Claim 3: The delegate did not lawfully consider the precautionary principle
48 The claim made by FOGC concerning the precautionary principle was to the effect that the delegate only considered the principle when addressing the threat to the western ringtail possum if the proposed action was approved. This was said to be deficient because the Act required the precautionary principle to be considered as a factor that applied to each part of the delegate's evaluation and that regard to the reasons demonstrated that there had been no such consideration by the delegate.
49 FOGC's submission was based upon a particular view about the proper construction of the language used in s 391(1) when it required the Minister to 'take account of the precautionary principle in making a decision listed [in the table set out in s 391(3)]'.
50 For the Minister and the Commissioner, it was submitted that s 391 should not be seen as providing for a matter which must be considered as if it were a factor or thing that may count for or against approval or inform whether there should be particular conditions and, if so, in what terms. Rather, the precautionary principle was said to be a way of describing how to approach risk and uncertainty in undertaking the evaluative process. It directed the decision maker as to how to approach a particular type of deficiency in the available material, namely where there was scientific uncertainty as to whether the proposed action threatened serious or irreversible environmental damage. In such a case, the principle to be applied was to the effect that uncertainty should not be used as a reason to postpone a measure to prevent degradation of the environment.
51 So, FOGC saw the provisions in the Act concerning the precautionary principle as identifying a factor or matter to be considered. The Minister and the Commissioner saw those provisions as requiring the observance of a particular approach to the level of proof, particularly the degree of scientific certainty, that may be required before a risk of serious or irreversible environmental damage might be brought to account in the decision making process.
52 As the divergence in views reflects different positions as to what is meant by s 391, I will consider first the proper construction of s 391 and its role within the legislative scheme, particularly that part which concerns decisions of the kind made by the delegate in the present case. The principles to be applied are well known. The meaning to be given to statutory instruments is their contextual meaning; that is, the text of the statute should be considered whilst at the same time having regard to its context and purpose: SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ), [37]-[39] (Gageler J).
53 I explained the relevant decision making scheme under the Act in my reasons on the application for an interlocutory injunction: at [7]-[20]. In the present instance we are concerned with an approval of a controlled action under s 133(1). Amongst other things, the approval must specify the action the subject of the approval and any conditions: s 133(2). Speaking broadly, the conditions that may be attached are those that are necessary or convenient to protect, repair or mitigate environmental damage: s 134. Section 136 then provides:
General considerations
Mandatory considerations
(1) In deciding whether or not to approve the taking of an action, and what conditions to attach to an approval, the Minister must consider the following, so far as they are not inconsistent with any other requirement of this Subdivision:
(a) matters relevant to any matter protected by a provision of Part 3 that the Minister has decided is a controlling provision for the action;
(b) economic and social matters.
Factors to be taken into account
(2) In considering those matters, the Minister must take into account:
(a) the principles of ecologically sustainable development; and
(b) the assessment report (if any) relating to the action; and
(ba) if Division 3A of Part 8 (assessment on referral information) applies to the action - the finalised recommendation report relating to the action given to the Minister under subsection 93(5); and
(bc) if Division 4 of Part 8 (assessment on preliminary documentation) applies to the action:
(i) the documents given to the Minister under subsection 95B(1), or the statement given to the Minister under subsection 95B(3), as the case requires, relating to the action; and
(ii) the recommendation report relating to the action given to the Minister under section 95C; and
(c) if Division 5 (public environment reports) of Part 8 applies to the action:
(i) the finalised public environment report relating to the action given to the Minister under section 99; and
(ii) the recommendation report relating to the action given to the Minister under section 100; and
(ca) if Division 6 (environmental impact statements) of Part 8 applies to the action:
(i) the finalised environmental impact statement relating to the action given to the Minister under section 104; and
(ii) the recommendation report relating to the action given to the Minister under section 105; and
(d) if an inquiry was conducted under Division 7 of Part 8 in relation to the action - the report of the commissioners; and
(e) any other information the Minister has on the relevant impacts of the action (including information in a report on the impacts of actions taken under a policy, plan or program under which the action is to be taken that was given to the Minister under an agreement under Part 10 (about strategic assessments)); and
(f) any relevant comments given to the Minister in accordance with an invitation under section 131 or 131A; and
(fa) any relevant advice obtained by the Minister from the Independent Expert Scientific Committee on Coal Seam Gas and Large Coal Mining Development in accordance with section 131AB; and
(g) if a notice relating to the action was given to the Minister under subsection 132A(3) - the information in the notice.
Note: The Minister must also take into account any relevant comments given to the Minister in response to an invitation under paragraph 131AA(1)(b). See subsection 131AA(6).
Person's environmental history
(4) In deciding whether or not to approve the taking of an action by a person, and what conditions to attach to an approval, the Minister may consider whether the person is a suitable person to be granted an approval, having regard to:
(a) the person's history in relation to environmental matters; and
(b) if the person is a body corporate - the history of its executive officers in relation to environmental matters; and
(c) if the person is a body corporate that is a subsidiary of another body or company (the parent body) - the history in relation to environmental matters of the parent body and its executive officers.
Minister not to consider other matters
(5) In deciding whether or not to approve the taking of an action, and what conditions to attach to an approval, the Minister must not consider any matters that the Minister is not required or permitted by this Division to consider.
54 It can be seen that s 136 refers to matters that 'the Minister must consider' and describes matters that the Minister 'must take into account' in considering those matters. It then refers to matters that 'the Minister may consider' in deciding whether to approve. Finally, it provides that 'the Minister must not consider any matters that the Minister is not required or permitted by this Division to consider'.
55 The provisions that follow s 136 specify matters that 'the Minister must not act inconsistently with' in deciding whether to approve the taking of action: see s 137 to s 140.
56 Significantly, s 391 is not included in this part of the legislation nor is there any reference to s 391 in the provisions that identify the matters that the Minister must or may consider, those which the Minister must not consider and the matters that the Minister must take into account in deciding whether to approve. Rather, s 391 is the opening provision in Chapter 6 of the Act which is concerned with the Act's administration and the enforcement of compliance with its provisions.
57 Section 391 also adopts a different form of wording to the provisions concerned directly with identifying the matters to be considered or taken into account in making a decision whether to approve. It uses the terminology: 'The Minister must take account of the precautionary principle in making a decision' (emphasis added). It does not refer to the precautionary principle as something that must be taken into account or to which there must be regard in making the decision. Further, s 391 describes a 'principle' not a 'matter'. It is concerned with a way of reasoning not with a particular topic or subject matter that might be considered in evaluating whether to approve. Finally, the list of decisions to which s 391 applies is extensive. It is not confined to decisions about whether or not to approve particular action. It includes decisions about whether to make various types of plans which will have legislative significance and about whether an action is a 'controlled action' (and therefore subject to the provisions of the Act requiring approval). Decisions of that kind require assessments that affect the scope of the regulation effected by the Act. It is understandable that the Act would ensure that decisions of that kind are guided by a particular view as to the degree of scientific certainty that is required to support the decision.
58 Therefore, (a) the language used in s 391 when compared to the provisions about the approval; (b) the particular context of s 391 within the overall scheme of the Act; and (c) the range of the decisions to which s 391 is applied, all support the position advanced by the Commissioner and the Minister. Indeed, the authorities as to the manner in which the precautionary principle is to be applied in environmental decision making support the conclusion that s 391 is imposing an obligation as to how evidence of serious environmental damage must be treated where there is scientific certainty and that it only applies where it has been determined that there is a lack of scientific certainty in respect of a particular matter. It is not a principle of general application in the sense that it is not taken account of unless there is scientific uncertainty.
59 The careful and detailed observations of Preston CJ in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hornsby Shire Council [2006] NSWLEC 133; (2006) 67 NSWLR 256 concerning the precautionary principle are often cited when considering claims that there has been a failure to conform to a statutory requirement that incorporates the principle in some form. Reliance was placed upon those observations by FOGC. Relevantly for present purposes, they were as follows (at [128]-[141]):
The application of the precautionary principle and the concomitant need to take precautionary measures is triggered by the satisfaction of two conditions precedent or thresholds: a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage and scientific uncertainty as to the environmental damage. These conditions or thresholds are cumulative. Once both of these conditions or thresholds are satisfied, a precautionary measure may be taken to avert the anticipated threat of environmental damage, but it should be proportionate …
Two points need to be noted about the first condition precedent that there be a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage. First, it is not necessary that serious or irreversible environmental damage has actually occurred - it is the threat of such damage that is required. Secondly, the environmental damage threatened must attain the threshold of being serious or irreversible.
Assessing the seriousness or irreversibility of environmental damage involves consideration of many factors …
…
Determining the existence of a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage does not involve, at the stage of assessing the first condition precedent, any evaluation of the scientific uncertainty of the threat. That evaluation comes in the following steps of analysis.
If there is not a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage, there is no basis upon which the precautionary principle can operate. The precautionary principle does not apply, and precautionary measures cannot be taken, to regulate a threat of negligible environmental damage …
…
The second condition precedent required to trigger the application of the precautionary principle and the necessity to take precautionary measures is that there be 'a lack of full scientific certainty'. The uncertainty is as to the nature and scope of the threat of environmental damage …
Assessing the degree of scientific uncertainty also involves a process of analysis of many factors …
[original emphasis]
60 Ultimately, the precautionary principle was explained as a principle that shifted the burden of proof. Preston CJ described the manner of its operation in the following way (at [150]-[152]):
If each of the two conditions precedent or thresholds are satisfied - that is, there is a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage and there is the requisite degree of scientific uncertainty - the precautionary principle will be activated. At this point, there is a shifting of an evidentiary burden of proof. A decision-maker must assume that the threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage is no longer uncertain but is a reality. The burden of showing that this threat does not in fact exist or is negligible effectively reverts to the proponent of the economic or other development plan, programme or project.
The rationale for requiring this shift of the burden of proof is to ensure preventative anticipation; to act before scientific certainty of cause and effect is established. It may be too late, or too difficult and costly, to change a course of action once it is proven to be harmful. The preference is to prevent environmental damage, rather than remediate it. The benefit of the doubt is given to environmental protection when there is scientific uncertainty. To avoid environmental harm, it is better to err on the side of caution.
The function of the precautionary principle is, therefore, to require the decision-maker to assume that there is, or will be, a serious or irreversible threat of environmental damage and to take this into account, notwithstanding that there is a degree of scientific uncertainty about whether the threat really exists …
61 Importantly for present purposes, the precautionary principle does not operate as a factor that will itself affect the outcome. Rather, it applies where there is a basis to conclude that there is a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage and scientific uncertainty as to the nature and scope of the threat. In order for it to operate there must be material to be evaluated. The principle does not provide a basis for a decision in and of itself. It is properly seen as being directed to the quality of proof that is needed concerning a risk of environmental damage that might bear upon a particular decision. It operates in a similar manner to the direction to a jury to be satisfied beyond reasonable doubt. It sets a standard as to the level of certainty on which a decision may be based.
62 Further, it is important to consider the manner in which the precautionary principle is deployed in the Act. It is a matter that the Minister 'must take account of' in making a decision, to the extent that the Minister can do so consistently with the other provisions of the Act. Both the terminology requiring account to be taken of the principle and the recognition of the possibility that taking account of the principle may be inconsistent with a specific provision indicate that s 391(1) is doing more than requiring the Minister to advert to the possible relevance of the principle for the matter at hand. Indeed, Parliament may be directing the Minister to do more than understand and evaluate the way the precautionary principle may apply, leaving the Minister free to then choose whether to apply it or not. It may be requiring the Minister to deploy the principle (save where such a course would be inconsistent with another provision in the Act) because such terminology may require regard to a matter as a fundamental element in the decision making process: see Re Michael; Ex parte Epic Energy (WA) Nominees Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 231; (2002) 25 WAR 511 at [50]‑[56] (Parker J, Malcolm CJ and Anderson J agreeing); Minister for Immigration and Citizenship v Khadgi [2010] FCAFC 145; (2010) 190 FCR 248 at [60]-[62]; and Warkworth Mining Ltd v Bulga Milbrodale Progress Association Inc [2014] NSWCA 105; (2014) 86 NSWLR 527 at [216]-[231]. For reasons which will emerge, it is not necessary to reach a precise conclusion as to this aspect. However, it may be noted that Moshinsky J has expressed the view that the requirement to take account is interchangeable with a requirement that a decision maker consider a particular matter: Bob Brown Foundation Inc v Minister for the Environment (No 2) [2022] FCA 873 at [33]. And in Lawyers for Forests Inc v Minister for the Environment, Heritage and the Arts [2009] FCA 330 at [36], Tracey J expressed the view that: 'So long as the Minister, as he did in the present case, takes account of the precautionary principle, it is a matter for him to determine what weight is to be accorded to the principle having regard to the wide range of other considerations which he is also required to take into account'.
63 In State of Queensland (Department of Agriculture and Fisheries) v Humane Society International (Australia) Inc [2019] FCAFC 163; (2019) 272 FCR 310, Allsop CJ, Greenwood and Robertson JJ considered the use of the precautionary principle in the Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Act 1975 (Cth) (GBRMP Act). In that legislation, the precautionary principle was expressed as one of the 'principles of ecologically sustainable use' for the purposes of the legislation. The principles were deployed in a provision that stated: 'In managing the Marine Park and performing its other functions, the Authority must have regard to, and seek to act in a way that is consistent with … the principles of ecologically sustainable use'. On an appeal on a question of law in respect of a decision made by the Administrative Review Tribunal, it was claimed that the Tribunal erred in its application of the precautionary principle. As to that claim, the Court said (at [120]-[121]):
Although we agree, with respect, with the observations of Preston CJ in Telstra Corporation Ltd v Hornsby Shire Council … at [129] that it is not necessary that serious or irreversible environmental damage has actually occurred - it is the threat of such damage that is required - in the context of the present legislation we do not regard it as apposite in relation to the GBRMP Act to say, as his Honour said at [128] in relation to … different language …, that the precautionary principle 'is triggered by the satisfaction of two conditions precedent or thresholds'. Certainly, in our opinion, the decision-maker under the GBRMP Act, before applying the principle, must form the view that there are threats of serious environmental damage or that there are threats of irreversible environmental damage and that in those circumstances lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to prevent degradation of the environment. However, we regard the issue of whether there are threats of serious environmental damage as largely a matter of evaluative fact for the decision-maker, and not as a jurisdictional fact the correctness of which we may independently evaluate.
In our opinion, no error on the part of the Tribunal in this respect has been established. The relevant principle was considered by the Tribunal at [78]-[87] of its reasons and it proceeded on the basis that there was a threat of serious environmental damage but lack of full scientific certainty. …
64 It may be noted that the nature of the claim made in State of Queensland v Humane Society was that there had been error in understanding and applying the precautionary principle. It was not a claim that there was a failure to have regard to the principle. Therefore, it was not necessary for the Court to consider the character of the principle for the purpose of a claim of that kind. Nevertheless, it is of significance for present purposes that the Court approached the issue on the basis that the underlying question as to whether there were threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage was largely a matter of evaluative fact. Such an approach is consistent with the principle itself not being a factor to be brought into account but rather that it has a role to play where there is material which gives rise to its application. So, the question whether there was material that gives rise to the requisite risk was a within jurisdiction adjudicative task entrusted to the Tribunal. It was a matter to which the Minister was required to have regard by reason of the terms of the provisions concerned with the matters which the Minister must consider or to which the Minister must have regard. Section 391(1) was not the source of that requirement. Likewise, in the present case, the question whether there was material that gave rise to a need to apply the precautionary principle was a matter for the Minister's delegate. Further, there could be no relevant error unless the delegate failed to bear in mind (perhaps actually deploy to the extent there was no inconsistency with another provision in the Act) the precautionary principle if there was a risk of the requisite kind about which there was scientific uncertainty.
65 Recently, in Bob Brown Foundation Inc v Minister for the Environment (No 2), Moshinsky J considered a claim that a delegate of the Minister had failed to comply with her obligation under s 391(1) of the Act to take account of the precautionary principle, alternatively failed to apply the precautionary principle in deciding whether the proposed action was likely to have significant impact on the Tasmanian masked owl.
66 His Honour referred to the consideration of the precautionary principle by Preston CJ at [19]-[32]. Then, as has been noted, his Honour concluded that the requirement to 'take account' in s 391(1) is used interchangeably with a requirement that a decision-maker 'consider' a particular matter: at [33].
67 The decision under review in Bob Brown Foundation was a decision that the proposed action was not a 'controlled action'. The consequence was that an approval was not required and the regulatory oversight expressed in the Act did not apply. The delegate identified the precautionary principle and said that she 'took account of the precautionary principle' in making her decision: at [39]. In finding reviewable error, Moshinsky J, reasoned as follows (at [48]):
In my view, it is apparent from the Statement of Reasons that the Delegate did not comply with the obligation in s 391(1) to take account of the precautionary principle. As set out above, to comply with this obligation, it is necessary for the Minister (or, in this case, the Delegate) to consider, at least, whether the first condition precedent (namely, if there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage) is satisfied. This requires the decision-maker to bring an active intellectual process to this matter. Having reviewed the section of the Statement of Reasons dealing with the Tasmanian Masked Owl (being [177]-[196]), and the Statement of Reasons as a whole, I am satisfied that the Delegate failed to do this. The Delegate did not expressly refer to the first condition precedent in the section of the reasons dealing with the Tasmanian Masked Owl. Nor did the Delegate make a finding in terms that correspond to the first condition precedent. While the Delegate, at [184], identified a number of 'threats' to the Tasmanian Masked Owl (by reference to the Approved Conservation Advice), the Delegate did not go on to discuss, or make a finding as to, whether those threats, or the threats posed by the proposed action, were serious or irreversible. In the absence of any discussion or finding about this matter, I infer that the Delegate failed to consider it.
(original emphasis)
68 It can be seen that his Honour found as a matter of fact (by a process of inference) that there was a failure to consider the precautionary principle. His Honour went on to explain that there was a failure by the delegate to consider whether there were threats and that this was a failure to address the first condition precedent to the precautionary principle.
69 It seems to me, with respect, that there is some tension between his Honour's approach and the reasoning by the Full Court in State of Queensland v Humane Society. It may be accepted that the precautionary principle described in s 391(1) may only apply where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental damage. However, it is not the principle itself that is the source of an obligation to consider whether there are such threats. Rather, the principle is that a lack of scientific certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing a measure to prevent degradation of the environment where there is the requisite threat. If the decision to be made requires consideration as to whether there is a threat of serious or irreversible environmental damage then a lack of full scientific certainty cannot be used as a reason not to take a measure to prevent that outcome. If a particular decision to be made under the Act requires there to be regard to whether there is a threat of the requisite kind then it is largely a matter of evaluative fact for the delegate as to whether there is such a threat. If there is such a threat, then scientific uncertainty 'should not be used' to postpone a measure that would prevent that degradation (in the present case that measure being refusing to approve the proposed action).
70 In the present case, there is no issue between the parties as to whether the delegate was required to consider and evaluate the nature and extent of the adverse impacts that the proposed action was likely to have on the identified ecological communities and species. Nor is it suggested that there was a failure to consider those impacts. Rather, what is said is that irrespective of the nature of the findings made by the delegate as to the likely risk of impact, the delegate was required to consider the application of the precautionary principle. The contention advanced was to the effect that the reasons as to the impact on each and every community and species under consideration should have included a consideration of the precautionary principle. However, for reasons that have been given, it was a matter for the delegate to consider whether there was the requisite threat and only if there was such a threat was the delegate to take account of the precautionary principle and then only by putting to one side the lack of full scientific certainty as a reason why the proposed action should not be approved.
71 As has been noted, s 391 operated as an evidentiary principle not as an articulation of a substantive mater to which the decision-maker was required to have regard. The precautionary principle itself could not be a reason why a decision might be made to refuse to give an approval. Rather, the precautionary principle could only be the basis upon which material that demonstrates the requisite threat may be used as a reason for a decision made in order to prevent degradation to the environment even though there is a lack of full scientific certainty that the damage is likely to occur.
72 The distinction assumes significance in the present case because of the manner in which the delegate approached the precautionary principle in deciding to approve the proposed action.
73 As to the delegate's decision, the first aspect to note is that the decision made was to agree with the department's recommendation to approve the proposed action. The basis for that recommendation was set out in detail in the recommendation report. Reflecting that course, the reasons identify the respects in which the delegate agreed with the matters in the recommendation report and where the delegate took a different view. In a number of significant respects, the recommendation report identified environmental impacts. Much of the report dealt with assessing the significance of those impacts and compensatory offsets. It identified species and communities that were unlikely to be impacted by the proposed action. The report addressed the factors that were required by s 136 to be taken into account. It addressed the conditions and identified respects in which the proposed conditions, in the view of the department, did not fully manage or resolve the residual impacts.
74 The recommendation report referred to the precautionary principle in the context of considering the impact of the proposed action on the western ringtail possum, but not otherwise. The report stated (para 80) that:
The Department considers it appropriate to apply the precautionary principle and is of the view that an unknown proportion of the 49-72 WRP displaced by clearing will suffer mortality as a result of the action. The recovery plan and conservation advice for WRP identifies that WRP display naivety towards introduced predators, compete with the Common Brushtail Possum for hollows and habitat, and that intra-species territoriality for home ranges occurs (Attachments F2 and F15). The Department also notes that the recovery plan indicates high mortality experienced by translocation sites, and low rehabilitation success rates experienced by unregulated wildlife volunteers (Attachment F2).
75 As has been noted, the reasons engaged with the views expressed in the recommendation report. When it came to significant environmental impacts, the reasons were as follows:
(1) as to banksia woodlands, the identified threats were described and the significant impacts described in the recommendation report were accepted (paras 43-47);
(2) as to tuart woodlands and forests, there was a similar approach was adopted accepted the threats and impacts described in the recommendation report (paras 57-63);
(3) as to black cockatoos, the reasons identified the relevant recovery plan and other conservation advice for the cockatoos. Again the threats and impacts described in the recommendation report were accepted (paras 74-80);
(4) as to the western ringtail possum, the reasons identified the relevant recovery plan and other conservation advice (paras 100-101). They then expressed the view that 'threats to the [possums] are complex, interactive and often population specific' (para 102). The primary threats were identified (para 102). They observed that the area in which the proposed action was to be undertaken was within a key management zone set out in the recovery plan for the western ringtail possum (para 103). They set out the long-term vision of the recovery plan (para 104). They noted the limited success of population translocation as a means to preserve the western ringtail possum (para 105). They addressed in some detail the impacts in terms that had regard to the precautionary principle (paras 112, 114, quoted below);
(5) as to the black-stripe minnow, the reasons noted the threats and impacts described in the recommendation report (paras 134, 136);
(6) as to other species, the reasons expressed agreement with the department that the proposed clearing was not likely to result in a significant impact to other species that were identified as being likely to be affected because they were not present within the proposed action are (para 147); and
(7) in dealing with 'Other Relevant Matters', the reasons began as follows:
In deciding whether or not to approve the taking of the proposed action, I took into account (amongst other matters) the principles of ecologically sustainable development as required under section 391 of the [Act]. In particular, as discussed above, I accepted the Department's recommendation that the principle applied to the Western Ringtail Possum.
76 Having regard to the form of the reasons and the manner in which they identified and engaged with serious threats I am unable to infer (as I was invited to by FOGC) that the delegate overlooked the possible application of the precautionary principle to aspects of the reasons that concerned impacts on species other than the western ringtail possum. Rather, the reasons as a whole indicate a considered view by the delegate as to where the precautionary principle might be appropriately applied and the application of the principle in that case where there was identified uncertainty as to the likely impact. In all other respects, the delegate approached the matter on the basis that the impacts had been established. No issue arose as to the certainty with which that conclusion may be reached, particularly no issue as to whether by reason of a lack of full scientific certainty the refusal of the approval should be 'postponed' (to use the language of the principle as stated in s 391(2)). Therefore, there was no occasion for any lack of scientific certainty to be used as a reason for allowing the approval in accordance with the precautionary principle.
77 It was submitted by FOGC that application of the precautionary principle required identification of the proportionate precautionary measures that needed to be taken in order to guard against the threat of serious or irreversible damage. For reasons that I have given this is not the correct approach. It involves giving the precautionary principle a kind of role that is not to be found expressed in the Act. The principle is not to be treated as a statement of a consideration to which there must be regard in making the evaluative decision whether to approve. Those matters are stated in the provisions that deal with the making of the decision. They include the principles of ecologically sustainable development and regard to environmental impacts of the proposed action. As has been explained, those matters were addressed by the delegate.
78 For those reasons, Claim 3 has not been made out.