Ground 2: Resolution
66 There was no dispute that by reason of the terms of s 499(2A), and Ministerial Direction 56, the DFAT Report on Nepal was a mandatory relevant consideration for the Tribunal in the conduct of its review: BMP15 at [33]-[34]; see also Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v Viane [2021] HCA 41 at [14] (footnote 13); PQSM v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 125; 279 FCR 175. Further, while maintaining the position that any error was not material, the Minister properly accepted that the DFAT Report on Nepal was capable of being relevant to the Tribunal's consideration of the exceptions to s 36(3), in particular s 36(4).
67 At [22] of its reasons, the Tribunal disclosed its consciousness of the obligation in Ministerial Direction 56:
In accordance with Ministerial Direction No.56, made under s.499 of the Act, the Tribunal is required to take account of policy guidelines prepared by the Department of Immigration - PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Complementary Protection Guidelines and PAM3 Refugee and humanitarian - Refugee Law Guidelines - and any country information assessment prepared by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade expressly for protection status determination purposes, to the extent that they are relevant to the decision under consideration
68 Contrary to the reasons of the Federal Circuit Court and the Minister's submissions, I do not consider this paragraph is sufficient to infer that the Tribunal considered the DFAT Report on Nepal. Nor do I consider that the Tribunal's remarks at [165] and [191] strengthen any such inference. The content of the rest of its reasons, and the applicable chronology, suggest otherwise.
69 The DFAT Report on Nepal was published on 21 April 2016. The matter was remitted to the Tribunal on 1 March 2016. The Tribunal held hearings on 28 June 2016 and 12 October 2016. The Tribunal published its decision on 9 November 2016. There are no references in the Tribunal's long and otherwise detailed decision to any country information from 2016. There is a reference in footnotes to a 2014 article which was accessed in October 2016 by the Tribunal; that is all. The Tribunal footnoted closely, or referred in the body of its reasons to, the sources for its propositions about the situation in India and Nepal. The DFAT Report on Nepal is conspicuous by its absence. I find this is because it is likely the Tribunal did not refresh the country information to which it had referred in its previous decision, aside from anything submitted by the appellants. For example, one of its footnotes referred to information being accessed on "6 January 2014", which must refer to consideration during the Tribunal's previous decision. Further, footnote 11 in the Tribunal's reasons refers to "[s]earches conducted on CISNET, think tanks, academic journals, open source search engines, human rights organisations, non-government organisations, and international news outlets" as the method by which the Tribunal searched for information indicating whether there was any practical barrier for Indian citizens travelling to and entering Nepal. This is one obvious place that the DFAT Report on Nepal should have appeared if the Tribunal had consulted it.
70 By reason of all of the above matters, I find there is no basis to infer the Tribunal considered the DFAT Report on Nepal at all. I find it is likely the Tribunal entirely overlooked its existence.
71 That inference is strengthened by the content of the DFAT Report on Nepal, to which I turn in the context of the Minister's materiality contention. However, the content of the report also confirms the likelihood the Tribunal would have referred to it, if it was conscious it existed.
72 The following is an extract of the key passages of the Report (with my emphasis):
[2.8] The capital city of Kathmandu had a population of 1.183 million in 2015 and approximately 17 per cent of the population live in urban areas. Inequalities exist across geographic regions and ecological zones, and between urban and rural areas. Ethnic and caste distinctions remain influential in Nepali society following a rise in identity-based politics and increased polarisation during and following the conflict from 1996 to 2006.
…
[2.9] Nepal's economic growth has been adversely affected by political uncertainty and conflict. The focus on political transition and the attainment of peace has meant inadequate attention has been given to economic and other reforms that would improve the investment climate, stimulate growth and create more private sector jobs. The earthquake of April 2015 and the subsequent aftershocks had a negative impact on the economy. The 2015 political dispute in the Terai, which restricted trade and services across the Nepal/India border, also affected growth.
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[2.17] Nepal's health sector is challenged by the country's widespread poverty, limited government funding and its remote and mountainous geography which hinders the development of appropriate health infrastructure and access to health services outside of the densely populated southern plains region. Health care services are generally considered inadequate by international standards, and some facilities, particularly in Kathmandu, were damaged or destroyed by the 25 April 2015 earthquake. Hospitals in Nepal tend to be located in urban areas and provide a much wider range of medical services than rural health centres, although the quality of health care provided in large urban centres such as Kathmandu is still variable. The average Nepali spends just 5 per cent of their annual income on health-related needs.
…
[2.35] In September 2015 protests began in the Terai and continued until early 2016. Led primarily by the Madhesi and Tharu groups, (see 'Ethnicity' below), these protests arose in part because of concerns about the demarcation of provincial boundaries under the 2015 Constitution and had a significant effect on Nepal's industry and economy as they have blockaded the East-West highway at Birgunj, the largest crossing on the border with India. Some figures suggest that only 40-50 per cent of goods and fuel were crossing into Nepal, which further added to the already difficult humanitarian situation faced by Nepal as it recovered from the 2015 earthquake. Nepal's security forces (mainly police) were heavily involved in responding to the Terai protests and police reportedly opened fire on civilians in some instances. Over 40 deaths, both civilians and police, have been reported. At the date of publication, the protests have stopped and all borders are open following an amendment to the Constitution in January 2016 to respond to the aforementioned concerns.
…
[3.3] In modern Nepal, Hindu castes and Buddhist and animist ethnic groups form a single caste hierarchy. However, ethnic divisions remain sensitive in Nepal. Discussion of ethnic difference or inequality was an offence punishable by jail until 1991. Efforts to restore and defend cultures and practices in opposition to Pan-Nepali identity policies began in the early 1990s through the creation of the Nepal Federation of Nationalities. There is no clear legislation criminalising hate speech, although provisions related to social justice and inclusion, including of minority communities, exist in the 2015 Constitution, and recognition of the rights of ethnic minorities have improved since the end of the civil war.
…
[3.10] India and Nepal have encouraged the free movement of people and goods and close cooperation on matters of defence and foreign affairs since a Treaty of Peace and Friendship was signed between the two countries in 1950. However, the overwhelming size of India comparative to Nepal can give rise to concerns about unchecked movement of Indians into Nepal, especially in the southern section of Nepal (the Terai) that is geographically contiguous with the Indian plains and where there are deep cultural links between Nepalis and Indians. Historical concerns about India's political and economic interference in Nepal and instances of poor treatment of Nepalis in India have given rise to anti-Indian sentiment amongst some Nepalis. The Indian state of Bihar has long been used as a safe haven for criminal organisations, political parties and separatist groups from Nepal, adding to concerns about India's interference in Nepal's domestic affairs.
…
[3.30] Nepal's caste-based system of social organisation is guided by the Hindu Varna system - a hierarchical allocation of rights, duties and obligations based on a person's inherited position (and associated 'purity' or 'impurity') in society. Caste has a direct and significant impact on a person's life experiences, including access to education, employment, residence and similar life opportunities.
[3.31] Members of the upper castes continue to dominate government and business in Nepal owing to historical practices that prioritised the rights and interests of upper-caste elites. Discrimination on the grounds of caste is still widespread despite being officially outlawed since 1962. This is particularly the case in rural areas although this may be reducing over time. Among the four major caste and ethnic clusters - the Brahmins/Chhetris, the Janajatis, the Dalits and the Muslims - Hill Brahmans have a low poverty incidence of 10.3 per cent, compared to 43.6 per cent for Hill Dalits and 38.2 per cent for Terai Dalits. The poverty incidence among Hill and Terai Janajatis is 28.3 per cent and 25.9 per cent, respectively.
…
[3.35] There are no legal barriers to inter-caste marriage in Nepal and the government has provided monetary incentives of 100,000 NRs (approximately AUD1, 300) to each inter-caste couple married since 2009. According to one study that examined 123 inter-caste marriages from Banke, Parbat and Shanusha districts between December 2011 and March 2012, 80 marriages were between a Dalit male marrying a non-Dalit female and 43 were between a non-Dalit male marrying a Dalit female. The former type of union was generally more successful. However, overall, success of an inter-caste marriage depends on a range of factors including economic, educational, social and political status. The practice of downgrading one's caste as a result of inter-caste marriage still exists in remote and rural areas. Dalit families involved in such arrangements can risk even further social exclusion and non-Dalit families risk losing their status in society.
[3.36] DFAT assesses that inter-caste couples can face disapproval by their families or society. Accusations of criminal activity such as theft, kidnapping, child marriage and rape can be used by the (relatively) higher-caste family to pressure the break-up of inter-caste marriages. Physical attacks and social exclusion by the families can also be imposed on couples in order to force a break-up of the relationship. Women (regardless of their Dalit or non-Dalit status) generally suffer more than men from such attacks, particularly social and familial humiliation (see section on 'Women' below).
…
[3.44] Nepali women rarely receive the same educational and employment opportunities as men. Although there has been an increase in the proportion of economically active women, their earned income is about one-third that of men. Less than six per cent of women are employed in the formal sector (compared to 21 per cent of men).
…
[3.47] Nepali women and girls across society, regardless of their economic, caste or ethnic status, are vulnerable to violence in many forms, including rape, sexual abuse and trafficking of. The Government is yet to investigate credible allegations of sexual violence allegedly committed during the 1996-2006 conflict but has acknowledged that women suffered rape during these years.
…
[3.50] DFAT assesses as credible reports outlining women's fear of, and related actual experiences of, sexual harassment and violence on the street (including rape and other forms of physical attack such as murder and mugging) and in the home. DFAT assesses that social stigma, cultural taboos about sexual violence and the fear of retaliation by the perpetrators prevent women from reporting criminal activity. Women's fear of potential violence or attack can restrict their freedom of movement.
…
[5.21] Relocation is a common experience for Nepalis. Millions travel each year to other countries seeking employment and other opportunities and to escape economic conditions at home. The open border arrangement with India, as per the 1950 India-Nepal Treaty of Peace and Friendship, allows large numbers of Nepalis to travel to and from India each year or reside in India on a long-term basis. In 2014, Nepal and India re-committed to this Treaty and agreed to review and update it. Large numbers of Nepalis also move within the country. The populations of major urban centres such as Kathmandu have increased substantially in recent decades, reflecting significant urbanisation and a desire to seek better employment opportunities and improved living standards.
…
[5.24] The Nepal Ministry of Home Affairs Department of Immigration is responsible for conducting entry and exit checks. There are ten formal entry and exit points, of which Kathmandu airport is the only international airport. Non-Nepali citizens (not including Indians) are required to use one of these points and must present valid passports and required visas. Nepal and India have an open border that, apart from the aforementioned points, is largely unmanned, meaning Nepalis and Indians are able to cross it at any point and without a passport. The movement of Nepalis into and out of the country is thus largely undocumented. Movement through Kathmandu airport - for Nepalis and foreigners alike - is slow and cumbersome. Significant physical security checks occur, and passports are required for international flights.
[5.25] Citizenship certificates are required by Nepalis to purchase or transfer land; register births, marriages, and deaths; open bank accounts, obtain micro credit loans, and register businesses; attend higher education institutions; acquire travel documents; receive state benefits for the disabled, widowed, or elderly; run for public office; and to enlist in the army, the armed police, and the civil police force. Certificates are also required in order to access formal sector employment opportunities, such as full-time permanent jobs that provide sick leave and pensions.
73 These passages make it clear that, on many of the issues raised by the appellants before the Tribunal, the content of the DFAT Report on Nepal had credible and significant information. In particular, it was capable of being seen as supporting what the appellants were saying about the risk posed to them through their inter-caste marriage, the porous border with India and the possibility they would be found by relatives and those intent on harming them, bearing in mind the Tribunal's finding they had a well-founded fear of persecution in the State of Punjab and it was not reasonable for them to relocate anywhere else in India (see [139]-[140]). The report was also capable of supporting much of what the appellants were saying to the Tribunal about the poor levels of health services and access in Nepal, and their access to the basics of life. The report was also capable of being relevant to the assessment to be undertaken by the Tribunal in respect of s 36(4)(a). To take a concrete example, the Tribunal made a finding at [175] of its reasons about the situation for those who married between castes in Nepal:
The [appellants] told the Tribunal at both hearings that people in Nepal oppose inter-caste marriage, as do people in India, and the applicants fear harm there as well. The Tribunal finds that the claim is not supported by the available evidence, including the evidence provided by the [appellants]. While "honour killings" may take place in Nepal, the perpetrators are relatives or neighbours of the victims; hence the name "honour killing". There is no evidence before the Tribunal that complete strangers or the authorities might inflict serious or significant harm on the [appellants], because they entered into an inter-caste marriage.
74 As the appellants submitted, the DFAT Report on Nepal dealt quite specifically with inter-caste marriages. I accept that there was enough in that report to find that the appellants were deprived of the realistic possibility of a different outcome on their claim to fall within the exception in s 36(4) of the Migration Act, because of the Tribunal's failure to consider the DFAT report as a whole, and these kinds of passages in particular.
75 Further, a matter I raised at the hearing with counsel was what the report said about the earthquake in Nepal on 25 April 2015, and its effect on basic matters such as access to accommodation and health services. The Tribunal does no more than refer to the earthquake in passing, but the DFAT Report on Nepal consistently refers to the effects of the earthquake in relation to deaths and casualties (at [2.5] of the Report), economic impacts (at [2.9]), the impact on healthcare (at [2.17]), the impact on the education sector (at [2.22]), and humanitarian and reconstruction efforts in response to the earthquake (including the extent to which these efforts were disrupted by political unrest) (at [2.27], [2.35], [3.37] and [5.9]).
76 The Tribunal's obligation to consider the facts and circumstances in a country of reference at the time of its review is well-established: see, e.g., MZYTS at [73]-[77]; BIL17 v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2019] FCAFC 6; 268 FCR 114 at [61]-[64]. The impact of the earthquake on the availability of many basic necessities of life for people in Nepal may well have affected the qualitative assessment by the Tribunal of whether the exception in s 36(4)(b) was made out. If the Tribunal had engaged with the content of the DFAT Report on Nepal, then the need for it to consider the impact of the earthquake was likely to have become more obvious.
77 In Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs v FAK19 [2021] FCAFC 153 at [174], Kerr J and I said (Allsop CJ agreeing - see [1]) said:
The weight to be given to the executive dimension of Australia's non-refoulement obligations was of course a matter for the Tribunal to decide. This court cannot substitute itself in the undertaking of such an evaluative task. In undertaking an assessment on materiality, where there are reasonable and rational choices to be made in fact finding, it is not appropriate for the supervising Court to attempt to place itself in the mind of the Tribunal, and speculate about what would or could have changed a particular Tribunal's mind. To do so brings the Court into the merits of the decision. Rather, the supervising Court must assume a Tribunal acting fairly and reasonably, with a mind open to persuasion, would give active and genuine consideration to all matters relevant to its review, including the matter which was erroneously omitted, or misconceived, and which caused it to exceed its jurisdiction. See generally Martincevic v Commonwealth [2007] FCAFC 164; 164 FCR 45 at [67]-[68], Chamoun v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2020] FCAFC 66; 276 FCR 75 at [70]; PQSM v Minister for Home Affairs [2020] FCAFC 125; 279 FCR 175 at [69]-[73].
78 While the identified error was quite different, the approach in principle is one to which I adhere in this case, and indeed I am obliged to. The DFAT Report on Nepal was central to the subject matter of the appellants' claims. How the Tribunal, acting conformably with what was said in FAK19 at [174], would deal with that report in its decision-making, would have been a matter for it, and will remain a matter for the Tribunal on remitter. It is not a matter to be pre-empted or assumed by any findings in this Court.
79 Ground 2 should be upheld and the appeal should be allowed. Costs should follow the event, and the Minister did not submit to the contrary.
I certify that the preceding seventy-nine (79) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment of the Honourable Justice Mortimer.