2 The notices of motion were listed before me for hearing together with a notice of motion filed by the plaintiff on 23 November 2009 in which she sought various orders, both in respect of the proceedings commenced by summons in this Court and various of the proceedings that were commenced against the defendants in the District Court in 2007, 2008 and 2009 each of which have since been dismissed.
3 The plaintiff cited her appearance in respect of her own notice of motion and that of the defendants.
4 Given that the application for vexatious proceedings orders under the Act concerned both the proceedings in this Court and the various proceedings commenced by the plaintiff (and since dismissed) in the District Court, I resolved to hear and determine the plaintiff's notice of motion first. This was at the plaintiff's urging and with the concurrence of counsel for the defendants.
5 The plaintiff relied upon an affidavit in support of the orders sought by motion. She also advanced oral submissions. I delivered an ex tempore judgment dismissing the motion whereupon the plaintiff collected her materials from the bar table and left the courtroom in a manner which clearly signalled her intention not to participate further in the proceedings.
6 After satisfying myself that the plaintiff was properly served with the defendants' notices of motion in accordance with the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules (UCPR), I am of the view that she was made aware of the nature of the proceedings brought against her by the defendants under the Vexatious Proceedings Act and, accordingly, although I have not heard from her as to her attitude to the orders they seek, I am satisfied that she has been afforded the opportunity to be heard as provided for in s 8(1)(3) of the Act.
7 Each of the defendants has standing to bring an application under the Act if I am satisfied, as provided for in s 8(4)(d), in that they are each individuals against or in relation to whom another person has instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings. A vexatious proceeding is defined in s 6 of the Act to include the following:
(a) proceedings that are an abuse of the process of a court or tribunal, and
(b) proceedings instituted to harass or annoy, to cause delay or detriment, or for another wrongful purpose, and
(c) proceedings instituted or pursued without reasonable ground, and
(d) proceedings conducted in a way so as to harass or annoy, cause delay or detriment, or achieve another wrongful purpose.
8 On the present application, the defendants place particular reliance on paragraphs (a) and (c) of the definition, namely proceedings that are an abuse of process and/or were instituted or pursued without reasonable grounds. In so far as proceedings that are an abuse of the process (of either a court or tribunal) I am guided by the many examples in the authorities, usually in the context of an application under the UCPR to strike out the proceedings, where proceedings have been held to give rise to an abuse of process, in particular, the pursuit of proceedings that have no prospect of success; the pursuit of concurrent proceedings for substantially the same causes of action and the pursuit of proceedings involving the re-litigation of matters already determined in prior proceedings.
9 Section 8 of the Act provides that a vexatious proceedings order in relation to a person may be made where the Court is satisfied that the person has frequently instituted or conducted vexatious proceedings in Australia. In undertaking that enquiry I am entitled, under s 8(2), to have regard to the proceedings in any Australian court or tribunal, and orders made by any Australian court or tribunal (including proceedings instituted or conducted and orders made before the commencement of the section).
10 The evidence relied upon by the defendants was voluminous, consisting of affidavits from the defendants' solicitors together with materials exhibited to those affidavits including a vast number of reported decisions. Although the defendants have narrowed the terms of the orders they seek, such as to prohibit the plaintiff only from instituting fresh proceedings involving any of them and/or making any application in any legal proceedings involving any of them without first obtaining leave under s 14 of the Act, it is still open to me to consider the vast number of cases between 1998 and 2008 either commenced by or involving the plaintiff (but not involving any of the defendants) in the Land and Environment Court, the Social Security Appeals Tribunal, the Administrative Appeals Tribunal, the Federal Court, this Court and the High Court. (A schedule of these decisions is attached to this judgment.)
11 In each of the fourteen actions the decision was adverse to the plaintiff whether at first instance or on appeal. After close consideration of each of the decisions, the relevant portions of which have been conveniently summarised and analysed in Mr Sheldon's submissions, I am satisfied that the actions commenced by the plaintiff variously against Municipal Councils, State or Federal government departments or other instrumentalities may, at least on some occasions have been instituted on disclosed grounds, they were almost exclusively pursued unreasonably, in the sense of being as persevered or persisted with on appeal in the face of there being no proper basis to challenge the decision.