Materiality
27 It is fundamental to the exercise of the discretion to approve a scheme of arrangement that there be full disclosure of all material facts to shareholders. Where, as here, the scheme is in the nature of an acquisition, appropriate safeguards, analogous to those which apply to conventional takeovers should be applied: Re NRMA Ltd (2000) 33 ACSR 595 at [16] per Santow J.
28 Materiality is a question of mixed fact and law which depends upon the facts and circumstances of the particular case: Pancontinental Mining Ltd v Goldfields Ltd (1995) 16 ACSR 463 at 466.
29 I accept that in the context of a scheme, the extent of disclosure that is required depends not only on the nature of the scheme but on the total context in which information is presented or omitted: Zenyth Therapeutics Ltd v Smith (2006) 60 ACSR 548 at [85]; see also Re Crusader Ltd [1996] 1 Qd R 117 at 126.
30 The object of the requirement is to put shareholders of the target in possession of information that will enable them to make an informed and critical assessment of the offer. Information is material if it could affect the shareholders' assessment of whether the offeror is likely to improve its offer, or the prospects of a competing offer: Pancontinental at 467.
31 If a deficiency in disclosure is identified, the Court considers whether there is any reasonable ground for supposing that the deficiency would cause shareholders to vote, or to abstain from voting, under a serious misapprehension of the position: ENT Pty Ltd v Sunraysia Television Ltd (2007) 61 ACSR 626 at [20] and the authorities there cited; see also Re Castlereagh Securities Ltd [1973] 1 NSWLR 624 at 636.
32 Mr Oakes submits that the absence of the 2012 audited accounts is not material to the decision of the shareholders to vote on the scheme in the facts of this case. He points to the disclosure in the scheme booklet of the unaudited accounts prepared as at February 2013.
33 He also points to the evidence given in the course of the hearing that the audited accounts as at 30 June 2012 are likely, if anything, to be worse than the position disclosed in the scheme booklet. In addition, Mr Oakes points to the evidence of the independent expert that he would be unlikely to alter his opinion even if the audited accounts were available.
34 It may be true that upon the basis of the evidence given by the auditor, the presence of the audited accounts would not assist the shareholders in coming to a view as to whether Keybridge may be prepared to pay more for the PRF shares. It may also suggest that the fair value of the PRF shares is less than that which was assessed by the independent expert, thereby bearing upon the question of the fairness of the offer.
35 But what seems to me to be critical is that the consideration which is offered is part cash and part shares in the bidder company. If the scheme is approved PRF will become a wholly owned subsidiary of Keybridge. Thus, the true value of the consideration to be paid by Keybridge will be affected by the value of its holding in PRF.
36 A relevant question in assessing materiality is whether the information would assist the shareholders to assess critically the attractiveness of the offer: Pancontinental at 467. Here, the attractiveness of the offer is dependent in a substantial part on the true value of PRF to the extent that the shareholders have what is in effect a continuing interest in the true worth of that company.
37 It is no answer, as PRF seeks to press upon me, that there has been disclosure of the position post 30 June 2011 to 28 February 2013. Nor is it an answer that the independent expert has made his own independent assessment of the value of PRF by reference to the value of lease assets and legal assets. Ultimately, his assessment placed some reliance on the position as at 30 June 2012, as to which there are no audited accounts.
38 I reject Mr Oakes' submission that it is open to PRF to rely upon the statutory window which enables audited accounts to be provided by 30 September or 31 October in a given year. The short answer to his submission is that the window only applies to accounts for the most recent financial year.
39 In the present case the window closed no later than the date to which ASIC extended the deadline for the provision of the accounts. That date was the end of December 2012. On any view the accounts were long overdue when PRF sought orders at the first court hearing concerning a meeting of shareholders.
40 The importance of the statutory accounts was recognised by Farrell J in her reasons for judgment. Her Honour noted at [9] the statement by the directors of PRF that the audited accounts would be filed before the scheme meeting.
41 It is in my view not open to PRF to avoid its statutory duty to lodge its audited financial accounts by suggesting that in the context of the scheme the audited accounts were not material.
42 Nor is my conclusion on this affected by the terms of the opinion expressed by the independent expert. It is true, as the independent expert observes, that if the scheme is not approved Keybridge will be in a position to appoint a receiver to PRF. It is also true that considerable efforts have been made, without success, to try to obtain a better offer. But that is no answer to the proposition that material information has been withheld from the shareholders.
43 In coming to that view, I have taken into account the possibility to which the independent expert has referred that, if PRF is placed into receivership, the shareholders may receive less than the value of the scheme consideration, or indeed nothing at all.
44 It is for the shareholders to have the opportunity to consider that question in light of the audited accounts.
45 I should add that the belated disclosure to shareholders on the eve of the scheme meeting and the post-meeting disclosure of the absence of the audited accounts do not alter the view that I have reached. The shareholders were entitled to the audited accounts and they were told they would be provided by the time of the meeting. The short answer is that the accounts were not provided and the communication with shareholders did nothing more than inform them of the position taken by ASIC.