tailings shall be deemed to be included in the definition of mining. The objective of this subclause is to ensure that the base of the tailings zone where a deposit of slimes, as hereinafter defined, may exist is at a level where this zone will be subject to wetting by rain percolation only, with the temporary exception of wetting caused by measures associated with active mining. (c) Having regard to the experimental nature of this mining operation and the possible risks involved thereby, the registered holder will be required to commence mining operations in an area remote from the Board's pumping stations and close to the boundary of the catchment. Areas close to the Board's pumping stations are not to be mined until 12 months, or such other time as the Board considers appropriate, has elapsed from the commencement of mining in the remote area in order to permit a preliminary assessment to be made of the effects of such mining. (d) The registered holder shall submit to the Minister and the Board at yearly intervals proposals defining the extent of mining desired both in respect to area and to depth during the following year. The proposals shall include plans and sections showing surface levels and depths of mining: depths of mining should be related to the datum nominated by the Minister and the Board. Furthermore the registered holder shall submit plans at not more than six monthly intervals defining the extent of mining proposed during the ensuing six months and these shall be approved by the Board before operations of the registered holder are extended into the area so defined. (e) The above proposals submitted at yearly intervals shall include plans of the proposed future mining advances within the subject area, with the anticipated mining advance locations shown at 12 monthly intervals. 221 On its face condition 17(a) appears to allow mining to a depth approved from time to time by the Minister and the Board. It does not authorise 're-mining' as such, but it may assist RZM's argument with regard to deep mining. Condition 17(b) appears to provide that the Board will not permit mining below levels of the 'highest groundwater level' with a 'factor of safety'. Condition 17(c) (like condition 1) emphasises the experimental nature of the mining operation and its inherent risks for the Board's water supply. Condition 17(d) requires the leaseholder to submit to the Minister and the Board annual proposals for mining including mining depths. 222 Nothing in condition 17 is directed to re-mining of an area once it has been mined, particularly if it has been rehabilitated. Indeed, it says nothing specifically to re-mining of an area already mined under the consent. It may arguably be relevant to deep mining with the reference to mining to the depths approved from time to time by the Minister and the Board. However, as I have said, I do not see how the approval of deep mining can be delegated by the Council to a third party. It would make the consent relevantly uncertain given its ambit, and offend the Mison principle. Condition 17 may therefore be seen as requiring that RZM obtain further approvals for deep mining, outside the development consent. 223 One further observation may be made. Deep mining, in the circumstances in which it occurred from 1990 onwards, was an aspect of re-mining (but to a greater depth). Mining had already been carried out on the land and the deep mining constituted a re-mining of the land to a greater depth than had already taken place. The same reasoning with respect to condition 64 applies to condition 17.

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225 The requirement for approval as found in condition 64 has the potential effect, as discussed above, of significantly altering the character of the development. It is not a requirement for review designed to ensure that the original character of the development is retained. The approval requirements in conditions 1, 20 and 30 however, do so operate. By providing for Ministerial review of the progress of the mining operation to ensure it is within the anticipated scope of effects (condition 1) and for the carrying out of tests relevant to pollution control (conditions 20 and 30), they strive to maintain the original nature of the development. Therefore, conditions 1, 20 and 30 fall within the category of administrative details ancillary to the core purpose of the development as previously discussed. 226 The discussion of the conditions thus far highlights the problems which arise when conditions negotiated by the Board and RZM for one purpose (the proposed mining lease) become transposed without amendment as conditions of development consent. This occurred because the PEC, when it issued its concurrence, did not address the need to 'translate' the agreed 'conditions of authority' into readily understandable conditions of a development consent under planning law. That having been said, the Court must do its best to interpret the conditions as they appear in the consent, although it should be emphasised that the task is undertaken in the context of planning law since it is a planning consent. The words should be given their primary and natural meaning if that is consistent with the use being permitted. A purposive construction may be adopted if the natural and ordinary meaning to be given to the words used does not give effect to the purpose of the legislation (Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 at 423). In Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319 at 344 Gaudron J (albeit in a dissenting judgment) said of s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987: The circumstances, if any, in which it may be applied to deprive unambiguous words of their ordinary and grammatical meaning must be extremely rare: a direction to that effect is not authority for distilling the purpose or object of an Act in isolation from its terms or divorced from the means which the legislature has selected for its attainment. 227 In my view, there is no need for a purposive construction in the context of the subject development consent. The natural and ordinary (or grammatical) meaning is consistent with the purpose and objects of the legislation. In any event, a purposive approach is directed to the promotion of the purpose or object underlying the legislation. It is not apparent that the construction adopted by his Honour was in reality a purposive one since it did not take account of the purpose and object underlying the EPA Act.

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228 It must be emphasised that consent to a 'Mineral Sands Mine' does not mean unconstrained development of the use, unless the consent is unconditional. Here there were 67 detailed conditions imposed on the approval. In my opinion, condition 64 contains ordinary English words of plain meaning. As I have said, the words should be given their primary and natural meaning. That is, that the leaseholder is only permitted to mine the land once. This means that RZM cannot, under the development consent, mine the land, then carry out rehabilitation of it and later return and re-mine (including deep mining) that same land, unless it obtains a further development approval. Such a requirement is flagged by the rider to the condition. Condition 64 is quite capable, read in its ordinary and literal sense, of meaning what it says. Condition 1 assists this construction and condition 17 is neutral or capable of supporting arguments for and against. 229 In my opinion, neither re-mining of lands already mined, or deep mining of those same lands, in the circumstances in which they occurred, is permitted by the consent. Accordingly, and prima facie, RZM was in breach of the consent by breaching condition 64. Looked at in a different way, the deep mining and re-mining was mining without development consent, where such consent was required by the planning and mining regimes. 230 The various conditions relating to rehabilitation, eg. conditions 26, 28, 36 and 53 also lend support to the conclusion that the consent permitted the land to be mined once and then rehabilitated in a fashion required by the consent and likely to be enduring. These conditions are consistent only with a prohibition on re-mining. 231 Appropriate meaning and effect must be given to the use of the word 'only' in condition 64 as explaining the word preceding it, 'once'. The word 'only' cannot simply be read out of the condition. 232 Talbot J noted that what was approved was a mineral sands mine. He said that it was a use to be carried on within the bounds of the land described by reference to the plan which accompanied the letter with the development application. On the construction of the consent which I have adopted, this is incorrect. What was conditionally approved was a mineral sands mine on the land specified in the consent itself. His Honour went on to say that the question of whether the consent authorised deep mining or re-mining did not arise. With respect to his Honour, I am unable to agree with this conclusion. The consent to carry out the use of a mineral sands mine on the subject land was conditioned. One of the conditions was condition 64. That condition clearly restricted the leaseholder to mining the area once and once only. The condition raises the issue of whether the consent authorised the leaseholder to mine the area more than once. Doing so obviously involves 're-mining' and also, in my view, deep mining if that is to be a second or subsequent mining of the land, as was here the case. 233 The 1979 development consent, which concerned what became ML744, did not include the same condition 17 in the 1978 consent. However, it did contain conditions 1 and 64. Accordingly, I would come to the same conclusion that it did not authorise re-mining or deep mining. The excision leases (1226, 1222 and 1170) were for areas excised from ML594 and no new development consents were issued with respect to them. Even if RZM could rely on the 1978 and 1979 consents, the same conclusion applies that they did not authorise re-mining or deep mining in the areas of the excision leases.

[35]

Enforcement of the consents and the 1973 Mining Act 234 The question of the enforcement of the development consents, particularly the 1978 consent, is bound up with the conflict and reconciliation of the mining and planning legislative regimes. Both the 1973 and the 1992 Mining Acts required all mining operations to have prior development consent under planning law. However, once a mining lease was granted, following a development approval, the conditions of the mining lease relating to the mining operation took precedence and ousted most of the conditions of the development consent. 235 Moreover, nothing in the EPA Act, or a planning instrument made under the Act, or a development consent, could prohibit a mining operation so long as operations under the mining lease commenced within 5 years of the issue of the development consent. 236 What was the operation of s 116 of the 1973 Act on the subject development consents? First, s 116(1) clearly had application since the consent of the Council was required under the IDO. Accordingly, before any mining lease was granted over the land, the Minister was obliged to require RZM to apply to the Council for development consent, to notify the Council and to give it the opportunity to suggest conditions to be included in the mining lease if granted. It is common ground that no such ministerial requirement was made with regard to ML594 and his Honour so found. Therefore, s 116(1) was not applied to ML594. Further, s 116 was not applied to the excision leases because again there was no s 116(1) requirement made. 237 If the Minister had made a requirement under s 116(1), and development consent was granted followed by the grant of a mining lease, then under s 116(4) nothing in or done under any planning law could prevent the leaseholder from carrying on mining operations. To the extent that the consent purported to do so, it would be of no force and effect. However, this immunity was only conferred on an applicant for a mining lease who obtained development consent. The consent must therefore have been obtained prior to the mining lease for ss (4) to have effect. Talbot J so found. The immunity did not apply to ML594 since it was granted before the grant of development consent by the Council. Subsection (4) did not apply to the excision leases since, as at the date of the issue of the 1978 consent, RZM was not an applicant for any mining lease. 238 If there was an immunity, it ceased if mining operations had not been commenced within 5 years of the issue of the development consent (s 116(7)). No mining commenced on the excision leases before June 1983 (nor could it) so no immunity would have extended to those areas, even assuming the application of s 116(4) in the first place. 239 Under s 116(3) and (3A) any prescribed condition imposed on a development consent was void. Prescribed conditions meant conditions concerning pre-mining preparation, mining methods and rehabilitation, s 116(9). Until 1983 this applied if the consent was obtained by a person applying for that consent pursuant to a s 116(1)(a) ministerial requirement. That precondition was removed by the insertion of ss (3A) in 1983. Subsection (3A) applied where the development consent was obtained prior to the grant of the lease but included leases where the consent had not been obtained pursuant to such a ministerial requirement. 240 Section 116(3) and (3A) did not apply to ML594, as his Honour correctly found, since the lease was granted before the consent. Talbot J found that ss (3A) applied to the excision leases because it was sufficient for any development consent to have been granted to mine, even if the mining proposed by the lease could not have been undertaken under the development consent. However, even assuming this to be correct, which I doubt, it cannot be said that the excision leases were 'granted in accordance with s 116' and ss (3) and (3A) are not concerned with the granting of a lease, rather with the consequences of a grant. 241 As I have already mentioned, none of the MLs were granted under the 1992 Act. All were granted under the 1973 Act, although the application for ML594 was made under the 1906 Act. With the exception of ML744, the leases were not ones to which s 116 applied. Where a mining lease was granted without the opportunity for the planning consent authority to consider it under s 116(1), the conditions of a development consent and the planning legislation remain in force, see his Honour's finding at page 15 of the judgment. 242 As I have recounted, the application for ML594 was made under the 1906 Act. Section 116 of the 1973 Act did not apply as the provisions of Part 6 (including s 116) were expressly excluded (cl 17, 2nd schedule). Accordingly, it was not necessary to obtain a development consent first and before a mining lease was granted, where an application for a lease had been lodged before the commencement of the 1973 Act. Talbot J accepted this. It follows that ML594 cannot be said to have been granted in accordance with s 116(1), as his Honour found. Since the lease predated the consent, s 116(3) did not void any of the conditions of the 1978 consent. Again, this was his Honour's conclusion. Further, as his Honour said, s 116(4) could not apply to ML594 since it was a precondition that the applicant for mining obtain development consent. 243 It follows that from the grant of ML594 in May 1978 until the 1992 Mining Act commenced, the June 1978 development consent had full force and effect, as did the EPA Act. 244 However, his Honour went on to determine that the transitional provisions of the 1992 Mining Act and that Act itself saved ML594 from the EPA Act.

[36]

The effect of the transitional provisions and s 74 of the 1992 Act 245 The effect of his Honour's decision, as I read it, is to confer on ML594 a greater protection to the mining operation than existed under the 1973 Act even though s 116(4) did not apply to the mining lease prior to 1992. This cannot have been the intention of the 1992 legislation. Such a construction would mean that 'legacy' mining under the 1906 Act would become immune from planning legislation in 1992 when it was not so immune in 1973. It would mean, as counsel for the appellant correctly points out, that a later mining lease granted for a different mining project, but covering part of an area of an earlier development consent (perhaps issued decades before), would not need to obtain development consent and would have no planning scrutiny imposed on it. This cannot have been intended and obtains no support from the passage of the 1992 Bill through the Parliament or in the Explanatory Notes. 246 Clause 8 of the transitional provisions has already been quoted, para 32. The clause contains a plain precondition to the application of ss 65 and 74 of the 1992 Act. That is, where a mining lease is 'granted in accordance with section 116' of the 1973 Act. A grant of a lease can only be in accordance with s 116 when ss (1) is applicable. In my opinion, it had no application to ML594, or to the excision leases. 247 However, Talbot J concluded that any mining lease granted after a development consent, irrespective of any requirement under s 116(1)(a), was granted in accordance with s 116 for the purposes of ss 65 and 74 of the 1992 Act pursuant to cl 8 of the transitional provisions. 248 The other important transitional provision is cl 4(2). Mining Lease 594 was granted under the 1973 Act so, on its face, cl 4 applied and it is taken to be a mining lease granted under the 1992 Act. His Honour rejected the appellant's submission that cl 8 was an implied exception to the generality of cl 4. He found that cl 8 should not be read as limiting the effect of cl 4(2). 249 However, cl 8 is a special provision. Authority holds that a specific provision, which includes some limitation or restriction not found in a general provision, will usually prevail. See, for example, G F Heublein & Bro Inc v Continental Liqueurs Pty Ltd (1962) 109 CLR 153 at 161, The King v Wallis (1949) 78 CLR 529 and Patrick Stevedores Operations (No 2) v MUA (No 3) (1998) 195 CLR 1 at 61. 250 In my opinion, cl 8 provides a special regime for the application of ss 65 and 74 of the 1992 Act to leases granted under earlier mining statutes if they have been granted in accordance with s 116 of the 1973 Act. It is apparent why this is so. It is to ensure that these provisions did not apply to leases which were granted without prior planning scrutiny and development consent. On the other hand, it was also to ensure that mining leases which had the protection of s 116 of the 1973 Act, were equally protected by ss 65 and 74. 251 It follows that none of the leases (other than ML744) have been granted in accordance with s 116. By this finding, and giving the phrase its natural and ordinary meaning, I accept that 'in accordance with' means 'in conformity with', see Walker v Wilson (1991) 172 CLR 195 at 208. 252 Talbot J said that cl 8 must be given a meaning consistent with the intention expressed by the words. He continued: If clause 8 is to be construed strictly, the result would be that ss 65 and 74 would apply only to a mining lease granted in complete agreement with s 116 … or it requires compliance in every respect with the section … 253 From the ensuing words used by his Honour it is apparent that he accepted that the use of the word 'granted' in cl 8 created a difficulty for his preferred construction, as did the words 'in accordance with'. His Honour resolved this by construing those words as meaning 'in conformity with' or 'consistently with' s 116. 254 His Honour continued: It would not be inconsistent with the legislative scheme to accept any lease granted after a necessary land use consent had been given, irrespective of a requirement under s 116(1)(a), as being a lease granted in accordance with s 116 for the purpose of cl 8. 255 With respect to his Honour, these are departures from ordinary rules of construction. They depart from the plain meaning of the words, and impose an unneeded and unnecessary gloss on the words used in cl 8. Indeed, they appear to depart from the apparent intent which the words seek to achieve. In my opinion, his Honour's conclusions on cl 8 are in error. The transitional provisions, properly construed and applied, lead to the conclusion that ss 65 and 74 do not apply to ML594 or to the excision leases.

[37]

Section 65 of the 1992 Act 256 On the assumption that the transitional provisions can apply ss 65 and 74 to the mining leases, other than ML744, it is necessary to consider those provisions. 257 At the trial RZM argued that ss 65 and 74 provided a complete defence to any claim for breach of the development consents or breach of the EPA Act for failure to obtain consent where consent was necessary. 258 It was submitted by RZM that s 65 removed the conditions of the 1978 consent which related to mining methods and to the environmental performance of the operation and s 74 removed any obligation to comply with planning laws as far as current operations were concerned. 259 Section 65 only has effect in relation to mining leases granted under the 1992 Act. It cannot apply to leases granted under the 1973 Act unless by a deeming or transitional provision. Assuming such a deeming, it is apparent that no lease can be granted unless 'an appropriate development consent' is in force. This must mean a development consent which is appropriate to the mining operation to be authorised by the proposed lease. If the development consent is not for the mining operation proposed to be authorised by the lease, then there is no 'appropriate development consent' that is in force with respect to the land. In this circumstance s 65 does not apply. 260 Where an appropriate consent has been issued, any conditions relating to mining methods and rehabilitation are void and the consent is taken to be given free of such conditions. 261 Talbot J decided that s 65 did not apply to ML594 but applied to ML744 and to the excision leases. I agree with his Honour with respect to ML594. However, with regard to the other leases his Honour found that the development consents were 'appropriate' and accordingly, the conditions relating to mining methods etc. were void. However, the development consent needs to be an 'appropriate' development consent, not just any development consent for the use of the land for mining. 262 I accept the submission of the appellant that there needs to be some harmony or concordance between the subject development consent and the proposed mining lease for the former to be an 'appropriate' consent. A development consent would be an inappropriate one if it did not reflect the mining operation included within the proposed mining lease. An appropriate development consent would be one which did so reflect the mining operation proposed in the lease application. The symmetry requires more than just a commonality of the taking of mineral sands or, to use his Honour's words, the 'dominant characterising purpose which can be commonly inferred from the applications'. 263 Such a construction defeats the purpose and intent of s 65, which is to ensure that a specific mining operation is subject to planning scrutiny and consent before the grant of a mining lease with respect to it. For example, if the only commonality is that the consent and the mining lease relate to the same mineral, one could envisage significant inconsistencies in the quantity of the mineral to be extracted as between the development consent and the mining lease. The result could nullify the objective of planning scrutiny. Environmental impacts would obviously greatly differ. Further, a development consent to an underground mine could authorise an open cut mine or vice versa. The primary purpose of s 65 is to ensure that the objectives of planning law are achieved, including the right of the public to object, rather than thwarted. 264 It must be kept firmly in mind that s 65 acknowledges that a planning consent authority may refuse consent to a mining operation the subject of a proposed mining lease. In my opinion, there must be some reasonable congruence or consonance between the subject matter of the development consent and what is proposed for the mining lease in order that the former may be an appropriate development consent under s 65. 265 In this case the excision leases authorise deep mining and re-mining whereas, as I have found, the 1978 consent did not. Accordingly, it is not an appropriate consent to those leases. 266 Moreover, the leases were granted after mining activities had been completed under ML594 and the land had been rehabilitated. This provides another reason why the consent is not appropriate. The mining to which the consent related had been completed, the land rehabilitated and the relevant mining lease (ML594) surrendered in relation to the areas which became the excised leases. 267 The construction adopted by the trial judge could lead to different mining operations undertaken by different mining operators being enabled by a single development consent obtained on the basis of certain given environmental impacts. Such a possibility could not have been intended.

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271 In so far as the facts of the case are concerned, since mining operations have ceased and are not proposed to resume, s 74 does not, in my view, prevent an order being made for rehabilitation. Such an order may have to be drafted so as not to prevent the leaseholder from continuing the present activities being carried on. But that would be a matter for further evidence (possibly) and the moulding of a suitable form of order. 272 I should turn to s 74(2), in case it be relevant. Assuming that his Honour was correct that ML594 was otherwise within ss 65 and 74, it is apparent that ss (2) was satisfied since mining operations began on that lease within 5 years of the consent. 273 The excision leases mostly relate to areas excised from ML594. They were granted between 1986 and 1990. No new development consents were obtained. His Honour held that the 1978 and 1979 development consents sufficed to support the new leases. The consents were to the use of the land for the purpose of obtaining minerals and related (in part) to the same land as the new leases. His Honour reasoned that s 116(1) did not apply because development consent was unnecessary since it had already been obtained. 274 In any event, Talbot J held that ss (3A) and (4) applied irrespective of whether consent was obtained pursuant to a requirement under s 116(1)(a). His Honour rejected the appellant's submission that it required a direct connection between the lease and the consent. His Honour found that the excision leases were granted in accordance with s 116 for the purposes of cl 8. Finally, his Honour found that s 74 applied to the leases because they continued to have effect when the 1992 Act came into force. 275 As I have said, his Honour's above findings are disputed and, it seems to me, with some legitimacy. I am unable to see how it can be concluded that the 1978 and 1979 development consents were referable to the excision leases granted many years later. But assuming that they can rely on the earlier consents, 'mining operations under the lease(s)' (my emphasis) did not begin within 5 years after the date of the giving of the development consents, thus s 74(2) applies and no immunity is obtained under s 74(1). In my opinion, it would make a mockery of the legislative provisions to hold that because the nature of mining is a continuous process, RZM can rely on the commencement of operations under ML594 (a different lease) to comply with s 74(2) in relation to mining leases granted many years later and in respect of a different mining project. 276 In relation to the excision leases the position is simply this. Development consent was required for them but none was obtained. Since these leases were directed to re-mining and deep mining, they were of a different nature to the 1978 development consent, which I have held did not include those activities. Clearly since no appropriate development consent was in force for these leases in 1992, neither ss 65 nor 74 applied. Moreover, the mining operations under the leases had not begun within 5 years of the 1978 consent being granted. In my opinion, the transitional provisions did not apply ss 65 and 74 to those leases.

[41]

The aquifer condition 278 This condition (No 1) is to be found in the 1978 and 1979 development consents. It was also a condition of ML594 until 30 June 1995 and contained in ML744. 279 The plain and unambiguous words of the first sentence of condition 1 require RZM to conduct its operations so 'as not to cause any detrimental effect on the aquifer'. There is evidence of significant detrimental impacts of mining activities on the aquifer prior to 1995. It is to be found in the findings of the consultants to the steering committee established in 1995 to investigate the situation. The detriment to the aquifer includes its partial removal, acidification and contamination with elevated levels of iron and arsenic, which would affect its use for potable water for a very lengthy period of time from the cessation of mining. 280 His Honour held that a purposive approach should be applied to construe the aquifer condition 'in the context of the nature of the development and mining authorised … '. He added that it would be a 'curious result if the effect of condition 1 was to prohibit any interference with the aquifer in circumstances where the interference has been specifically' permitted by the Regulation 27 permit. This was a reference to the permit issued by the sixth respondent in 1995. 281 It is impermissible to construe a condition imposed in 1978 by reference to the granting of the permit in 1995. The Regulation 27 permit is irrelevant to ascertain the meaning of condition 1 of the 1978 consent. It must be recalled that in 1978 the Board was both manager and regulator of activities within the subject sandbeds, as well as the user of its potable waters. The sandbeds had been reserved for the purpose of water supply since 1916. The purpose of the conditions included in the 1978 consent was far more than simply to protect the Board's asset. For example, numerous conditions relate to protection of flora and fauna and to rehabilitation. 282 It is not permissible to construe condition 1 in the light of subsequent events, see AMP Society v Allan (1978) 52 ALJR 407. Nor is it permissible to read the condition down as his Honour appears to have done. His Honour was concerned with whether there was any evidence that established a direct detrimental impact upon the 'actual supply of water to any of the points presently used by the Board'. He found that there was no such evidence. While this may have been literally correct, the reason that this may be so was the withdrawal by the Board from areas affected by contamination. However, the condition is not restricted to a direct detrimental effect on the actual supply of water to the Board. The condition states that the leaseholder shall not conduct operations so as to 'cause any detrimental effect to the aquifer or the Board's assets' (my emphasis). 283 The condition protects both the aquifer and the Board's assets. His Honour appears only to have given effect to the latter and to read out the former to the extent that the actual water supply then presently used by the Board had not been detrimentally effected. The 'detriment' in the condition clearly relates both to the aquifer and to the Board's assets. 284 I mentioned the reason why his Honour was able to find that there was no direct impact by way of detrimental effect on the actual supply of water to the Board. It was because the Board had to move its extraction points as RZM's mining operation proceeded so as to prevent a detrimental impact on the potable water supply for Newcastle. For example, pump station No 6 (north and south) had to be abandoned and decommissioned in 1994 due to the extremely high iron levels. It also appears from the evidence that pump station 22 will necessarily be abandoned. Further, the Board anticipates that the mining activities will ultimately lead to the abandoning of other pump stations (3, 4, 21 and 1). There is uncertainty about these because it is presently impossible to predict how long it will take for the elevated iron levels to decay to background. Clearly this could take a considerable period, possibly running into several decades. It is common ground that at least 20 years is involved. 285 Presently known iron concentrations are extremely high, coupled with arsenic concentrations, both well in excess of the NHMRC draft drinking water guidelines. What has occurred is the very thing that the aquifer condition, and other conditions of the 1978 consent, sought to avoid. The detrimental impact on the aquifer is not some minor and transient deleterious effect. It is dramatic and long lasting. RZM was in breach. 286 In my opinion, the words in condition 1 are plain and should be given their ordinary and natural meaning. The words used give effect to the purpose of the legislation. There is no ambiguity in them and the construction adopted by his Honour is not available. Indeed, I do not see how the construction favoured by his Honour was truly a purposive one. It did not promote the purpose or object underlying planning legislation.

[42]

The pollution condition 287 Condition 20 in the 1978 and 1979 consents is also to be found in the conditions of ML594 until 1995 and in ML744. Condition 20 does not appear in MLs 1170, 1222 and 1226, although other pollution conditions appear in those leases. 288 Condition 20 provides that the leaseholder shall conduct operations so that there is 'no increase above that existing naturally in the local ground water prior to mining operations in the saline, iron or other deleterious content of the water caused by the mining process'. 289 His Honour accepted RZM's submission that the condition should be 'construed so that the prohibition contained in them does not apply to the necessary and inevitable consequences of a well managed dredging operation'. 290 The obvious intent of condition 20 is that mining operations not cause any elevation in iron, or other deleterious substances, in the water in the aquifer above those naturally existing prior to mining. One may put to one side slight elevations not causing any short or long term effect on the quality of water in the aquifer. There is however no sanction in the plain and readily understandable words in condition 20 to read out of it any elevations which arise as the 'inevitable consequences of a well managed dredging operation'. This is to write into the conditions words that are not there. The construction has the effect of severely cutting back the clear words of prohibition in the condition. Such a construction defeats the purpose of the condition and is unwarranted. Indeed, the construction has the effect of permitting the very thing the condition seeks to prohibit. It must not be forgotten that conditions of a development consent serve to protect the public interest and that breaches may be enforced by 'any person' under s 123 of the EPA Act. It is not simply a decision to be made by the regulator. 291 In any event, I fail to see how what occurred, the oxidation leading to elevated iron and arsenic levels, can be said to be a naturally occurring process. What happened was a direct result of the mining operations, which are the antithesis of processes naturally occurring in the sandbed. 292 On a correct construction of conditions 1 and 20 in the 1978 and 1979 consents, RZM was in clear breach of both. The same conditions are included in ML594 (to 1995) and ML744. Section 5 of the 1992 Mining Act prohibits mining otherwise than in accordance with a mining lease in force in relation to the land. Mining has plainly occurred in breach of the conditions of these mining leases and consequently, in breach of the 1992 Act. 293 As mentioned, the sixth respondent issued a permit to the third respondent under cl 27 of the Hunter Water Board (Special Areas) Regulation 1989 on 9 August 1995. Condition 9 of the permit required RZM to observe all statutory provisions in force relating to the mining operations and to comply with the conditions of its relevant mining leases. Condition 9 would include compliance with relevant development consents. I have found that RZM breached the conditions of the development consents and the mining leases mentioned. This would amount to a breach of the permit and cl 25 of the Regulation.

[43]

The question of relief 294 The breaches of the development consents or the carrying on of development without consent (where consent is required) may result in relief being granted under s 124 of the EPA Act. Breaches of the mining leases are breaches of the Mining Act 1992 by way of s 5 and can only result in relief via s 25 of the EOP Act. Likewise any breach of the Reg 27 permit. 295 RZM submits that no relief may be granted under s 25 because there is no threat of any breach to be restrained. All mining has ceased and is not to be resumed. 296 The EOP Act was enacted in 1989. Its principal object was to supplement other laws which protect the environment from pollution (s 3(1)). 297 Section 25(1) provided that: Any person may bring proceedings in the Land and Environment Court for an order to restrain a breach (or a threatened or apprehended breach) of this or any other Act, or any statutory rule under an Act, if the breach (or the threatened or apprehended breach) is causing or is likely to cause harm to the environment. 298 Subsection (3) required the leave of the Court to be given to any proceedings under the section. Talbot J granted such leave and this is not in issue on the appeal. 299 Subsection (5) provided: If the Court is satisfied that a breach, or a threatened or apprehended breach, will, unless restrained by order of the Court, be committed or be likely to be committed, it may make such orders as it thinks fit to restrain the breach or other conduct of the person by whom the breach is committed or by whom the threatened or apprehended breach is likely to be committed. 300 The EOP Act has been repealed and s 25 has been re-enacted in a slightly different form in s 253 of the Protection of the Environment Operations Act 1999. Leave of the Court is no longer required. 301 Counsel for RZM draws attention to the difference in the wording between s 25(1) of the EOP Act and the broader words used in s 124 of the EPA Act, which includes 'remedy'. Mr Walker submits that s 25 cannot apply because there is no breach which is causing or likely to cause harm to the environment. If there was a breach, it has long since ceased. It is also submitted that the section only permits injunctive orders to be made and not declaratory relief. 302 In Brown v EPA (1992) 78 LGERA 119 the Chief Judge of the Land and Environment Court, Pearlman J, considered a similar argument. Of it she said: … I do not think the powers of the Court to make orders as it sees fit are constrained by s 25. The whole purpose of that section is to restrain statutory breaches which are causing or likely to cause harm to the environment. If this Court adopts a purposive interpretation (as s 33 of the Interpretation Act 1987 (NSW) requires) then the word "restrain" should not be interpreted in a technical and narrow sense, meaning only an order for injunctive relief. Rather, it must be interpreted in its wider and ordinary sense of "to prevent" or to "hold back". It follows from such an interpretation that the Court may make whatever orders it considers appropriate in order that the breach which is causing or likely to cause harm is discontinued. Those orders may be declarations, or injunctives, or orders for mandamus. I am fortified in this approach to the construction of the section by the words used in subs (5) and the opening words of subs (6). Subsection (5), (which subs (6) does not limit) empowers the Court to "… make such orders as it thinks fit to restrain the breach or other conduct …". Clearly "restrain" is here used in a wide not technical sense. It would be straining the language of subs (5) to hold that the only orders it permits are orders granting injunctive relief. (at 126) 303 I agree with her Honour and adopt her reasoning. Bearing in mind the objects of the EOP Act and the extension of standing to pursue relief where the breach (or threatened or apprehended) of any statute is causing or likely to cause harm to the environment, the provision should not be read narrowly but expansively. See Knight v F P Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 at 205 and Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 at 581 - 582. Further, in the specific context of the Land and Environment Court, see Logwon Pty Ltd v Warringah Shire Council (1993) 33 NSWLR 13. 304 The fact that the removal of minerals has ceased, and is not threatened to resume, does not mean that s 25 is not able to be enlivened. Rehabilitation is part of the operations still being conducted on the land and the breach of conditions of the development consent, the mining leases and the Regulation 27 permit, are continuing until remedied. 305 The essence of the breach of condition 1 is the causing of a detrimental effect on the aquifer, namely the iron and arsenic contamination. The breach of condition 20 is the causing of an increase of iron in the water over and above that naturally existing. These breaches were caused by the mining operations of RZM. The breaches, that is the contamination of the aquifer, are continuing. They are the continuing consequences of the mining operation. The contamination of the aquifer is not being caused by the present activities of rehabilitation. The breaches, it seems to me, may be restrained under s 25 of the EOP Act and, in so far as they constitute breaches of the EPA Act, under s 124 of that statute. 306 In relation to the point taken by RZM, it should be noted that no such question relating to s 25 was raised before the Land and Environment Court. Accordingly, we do not have the benefit of his Honour's reasons. The time for the issue to be raised was on the application for leave, or at least before the trial ended. Notwithstanding that I assume Talbot J would have followed and applied Brown, there is, in my opinion, nothing in the point. 307 While I have found that RZM has been in and is in breach of planning law, of the conditions of development consent, and of mining without consent where it was required, there is a question as to whether any declaratory relief should be granted. Many of the breaches took place in the past and, to some extent, events have overtaken them. Moreover, no mining (only rehabilitation) is presently taking place, nor is any mining contemplated in the future. The same may be said of the breaches of the mining leases (s 5 of the Mining Act), as well as the Regulation 27 permit. However, what is important is the continuing consequence of the breaches.

[44]

308 In so far as any declarations are reliant on s 25 of the EOP Act, for reasons already mentioned, I believe that it is open to grant relief. Declarations are also open to be made under the EPA Act. There is a demonstrable purpose in making the declarations. They serve to declare the law and underline the breaches. They have utility and draw attention to the continuing environmental harm to the aquifer. 309 The real point of the litigation, as I understand the appellant, is to seek relief by way of mandatory order to rehabilitate the land in such a way as to cleanse the aquifer of iron and arsenic contamination, which is not being undertaken by the present rehabilitation being carried out by RZM. 310 The respondents argue that there is no purpose in remitting the matter to the Land and Environment Court. In support of this proposition they argue that by reason of s 74 of the Mining Act 1992 the Court has no power to make such an order. I have already rejected this submission. Any order made may not prevent the leaseholder from carrying on mining operations. The reason for this is that no mining operations are presently being carried on or are contemplated. Mining has been completed and has ceased. In any event, it will be up to the Court, should it decide in its discretion to make any order, to tailor such order to the law and to the particular circumstances disclosed by the evidence. 311 That the mining operations have ceased has been confirmed by the undertaking handed to the Court during the hearing of the appeal. There is now simply nothing to prevent. In any event, as far as the excision leases are concerned, because of the operation of s 74(2), subsection (1) has no operation. 312 The second reason advanced by the respondents is discretionary. It is submitted that having regard to his Honour's findings of the conduct of mining over a lengthy period of time and his remarks on discretion, there is no practical purpose in a remitter. 313 I am unimpressed with the respondents' arguments on discretion, and do not accept the submission that a remitter has no utility. 314 First, his Honour's comments on discretion were obiter and made on the basis that no relief was to be granted since no breaches had been found. His Honour's remarks are not determinative. The remitter will be held in a quite different context, acknowledging the breaches and the finding of the Court on appeal, and in the light of what has occurred since his Honour's judgment in 1996. In this latter respect, the parties have filed considerable evidence. The remitter will also be on the basis that no mining is presently proceeding nor intended in the future. To use the expression of the appellant's counsel, the caravan has moved on. 315 There is, in my opinion, good reason why the matter ought be remitted. The situation of damage to the sandbeds and the aquifer is a continuing one. It is important for the Land and Environment Court to hear evidence on whether or not, in the exercise of the discretion, a mandatory order for rehabilitation should be made. If it determines that an order should be made, the precise terms of that order will require further evidence and consideration, especially in respect of its framing. I am unpersuaded that it is necessary to hear counsel on the form of Short Minutes of Order to be made by the Court of Appeal.

Parties

Applicant/Plaintiff:

Winn

Respondent/Defendant:

Director General of National Parks and Wildlife and Ors

Legislation Cited (2)

Interpretation Act 1901(Cth)

Interpretation Act 1987(NSW)

Cases Cited (32)

CITATION : Winn v Director General of National Parks and Wildlife and Ors [2001] NSWCA 17 revised - 19/03/2001 FILE NUMBER(S) : CA 40026/97 HEARING DATE(S) : 3 - 5 July 2000 JUDGMENT DATE : 20 February 2001

T F Robertson/P Singleton (Appellant) Submitting (First Respondent) COUNSEL : B Walker SC/T S Hale SC/Ms P Sibtain (Second/Third Respondents) Dr M Evans (Fourth/Fifth Respondents) Submitting (Sixth Respondent) Woolf Associates (Appellant) Director General of National Parks and Wildlife (First Respondent) SOLICITORS : Minter Ellison (Second/Third Respondents) NSW Department of Mineral Resources (Fourth/Fifth Respondents) Department of Land and Water Conservation (Sixth Respondent) CATCHWORDS : ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - tension between mining planning and environmental legislation - immunity from environmental legislation - Mining Act 1973, s 116 - Mining Act 1992, ss 65, 74, cls 4, 8 of Schedule 6 - ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - Development Consent - Interpretation of Planning Conditions - Finality - ENVIRONMENTAL LAW - Development Consent Conditions - Remedy for Breach - no present and continuing breach - Environmental Offences and Penalties Act 1989, s 25 - Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, s 124 - D Environmental Offences and Penalties Act (NSW) 1989 ss 21, 25 Environmental Planning and Assessment Act (NSW) 1979 ss 91, 123 Hunter District Water Sewerage and Drainage Act (NSW) 1938 Interpretation Act (NSW) 1987 ss 5, 30, 33 Land and Environment Court Act (NSW) 1979 s 20 LEGISLATION CITED : Local Government Act (NSW) 1919 Pt XIIA Div 7 Mining Act (NSW) 1906 Mining Act (NSW) 1973 ss 116 Mining Act (NSW) 1992 ss 5, 65, 74, Schedule 6 clause 4(2), 8 Protection of Environment Operations Act (NSW) 1999 s253 Hunter Water Board (Special Areas) Regulation 1989 Ainsworth v Criminal Justice Commission (1992) 175 CLR 564 AMP Society v Allan (1978) 52 ALJR 407 Auburn Municipal Council v Szabo (1971) 67 LGRA 427 Brown v EPA (1992) 78 LGERA 119 Byron Shire Businesses for the Future Inc v Byron Council (1994) 84 LGERA 434 Cann's Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1946) 71 CLR 210 City of Unley v Claude Neon Ltd (1983) 32 SASR 329 Corporate Affairs Commission (NSW) v Yuill (1991) 172 CLR 319 Evans v Western Australia (1997) 77 FCR 193 Flynn v Director of Public Prosecutions [1998] 1 VR 322 Genkem Pty Ltd v Environmental Protection Authority (1994) 35 NSWLR 33 G F Heublein & Bro Incorporated v Continental Liquers Pty Ltd (1962) 109 CLR 153 Greek Australian Finance Corporation Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1974) 29 LGRA 130 Hall & Co Ltd v Shoreham-by-Sea Urban District Council [1964] 1 WLR 240 House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 498 Interlego AG v Croner Trading Pty Ltd (1992) 39 FCR 348 Jungar Holdings Pty Ltd v Eurobodalla Shire Council (1990) 70 LGRA 79 Kent City Council v Kingsway Investments (Kent) Ltd: Same v Kenworthy [1971] AC 72 King Gee Clothing Co Pty Ltd v Commonwealth (1945) 71 CLR 184 Kingston v Keprose Pty Ltd (1987) 11 NSWLR 404 Knight v F P Special Assets Ltd (1992) 174 CLR 178 Lend Lease Management Pty Ltd v Sydney City Council (1986) 68 LGRA 61 CASES CITED: Logwon Pty Ltd v Warringah Shire Council (1993) 33 NSWLR 13 McBain v Clifton Shire Council [1996] 2 QdR 493 Malcolm v Newcastle City Council (1991) 73 LGRA 356 Miller-Meed v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1963] 2 QB 1996 Mison v Randwick Municipal Council (1991) 23 NSWLR 734 Mt Marrow Blue Metal Quarry Pty Ltd v Moreton Shire Council [1996] 1 QdR 437 Parramatta City Council v Kriticos & Anor [1971] 1 NSWLR 140 Parramatta City Council v Shell Co of Australia Limited [1972] 2 NSWLR 632 Patrick Stevedores Operations (No 2) v MUA (No 3)(1998) 195 CLR 1 Qiu v Minister for Immigration (1994) 55 FCR 439 Randwick Municipal Council v Pacific-Seven Pty Ltd (1989) 69 LGRA 13 Ryde Municipal Council v The Royal Ryde Homes (1970) 19 LGRA 321 Scott v Wollongong City Council (1992) 75 LGRA 112 Seincott Pty Limited v Snowy River Shire Council (2000) 108 LGERA 66 Slough Estates Limited v Slough Borough Council (No 2) [1971] AC 958 Sydney Serviced Apartments Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council (No 2) (1993) 78 LGERA 404 Stradbroke Island Association v Sandunes Pty Limited & Redland Shire Council (1998) 101 LGERA 161 Swan Hill Corporation v Bradbury (1937) 56 CLR 746 Switz Pty Ltd v Glowbind Pty Ltd (2000) 48 NSWLR 661 Television Corporation Ltd v Commonwealth (1963) 109 CLR 59 The King v Wallis (1949) 78 CLR 529 Transport Action Group against Motorways Inc v Roads and Traffic Authority (1999) 46 NSWLR 598 Walker v Wilson (1991) 172 CLR 195 Woolworths Limited v Campbells Cash & Carry Pty Limited (NSWCA, 19 September 1996, unreported) DECISION : 1. Appeal allowed with costs. 2. Set aside the order of Talbot J dismissing the application. 3. Remit the proceedings to the Land and Environment Court to consider whether there was any breach of Conditions 1, 20 and 30 of the development consent with respect to the conduct of operations in ML594 and if so to consider what further orders, if any, should be made, under s 124 of the Environmental Planning and Assessment Act 1979, requiring the Second and Third Respondents to remedy any contravention of that Act arising from such breaches of these conditions as that Court determines to have occurred.

The 1978 Consent 2 His Honour refers to authorities which establish that the documents accompanying an application for consent are not taken as incorporated in the consent, unless incorporated expressly or by necessary implication. His Honour refers to Auburn Municipal Council v Szabo (1971) 67 LGRA 427 and Sydney Serviced Apartments Pty Limited v North Sydney Municipal Council (No 2) (1993) 78 LGERA 404 at 407, 408. 3 In addition to the authorities referred to by Stein JA, see Parramatta City Council v Shell Co of Australia Limited [1972] 2 NSWLR 632 at 637 per Hope JA, with whom Jacobs and Manning JJA agreed at 637; Woolworths Limited v Campbells Cash and Carry Pty Limited (New South Wales Court of Appeal, 19 September 1996, unreported), at p4 per Sheller JA, with whom Beazley JA agreed; Stradbroke Island Association v Sandunes Pty Limited and Redland Shire Council (1998) 101 LGERA 161 at 169; Sericott Pty Limited v Snowy River Shire Council (2000) 108 LGERA 66 at 74 per Beazley JA, with whom Handley and Powell JJA (in relevant respects) agreed; House of Peace Pty Ltd v Bankstown City Council (2000) 48 NSWLR 498 at [37]; Ryde Municipal Council v The Royal Ryde Homes (1970) 19 LGRA 321 at 324 per Else-Mitchell and Stephen JJ; Miller-Meed v Minister of Housing and Local Government [1963] 2 QB 1996 at 215 per Lord Denning and 223 per Upton LJ; Slough Estates Limited v Slough Borough Council (No 2) [1971] AC 958 at 962 per Lord Reid). 4 A public document, such as a development consent, constitutes a unilateral act on the part of the consent authority expressed in a formal manner, required and intended to operate in accordance with its own terms. It has, as Stein JA points out, an inherent quality that it will be used to the benefit of subsequent owners and occupiers. It is also a document intended to be relied upon by many persons dealing with the original grantee, or assignees of the grantee, in such contexts as the provision of security. In some respects it is equivalent to a document of title. It must be construed in accordance with its enduring functions. 5 I agree with Stein JA that in the present case the documents upon which the Appellant sought to rely were not incorporated in the consent, either expressly or by necessary implication. The construction of the conditions which the Appellant contends were breached cannot be determined in accordance with what is said to arise from the documents accompanying of the application.

(1992) 175 CLR 564

(1978) 52 ALJR 407

(1992) 78 LGERA 119

(1994) 84 LGERA 434

(1946) 71 CLR 210

(1983) 32 SASR 329

(1991) 172 CLR 319

(1997) 77 FCR 193

(1994) 35 NSWLR 33

(1962) 109 CLR 153

(2000) 48 NSWLR 498

(1992) 39 FCR 348

(1945) 71 CLR 184

(1987) 11 NSWLR 404

(1992) 174 CLR 178

(1993) 33 NSWLR 13

(1991) 23 NSWLR 734

(1998) 195 CLR 1

(1994) 55 FCR 439

(2000) 108 LGERA 66

(1993) 78 LGERA 404

(1998) 101 LGERA 161

(1937) 56 CLR 746

(2000) 48 NSWLR 661

(1963) 109 CLR 59

(1949) 78 CLR 529

(1999) 46 NSWLR 598

(1991) 172 CLR 195

(2000) 111 LGERA 84