10 This observation about the range is particularly apt for offences involving a breach of the EPA Act where the maximum penalty is $1.1 million. The potential offences involved (principally carrying out development that required consent without consent, carrying out development that is prohibited, and carrying out development otherwise than in accordance with a development consent) cover a vast range of circumstances. This is reflected in the many different cases that come before this Court for sentence under s 125(1) of the EPA Act. Cases of wilful removal of large trees (particularly on neighbouring or public land) without consent are not analogous to unintentionally (or at worst negligently) clearing a rural property in excess of that authorised by a consent. For example, in Wheelhouse, the offence was cutting down three mature trees on a neighbour's land without consent and in breach of a tree preservation order. The defendant's explanation for the offence was unsatisfactory. Apparently, the neighbours had some emotional attachment to the trees, which were large. The offence was deliberate. Those facts are very different from the present case. Hornsby Shire Council v Devaney [2007] NSWLEC 199 involved the clearing of trees and vegetation on rural land without consent (including, probably, a vulnerable species). One defendant was an experienced earthworks contractor who told the other defendant, a young and inexperienced person of limited means, that no consent was required. The other defendant instructed the contractor to proceed and about 0.42 hectares of land was cleared of trees and vegetation (being devoid of both after the clearing). Fifty-five trees were removed in the process, 49 of which were alive before being removed. The Court fined the contractor $20,000 but discharged the other defendant on the basis of a bond. Camden Council v Runko (2006) 147 LGERA 214 involved another exceptional case where the Court found the defendant removed 30 trees from a rural property that were damaged and dangerous. The Court dismissed the charge and ordered the defendant to undertake rehabilitation of the property.
11 The penalty imposed by the Magistrate in this case was low; probably, even at the lowest possible end of the range. The area cleared substantially exceeded that authorised. But the fact that an appellate court considers a penalty to be low is insufficient. The penalty was not so low as to be definitely or obviously outside the range a sentencing court could have imposed in all of the circumstances. This is particularly so having regard to: - (i) the fact that the defendant obtained a development consent that authorised clearing of a rural property, with the offence involving clearing a larger area (just over double) that which was authorised, (ii) the lack of evidence of unlawful removal of trees as opposed to clearing in the nature of under-scrubbing, (iii) the finding that the clearing did not involve removing all trees or vegetation, supported by the photographic evidence, (iv) the finding that the defendant's default was if anything negligent rather than deliberate, supported by the defendant's evidence about how he had arranged for the clearing to be carried out, and (v) the lack of evidence about the nature and significance of the vegetation and of environmental harm. There were also substantial mitigating circumstances in the defendant's favour, including: - (i) the defendant's visual impairment made it unlikely that he was capable of adequately supervising the works, (ii) the evidence of voluntary rehabilitation by the defendant, (iii) the defendant's lack of prior convictions, (iv) the defendant's entry of a plea of guilty, (v) the defendant's limited means to pay, with his only income being a disability support pension, and (vi) the defendant's liability with respect to costs in the sum of $1000. Moreover, the Magistrate was clearly aware of the importance of general deterrence of environmental offences. In this case, the defendant was convicted, a fine imposed (albeit a low fine), and the defendant ordered to pay $1000 in costs. The small pecuniary penalty, in all of the circumstances, does not indicate an error that justifies and authorises appellate intervention.