Conclusions on the appeals
101 These are complex matters, and the Court has had the benefit of full argument, written and oral, in the appeals. It will not be practicable to state my conclusions on each of the many points raised in argument. I propose therefore to follow the approach adopted by other Full Courts in other complex appeals, and to confine my reasons to those issues which are both significant and consequential (see, for example, Amadio Pty Ltd v Henderson (1998) 81 FCR 149 at 175).
102 As has been noted, the FOXTEL parties on the one hand, and the Telstra parties on the other, pleaded the nature and origins of FOXTEL's "PCR" in slightly different ways. But, on either approach, the relevant provisions of the Umbrella Agreement dated 9 March 1995 are material for present purposes, and their effect should be recalled, as follows.
· An "alliance" was established for the principal purpose of establishing a number of businesses in the broadband video home entertainment sector in Australia (Recital D). As a matter of law, and in equity, a relationship in the nature of a joint venture was thereby constituted. It may follow, but it will not necessarily follow, that the relationship is fiduciary. This will depend upon the form that the particular joint venture takes and upon the content of the parties' obligations (see United Dominions Corporation Ltd v Brian Pty Ltd (1985) 157 CLR 1 per Mason, Brennan and Deane JJ at 11). But the relationship between prospective partners or participants in a proposed partnership to carry out a single joint undertaking or endeavour will ordinarily be fiduciary if the prospective partners have reached an informal arrangement to assume such a relationship and have proceeded to take steps involved in its establishment or implementation (Brian, above, at 12). In my view, this was the position here, at least upon the execution of the Umbrella Agreement in March 1995. It did not, of course, follow that a PCR, or at least a relevant PCR, was thereby vested in FOXTEL. But, at law and in equity, the participants in the proposed joint venture were "associated for … a common end", and their relationship was "based upon a mutual confidence" that they would "engage in [the] particular activity … for the joint advantage only" (Brian, above, at 12 - 13).
· The scope of the alliance was linked to the definition of "Services", i.e. (relevantly) a service that delivers to a "Residential Subscriber" either a "Video Program" on a (pay) television or an audio program via an STU (cl 3.2).
· The ownership (i.e. the joint venture entities) and the operational structure of the businesses to be established as part of the alliance were provided for in cl 4, acknowledging that variation may be necessary to ensure compliance with the TEA and the BSA (cl 4.6). (At this time (March 1995), there were no statutory requirements, in any legislation, that access be granted to a network facility.)
· Provision was made for "operational structure" by cl 4.4 relevantly as follows:
"4.4 The operational relationships between the Joint Venture Entities will be governed by the following agreements:
(a) an agreement between [Telstra Multimedia] and [FOXTEL] Management as agent for the [FOXTEL] Partnership setting out the terms on which [Telstra Multimedia] and the [FOXTEL] partnership will co-operate in the establishment of their respective businesses substantially in the form [annexed] …." (Emphasis added)
· A question arises, in this context, as to the meaning of the adverb "substantially". It appears that no special or technical meaning was intended. The dictionary meanings of the adjective "substantial" include "of or pertaining to the essence of a thing" (The Macquarie Dictionary, 2nd ed. 1991). This seems to be the meaning intended here; that is, it is agreed that the terms of the Broadband Co-operation Agreement will be, in essence, as provided in the annexed form.
· The form of the annexed Broadband Co-operation Agreement made provision for an "exclusive relationship" in cl 3. In particular, cl 3.2 then provided:
"Subject to this clause, [FOXTEL] shall:
(a) exclusively provide and manage the provision of Services delivered to subscribers through the use of the Broadband System Service; …." (Emphasis added)
103 Since cl 3.1 was expressed to be "subject to [cl 3]", it is necessary to consider the other (material) provisions of cl 3, which were then as follows.
104 By cl 3.2 it was provided that, to give effect to cl 3.1, and subject to cl 3.7, Telstra Multimedia will not permit the use of facilities controlled by it for delivery of Services by any service provider other than FOXTEL.
105 By cl 3.7(b) it was provided that Telstra Multimedia may use, or permit an entity other than FOXTEL to use, its facilities to deliver Services in the event that FOXTEL had not complied with cl 3.3.
106 By cl 3.3 it was provided that, whenever Telstra Multimedia may be required by Law to use or permit any entity other than FOXTEL to use its facilities, Telstra Multimedia shall arrange for FOXTEL to satisfy that legal requirement. As has been noted, there was no such requirement by Law at the date of the Umbrella Agreement - and Part IIIA was not inserted into the TPA until four months later (July 1995). It follows that, at the date of the Umbrella Agreement, cl 3.3 had no immediate operation. However, on 1 August 1995, the introduction of Part XIC was foreshadowed by the Ministerial Statement. When Part XIC came into operation (in 1997), cl 3.3 would have applied.
107 In July 1995, as had been mentioned, revised draft five of the Broadband Co-operation Agreement was drawn up. Clause 3 of this draft (the July 1995 BCA) still dealt with the parties' exclusive relationship, but there were some variations, and some supplementary provisions were added, as follows.
108 The key provision, formerly cl 3.1, became cl 3.2, slightly varied:
"Subject to this clause, FOXTEL shall:
(a) exclusively provide or manage the provision of Services delivered to Subscribers through use of the Broadband System Service; …." (Emphasis added)
109 Since cl 3.2 was also expressed to be "subject to [cl 3]," reference should again be made to the other provisions of cl 3.1 at that time.
110 By cl 3.1(b), reference was made to "FOXTEL's exclusive entitlement to provide or manage the provision of Services …". By cl 3.1(d), it was recorded that FOXTEL intends, on reasonable commercial terms, to offer to provide and manage the provision of Services of "Other Service Providers" (defined as a person who provides or manages the provision of Services other than FOXTEL or a Joint Venture Entity). However, this was expressed to be subject to FOXTEL's requirement that it be able to provide and manage the provision of Services to Subscribers on an attractive, marketable, co-ordinated and efficient basis. (There followed a notation that this language was to be checked with News' in-house lawyer.)
111 Several aspects should be noticed here. Clauses 3.1(b) and cl 3.2(a) spoke of FOXTEL exclusively providing, or managing the provision of, Services; whereas cl 3.1(d) spoke of an offer to provide, and manage the provision of, Services. However, for present purposes, nothing appears to turn on the distinction thus drawn.
112 More important, in my view, was the insertion in this draft of cl 3(1)(d). Although its "language" was to be the subject of scrutiny by News' legal counsel, its essence was clear: FOXTEL contemplated offering to provide, and to manage the provision of Services of Other Service Providers, subject to the proviso that FOXTEL was able to provide and manage the provision of Services to Subscribers on an attractive, marketable, co-ordinated and efficient basis.
113 No doubt, a provision to this effect could be expressed in a number of different ways, whilst preserving its essence. In other words, in my view, so far as concerns the exclusive character of the relationship between these parties, the essence of the arrangement had two aspects: (a) FOXTEL had exclusive access to the facility; but (b) provided the service to Subscribers did not suffer, FOXTEL could deal with Other Service Providers.
114 It is next necessary to consider the impact, if any, of the letter dated 23 October 1995, in this connection.
115 It will be recalled that, relevantly, the letter stated:
"If the Australis merger is not completed [and by April 1996 it was accepted that it could no proceed], either Telstra Multimedia or FOXTEL Management may require the other to enter into a long form Broadband Co-operation Agreement, substantially in the terms of the BCA." (Emphasis added)
116 Although the letter is not entirely clear on the point, it seems that the reference to "BCA" was intended to pick up, not only the July 1995 draft BCA, but also that document "as supplemented by correspondent and negotiations between [the parties]."
117 On behalf of the appellants, it is submitted that the following answer the description of supplementary "correspondence and negotiations" in this context:
(a) FOXTEL Management board minutes and Business Plan dated 11 September 1995 and approved (subject to issues said to be resolved in the letters described in (b), (c) and (d) below) by FOXTEL Management board on 19 September 1995.
(b) Letter dated 20 September 1995 from Telstra Multimedia to News (as amended on 22 September 1995).
(c) Letter dated 22 September 1995 from News Limited to Telstra Multimedia.
(d) Letter dated 17 October 1995 from Telstra Multimedia to News Limited.
118 However, whilst these documents record negotiations and agreements in respect of aspects of the subject-matter of the Umbrella Agreement, none makes any reference to the subject matter which was dealt with in cl 3(1)(d) of the July 1995 BCA. In other words, nothing in this material detracted from the thrust of that provision.
119 By letter dated 15 August 1995, the solicitors for Telstra Multimedia wrote to the solicitors for FOXTEL about, inter alia, the BCA as follows:
"3. Broadband Co-operation Agreement
We have not prepared a revised draft of this agreement. Most of the remaining issues relate to matters of detail arising out of the discussions in New York in June. We set out below the remaining matters to be finalised under the Broadband Co-operation Agreement.
· …
· Clause 3. This clause needs to be reviewed and discussed in the light of the policy principles for reform of the Telecommunications Act endorsed by cabinet on 31 July 1995. In addition, for the purposes of the Ministerial Direction and the recent amendments to the Trade Practices Act, the capacity in which FOXTEL exercises its rights under clause 3 needs to be considered." (Emphasis added)
120 Telstra, by letter to FOXTEL dated 23 August 1995, relating to a meeting arranged to take place the following day, indicated that they would:
"… focus on resolving, at the commercial level, the outstanding issues flowing from the Broadband Cooperation Agreement, rather than concentrating on specific wording by going through the contract clause by clause. We can then leave it to the lawyers to fine tune the words."
121 In the proposed agenda for the meeting set out in the letter, Ms Judy Slatyer (an executive of Telstra interests) noted that one of the outstanding issues "from our perspective which we need to address or, at a minimum, agree principles which can then be incorporated in the agreement" was the "1997 impact (clause 3)". This seems to be a reference to the end of the exclusionary period for pay TV described in the Ministerial Statement. The meeting was held between representatives of the parties on 24 August 1995. The handwritten minutes for the meeting simply record, next to "1997", "review in 6 months/[illegible]".
122 In an internal Telstra e-mail addressed to Ms Slatyer (and others) dated 28 August 1995, Ms Slatyer was asked whether some of the provisions of the BCA should perhaps be amended in view of the limited duration of the protection afforded by the Ministerial Direction, as follows:
"If the unbundling protection under the direction (for services not previously separately supplied) has a shelf life, should the obligations not to unbundle under the BCA be similarly limited? Or does this strike at the heart of the deal" (Note that the spillover revenue for Scope services still does give the [joint venture] some protection)."
123 In an internal Telstra e-mail reply that same day, Ms Slatyer said:
"This strikes at the heart of the deal. But we (News & Telstra) agreed last week that given the uncertainty we should include an additional point in clause 3 that the parties will review and renegotiate the entire clause 3 in good faith once the 1997 arrangements are clearer. The caveat was that the parties would use best endeavours to keep similar commercial principles. I think given the uncertainty that is the best we can do."
124 In my opinion, as a matter both of form and of substance, this internal exchange does not indicate that the whole of the provisions of cl 3 contained in the July 1995 BCA were to be put aside. On the contrary, in my view, the e-mail, when read as a whole, indicates that, in their essence (i.e. "similar commercial principles"), those provisions stood, notwithstanding that the language in which that essence was to be expressed could be negotiated.
125 In my opinion, the parties' position with respect to cl 3 of the July 1995 BCA as at 23 October 1995 was as described by Dixon CJ, McTiernan J and Kitto J in Masters v Cameron (1954) 91 CLR 353 at 360, that is a situation -
"… in which the parties have reached finality in arranging all the terms of their bargain and intend to be immediately bound to the performance of those terms, but at the same time propose to have the terms restated in a form which will be fuller or more precise but not different in effect."
126 Another, similar, way of viewing the position of the parties vis-ŕ-vis cl 3 as at 23 October 1995, is to regard it as a case of the kind described by Lord Wilberforce in Liverpool City Council v Irwin [1977] AC 239 (at 254):
"[T]he court here is simply concerned to establish what the contract is, the parties not having themselves fully stated the terms."
127 As mentioned, by April 1996 Telstra and FOXTEL had accepted that the Australis merger proposed could not proceed. Between that time and 13 September 1996, the following (relevantly) occurred.
· On 13 May 1996, Ms Slatyer wrote to other Telstra executives a note about the subject of exclusivity, saying:
"… [T]here is one matter which … we need to pull back on. That relates to the area of exclusivity. This is for three reasons:
a. new product development - where certain clauses (eg 15.1 new technologies) have the potential to prevent [Telstra Multimedia's] business development (eg cable modems);
b. potential interconnect scenarios (clause 7) [the exclusivity clause of the December 1995 BCA]; and
c. flexibility in dealing with regulatory change.
John [Atkin] has already pointed out that the 12 July version suits our needs better for (b) but it also suits our needs better for (a).
If News start pushing on the exclusivity issues again I think we are in a strong position to maintain a firm line. It is now getting to the stage where FOXTEL's exclusivity will be won or lost in the market and by who owns what programming rights rather than who gets access to our cable or for what other purposes we use the cable.
Geoff [Nicholson], if you feel you will be unable to wind back the 22/12 BCA [the December 1995 BCA] to 12/7 [the July 1995 BCA] (for clauses 7, 15, 16) please talk to me early in the process as I think it is commercially very important to us."
· By letter dated 28 June 1996, Telstra's solicitors wrote to FOXTEL's solicitors on "Finalisation of Establishment Agreements", listing Telstra's understanding of changes to the BCA requested by News, relevantly as follows:
"Clause 3 Exclusive relationship
3.1 Expand definition of Law to include Access Undertakings
3.2 Modify clause 3.8(c) to remove [Telstra Multimedia's] ability to recoup its expenses before accounting to FOXTEL for super revenue received when [Telstra Multimedia] provides broadband services to an Other Service Provider.
3.3 Include provisions for consultation disclosure and discretions in relation to access undertakings.
3.4 Include a prohibition on Telstra giving Access Undertakings where it has a material adverse effect on FOXTEL.
3.5 Impose an ongoing covenant on [Telstra Multimedia] that it own, control and operate the Broadband System.
3.6 Impose restrictions on Telstra providing Residential Video Transmission Services.
3.7 Extend the exclusivity obligations to related entitles and affiliates.
3.8 Modify clause 3.12 to qualify the requirement that [Telstra Multimedia] be the only broadband supplier to FOXTEL by:
(a) including a provision enabling delivery by satellite services subject to cable preference principles;
(b) consider whether permitted delivery methods should also extend to MDS;
(c) providing that FOXTEL is not required to use [Telstra Multimedia] for transmission of signals to head ends; and
(d) substitute a requirement that [Telstra Multimedia] be preferred supplier.
3.9 Consider whether FOXTEL should be permitted to install common cabling in MDUs."
· On 29 July 1996, Mr Nicholson, Telstra Multimedia's General Manager, Investment Support & Development, wrote a memorandum to Telstra executives on "Establishment Agreements", saying -
"… News appear to have accepted the fact that we will use the July version of the BCA for drafting - you will recall this was an area of significant disagreement last time.
We have established and classified a list of 35 outstanding issues into:
· Commercial issues - about 12 issues where detailed discussion will be needed eg variation events, exclusivity provisions, revenue sharing and equity accounting, dual capability charges etc
· Operating issues - where we need opinion of FOXTEL and or Telstra operational staff before considering/resolving the issue
· Legal drafting issues - non controversial issues where [the parties' respective solicitors] will redraft July document to incorporate wording of December document eg re transmission of free to air not mentioned in July
· Issues which could be agreed to immediately - about 12 of the issues were of little consequence and were easy to deal with eg points were already covered in Umbrella Agreement and therefore BCA needed no change."
· The minutes of a meeting held on 21 August 1996 between representatives of the parties indicate that the topic "exclusivity" was discussed. It was noted that "[t]he access regime [i.e. Part XIC] will clearly qualify the exclusivity commitments that Telstra gives …".
· By memorandum dated 23 August 1996, Mr Cowley, a director of News Limited, wrote to Mr K R Murdoch about a meeting scheduled with Mr Frank Blount, Telstra's Managing Director, making note of, inter alia -
"The position under the Broadband Co-operation Agreement, which has yet to be signed but is likely to be held legally enforceable …."
· On 27 August 1996, Telstra's solicitors wrote to FOXTEL's solicitors noting, inter alia, that "before business commenced on 23 October 1995, correspondence was exchanged between the parties confirming their intention to proceed on the basis of the draft documentation then set out". The letter went on to note that "Telstra Multimedia … has entered into the [BCA] with FOXTEL Management … as agent for the FOXTEL Partnership".
· On 9 September 1996, Telstra's solicitors wrote to FOXTEL's solicitors indicating proposed changes to the July 1995 BCA as discussed at meetings held on 15 and 25 August 1996. Although the exclusive relationship clause became cl 5, its terms were, except for insignificant minor variations, identical with the provisions of the July 1995 draft.
128 In the light of these exchanges, it becomes necessary then to review the position of the parties at law and in equity at the date nominated by statute, 13 September 1996, so far as their relationship, in terms of being wholly or partially exclusive, or otherwise, was concerned.
129 The starting point for present purposes may be taken as at 23 October 1995, the date of the October letter agreement. As earlier stated, in my view, the position then was that the parties should be regarded as having committed themselves to an arrangement by which, in essence - (a) FOXTEL had exclusive access to the facility; but (b) provided the service to Subscribers did not suffer, FOXTEL could deal with Other Service Providers. As has been seen, between 23 October 1995 and 13 September 1996, there were several meetings and exchanges of correspondence between these parties. But, upon analysis, what then passed between them should not, in my opinion, be characterised as a variation or rescission of the essence of their previous commitment in this area. It is true that several proposals, mainly relating to drafting, were raised for consideration. But nowhere does any consensus emerge which could be seen as an acceptance by both sides that a variation or rescission of cl 3 should take effect. On the contrary, the exchanges proceed rather upon the assumption that the essence of the previous arrangement (cl 3) will remain in place.
130 It follows, in my view, that the respondents' contention that, as at 13 September 1996, the exclusivity arrangement pleaded by the appellants was void for uncertainty, should be rejected in the specific circumstances described. Support in principle for this conclusion as a matter of approach may be found in the general unwillingness of the courts to hold commercial agreements void for uncertainty. This is particularly true of wholly or (as here) partially performed contracts (see Elizabeth Peden, "'Co-operation' in English Contract Law" (2000) 16 Journal of Contract Law 56 at 56).
131 The relevant principles, for our purposes, were explained by Steyn LJ (as he then was) in Trentham (G Percy) Ltd v Archital Luxfer Ltd [1993] 1 Lloyd's Rep 25 (at 27):
"… [F]our matters are of importance. The first is the fact that English law generally adopts an objective theory of contract formation. That means that in practice our law generally ignores the subjective expectations and the unexpressed mental reservations of the parties. Instead the governing criterion is the reasonable expectations of honest men. And in the present case that means that the yardstick is the reasonable expectations of sensible businessmen. Secondly, it is true that the coincidence of offer and acceptance will in the vast majority of cases represent the mechanism of contract formation. It is so in the case of a contract alleged to have been made by an exchange of correspondence. But [it] is not necessarily so in the case of a contract alleged to have come into existence during and as a result of performance. See Brogden v. Metropolitan Railway, (1877) 2 A.C. 666; New Zealand Shipping Co. Ltd. V. A.M. Satterthwaite & Co. Ltd. [1974] 1 Lloyd's Rep. 534 at p. 539, col. 1; [1975] A.C. 154 at p. 167 D-E; Gibson v. Manchester City Council, [1979] 1 W.L.R. 294. The third matter is the impact of the fact that the transaction is executed rather than executory. It is a consideration of the first importance on a number of levels. See British Bank for Foreign Trade Ltd. v. Novinex [1949] 1 K.B. 628, at p. 630. The fact that the transaction was performed on both sides will often make it unrealistic to argue that there was no intention to enter into legal relations. It will often make it difficult to submit that the contract is void for vagueness or uncertainty. Specifically, the fact that the transaction is executed makes it easier to imply a term resolving any uncertainty, or, alternatively, it may make it possible to treat a matter not finalised in negotiations as inessential. In this case fully executed transactions are under consideration. Clearly, similar considerations may sometimes be relevant in partly executed transactions. Fourthly, if a contract only comes into existence during and as a result of performance of the transaction it will frequently be possible to hold that the contract impliedly and retrospectively covers pre-contractual performance. See Trollope & Colls Ltd. v. Atomic Power Construction Ltd., [1963] 1 W.L.R. 333."
132 Reference should next be made to the relevant provisions of the April 1997 BCA. As earlier noted, this version, as executed, made provision for an exclusive relationship in cl 5 in terms which, in all material respects, were to the same effect as cl 3 of the July 1995 BCA. No relevant question therefore arises whether the April 1997 BCA varied or rescinded cl 3 of the 1995 document (cf. Commissioner of Taxation v Sara Lee Household & Body Care (Australia) Pty Ltd (2000) 74 ALJR 1094.
133 It follows, in my view, that there was vested in FOXTEL on 13 September 1996, a limited contractual right that was "protected" within the meaning of s 152AR (12), that is to say, a PCR. It does not follow, however, from my conclusion that these parties had, as at 13 September 1996, agreed upon a conditional exclusive relationship, that the provisions of s 152AR(4)(d) have any operation here. I turn to this question next.
134 The structure of s 152AR will be recalled. By s 152AR(3)(a) it is relevantly provided that an access provider (i.e. Telstra Multimedia) must, if requested to do so by a service provider (i.e. Seven and TARBS), supply an active declared service to them in order that they can provide carriage and/or content services. This obligation is, however, limited by s 152AR(4)(c) which negates the obligation that would otherwise be imposed by s 152AR(3)(a) to the extent, if any, that -
"… the imposition of [that] obligation would have … the effect[ ] … [of] depriving any person of a [PCR]."
135 There appears to be no authority dealing with the interpretation or construction of s 152AR(3) or (4). However, the central concept of s 152AR(4)(d) is the notion of "deprivation" of the relevant right.
136 It appears that the verb "deprive" was intended, in this context, to have its ordinary meaning rather than having any special or technical sense.
137 The New Shorter Oxford Dictionary 1993 defines the verb "deprive" relevantly as "… divest, strip, dispossess … of a possession". The Macquarie Dictionary offers a similar meaning.
138 It is evident, from the reference to the "effect" of the supply of a service, that s 152AR(4)(d) was intended to operate broadly, and thus pick up the remoter consequences of the activity in question. (See Re Black Bolt & Nut Association of Great Britain's Agreement [1961] 2 All ER 316 at 319 - 320; cf. Stenhouse Ltd v Phillips [1974] AC 390 at 402 - 403.) But s 152AR(4)(d) can only apply if the operation of such effects was to deprive a person of the contractual right.
139 Would the supply by Telstra to a service provider other than FOXTEL of the services contemplated by s 152AR(3)(a) necessarily have the effect of depriving FOXTEL of its PCR? In my opinion, it would not, notwithstanding that it may diminish to some extent the scope of FOXTEL's capacity to bargain with a party seeking access.
140 That is to say, in my opinion, since cl 3(1)(d) of the July 1995 BCA already contemplated that FOXTEL might, in certain circumstances, deal with another service provider, the parties to the BCA had, in effect, allowed for the introduction and implementation of the access regime provided by Part XIC. Hence, it is difficult to argue that its introduction and implementation would have the effect of depriving FOXTEL of a PCR, when that contingency was, in reality, already catered for by cl 3(1)(d) itself. The provision for arbitration under Part XIC must be borne in mind in this connection. Its operation would mean, in practice, that any other service provider requesting access from Telstra would do so in the knowledge that, in default of agreement with Telstra, arbitration would be available to resolve any dispute. That service provider's only commercial alternative would be to seek to deal with FOXTEL, but against the background of the provision for statutory arbitration. In the result, it seems that the only real impact of Part XIC upon FOXTEL's position as at 13 September 1996 would be a risk of the loss of some opportunity of bargaining position vis-ŕ-vis another service provider. Yet, given the statutory scheme for arbitration if Telstra Multimedia supplied services upon request, FOXTEL's potential loss of bargaining power seems more theoretical than real. In any event, what is protected by s 152AR(4)(d) is the deprivation (i.e. the divesting) of a contractual right, not the diminution of a bargaining position. It is true that s 152AR(4)(d) proscribes the deprivation of a PCR even if the deprivation is not direct; that is, even a deprivation of the right which occurs indirectly, by a remote cause, will not be permitted. But the subject matter of protection remains the divesting of the right itself, not any loss or diminution of economic opportunity.
141 Under cl 3 of the July 1995 BCA, Telstra and FOXTEL had agreed that FOXTEL would have exclusive access, but upon the condition that, in certain circumstances, FOXTEL might provide or manage the provision of Services for another service provider. This would occur in pursuance of the objects of their joint venture, and it is difficult to accept that the mere grant of access to another provider by Telstra amounts to the deprivation of FOXTEL's rights under cl 3, whatever the bargaining implications might be for FOXTEL. It is significant in this connection (1) that in making their requests for access both Seven and TARBS accept that FOXTEL could manage the provision of their services; and (2) that there was no finding, or evidence, that the grant of access, sought would detrimentally affect the satisfactory supply of services to FOXTEL Subscribers; in other words, the requests for access could be granted without prejudice to the operation of cl 3 of the July 1995 BCA, and in particular, the proviso to cl 3(1)(d).
142 For completeness, one further aspect of the matter should be mentioned. I have concentrated upon the exclusivity element as being, in my view, the relevant issue. On behalf of Seven and TARBS, reference was made to the circumstance that the parties' representatives were also discussing other aspects of their relationship, e.g. the subject of dual capability. It was said that this was further evidence of uncertainty. But, in my opinion, these discussions do not, for several reasons, bear upon the present question, that is whether FOXTEL held a PCR in respect of the exclusivity of its access to the network.
143 In the first place, it is open to parties to be taken as bound by an informal agreement on the main matters, expecting to make a further contract which, by consent, might contain additional terms (see Sinclair, Scott & Co. Ltd v Naughton (1929) 43 CLR 310 at 317; G R Securities Pty Ltd v Baulkham Hills Private Hospital Pty Ltd (1986) 40 NSWLR 631 at 635 - 636).
144 In the second place, it is a matter for the judgment of the parties themselves to determine what are, or are not, the essential terms (see Pagnan S.p.A. v Feed Products Ltd (1987) 2 Lloyd's Rep 601 at 619). In the present case, the parties did not regard the other "issues" for discussion as essential for their working relationship, since they had been conducting their joint venture operation since 23 October 1995; and there is nothing in their exchanges that the recording of the detail of their agreement on those other matters was necessary before the joint venture could (a) commence and (b) continue, operation; in other words, no sense of urgency in this area surfaced; nor was there technical expert evidence that the conduct of the business operations of the joint venture was not practicable unless and until the parties reached and recorded their agreement on all details of the remaining "issues".
145 Moreover, the comments made about the exclusivity provision, in terms of the need to ascertain whether the parties had, in fact, agreed in essence upon a provision (i.e. "substantially" agreed) are equally applicable in principle to these other "issues". But, in the circumstances, I have not found it necessary to undertake an analysis of the detail of these other "issues".
146 Put differently, unless and until one knows the terms, agreed or arbitrated, upon which a statutory carrier does in fact grant access to an access seeker, it is not possible to say whether the grant of access upon those terms will have the effect of divesting FOXTEL of its rights under cl 3 of the July 95 BCA. This is especially so, given FOXTEL's right, under cl 3(1)(d), to deal with an access seeker, provided this does not prejudice its service to its subscribers. At the moment, any such prejudice is hypothetical only. In other words, as things stand, it cannot be said that the mere grant of statutory access will necessarily have the effect of divesting FOXTEL of its right under cl 3. It is possible that future dealings could have this effect, although the existence of statutory arbitration scheme and of Telstra's fiduciary obligations under the joint venture arrangements, suggest that this is unlikely. In short, to understand the effects of the grant of statutory access, one needs to know all the surrounding circumstances at the time of the grant. Without that knowledge, one can only speculate. Without the benefit of that knowledge, I am not persuaded that the mere grant of access would, of itself necessarily deprive FOXTEL of its rights under cl 3.
147 It must be said that there are novel aspects to the present statutory scheme which make it difficult to apply in some respects. Cases such as Stenhouse, above, demonstrate that it is legitimate to have regard to the practical effect of a contractual provision in determining whether it is, in truth, a restraint. Here, however, the position is the converse. The present question is whether some other activity (the grant of access) has the effect of taking away absolutely a contractual right. As a matter of jurisprudential analysis, a chose in action in the form of a contractual right may be extinguished by statute in a number of ways (cf. Georgiadis v Australia & Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1993-1994) 179 CLR 297 at 304 - 305). Yet, where the divesting is not direct but, rather, depends upon "effects", a broad and complicated inquiry is inevitably opened up, and questions of degree, often of an economic or commercial kind, arise which are difficult to apply precisely. This approach is comparable to the distinction, also difficult to apply, drawn in a constitutional context between "regulation" on the one hand, and "taking" on the other (cf. Belfast Corporation v O D Cars Ltd [1960] AC 490 at 519, 523 - 525; Trade Practices Commission v Tooth & Co Ltd (1979) 142 CLR 397 at 428).
148 In summary then, whilst I accept that FOXTEL had a PCR under cl 3 as at 13 September 1996 under its joint venture arrangements, I cannot accept that the bare supply by Telstra to another service provider of services (which FOXTEL was itself at liberty to supply under the joint venture in certain circumstances) would necessarily have the relevant effect of depriving FOXTEL of its PCR. On the contrary, this (i.e. the supply by FOXTEL as joint venturer) was an event which, albeit only in particular circumstances, was contemplated by the joint venture arrangement itself. It is important to bear in mind that the contractual right in question was created between joint venturers which have an ongoing commercial relationship. The commercial realities (i.e. the "effects") must be viewed in that context. If an absolutely exclusive contractual right had been vested by the carrier in a third party at arms' length, that is, a party which shared no common business interests with the carrier, the position may well have been different.
149 I propose therefore, for reasons which differ somewhat from those of the primary Judge, that the appeals ought to be dismissed, with costs.
I certify that the preceding one hundred and forty-nine (149) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Beaumont.