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[2011] TASSC 19
Supreme Court of Tasmania
2011-04-21
Wood J
Original judgment source is linked above.
Torts - Negligence - Essentials of action for negligence - Duty of care - Special relationships and duties - Other cases - Breach of duty owed to fellow jockey.
Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40; Rootes v Shelton [1967] HCA 39; (1967) 116 CLR 383; Kliese v Pelling [1998] QSC 112, discussed.
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss11, 12.
Torts - The law of torts generally - Volenti non fit injuria - Three elements to be proven - Effect of Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas).
Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council [2007] NSWCA 4; Colin Ball v Transport Commission, B52/1991, discussed.
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss15, 16.
Torts - Statutes, regulations, etc - Applicability and effect in actions for negligence - Generally - Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), s19 - "Recreational activity" - Professional jockey injured - Interpretation - Natural meaning.
Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27; CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384; Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355; Falvo v Australian Oztag Sports Association (2006) NSWCA 17; Fallas v Mourlas [2006] NSWCA 32, discussed.
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss15, 18, 19, 20.
Acts Interpretation Act 1931 (Tas), ss8A, 8B.
Damages - Measure and remoteness of damages in actions for tort - Measure of damages - Personal injuries - Method of assessment - Generally - Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas) - Award of damages for gratuitous services - General damages - Reference to awards in other jurisdictions.
Van Gervan v Fenton [1992] HCA 54; (1992) 175 CLR 327; Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa [1968] HCA 62; (1968) 119 CLR 118, applied.
Civil Liability Act 2002 (Tas), ss28, 28B.
Judgment Number: [2011] TASSC 19
1 On 28 January 2007, the plaintiff, Kevin Dodge rode Oceano in the Moorilla Stakes at Elwick Racecourse. The defendant, Simon Snell, rode The Mighty West. Mr Snell drew the outside barrier. Soon after the start of the race Mr Snell started to cross to the rail. The rail was the shortest run to the finish. He safely crossed in front of two horses. Having done so he then had five horses to his inside with 3 at the front and two, including Mr Dodge's mount, racing close behind. The field of five horses on his inside was tightly bunched and racing close to the rail. To reach the rail and maintain his forward position, Mr Snell had to cross in front of the three horses in the lead. The first of the three horses was Colonel Parker ridden by jockey Brendan McCoull. Mr Snell shifted inwards to cross in front of Colonel Parker. Mr McCoull on Colonel Parker shifted inwards. Further back and close to his inside was Tal Jack ridden by Kane Bandy. Tal Jack clipped heels with Colonel Parker and fell. Mr Dodge was directly behind Tal Jack and could do nothing to avoid Tal Jack falling in front of him. His horse, Oceano, collided with Tal Jack catapulting Mr Dodge forward onto the ground. Oceano fell forward landing on top of Mr Dodge. Mr Dodge was injured and as a consequence his career as a professional jockey was brought to an end.
2 Mr Dodge brings a personal injuries claim for negligence against Mr Snell. He claims that it was Mr Snell's negligent riding of The Mighty West that caused his horse to fall. The particulars of negligence are:
(b) rode his mount inwards when it insufficiently clear for Colonel Parker to enable the manoeuvre to be safely completed;
(d) Rode his mount inwards when insufficiently clear of Colonel Parker and when he knew or reasonably to have known that in doing so he was exposing other horses and riders to a risk of injury."
3 The essence of the plaintiff's case, described in counsel's opening, was that Mr Snell rode his mount in towards the rail when he was insufficiently clear of the horses to his inside; this caused a cramping of those horses and the falls resulted.
(1)
The defendant maintains that he did not breach his duty of care to the plaintiff.
(2) If he did breach that duty, he is not liable for it because the plaintiff voluntarily accepted the risk of that breach.
(3) By reason of the Civil Liability Act 2002 ("the CL Act"), s20, the defendant is not liable for that breach.
5 Mr Snell does not dispute that he owed the plaintiff a duty of care, the breach of which would make him liable for the harm suffered by Mr Dodge. The extent of the duty of care is in issue. It is conceded that Mr Snell's conduct during the race was a cause of Mr Dodge's fall and resulting injuries. He concedes an error of judgment but denies negligence.
6 In maintaining that he did not breach his duty of care Mr Snell denies the particulars of negligence. An assertion of contributory negligence was made but abandoned at trial.
7 Before dealing with the first question of whether the defendant breached his duty of care to Mr Dodge I commence with an overview of some statutory reforms regarding the law of negligence. I leave a more detailed consideration of the law regarding breach of duty until after consideration of the facts.
Negligence and the Civil Liability Act: an overview
8 Foreseeability, standard of care, breach of duty, causation and remoteness of damage are addressed by the CL Act. The CL Act is a response to recommendations for reform of the law of negligence contained in the Final Report by the panel appointed by the Commonwealth and State Governments to review the law of negligence. (See Fallas v Mourlas [2006] NSWCA 32, par[45], and D Ipp, Review of the Law of Negligence: Final Report (2002) Canberra, Canprint Communications). Comparable reforms are made in other jurisdictions in Australia.
9 The CL Act carries into effect various reforms to aspects of the law of negligence regarding civil liability for damages for personal injury or death or damage to property. The Act has application to causes of injury that arise after the commencement of the Act[1] with the exceptions provided for in the CL Act. The CL Act does not apply to work related injuries as specified[2], and parts of the Act do not apply in respect of civil liability relating to injury to which Part III of the Motor Accidents (Liabilities and Compensation) Act 1973 applies.
10 Some of the reforms implemented by the CL Act relating to the defence of voluntary assumption of risk, and cases involving "dangerous recreational activities", arise for consideration in this case. These are substantial issues for consideration and I have the benefit of submissions from counsel with regard to these matters.
11 As noted, questions of breach of duty and causation are now governed by provisions in the CL Act. Provisions relating to causation deal with substantive principles and effect significant changes to the law: ss13 and 14[3]. Causation does not arise as an issue in this trial. Breach of duty is a central issue in this trial. For the purposes of this case there are few, if any real, differences between the common law principles and the statutory provisions regarding breach of duty. Indeed, counsel's submissions regarding breach of duty were confined to the common law and the classic pronouncement by Mason J (as he then was) in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt [1980] HCA 12; (1980) 146 CLR 40.
12 Even though there are few, if any, real differences between the common law and the CL Act regarding breach of duty, the proper approach is to commence a consideration of negligence by having regard to the CL Act first (Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Moubarak; Adeels Palace Pty Ltd v Bou Najem [2009] HCA 48; (2009) 239 CLR 420).
"11 General principles
(1) A person does not breach a duty to take reasonable care unless -
(a) there was a foreseeable risk of harm (that is, a risk of harm of which the person knew or ought reasonably to have known); and
(c) in the circumstances, a reasonable person in the position of the person would have taken precautions to avoid the risk.
(2) In deciding whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against a risk of harm, the court is to consider the following (among other relevant things):
(a) the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken;
(c) the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm;
(d) the potential net benefit of the activity that exposes others to the risk of harm.
(3) For the purpose of subsection (2)(c), the court is to consider the burden of taking precautions to avoid similar risks of harm for which the person may be responsible."
14 Section 12 provides other principles:
"12 Other principles
In a proceeding relating to liability for breach of duty -
(a) the fact that a risk of harm could have been avoided by doing something in a different way does not of itself give rise to or affect liability for the way in which the thing was done; and
(b) the subsequent taking of action that (had the action been taken earlier) would have avoided a risk of harm does not of itself give rise to or affect liability in relation to the risk and does not of itself constitute evidence of liability in connection with the risk."
15 It may be noted that s11 discards the common law test for scope of liability for foreseeable risk of "not fanciful or far-fetched". Substituted is a test of a risk that is "not insignificant", setting the threshold a little higher for plaintiffs.
16 Section 11 substantially restates the common law test for breach of duty of care stated by Mason J in Wyong Shire Council v Shirt (supra) (Council of the City of Greater Taree v Wells (2010) NSWCA 147 Beazley JA pars[33], [55], Waverley Council v Ferreira [2005] NSWCA 418, par[45]) and presupposes the existence of the law of negligence (Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Limited [2009] NSWCA 263 per McColl J par[173][4].
17 Section 11 specifies the matters the court is to consider, "among other relevant things" in determining whether a reasonable person would have taken precautions against the risk of harm[5]. It ensures that the "balancing" exercise be undertaken and that considerations that weigh against the taking of precautions be considered and not overlooked (see CL Act, s11(2)(c) and (d))[6]. It is worthwhile to bear in mind that the whole purpose of the provision is to "encourage judges to address their minds more directly to the issue of whether it would be reasonable to require precautions to be taken against a particular risk" (par7.17 of the Final Report, and Waverley Council v Ferreira (supra), per Ipp JA at 27, Spigelman CJ and Tobias JA agreeing). This provision has the unambitious and arguably unnecessary objective of seeking to ensure the correct application of the Wyong formula.
18 Other conflicting responsibilities not mentioned in subs(c) and (d) of the CL Act s11(2) are still to be taken into account as subs(2) is not exhaustive: Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Limited (supra), McColl JA at 173 (Campbell JA and Sackville AJA agreeing). I will return to conflicting responsibilities later when dealing with principles regarding breach of duty arising from the sporting context.
19 Many of the facts are not disputed. The race was filmed from various angles and the films were available at the trial. However, there are areas of dispute and contention relating to matters of detail bearing on liability. It is convenient to set out the uncontentious facts that are accepted, and then identify the factual issues that need to be decided relevant to the question of negligence.
20 The unchallenged facts regarding the incident are as follows.
21 The race: Wrest Point Guineas Day Race meeting at Elwick Racecourse, Moorilla Stakes, Race 8.
22 The track: 1200 metre race (six furlongs) with the turn at the 600 metre mark. Until that turn the track is straight and there is no disadvantage to jockeys in not being close to the rail.
24 Barrier positions: The allotted barrier positions of the horses in the race were as follows:
25 It can be seen that Mr Dodge rode Oceano in starting position barrier 6. Mr Snell rode The Mighty West starting in outside barrier number 9.
26 Their race plan: Mr Snell intended to race forward of the field. Mr Dodge had instructions from the trainer of Oceano, George Blacker (pp53 - 54). He told Mr Dodge that Oceano missed the start in the previous race, meaning that it was slow getting out of the barriers. George Blacker said to make sure that the horse "jumped well", to make sure it did not "give away start" at the beginning of the race and then to "settle back in the field a little bit and save its energy for home straight". Mr Dodge's plan was to track Rice Man as he believed it would be the hardest horse to beat (pp54 - 55).
27 The horses' positions just before the fall: The falls happened at approximately the 200 metre mark. Mr Snell had crossed jockey Pires on A Dreamer and jockey Smith on Riceman. The position of the horses to his inside were as follows. The field was bunched close to the rail. The field formed loosely staggered two rows front to rear with four horses in the lead. From the rail:
Speechmaker (Peter Mertens)
Tal Jack _(_Kane Bandy)
Colonel Parker (Brendan McCoull)
The Mighty West (Simon Snell) on the outside.
Taxi Tom (Jodi Borrett) was to the rear of Speechmaker
Oceano _(_Kevin Dodge) behind Tal Jack
Riceman (Glenn Smith) behind and to the outside of The Mighty West. Kings Scholar was behind the field.
29 The jockeys: Mr Dodge and Mr Snell were experienced professional jockeys. Both had had experience racing interstate and both had over 1,000 race starts.
30 Mr Snell completed his apprenticeship in about 1996 and he was licensed as a race jockey from then until 2009. In the period April 2004 - April 2009 he had 1,340 race starts. Mr Dodge completed his apprenticeship approximately 20 years ago. In the period August 2002 to April 2007 he had 1,036 starts.
31 The rules: A rule of Australian Racing requires that jockeys endeavour to win:
"AR.135. The rider of every horse shall take all reasonable and permissible measures throughout the race to ensure that his horse is given full opportunity to win or to obtain the best possible place in the field."
32 AR.136 prohibits crossing another horse so as to cause interference:
"AR.136. (1) If a horse -
(a) crosses another horse so as to interfere with that, or any other horse, or
(b) jostles, or itself, or its rider, in any way interferes with another horse or its rider, unless such jostle or interference was caused by some other horse or rider -
such horse and any other horse in the same nomination may be disqualified for the race."
If a placed horse or its rider causes interference to another placed place then the stewards have discretion as to the finishing results of the race: AR 136(2).
"Any rider may be punished if, in the opinion of the Stewards,
(a) He is guilty of careless, reckless, improper, incompetent or foul riding."
34 These rules ensure the fairness of the race and that each horse has the best opportunity to win or to achieve the best possible place.
35 A race advantage: There is a clear advantage to a racing position close to the rail. Mr Dodge gave evidence that in a race over a distance of 1,200 metres, a position one horse off the rail would add a distance of three to four horse lengths compared to a position on the rail. A horse racing a position two horses off the rail has a six to eight lengths disadvantage compared with a horse racing on the rail (p56).
36 The two lengths policy: There was quite a deal of evidence about a requirement referred to by a number of the witnesses as the two lengths "rule". Although various descriptions were given of it, the definitive statement of it was provided by Mr Gleeson (at p318) as the length of a horse standing still from the tip of its nose to its tail, about eight feet or 2.4 metres, and another length of daylight, so "2.4 metres times two". Mr Gleeson went on to note that the definition is clear and people who are involved in racing do not have any difficulty in interpreting the two lengths policy during the running of a race.
37 The two lengths policy was referred to by some of the jockeys as a two lengths rule. Mr Gleeson described it as a policy, not a rule, and that is accepted as a correct characterisation.
38 The policy enables jockeys to avoid breaching the careless and reckless riding rule and the prohibition on causing interference with other horses. The entitlement of other horses to their position and to race without interference was sometimes described as their "rightful running". When horses jump from the barrier they have a path forward and jockeys are entitled to race in that path, considered the jockey's rightful running (Mr Gleeson p321). Other jockeys are not permitted to shift ground inwards or outwards unless they are sufficiently clear of other horses so as not to cause interference with other horses and their "rightful running". The two lengths policy has been developed in order to assist riders so that they know when they can shift ground, either inwards or outwards, without causing interference to horses following them in the field.
39 The one horse length of daylight referred to by Mr Gleeson is judged by reference to the horses in a standing position. It is useful to bear in mind what occurs to this one horse length of daylight during a race when the horses are striding out in a galloping action. The horse's hooves extend to the rear beyond the rump of the horse and forward of the horse's shoulders. When two horses are galloping one behind another and the hooves are fully extended, then the rear hooves of the horse in front and the front hooves of the horse behind both impinge on this one horse length of daylight. The two lengths policy allows for the galloping action and, if judged correctly by the jockey in front, will mean that he or she does not impede the running of the horse behind. If not clear, interference can occur and there is a risk that the horses can clip heels and a fall can result with the risk of serious injury.
40 The policy has been adopted Australia-wide. The evidence established that jockeys are advised of the importance of the policy early in their apprentice training and reminded of the policy at race meetings. At major races and in the course of work as a jockey, the race stewards speak about the policy.
41 What happened: After the start of the race the three horses closest to the rail ridden by jockeys, Mertens, Bandy and McCoull drew closer to the rail and to each other. They were racing on a true and straight course. The tightening of the field (seen in the rear view of the race photographs 2, 3 and 4) is due to jockeys slotting into positions with Mr Dodge and Ms Borrett coming back behind the other runners, giving Mr Smith room to move closer to the inside of the track alongside Messrs Mertens, Bandy and McCoull. As a consequence there was a tight bunch of horses racing at an early stage of the race and while there was no pressure on any of the horses and all horses had their rightful running there was little room to manoeuvre from side to side.
42 Mr Snell crossed clear of Mr Smith and Mr Pires. On an inward path he got closer to Mr McCoull and as he did so he placed the field to his inside under pressure and in response there was further tightening. Mr Snell was intending to try and get to the rail and intending to cross in front of Mr McCoull. Mr Snell rode inwards towards Mr McCoull. Mr McCoull shifted inwards to avoid Mr Snell. Before Mr Snell had crossed in front of Mr McCoull to any extent, Mr Snell straightened up and rode on a forward path.
43 The horse Tal Jack fell. Mr Dodge in the position behind Tal Jack was unable to avoid Tal Jack.
44 The falls: Tal Jack ridden by Kane Bandy fell. Mr Dodge had nowhere to go because the field was so tightly bunched. Tal Jack fell head first and Mr Dodge's mount, Oceano, collided with Tal Jack. Oceano fell throwing Mr Dodge forward onto the ground. Oceano fell forward and in the momentum of the fall rolled over the top of Mr Dodge.
45 There is no dispute that Tal Jack fell as a consequence of Colonel Parker shifting inwards. There is no dispute that as a consequence of Colonel Parker shifting inwards Tal Jack clipped heels with Colonel Parker and fell. There was other evidence indicating that after Colonel Parker shifted inwards there was additional contact with Tal Jack and/or contact with Speechmaker:
•
Tal Jack's shoulders made contact with Colonel Parker's hindquarters.
•
Tal Jack tightened onto, and made contact with Speechmaker, turning Speechmaker slightly outwards and then Tal Jack lost its rightful running, appearing to "clip heels" and fall.
46 A finding about the extent of all of the contact with Tal Jack or contact with Speechmaker is not necessary.
47 Another matter that does not need to be resolved relates to a suggestion that Colonel Parker may have been bumped, presumably by Mr Snell's mount as Mr Snell's mount shifted inwards. In light of the areas of dispute and findings made, this issue is immaterial.
48 The risk of injury resulting from a fall: When considering the risk of injury resulting from a fall it should be borne in mind that the average weight of a horse is approximately 500 kilograms. Mr Dodge stated that a good race horse can travel at speeds around 65 kilometres an hour. Horses race side by side in close proximity to each other.
49 It is the plaintiff's case that when Mr Snell started to cross in front of Mr McCoull he was well short of the two metre clearance required by the policy and he was only a length to a length and a quarter at most in front. That was not a widening gap. Jockeys McCoull and Bandy called out, warning Mr Snell that Mr McCoull had another horse on the inside. Mr Snell moved inwards, ignoring the warning, and thereby causing interference to Mr McCoull's path or "running". Mr McCoull was forced inwards. Mr Snell realised the situation and straightened up, but by then the interference with Tal Jack had occurred.
50 The defendant's case is that when he started to cross in front of Mr McCoull he looked and thought he was two lengths clear. He started to cross. In this regard he made an error of judgment and he was not two lengths clear at the time he crossed. However, it was an error of judgment falling short of negligence. Mr Snell did not realise Kane Bandy was on the inside of Mr McCoull. Mr Snell straightened up giving Mr McCoull room to move outwards. Despite that opportunity Mr McCoull's horse strode inwards. Mr McCoull strode in at least one stride more than he needed to, bearing in mind that Mr Snell had straightened up and eased off the pressure. Furthermore, Mr McCoull's horse was over-racing and not responding to his jockey and this may have contributed to the clearance not being as great as it would have otherwise been_._ Further, it was the extra stride or strides that caused the interference with Tal Jack and the fall that resulted, and if not for the extra stride or strides, the incident might have been avoided.
51 The defendant's case is that Mr Snell's error of judgment was the kind of error that jockeys frequently make and he made it having taken reasonable care and not because of a lack of reasonable care.
Factual issues that have resolved: Mr Snell caused Mr McCoull to shift inwards
52 A number of issues were explored during the trial but then not pursued during the final stages of the trial.
53 During cross-examination of Mr Dodge there was some lengthy enquiry regarding the tightening of the field and whether other riders had created pressure of a kind that would cause interference to Mr McCoull and cause him to shift inwards. There was detailed cross-examination of Mr Dodge about whether stills taken from the films of the race revealed that the progressive bunching of the field was caused by factors other than Mr Snell's riding. Other possible factors advanced during this stage of the trial were, whether the three horses next to the rail were drawing too close together and whether Mr Smith's mount closed in on Mr McCoull and Mr Bandy, and placed Mr McCoull under pressure and pushed him inwards.
54 These factors were refuted by Mr Dodge. Mr Dodge gave evidence that while the three horses ridden by Messrs Mertens, Bandy and McCoull had moved closer together and closer to the rail, they were heading on a straight course. Mr Smith's horse had moved towards Mr Bandy's horse with Mr McCoull's horse well in front of both of them but in between. Mr Dodge explained that Mr Smith's riding did not place Mr Bandy's horse under pressure because he was well behind Mr Bandy's horse, approximately three-quarters of a length behind. In order to push another horse inwards, you have to be on at least level terms or in front of that horse. This meant that if a bump had occurred it would have involved Mr Smith's horse's shoulder contacting Mr McCoull's horse's rump, and this did not pose a risk of a fall[7].
55 As both Mr Bandy's mount and Mr Smith's mount were either side of Mr McCoull but about three quarters of a length behind Mr McCoull, they did not put Mr McCoull's mount under pressure in the sense that a collision with either would not be problematic. It is the position of Mr Snell's horse forward of Mr McCoull that placed Mr McCoull under pressure.
56 Mr Dodge's evidence was persuasive and it is accepted by me. These issues as contributing factors were not pursued in cross-examination of the other jockeys or of Mr Hadley or Mr Gleeson. Mr Snell's evidence did not suggest they were valid considerations. Counsel for the defendant did not suggest in his closing address that there was any contributing factor causing Mr McCoull to deviate from his racing line, other than the pressure he received from Mr Snell.
57 On occasions during the plaintiff's case it seemed that there was an issue about whether or not Mr Snell, in riding towards Mr McCoull in order to cross to the rail, placed actual pressure upon Mr McCoull causing him to shift inwards and deviate from his path, or whether Mr McCoull's evasive response was pre-emptive, and he shifted before he needed to. There was compelling evidence of actual pressure that required evasive action:
•
evidence of Mr McCoull was that Mr Snell "tightened my horse taking me onto the other runners".
•
Mr Gleeson's evidence based on the videos of the race was that Mr Snell's horse shifted "into his (Mr McCoull's) running".
•
Mr Snell gave evidence and admitted that he had ridden his mount inwards and that had sent Mr McCoull's horse on an inwards path.
58 During closing submissions it was conceded by counsel for the defendant that there was a connection between the defendant's conduct in the race and Mr Dodge's fall. It is plain that there is no issue that Mr Snell rode his mount so that Colonel Parker was placed under pressure, was taken inwards and deviated from his racing line.
59 I add that, regardless of the concession made, I find that Mr McCoull's mount deviated from his racing line and turned inwards as a consequence of the pressure from Mr Snell. It was the proximity of Mr Snell's mount forward and laterally to his outside that caused him to lose his rightful running. While Mr Snell had not yet crossed Mr McCoull or even partially crossed in front of McCoull, his horse was drawing closer and on an inward path and his position forward of Mr McCoull placed Mr McCoull under actual pressure to shift away.
60 Most of the factual issues in this case on liability could be simplistically categorised as matters of detail of what happened in the moments before the fall. A list of these factual issues is as follows:
•
Whether Mr Snell had a proper look before shifting towards Mr McCoull.
•
The clearance, with regard to the two lengths policy, between Mr Snell's mount and Mr McCoull's mount as Mr Snell's mount began to shift inwards.
•
Whether Mr McCoull's mount and Mr Snell's mount were maintaining the same pace or whether Mr Snell was "going away".
•
Whether Messrs McCoull and Bandy called out to Snell as a warning not to cross.
•
What Mr Snell saw regarding his proximity to Mr McCoull and other jockeys before and as he shifted inwards.
•
Whether Mr McCoull's mount was "over-racing".
•
Whether once Mr Snell straightened up Mr McCoull had an opportunity to ease the pressure.
•
The purpose of the two lengths policy and whether the purpose of it is safety or preventing interference.
62 The plaintiff's case regarding liability consisted of the evidence of jockeys Mr Dodge, Mr McCoull and Mr Bandy, and expert witnesses Mr Gleeson and Mr Hadley. Mr Snell was the only witness for the defendant. I will consider the evidence of the witnesses in some detail. The video footage of the race taken from four different camera angles was tendered during the plaintiff's case. Two videos are taken side on to the track, one from the rear of the field and one from the front. A slow motion version of all films was tendered. Stills taken from the videos were also tendered and referred to as photographs. A steward's inquiry was chaired by Mr Hadley and a transcript of that inquiry was provided.
63 The transcript of the inquiry was provided. It runs for 15 pages. The inquiry was held on 10 February 2007. Mr Dodge had only recently been discharged from hospital. The format of the inquiry was relatively informal. There were interruptions to the proceedings so that jockeys could race. An aspect of Mr Snell's evidence was not transcribed due to an interruption caused by the radio. Jockeys Dodge, McCoull and Snell gave evidence. Mr Bandy was not available. The inquiry commenced with Mr Dodge giving a brief account of the incident. The Chairman then sought an account from Mr McCoull and Mr Snell. These three accounts were all brief. Early in the proceedings the videos of the race were played. The jockeys viewed the videos and then provided an account based on what they had seen in the videos. There was some further questioning by the Chairman.
64 To a large extent the evidence that the three jockeys gave during the trial was consistent with the evidence they gave in the inquiry with issues more amply dealt with at the trial. It is not necessary or helpful to recount all the evidence given at the inquiry. In summary, it can be said that there was a focus on the movements of Mr Snell's mount and Mr McCoull's mount in the moments before the fall, involving the pressure applied by Mr Snell, whether he "carried in" Mr McCoull's mount, and whether once Mr Snell straightened his mount, Mr McCoull could have straightened up earlier avoiding striding in as far as he did. There was also consideration given to whether McCoull's mount "over-raced". Some reference will be made to aspects of the evidence given during the inquiry when reviewing the evidence given by the jockeys at the trial.
65 At the conclusion of the inquiry, Mr Snell was charged with careless riding under AR 137. It is noted in this context that careless riding is the least serious charge that can be brought under rule 137(a).
66 Mr Snell reserved his plea. He was found guilty of the charge and suspended for four race meetings. There was evidence that Mr Snell did not appeal.
67 The finding of careless riding made against the defendant as a result of the Stewards' inquiry does not assist the plaintiff in proving that the defendant was negligent. It is no more than a finding by a tribunal based on the evidence before it, that the defendant has breached a rule of racing. In a similar fashion, a finding by Mr Hadley that Mr Snell breached the two lengths policy does not advance the plaintiff's case. An assessment of whether Mr Snell breached the two lengths policy must be based on the evidence in this trial. Furthermore, even if I determine upon the evidence before me that Mr Snell did not comply with a rule or policy of racing that non-compliance does determine the issue of negligence (Rootes v Shelton [1967] HCA 39; (1967) 116 CLR 383, per Kitto J at 389, Barwick CJ at 385; Kliese v Pelling [1998] QSC 112, per Chesterman J, at 9).
68 Mr Gleeson and Mr Hadley gave evidence based solely on what they had seen on the videos of the race. They were both able to discern movements of the horses, and, to some extent, the jockeys as well that were difficult for a non expert to detect. They were able to draw inferences based on these subtle movements. While, generally speaking, a witness cannot give evidence of what a video shows because it speaks for itself, the interpretation by Mr Gleeson and Mr Hadley went beyond a descriptive account of what was plain to any observer. Their evidence is admissible as they were "people with experience and a practised eye" who were able to detect difficult to see and subtle movements, and attach a certain significance to those movements that would be lost on a lay person: Appo v Stanley [2010] QSC 383 at par[51], Flanders v Small [2000] QDC 461, at pars[13] - [14]; Chesterman J in Kliese v Pelling at 2; and generally see Beswick v Tamarack Pty Ltd [2009] TASSC 109, at [109].
69 Mr Dodge gave evidence about his observations as he was riding in the race, and also evidence about what was shown on the videos and frames that were taken from the video.
70 Mr Dodge gave evidence that his mount started well. He eased back in and got to nearly one horse off the fence, with Rice Man in front and to his outside (54 - 55). He saw The Mighty West being ridden along to try and go forward. He saw Simon Snell riding his mount forward and inward towards the fence. Mr Dodge had about four to five horses ahead of him. Mr Dodge was tucked in behind and to the inside of Brendan McCoull's mount nearly behind Tal Jack. Mr Dodge described what happened as Simon Snell's horse was coming across. The field kept on getting tighter and tighter in front of him. He could see it was getting too tight. The bunching was so severe that there was not room for all the horses to be there, and he could see that unless the pressure was eased so the horses had enough room to gallop, something was going to happen. As the field progressively bunched and tightened his view of Mr Snell became obscured because of his position.
71 He had a glance to his inside and outside to see if he had anywhere to go because the bunching was getting too severe. He explained that at this stage of the race, 200 metres out of the barriers, the horses race at approximately 40 - 45 kilometres an hour. He had horses to his inside and outside. He heard Kane Bandy and Brendon McCoull both calling out to Mr Snell "keep out, keep out" because Mr Snell was coming across and he was not two or two and a half lengths clear to give all the horses room to gallop.
72 The next second Tal Jack fell directly in front of him.
73 During the race Mr Dodge could not tell whether Brendan McCoull's mount was over-racing as he was behind the horse. He had observed Colonel Parker racing lots of times prior to 28 January 2007. Mr Dodge had never observed Colonel Parker to over-race (p96). Mr Dodge described "over-racing" as a horse fighting the rider and when the jockey pulls on the reins to slow the horse down, the horse does not respond and will resist by throwing its head profusely or shake its head from side to side. Mr Dodge had viewed the video of the race and he had seen Colonel Parker's head "come up" a little bit (p97). Mr Dodge saw Colonel Parker open its mouth a little bit which would be consistent with a response to the jockey trying to slow the horse. He gave evidence that he did not believe that the horse was over-racing.
74 Mr Dodge was cross-examined about the jockey's obligation in Mr Snell's situation. He agreed that you have to look if you are going to move inwards and it is necessary to make a judgment about whether you are sufficiently clear to move in. He also agreed that it is a judgment that has to be made in a very, very short space of time. Mr Dodge pointed out that jockeys are trained to make those judgments.
75 Mr Dodge was cross-examined about frame 8 and what it shows about the location of Kane Bandy's mount. His evidence was that Mr Bandy was about half to three-quarters of a length inside Mr McCoull's horse. Mr Dodge gave further evidence regarding this frame and stated that Mr McCoull is going in because Mr Snell's heels are in front of him. "If Brendan McCoull was to keep a straight course he would clip Simon Snell's heels at that stage and fall himself" (p169). He was challenged about that, and it was put that Mr Snell was "outside" Mr McCoull, and Mr Dodge stated that he was "only just". He maintained that Mr McCoull's horse is in a position where he is "getting close" to clipping the rear heels of Mr Snell's horse.
76 It was suggested to Mr Dodge that he did not hear any calling out by Mr McCoull or Mr Bandy to Mr Snell because it was a windy day and that made it difficult to hear calling out. Mr Dodge did not agree that it was difficult to hear. Mr Dodge heard them both call out "stay out Snelly, stay out Snelly" or "keep out".
77 After seeing the video of the race during the inquiry Mr Dodge noted:
•
Jockey Snell has ridden inwards to try and cross Mr McCoull and that he was "not clear" of Brendon McCoull.
•
While he (Snell) did "pull off" he (McCoull) had already started the shift inward and it was "too late".
78 It is noted that during the inquiry Mr Dodge did not mention any calling out by the jockeys before the incident. It is also noted that at this stage Mr Dodge, as a consequence of his injuries, was in "a lot of pain" and "on a lot of medication" for pain relief.
79 Brendan McCoull described Mr Snell racing on the outside. He had crossed down to the inside, "tightened my horse and taken me in onto the other runners" (p205). Mr McCoull gave evidence that he saw him coming and, "I called out to let him know that (a) I was there and (b) there were horses on my inside." He gave evidence that he could not recall the exact words he used - whether he called out just "Simon" or "inside". Mr McCoull's evidence was that after calling out he could not recall any reaction from Mr Snell, "I think his horse sort of kept coming inwards and probably pushed me in marginally still".
80 When challenged in cross-examination about whether he had called out to Mr Snell he was definite that he had, and he believed Kane Bandy had called out as well. He went on to explain why it is common for jockeys to call out (p213):
"It's something that I always do if a horse is looking like it's going to interfere with you, especially if you have other runners on your inside and you've got an obligation to let the other rider know that's coming across that they'll - you have horses on your inside 'cause sometimes if a rider on your outside might not know how many horses you have on your inside they might just see the horse itself and believe they can push me in a horse or so when they're not actually able to do so."
81 Mr McCoull gave evidence that Mr Snell's mount was well inside two lengths and only about a length in front because his horse's rump was probably at or just forward of Mr McCoull's mount's shoulders. Mr McCoull described restraining his horse because it looked like Mr Snell was not going to stop: "I've tried to ease my mount back in a straight line so he's able to actually cross and clear and not cause any interference" (p206).
82 Mr McCoull was shown the film of the race during his evidence and described Mr Snell's shift inwards: Mr Snell's horse was on an inward path and "coming across onto my horse, taking it in a fraction onto Kane Bandy's horse", Tal Jack.
83 Mr McCoull stated that his horse was not over-racing in the sense of fighting the restraint. Mr McCoull was shown a slow motion film and head-on view of the race and he was asked to identify the moment when his mount's head comes up (24:18). The significance of a horse tossing its head is that it can be a sign that the horse is fighting the restraint. Mr McCoull stopped the film to show when he was restraining his horse. The film shows the horse raising its head but it does not toss its head about at all. Mr McCoull explained that the reason the horse raised its head was because he restrained him because Mr Snell, on his outside, was coming across. Mr McCoull explained that "over-racing" does not mean a situation where a horse is eased back because of pressure from outsiders but "because the horse is racing keener than you would otherwise normally race without getting interference" (p217).
84 During cross-examination Mr McCoull was asked about the distance between Mr Snell's mount and his mount with reference to the two lengths policy. He was challenged about his evidence of the possibility of rump to shoulder contact. He was shown photographs 17 and 18 and he agreed that at that stage there was no possibility of such contact, and that the horses were further apart than that. Mr McCoull drew attention to the fact that those photographs showed that, at that point, Mr Snell was only one and a quarter lengths clear as opposed to two lengths.
85 Mr McCoull noted photographs 17 and 18 showed the strides of the two horses overlapped and that he was inside the heels of Mr Snell's mount although not very far. He explained that the point where you have front legs and back legs around the same area is most dangerous in terms of the horses "clipping heels" and that is where you are likely to be brought down.
The evidence given by Brendon McCoull at the inquiry
86 Mr McCoull stated that as Simon Snell moved forward and came across he took Mr McCoull in a bit and there was not any "room for error". Mr McCoull stated that he tried to ease out of the situation but he just was not able to ease his horse back sufficiently and he was "carried inwards" by Mr Snell's horse.
87 Mr McCoull accepted that it was possible that after he was carried in by Mr Snell, Mr Snell relieved the pressure and Mr McCoull's horse probably kept carrying in for a stride.
88 Mr McCoull was asked about whether his horse was over-racing, at 9, transcript of inquiry:
"MR TYSON: ... Mr McCoull was your horse over racing or was his head carriage due to you taking hold at the time?
MR MCCOULL: I believe, like probably a bit of both, I've elected to take hold and he didn't come back underneath me as on the tape
MR TYSON: So it was a result of you taking hold in the first place, not the fact that you over raced in the first place that his head carriage became high and he opened his mouth?
MR MCCOULL: I would say that's fair."
89 It is noted that during the inquiry Mr McCoull did not mention that he had called out to Mr Snell.
90 Kane Bandy gave evidence that he was racing about three quarters of a length to a length behind Mr McCoull's mount and on his inside. He gave evidence of his observations at the critical stage:
"Right. Now you've mentioned pressure from the outside what did you see or hear?......Initially I couldn't see the horse racing outside Brendon because he was racing diagonally across from me, he was blocking my view, but I did hear Brendon call out twice and - which made me become alert that there was obviously a horse coming across and at the last minute I was - it came into my vision and I called out myself and no sooner had that happened the horse fell."
91 Mr Bandy gave evidence that the horse coming across was ridden by Simon Snell and that he called out "Simon". He did not accept that Mr Snell might not have heard him. He said when he saw Simon's mount it was just over a length in front of Mr McCoull's mount.
92 Mr Bandy gave evidence that Brendan McCoull tried to relieve the pressure and ease back off the horse that was crossing in front by checking his mount back, but it happened too quickly for Mr McCoull to be able to ease any pressure and he was therefore taken in. Kane Bandy gave evidence that he did not notice Mr McCoull's horse over-racing.
93 As previously noted, Mr Bandy did not give evidence at the Stewards' inquiry.
94 Mr Gleeson gave evidence of his long association with the racing industry. At the time of giving evidence he was a director of Tasmanian Racing. He was Chairman of Stewards for the Southwest District Association in Victoria in 1977. He was appointed to the panel of the Victorian Racing Club in 1978, and Deputy Chairman of Stewards in 1983, and Chairman of Stewards in 1996. When Racing Victoria was formed he was appointed to the dual role of Director of Integrity Services and Chairman of Stewards in 2000 and he held that role until his retirement until July 2008. The duties of stewards in Tasmania and Victoria are the same, to uphold the Australian Rules of Racing. He has been formally involved in the appointment of the Racing Board in New South Wales and the Racing Appeals Deputy Chairman in Tasmania. Mr Gleeson has extensive experience officiating overseas[8].
95 Mr Gleeson was called as an expert witness who had been shown the video footage of the race, taken from four different camera angles. His evidence comprised of his description of the movements of the horses during the race and his opinion regarding the cause of the falls. His report regarding these matters was tendered in evidence. The material parts of the report stated:
" ... I believe the incident occurred at approximately the 1000 metre mark of the 1200 metre race because Jockey Simon Snell rode his mount (The Mighty West) inwards when not sufficiently clear of Brendan McCoull's mount Colonel Parker, this action took Colonel Parker inwards, ... because of the shift from the outside Tal Jack lost its rightful running and then appeared to clip heels and fall. Kevin Dodge's mount Oceano which was following was unable to avoid the fallen horse and rider also fell. Whilst Simon Snell did make an effort to straighten his mount (The Mighty West) in my opinion it was too late as the tightening to Colonel Parker, Tal Jack and Speechmaker had already occurred.
All riders are notified before they commence race riding and continually throughout their careers of their obligation when shifting ground either inwards or outwards to ensure the horses they are riding are clear (2 lengths) of following horses so as to avoid interfering with them.
In my view when Simon Snell rode his mount inwards he was 1 to 1.25 lengths clear of the horse racing on his inside, Colonel Parker and his riding was the cause of the incident occurring resulting in Tal Jack and Oceano falling."
96 Mr Gleeson gave evidence expanding upon various aspects of his report relating to Simon Snell's movement shifting inwards:
•
In terms of the two lengths clearance, Simon Snell's horse's hind legs and Brendon McCoull's horse's front legs overlapped considerably. This meant that when Mr Snell shifted in Mr McCoull had no option but to go in. Mr McCoull could not shift out and he could not maintain his position, otherwise he may clip Mr Snell's horse's heels and fall himself.
•
Simon Snell's mount was not "going away" from the horses on his inside and was maintaining his position. If he had been drawing away then the interference would have been reduced to some extent (p320).
•
Simon Snell's horse was tractable and responded when he was turned out but the "damage" had been done by the time Mr Snell took that action.
97 Mr Gleeson gave evidence regarding the location of the incident as occurring approximately 200 metres from the barriers in light of the objective that jockeys have to get to the rail. Mr Gleeson commented that the track at Elwick has a straight run until the first turn at approximately the 650 metre mark. There is time for the horses to shift inwards after the horses have sorted themselves out before the first turn. Generally, the horses continue racing in straight lines until the field sorts itself out. The leaders go forward and the horses who wish to race back in the field take up that position. Mr Gleeson noted that Mr Snell was in a "hurry" to get close to the rail with a long run still ahead of him before the first turn. Mr Gleeson also noted that at the time Mr Snell shifted inwards, the horses had not "sorted themselves out".
98 Mr Gleeson was asked to comment on Mr Snell's manoeuvre of shifting inwards in terms of a continuum of carelessness capturing breaches of the two lengths policy. He described Mr Snell's manoeuvre as a higher level breach of the policy and higher level carelessness, noting that Mr Snell was only one length in front of the horses, the pace of the horses, that he was not going away, and that the horses were still 350 - 400 metres away from having to negotiate the first turn. He gave evidence that it was "relatively rare" that riders shift in causing interference when only one length in front.
99 I treat Mr Gleeson's evidence describing Mr Snell's shift inwards as a "higher level of carelessness", as an opinion confined to the issue of the two lengths policy, and as a description of the nature of the breach as to whether it was a clear breach or a marginal breach of the policy. Of course, whether there has been a clear breach of the two lengths policy, or indeed any other policy, or a rule of racing, is not determinative of the question of whether there has been negligence by a jockey: Rootes v Shelton (supra) per Barwick CJ at 385_;_ Appo v Stanley (supra), par[44]. Depending on the circumstances it may be that a clear breach of the two lengths policy does not amount to negligence.
100 In cross-examination Mr Gleeson was asked about the judgment that jockeys make regarding whether they are two lengths clear. He gave evidence that jockeys often make errors of judgment as to whether they are two lengths clear. Riders are regularly charged with careless riding, and that most frequently, careless riding is caused by riders shifting in when they are not two lengths clear.
101 Mr Gleeson agreed that jockeys only have a few seconds in which to decide whether they are two lengths clear. Mr Gleeson gave evidence that once Mr Snell looked, there was no possible chance of him making an error as to whether he was two lengths clear or not, because Mr McCoull's mount was only one length behind and right at the rump of Mr Snell's mount.
102 He was pressed about whether or not errors of judgment with regard to the policy occur when jockeys take care, and he gave the following evidence at p330:
"Well, that error of judgment can occur even if a jockey takes care to make the judgment.........Well, it depends. If he endeavours to take care and misses it by a length, he hasn't taken care.
...
It's looking and making a judgment about distance?........Yes, but you can't - it's not an error if you miss it by a length. If you miss the judgment by a length, that's more than an error. It's a serious error."
103 Mr Gleeson gave evidence regarding the practice of calling out by jockeys. Jockeys will call out if they feel that they are losing their rightful running when another horse is shifting ground. Jockeys call out to alert the rider who is shifting ground that there are horses on his inside. Generally, if that happens, riders will then take the required action to ease off.
104 Mr Gleeson was asked about whether Mr McCoull's horse over-raced to some extent contributing to the incident. Mr Gleeson's evidence was that the horse certainly lifted its head but that was when Brendan McCoull took hold of his horse as Simon Snell's horse on his outside is "shifting into his running". Mr Gleeson gave evidence that it is not unusual for a horse to throw its head up when it is being restrained in that manner. He agreed that Mr McCoull would be the best judge as to whether his horse over-raced.
105 Wade Lindsay Hadley is Chairman of the Thoroughbred Stewards, Tasmania, and has held that position for the past five and a half years. He was on duty as Chairman of Stewards on 28 January 2007 at Elwick and he chaired the inquiry involving Mr Dodge's fall. The transcript records Mr Hadley informing Mr Snell that he had a charge to answer under AR 137, of careless riding. Mr Hadley gave evidence that he believed Mr Snell had a charge to answer based on the evidence that was taken during the inquiry, and the evidence from the video of the race that was shown during the inquiry. He had also reviewed the video of the race recently before the trial and he adhered to his belief as expressed in the charge. The charge read out by Hadley during the inquiry was, in part, as follows:
"In that whilst riding THE MIGHTY WEST in race 8 the Moorilla Estate Stakes at approximately the thousand metres you rode your mount inwards resulting in COLONEL PARKER Brendon McCoull being carried in onto Kane Bandy TAL JACK ...".
106 Mr Hadley expressed the view during his evidence at the trial that Mr Snell had come across when he was "insufficiently clear of the runners to his inside" which led to the incident. His settled view of the clearance that Mr Snell had was a length and a quarter, and that he did not see any gap greater than that.
107 Mr Hadley gave evidence about the issue of over-racing by Mr McCoull. Mr Hadley's evidence was that Mr McCoull took evasive action when Mr Snell came across quickly. He stated that it was quite clear that leading up to the incident Mr McCoull's mount was tracking in a straight line and it was not until he received the pressure from the outside from Mr Snell's mount that he attempted to ease his mount.
108 Mr Hadley conceded that over-racing might have the effect of closing the gap which Mr Snell established. However, he gave evidence that he believed that in this case, the gap was one and a quarter lengths and maintaining.
109 Mr Hadley agreed that Mr Snell gave evidence to the inquiry, not recorded due to a radio interruption, to the effect that he had taken care to see that he was clear to cross, and Mr Snell had said that he believed that he was clear.
110 Mr Hadley was asked questions regarding whether interference by crossing is a common occurrence. He conceded that a breach of the two lengths policy is a frequent occurrence but he did not concede that the degree of interference in this case was common. In re-examination he explained that a crossing at one and a quarter lengths and maintaining is "rarely seen".
111 Simon Snell gave evidence-in-chief relating to the frequency with which jockeys breach the two lengths rule. He has seen the two lengths policy breached by other jockeys "all the time". He has seen it result in falls and result in injury. Mr Snell stated that falls caused by breach of the policy often occur.
112 Mr Snell described the unfolding of the race to the point of Mr Dodge's fall. From the outset he wanted to race forward. He crossed Mr Pires and Mr Smith "okay" and he crossed Brendon McCoull "okay". In doing so he looked, "I think it was three or four times, with one real good look". He was looking to make sure that he was clear of all the riders to his inside. The films of the race show him looking and he has got his head turned to the side for a number of strides.
113 Later Mr Snell gave evidence that he had not crossed into Mr McCoull's path. His account in this regard was based on what he had seen in the films of the race.
114 Mr Snell gave evidence acknowledging that it was clear from the films of the race that he was not two lengths clear. His evidence was as follows:
"But after seeing the film I believe that I wasn't the full two lengths required to cross Jockey McCoull and I therefore, at that stage, when I was looking, I straightened my mount, and after looking at the film it looks to me that Jockey McCoull's horse got over racing, that's why I straightened my mount. But, I'd stepped in for one stride which had sent McCoull in on a inward path, and two strides later there was a fall. I believe McCoull's horse had a big part in this situation for two reasons; it's over raced and also laid away from my horse - ".
115 Mr Snell gave evidence that his description of Mr McCoull's horse as over-racing was also based on what he had seen in the video of the race and not his memory of observations during the race. Mr Snell gave evidence that he straightened his horse and that had the effect of opening the gap between him and Mr McCoull's horse, giving Mr McCoull an opportunity to move out. Mr Snell gave evidence that, despite that opportunity, Mr McCoull's horse did not move out immediately but continued on inwards for two strides.
116 Mr Snell stated that when he looked to determine if he was clear to cross Mr McCoull he saw two horses on the inside: Colonel Parker and Speechmaker. Having seen the film of the race he accepted Mr Bandy, riding Tal Jack, was also on his inside, but he did not see him during the race because his vision was obscured by Mr McCoull.
117 Mr Snell's evidence was that he did not hear anyone calling out to him. He gave evidence that the conditions were very windy, with the wind coming off the Derwent and going towards the grandstand, from his right to left, affecting the ability of jockeys to hear during the race.
118 In cross-examination Mr Snell was asked whether he had a good look before he crossed Mr Pires with the implication that he did not have a good look when he shifted towards Mr McCoull. Mr Snell agreed that he looked before crossing Mr Pires and maintained that he had had a "good look" when he was about to cross Mr McCoull.
119 Mr Snell said in his evidence that during the race he had not realised that he was not clear to cross Mr McCoull. During cross-examination Mr Snell maintained that during the race, and before seeing the video of the race, he thought he had been "clear" of Mr McCoull.
120 As noted, Mr Snell's evidence acknowledged that it was apparent from the video of the race that he was not in fact the required two lengths clear of Mr McCoull. Noting that Mr Snell straightened his mount rather than continuing on his path to the rail, he was asked questions about why he had done so. His response was that he had done so because he had not given Mr McCoull the required two lengths. This response was at odds with Mr Snell's account that during the race he thought he was right to cross in front of Mr McCoull, and that it was not until he had seen the video of the race that it was evident that he was not two lengths clear. The cross-examination probed whether he straightened because he heard the calls from the other jockeys, but Mr Snell maintained that he did not hear any calls.
121 Given that Mr Snell's evidence was that his awareness that he was not two lengths clear came from the video of the race, I was left without an adequate explanation for why Mr Snell had straightened his horse rather than continuing on his inward path to the rail.
The evidence given by Mr Snell at the inquiry
122 The account from Mr Snell during the inquiry based upon his memory of what had happened in the race was very minimal. During the race he had not been aware of the fall/s and all he could remember was that he had looked three times.
123 After he watched the video he gave further information to the inquiry. Focussing on the final moment before the fall, the evidence Mr Snell gave was:
•
Mr Snell believed he was free to cross and was "gunna do it real quick".
•
Jockey McCoull's mount was over-racing and it went in and caused the interference.
•
He agreed that Jockey McCoull got inside his heels and he said that was why he "come off", ie shifted outwards.
•
Jockey McCoull's horse "obviously laid away" from Snell's horse, and Brendan took hold of it and that was when Snell shifted outwards.
124 When jockey Snell was asked whether he corrected too late he said, "I'd say yes sir, I wasn't aware of Kane Bandy inside at the time". When asked a question by Mr Dodge as to whether, if he had pulled out two strides earlier, then the interference probably would not have taken place, he said "one stride".
125 Mr Read sought to cross-examine Mr Snell about his credibility and in particular, that he had robbed the Blenheim Inn at Longford on a date in the previous 12 months and stolen cash from the premises. The line of cross-examination was objected to and the evidence was received on a provisional basis, with an indication that a ruling would be given at a later time. It is convenient to provide that ruling in these reasons.
126 The Evidence Act 2001, s102, provides that evidence that is relevant only to a witness's credibility is not admissible. There is no suggestion that the evidence relates to any issue other than Mr Snell's credibility. Section 103 creates an exception in the case of cross-examination, providing the evidence has substantial probative value. In determining whether the evidence has substantial probative value, some of the matters that the court is to have regard to are set out in s103(2):
"(2) Without limiting the matters that the court may have regard to for the purposes of subsection (1), it is to have regard to -
(a) whether the evidence tends to prove that the witness knowingly or recklessly made a false representation when the witness was under an obligation to tell the truth; and
(b) the period that has elapsed since the acts or events to which the evidence relates were done or occurred."
127 The crime of robbery is a blatant act of dishonesty. The credibility of Mr Snell arises as a consideration in this trial. The recent criminal activity bears upon the issue of whether his account is to be believed in terms of his inherent honesty as a witness. Of course, it does not follow that because a man has robbed premises he will give false evidence. A person convicted of such a crime may tell the truth. I consider that the evidence is relevant to an assessment as to whether Mr Snell should be relied upon to provide a truthful account. I conclude that the evidence has "substantial probative value". This ruling addresses the potential relevance of the evidence and whether there is a real prospect or likelihood that the evidence may have a bearing on the issue of credibility. The ruling does not take account of whether the line of cross-examination was successful in undermining his credibility, ie whether counsel received the answers he was seeking: per Hulme J at par[58] in R v Lumsden [2003] NSWCCA 83, and R v Beattie (1996) 40 NSWLR 155 at 163. The evidence is admitted.
128 It transpired that the line of cross-examination has not in fact undermined Mr Snell's credibility as a witness. The answers he gave regarding the robbery did not indicate that his criminal conduct was representative of his character generally, or that it was revealing of his honesty as a witness in these proceedings. There was a suggestion in the answers he gave that his conduct was the product of unusual pressures or circumstances although, understandably, that was not explored in cross-examination. The line of questioning did not assist in my ultimate assessment of Mr Snell's reliability as a witness. I found that the evidence Mr Snell gave with regard to the incident was revealing with regard to his reliability, and it provided the basis for my assessment of his credibility and reliability.
129 In determining the contentious detail of what occurred during the race, the principal focus has been the reliability of the accounts given by the jockeys and an assessment of the accuracy of their recall of the events.
130 I made no adverse findings regarding the truthfulness and the honesty of Mr Dodge, Mr Snell and the jockeys who have given evidence in this trial. Similarly, the transcript of the Stewards' inquiry revealed that a frank account of the events was given by them.
131 I found the evidence of the plaintiff's witnesses Mr Dodge, Mr McCoull and Mr Bandy was given in a conscientious and fair manner. For example, in Mr Dodge's case he was asked in cross-examination about whether he saw Mr Snell looking to his left at any time. Mr Dodge explained that his view was probably obscured at that stage, but he volunteered that he had seen on the video that Mr Snell looked once. He described that it was one good look and that he may have glanced across on other occasions but he had not detected that on the video.
132 Largely, the accounts given by the plaintiff's witnesses did not appear to stray beyond the limitations of their observations and their recollections, and they did not seem to overstate facts. Their accounts were consistent. I found them persuasive.
133 I found Mr Snell's memory of the critical moments before the incident was extremely limited. It was evident that he remembered a few isolated matters such as looking to his inside, thinking he was right to cross in front of Mr McCoull and not realising that there was another jockey to the inside of Mr McCoull. Another key matter he remembered occurring at a slightly later stage of the race was straightening up, thereby allowing some space between himself and Mr McCoull.
134 Otherwise Mr Snell's memory of this stage of the events was lacking in content and almost non-existent. His evidence did not suggest that he even had a recollection of the distance of his mount from Mr McCoull's mount, and yet there is no dispute that he looked before shifting inwards to cross.
135 Some of the evidence given by Mr Snell was ill-considered and incautious, and there were some inconsistencies in the account he gave. For example, he spoke about crossing Mr McCoull, and then later, when asked about that, he stated he had not crossed him at all. It is noted that his first poorly considered answer was not to his advantage. The unreliable aspects of his evidence were not calculated to improve his position.
136 Parts of the account Mr Snell gave in Court of his observations were influenced by the videos of the race, and he could not extract a memory of those observations untainted by the videos. For example, he could not extract a memory of why he had straightened up. Despite persistent cross-examination about why he had straightened up he kept referring to knowledge he had acquired from watching the videos of the race and which obviously he did not have at the time of the race. There was a genuine level of confusion and inability to detect the logic underpinning the questions in cross-examination.
137 The objective evidence of the videos and the stills taken from the videos of the race is helpful in resolving some of the issues.
138 The evidence of Wade Hadley and Mr Gleeson was largely unchallenged. I found they gave objective, sound evidence which proved helpful in resolving some of the issues.
139 I find that as Mr Snell reached Mr McCoull and before shifting inwards he looked to his inside. It was a definite turning of his head to look and not a glance. Mr Snell maintained he looked three to four times. If he looked three times before deciding to cross Mr McCoull, the other two looks must have been glances and cannot be seen on the film or the photographs. In light of my findings, whether or not Mr Snell looked once or three times, is immaterial.
140 The question of whether Mr Snell not just looked but had a proper look, paying attention to what he saw, needs to be considered in light of my findings about the two lengths policy, and clearance of Mr McCoull when Mr Snell decided to cross and shifted inwards. I will make findings about this later in the context of conclusions about the facts.
141 I accept Mr Snell's evidence that he did not see Mr Bandy and he did not know there was a horse to the inside of Mr McCoull between Mr Mertens and Mr McCoull. Mr Bandy was about three quarters of a length to a length behind Mr McCoull's mount. Mr Snell's view was obscured by Mr McCoull and Mr Bandy's view of Mr Snell was obscured by Mr McCoull.
142 Implicit in Mr Snell's evidence that he did not see Mr Bandy and he did not know another horse was there when he proceeded to cross to the rail was that Mr Snell made an assumption that there was not another horse there. This assumption was unsound.
143 Mr Snell's sighting was not of two horses and a good clear view of empty track in between, but a sighting of Mr McCoull and Mr Bandy, with an obscured view of the location between and to the rear of the two horses. He did not see Mr Bandy's horse in its location because he could not see that location. It was evident to anyone in Mr Snell's position, if they had had a proper look, that their view was obscured.
144 Mr Snell's assumption that there were only two horses to his inside was made by him in a situation where there was a real prospect that there was another horse to his inside obscured from view, given:
•
It was early in the race when the horses had not sorted themselves out.
•
He could see the horses were tightly bunched and not spread out.
•
It was too early in the race for any of the horses to have fallen behind.
•
He was in the outside barrier and all the horses had been to his inside, he had only crossed in front of Mr Pires and Mr Smith and the rest of the field was to still to his inside.
145 In making the assumption and in proceeding to cross to the rail, Mr Snell did not pay regard to the prospect of another horse to the inside of Mr McCoull and thus, three horses to cross to get to the rail. The implication of Mr Snell's assumption was that he did not appreciate how tight the situation was for the three horses, and that if he put pressure on Mr McCoull, there was no room for Mr McCoull to move across. Mr Snell having looked and not seen Mr Bandy, then continued to take an inward path to the rail.
Clearance with regard to the two lengths policy
146 There is no dispute that Mr Snell was not two lengths clear of Mr McCoull as he started to shift across. Mr Snell conceded in his evidence that, having viewed the videos of the race, he was not two lengths clear. The question is the degree of clearance as Mr Snell applied pressure and shifted inwards. A related question is Mr Snell's state of mind, whether he believed he was two lengths clear and whether he made an error of judgment that was understandable given the circumstances he was in.
147 The evidence of Mr McCoull regarding his memory of the clearance between his mount and Mr Snell's mount was that Mr Snell was well short of two lengths clear. In assessing Mr McCoull's evidence I am conscious that his evidence at one stage, that the rump of Mr Snell's horse was "probably" at or just forward of the shoulders of his horse, was not accurate, and that the horses were further apart than that. I found Mr McCoull's evidence of a distance of approximately a length in front was reliable. He was acutely affected by the situation that was unfolding and the clearance was an important matter from his point of view and, as was evident from his evidence, the focus of his attention. I noted that Mr McCoull's conduct in calling out and restraining his mount is consistent with him having observed the degree of clearance of approximately one length.
148 Mr Bandy saw Mr Snell at the last moment just before the fall. He was also alert to the situation that was unfolding. He also described Mr Snell as probably just over a length in front.
149 The videos of the race and the stills show that Mr McCoull and Mr Snell's mount are very close. The videos and the frames reveal the proximity of the hooves of Mr Snell's mount and Mr McCoull's mount and that they were close to clipping (frames 8 and 18, taken close in time, show the overlap of hooves). It was the fact that the rear heels of Mr Snell's mount were inside or close to inside the front heels of Mr McCoull's mount that created the pressure for Mr McCoull[9].
150 Photograph 18, taken close in time to the fall shows the proximity of the horses and a distance of about one and a quarter lengths. In photographs 19, 20 and 21 the horses are no further apart and may be even closer. The evidence of Mr Gleeson was persuasive as to the distance between the horses. Mr Hadley's account on this point, based on the video, was consistent with that given by Mr Gleeson.
151 Mr Snell's evidence was that, "I crossed Brendon McCoull okay" and later, when he clarified that he had not actually crossed Mr McCoull, his evidence was that he "thought he was clear of jockey McCoull". In cross-examination he was asked about what he meant by "clear" and he gave evidence that he meant he had cleared the two lengths rule.
152 His evidence that he believed he was two lengths clear of Mr McCoull, if accepted by me, would support the proposition that he was close to two lengths clear. However I found his evidence regarding his belief unconvincing. It lacked content and detail. Other than saying that during the race he looked, and thought he was clear to cross, there was no other detail regarding his observations. It was evident that the matter of clearance between his mount and Mr McCoull's mount as he applied pressure to Mr McCoull and shifted to his inside, was not the focus of his attention.
153 It was apparent that a prominent consideration in Mr Snell's decision to cross was the fact that he did not know Mr Bandy was there. He emphasised this consideration during the Stewards' inquiry. In his evidence during the trial it also seemed to be a matter that assumed some significance and was relevant to his assessment that he was "right to cross". Yet, if he was two lengths clear or more, it would not have mattered if Mr Bandy was there or not.
154 I found his observation of the clearance between his mount and McCoull's mount was non-existent other than a recollection that he was "right to cross".
155 During the inquiry Mr Snell conceded after viewing the video that he "got inside the heels" of Colonel Parker. He not only conceded that but gave it as an explanation for why he straightened up. That concession by the defendant made at the Stewards' inquiry provides further support for the plaintiff's case that Mr Snell was only approximately one length clear of Mr McCoull's mount.
156 I conclude that Mr Snell was well short of two lengths clear. The evidence of the jockeys, McCoull and Bandy, the videos and frames, all support the conclusion that he was only one and a quarter lengths clear at most. The concession made by Mr Snell at the Stewards' inquiry supports that conclusion. The evidence of Mr Gleeson and Mr Hadley and their interpretation of the films of the race that the horses were a length and a quarter apart, support this finding. Indeed, the evidence supporting the finding is overwhelming and the only evidence to the contrary is Mr Snell's impoverished recollection.
157 I conclude that Mr Snell was at most one and a quarter lengths clear when he shifted inwards on his path to the rail. Given Mr Snell's forward position there was a risk of clipping heels.
158 I also make the finding that it was obvious to a jockey in Mr Snell's position that he was well short of the two lengths clearance. The distance of only one and a quarter lengths meant that the nose of Mr McCoull's mount was approximately just behind the rump of Mr Snell's mount. That would have been a telling indicator to a jockey that he was well short of the necessary clearance. As Mr Gleeson said this could not be put down to an error of judgment. The fact that Mr Snell thought he was clear to cross indicates that he either did not pay attention to how close he was to Mr McCoull's mount when it was abundantly clear, or that his assessment that he was clear to cross was not about whether he considered he was complying with the two lengths policy but that he thought he could reach the rail without incident. His answers at the Stewards' inquiry indicate an impetuous decision to cross with a mindset that he would make it to the rail if he was quick enough. He may have assumed that Mr McCoull could move across if need be. As noted, it seems from Mr Snell's evidence during the trial and the Stewards' inquiry that a prime consideration in his decision to cross was that he did not know Mr Bandy was there. Seemingly, the apparent absence of Mr Bandy contributed to Mr Snell's assessment that he could effect the crossing.
159 There was a suggestion on behalf of the defendant that the two lengths policy is really no more than a guide or rule of thumb. The evidence from Mr Gleeson persuaded me that it is not correct to refer to the policy as a rule of thumb. If jockeys do not comply with the policy, a charge of interference or reckless riding will generally result. If jockeys do not comply with the policy, and interference is caused, then jockeys are charged with careless or reckless riding. It was submitted for the defendant that breaches of the two lengths policy often go unpunished. The evidence established that there are instances where jockeys are not penalised. It is a matter of degree, and instances where there is no interference caused to other riders will mean that they are not guilty of careless riding. An example of a situation where a rider may not be charged with careless riding was given where the margin is very close to two lengths, especially if the gap is widening.
160 It was submitted for the defendant that the evidence establishes that if a penalty is imposed for breach of the two lengths policy, its purpose is to punish interference with the fair running of the race. It has nothing to do with safety of jockeys or horses. In support of that submission there were references to answers given in cross-examination by Mr Dodge, Mr McCoull, Mr Aitken, Mr Hadley and Mr Bandy.
161 In the passages relied upon, the witnesses agreed that a common basis for charges of careless riding are breaches of the two lengths policy, and that crossing and breaches of the two lengths rule is a frequent occurrence. Mr Hadley agreed that while breaches of the two lengths policy would result in falls in less than 5 percent of cases, breaches are serious as they compromise the fairness of the race. It is clear that Mr Hadley was speaking generally about breaches of the policy, including situations where there are no safety concerns. Mr Gleeson agreed that the Australian Rules of Racing particularly, rules 135, 136 and 137, are about the fairness of the race and to ensure that each horse had the best opportunity to win, or to achieve the best possible place. The answers given by the witnesses do not exclude the purpose of safety. There can be no doubt that the two lengths policy is also concerned with safety. The fact that rules 135, 136 and 137 are concerned with the fair running of the race, does not preclude safety of horses and jockeys as one of the objectives of the rules. If that were a serious contention it could have been put to Mr Gleeson and it was not. Breaches of the policy capture a spectrum of conduct. At one end of the spectrum is conduct that does not even interfere with the rightful running of a horse. Other breaches may compromise rightful running but not safety. More serious breaches will do both. Whether or not a breach of the policy compromises the safety of a horse and jockey will depend upon the nature of the breach.
162 The evidence given by Mr Dodge, Mr McCoull and Mr Bandy was that both Mr McCoull and Mr Bandy called out to Mr Snell.
163 Mr Dodge's evidence was that he heard both Mr Bandy and Mr McCoull calling out to Mr Snell words to the effect of "keep out, keep out" or "stay out Snelly, stay out Snelly".
164 I found that the fact that Mr Dodge did not mention calling out during the Stewards' inquiry did not undermine Mr Dodge's account that there had been calling out by the jockeys during the race. The account volunteered by Mr Dodge at the outset of the inquiry was relatively brief, and not given as a comprehensive account of all that occurred. At an early stage of the inquiry the videos of the race were played, and thereafter the focus was on what could be seen on the videos, as well as specific questions raised by the jockeys or the Chairman. The question of calling out did not arise as an issue that was specifically addressed at the inquiry. Moreover, it is not surprising, given his medical condition, that Mr Dodge did not recount all the details of the incident.
165 The evidence of Mr McCoull was consistent with Mr Dodge's evidence. He gave evidence that he called out, but could not recall the exact words he used, whether he called out just "Simon" or "inside". His evidence was that he could not recall any reaction from Mr Snell, that his horse continued coming inwards, and Mr McCoull then tried to ease his mount.
166 Mr Bandy gave evidence that he heard Mr McCoull call out twice and then at the last moment when Mr Snell came into view Mr Bandy called out "Simon". Mr Snell's mount was just over a length in front of McCoull's mount. Mr McCoull tried to relieve the pressure by checking his mount back but he was taken in.
167 Mr Snell's evidence was that he did not hear anyone calling out to him. He gave evidence that the conditions were very windy. As noted his recollection of the incident was very poor.
168 I am satisfied that both Mr McCoull and Mr Bandy called out to Mr Snell. They were paying attention to the situation that was developing as Mr Snell placed more and more pressure on the field by proceeding on his inward path. Mr Snell's riding was a matter of some concern, impinging on their own running and potentially their safety. In light of their perspective, it would be a natural response for them to call out. It was easily heard by the three jockeys all in close proximity, and I am satisfied that it was heard by Mr Snell (who was within the same proximity) or it would have been heard by him if he had been paying attention.
169 I find that there was time for Mr Snell to respond to the first call by Mr McCoull but he did not react and alter his course. As Mr McCoull described in his evidence, there was no reaction from Mr Snell to his calling out and he continued on his inward path. The evidence persuades me that there was an opportunity for Mr Snell to respond, but he did not, and instead, he continued to ride on his inward path. While he did straighten up it was not at this stage. The calling out by Mr Bandy occurred very late, just before the fall. It is unclear whether Mr Snell responded to that call, straightening up at that time, or whether he straightened up in response to something else.
170 I find in accordance with the evidence of Mr McCoull and the assessment of Mr Gleeson and Mr Hadley, that as a consequence of the pressure from Mr Snell's mount, Mr McCoull tried to restrain his mount, attempting to increase the distance between the horses. This is not a contentious finding. Mr Snell did not dispute that Mr McCoull tried to restrain his horse due to the pressure from his action of shifting inwards, and indeed, his account at the inquiry is consistent with that sequence of events.
171 Mr McCoull tried to steady his mount by pulling back on the reins. His mount, Colonel Parker, lifted its head in response to the restraint. The restraint applied by Mr McCoull was to reduce his horse's pace because of the pressure from his outside from Mr Snell, and in the words of Mr Gleeson, as Mr Snell was "shifting into his running". Mr McCoull had the rightful running and was entitled to be there; Mr McCoull should not have needed to restrain his horse; evasive action should not have been necessary; and he only did so because Mr Snell caused him to lose his rightful running.
172 It is arguable whether the horse's response in these circumstances is properly described as "over-racing". Whether the label applies or not is immaterial.
The gap: whether Mr Snell was maintaining and whether Mr McCoull closed the gap
173 There was no evidence from Mr Snell, or any other source, suggesting that Mr Snell's mount was drawing away as he shifted inwards. Mr Snell did not suggest that he was drawing away or that Mr McCoull was falling back. Mr Gleeson's evidence was that Mr Snell's mount was maintaining the distance with McCoull's mount, and not going away. His evidence was not challenged in cross-examination. I accept Mr Gleeson's assessment.
174 Another issue is whether the forward gap as Mr Snell's horse shifted inwards was closed by over-racing by Mr McCoull's mount. The effect of Mr Gleeson's evidence was that, while over-racing by Mr McCoull's mount may in theory have the effect of closing the gap, he believed that the gap between Mr Snell and Mr McCoull stayed approximately the same. Mr Snell's evidence, based on watching the video, was that Mr McCoull's horse was over-racing and that Mr McCoull did not straighten up when he had the opportunity to do so. It seemed that Mr Snell was asserting that the significance of over-racing was more to do with the fact that it contributed to Mr McCoull's failure to take up the opportunity he created, rather than that Mr McCoull closed the gap.
175 Mr Snell did not assert that the forward gap between his horse and McCoull's horse was closed, although he did not discount that either. I accept Mr Gleeson's evidence on this point and conclude that the gap was not closed by over-racing.
Did Mr McCoull have the opportunity to ease the pressure and move away from Mr Bandy and Tal Jack?
176 The defence case was that Mr Snell straightened his horse, which had the effect of opening a gap laterally between his horse and Mr McCoull's horse, giving him an opportunity to move outwards and away from Mr Bandy's horse. It is the defence case that Mr McCoull's horse did not move out immediately and continued on inwards for two strides, resulting in the interference with Mr Bandy's horse.
177 I reject the defence proposition that the failure of Mr McCoull to straighten up after Mr Snell straightened up contributed to the fall. I reject the proposition that there was an opportunity for Mr McCoull to avoid contact with Mr Bandy's mount.
178 Further, I doubt Mr Snell's memory of the incident, especially noting that during the race he was entirely unaware of the fall or, indeed, any adverse outcome of his riding. I also doubt an assessment made by Mr Snell based on his viewing of the videos of the race. In particular, I am dubious about his capacity to be accurate that Mr McCoull's mount went inwards for two strides and that those two strides were critical to the incident. In any event, the defence position on this point overlooks that the taking up of an opportunity after Mr Snell straightened up could not occur "immediately", and allowance needed to be made for reaction time, ie, time for Mr McCoull to react and his mount to react to any signal from its rider.
179 Mr Gleeson's assessment, contained in his report, was that Mr Snell's attempt to rectify the situation and ease the pressure by moving out was "too late as the tightening to Colonel Parker, Tal Jack and Speechmaker had already occurred". I accept Mr Gleeson's assessment that Mr Snell's straightening up occurred too late.
180 Even if Mr McCoull could have straightened up one or two strides earlier than he did, and avoided the fall, his failure to do so does not detract from Mr Snell's responsibility for the interference with Mr Bandy and the fall that resulted.
181 While my detailed findings are set out above, I summarise the main conclusions I draw on the factual issues, as follows:
•
Mr Snell looked to his inside and it was plain for him to see that he was only one and a quarter lengths clear of Mr McCoull. He was maintaining that clearance. The nose of McCoull's mount was almost on his horse's tail. Mr Snell would know that that meant his mount's rear heels were inside or extremely close to McCoull's mount's heels.
•
While Mr Snell looked, he did not have a proper look. He either paid no attention to what he was looking at and failed to observe the lack of clearance between his horse and Colonel Parker, or he paid attention and proceeded regardless, taking a calculated risk, despite the fact that the distance of only one and a quarter lengths was fraught with risk.
•
Mr Snell assumed he could shift Mr McCoull across laterally some distance if he interfered with Mr McCoull's running. He could not see Kane Bandy and Tal Jack to the inside of Mr McCoull's mount as his view of them was obscured by Mr McCoull. It was evident to him that his view was obscured. Regardless of these considerations, he started to shift across.
•
There were calls from Mr McCoull which were made in sufficient time to amount to a warning to Mr Snell. Mr Snell either ignored those calls or they did not register because he was not paying attention. Either way he was not as mindful as he should have been of the obvious prospect of a rider to the inside of Mr McCoull being obscured from view. In addition, he was not mindful of the fact that a reason for the call may have been to alert him to the fact that he was causing interference and that there was not enough room. He also was not alert to the fact that the call/s were to inform him of the presence of another rider. He continued on his inward path, ignoring the call/s and/or not paying attention to them, pursuing his objective to get to the rail.
•
In shifting inwards Mr Snell got so close side by side to Mr McCoull, that an experienced jockey in McCoull's position would take evasive action in order to avoid clipping heels and in doing so would deviate from his rightful running. Mr McCoull then took evasive action by restraining his mount. Mr Snell then realised that he had created a situation of peril for the other riders because he was inside Mr McCoull's heels and/or he heard Mr Bandy's call, and with that realisation, he straightened up. However, it was too late to avoid the impact on the other riders and the falls occurred.
•
Mr Snell shifted inwards when the clearance was obviously inadequate and there was a real risk of heels clipping and Mr McCoull's mount falling. It was a breach of the two lengths policy of a kind which is relatively rare. It was particularly dangerous because Mr McCoull's capacity to avoid the danger was minimal. He had no room to his inside and, while he could restrain his mount, he had horses racing and close behind him, and in reality barely any time to increase the distance between him and Mr Snell. Mr McCoull did what he could by restraining his mount, but he could not prevent the fall.
•
Although Mr Snell's decision to cross was based on a judgment that was made in a very short space of time, it was a decision that jockeys are trained and well-equipped to make.
•
There was no subjective justification for such a poor decision to shift inwards. It was very early in the race and there was plenty of time to reach the rail before the first turn in the track.
182 I turn now to apply the CL Act and supplementary common law principles regarding aspects of negligence, and then I turn to a focus on the issue regarding whether there has been a breach of duty.
183 Jockeys owe a duty of care to their fellow jockeys to take reasonable care to avoid creating a foreseeable risk of injury.
184 By shifting inwards Mr Snell exposed Mr Dodge, and the jockeys riding on his inside, to a foreseeable risk of injury. The risk of harm was "not insignificant". In fact, it was significant. In the circumstances that existed, including the number of horses racing in a tight bunch, there was a clear prospect that another horse or horses would be adversely affected if Mr McCoull's horse lost its rightful running. There was the risk that one of the horses affected by the manoeuvre would clip hooves with another horse. As a consequence of Mr Snell's actions of shifting inwards, with a clearance of no more than one and a quarter lengths, there was an obvious risk of a jockey falling and serious injuries resulting. Clearly, the fall and injuries of the type suffered by Mr Dodge were foreseeable. It was a risk of harm of which Mr Snell was both well aware, and of which he ought reasonably to have known.
185 It is not necessary that the precise set of events which produces the harm be envisaged. The plaintiff does not need to prove that the precise manner in which his injuries were sustained was foreseeable: Chapman v Hearse [1961] HCA 46; (1961) 106 CLR 112. It is sufficient if injury to a jockey, as a class of person, to which the plaintiff belongs, was reasonably foreseeable. Accordingly, the precise sequence of events, including the nature of contact with Tal Jack, does not need to be proved or that it was foreseeable that Tal Jack would be the horse that would fall, causing the plaintiff's mount to collide with it and also fall.
Relevant principles in assessing reasonable response
186 The Court must consider what a reasonable jockey in the defendant's position would have done by way of response to the risk. In assessing what is reasonable, it is necessary to take into account all the circumstances; that the jockeys are engaged in a sport, that the sport of horse-racing has inherent risks, the rules and conventions that govern the sport of racing, and the imperative that every jockey must use his best endeavours to win: Rootes v Shelton at 389 - 390, Kliese v Pelling at pars[4] - [7]; Appo v Stanley (supra), at 39.
187 Jockeys are required to avoid exposing their fellow jockeys to some additional risk, that is to say, "a risk to which his participation in the sport could not be said, necessarily or ordinarily, to expose a participant", per Taylor J in Rootes v Shelton, at 392_._
188 In having regard to the rules and conventions that govern the sport of racing, the rule that is relevant in this case is Australian Rule of Racing 136(1), preventing interference. The application of this rule involves reference to the policy adopted by jockeys Australia-wide, known as the "the two lengths policy". This policy is also of relevance. As previously noted, a breach of a rule and/or a policy of racing is not determinative of whether the duty of care has been breached.
189 In assessing the standard of care expected of jockeys, the difficult circumstances under which they operate must be taken into account. As stated by Chesterman J in Kliese v Pelling, at [12]:
"Thoroughbred horse racing is a competitive business which is played for high stakes. Its participants are large animals ridden by small men at high speed in close proximity. The opportunity for injury is abundant and the choices available to jockeys to avoid or reduce risk are limited. It is, no doubt, for these reasons that claims for damages arising out of horse races have been rare and are likely to remain so. But where evidence reveals that a rider has failed to take reasonable care which could and therefore should have been taken, the court is required by law to make a finding of negligence."
190 It goes without saying that each case must be judged on its own facts and it is unhelpful to compare and contrast the facts as they are found to be in the case in question, with conclusions reached regarding negligence in other cases involving jockeys.
191 The imperative that each jockey must try to win is a factor which has to be considered. As noted by Chesterman J in Kliese v Pelling, at [6], "the rules of the racing clubs require the riders to get the best out of their mounts and to win if they can. The owners and trainers require the same. The public which bestows its money on bookmakers do so in the expectation that every jockey on every horse is doing his best to win." The imperative is a "conflicting responsibility" which the defendant has and which must be taken into account as an important factor in applying the reasonable response test from Wyong v Shirt (supra), and which is preserved by the CL Act, s11(2)[10]. However, it does not displace other considerations in the balancing exercise that must be undertaken: Kliese v Pelling at [7]: "Racing is the sport of kings, not of savages. Endeavouring to win does not entitle a jockey to ignore the safety of fellow riders".
192 The other factors which are to be taken into account pursuant to the CL Act, s11(2), in determining whether there has been a breach of the duty to take care are, the probability that the harm would occur if care were not taken, the likely seriousness of the harm, the burden of taking precautions to avoid the risk of harm, and the potential net benefit of the activity that exposes others to the risk of harm. These factors restate the Wyong formula of the magnitude of the risk, the likelihood of its occurrence, and the difficulty or inconvenience of avoiding it: Wyong v Shirt (supra) per Mason J.
193 The reasonable response to the risk and the considerations in s11(2) of the CL Act must be assessed prospectively and not with the wisdom of hindsight: Vairy v Wyong Shire Council [2005] HCA 62; (2005) 223 CLR 422 at 461 - 463; Adeels (supra), at 31.
194 As noted above, when Mr Snell shifted his mount inwards towards Mr McCoull, he was aware or ought reasonably to have been aware he was endangering his fellow jockeys. The defendant's case is that the shift inwards was an error of judgment when Mr Snell had exercised reasonable care, noting that he looked and believed he was clear to cross. I do not accept that a belief by Mr Snell that he was clear to cross, in the circumstances as I have found them to be, could sensibly be described as a mere error of judgment. I reject the defendant's proposition that it was an error of judgment made after taking care.
195 As previously noted, Mr Snell's belief that he was clear to cross could only have been held by him if, having looked, he failed to make an observation, register what he was looking at, or if he had regard to the proximity of Mr McCoull's horse at only one and a quarter lengths away, but he decided he would continue on regardless. That is not the kind of "error of judgment" that a reasonably competent professional jockey acting with ordinary care would have made.
196 The probability of harm occurring if care were not taken was significant. When the manoeuvre brings a jockey directly in front of another horse and so close that their hooves may clip. or so close that the horse is forced from its rightful running and into close proximity with the path of other horses, the risk is high. There is a real risk that a horse will be brought down and, if a fall eventuates in circumstances such as this case where horses are running in close proximity, the consequences may well be grave.
197 There was no difficulty in Mr Snell avoiding the risk. The solution was simple and that was to wait, stay in his forward position, gain some ground on the horses to his inside, and then cross.
198 While reaching the rail is the objective of every jockey and, speaking generally, delaying a crossing could mean that a jockey's chances of winning the race are reduced, that was not a pressing consideration in this case. The crossing attempted by Mr Snell did not present as an isolated opportunity to reach the rail. He had time to gain some distance on the horses to his inside and for the field to sort itself out before the first turn.
199 I must say that in this case the risk of harm was so obvious to a reasonable jockey, and the prospect of serious bodily injury so evident, that even if Mr Snell had been running out of opportunities to reach the rail, it would not have provided him with a justification for putting his fellow jockeys at risk as he did in this case. In the circumstances of this case, his conflicting responsibility to win and reach the rail could not weigh in favour of such a reckless act.
200 Besides the imperative of winning the race there was no other burden of delaying the manoeuvre. There was no potential net benefit of Mr Snell's activity exposing others to the risk of harm (CL Act, s11(2)(d)).
201 I am satisfied that Mr Snell exposed Mr Dodge to a "risk to which his participation in the sport could not be said, necessarily or ordinarily, to expose a participant" (Rootes v Shelton, at 392).
202 A reasonable jockey in the position of Mr Snell exercising ordinary care and skill, would have responded to the risk to his fellow jockey/s by not shifting inwards. I conclude that Mr Snell breached his duty of care to Mr Dodge when he rode The Mighty West and shifted in close to the rightful running of Mr McCoull's mount.
203 The defendant concedes his conduct caused the fall and the injuries that resulted. Regardless of that concession, the plaintiff has established that as a consequence of Mr Snell's failure to take reasonable care, Mr McCoull shifted inwards and clipped heels with Tal Jack, and Mr Dodge's mount fell, resulting in injury to Mr Dodge. The breach of duty was a necessary element of the occurrence of the harm to Mr Dodge (s13(1)(a)) and it is appropriate for the scope of the liability of Mr Snell to extend to the harm caused to Mr Dodge (s13((1)(b)). Mr Snell's negligence caused Mr Dodge's injuries.
204 The defendant relies upon the defence of voluntary assumption of risk. The following assertions are pleaded in the defence:
"13 In the knowledge and full appreciation as to the dangerous nature of being a professional jockey participating in a horse race, the Plaintiff voluntarily accepted the risks associated with riding in the said race and is therefore prohibited from claiming damages in respect of the incident. The Defendant relies on the doctrine of Volenti Non Fit Injuria."
205 The defence of voluntary assumption of risk is grounded in common law principles, with some recent changes brought into effect by the CL Act. The common law principles are well-settled and did not give rise to any debate. The CL Act has application to actions involving damages for breach of duty causing harm once a defence of voluntary assumption of risk is raised by a defendant. The effect of the CL Act is to make some modifications to the law regarding voluntary assumption of risk. The effect of the statutory provisions is uncontentious, as is the proper approach to be taken in applying the common law with the statutory modifications. The contentious issue is the question of whether the defence has been established.
Legal principles and the Civil Liability Act
206 To successfully establish the defence of voluntary assumption of risk, or volenti non fit injuria, it must be shown that the plaintiff freely and voluntarily, with full knowledge of the nature and extent of the risk he ran, agreed to incur that risk: per Wills J, Osborne v London and North Western Railway Company (1888) 21 QBD 220 at 224, approved by the Privy Council in Letang v Ottawa Electric Railway Company [1926] AC 725 at 731. Knowledge that a risk exists is necessary but not sufficient to establish the defence; there must be a full appreciation of the risk and also voluntary acceptance of it Smith v Baker & Sons [1891] UKHL 2; [1891] AC 325, at 362, Roggenkamp v Bennett [1950] HCA 23; (1950) 80 CLR 292 at 300, Monie v Commonwealth of Australia [2007] NSWCA 230 at pars[74] - [75], Carey v Lake Macquarie City Council [2007] NSWCA 4 at [76].
207 Thus there are three elements of the defence of "volenti" which must be proved by the defendant (as summarised by McClellan CJ in Carey at [85]):
1 That the plaintiff perceived the existence of the danger;
3 That he or she freely and voluntarily agreed to accept the risk.
208 At common law a defendant must prove that the plaintiff had actual knowledge of the risk and fully appreciated the danger. The risk that a plaintiff must have an awareness of is not a generalised risk of injury; the defendant must prove that the plaintiff appreciated the risk of the defendant's breach of duty. Moreover, because the defence involves voluntary consent, the defendant must show that the plaintiff freely and voluntarily accepted that risk: Carey at par[86] and Colin Ball v Transport Commission, unreported, TASSC, Zeeman J, 18 September 1991, B52/1991 at 14.
209 In Ball, Zeeman J stated at 14 that the "defendant must establish that the plaintiff voluntarily assumed the legal risk of injury ie consented to the breach of duty complained of". Zeeman J referred to the expression of the principle by Street CJ in Hewertson v Courtaulds (Australia) Ltd [1957] SR (NSW) 398 at 401:
"It is the assumption of the legal risk which the defendant must prove in order to escape liability, and not the mere assumption of the physical risk involved in carrying out of a dangerous operation in industry, and there must be some material from which the jury could draw the inference that the deceased in the present case consented to the breach of duty now complained of, that is to say, consented to the defendant's negligence and voluntarily incurred the risk which would be entailed as a consequence of such negligence."
210 This element of the defence is captured by the question, did the plaintiff consent to the defendant's negligence?
211 The CL Act impacts on the first two elements of the defence regarding the plaintiff's awareness and appreciation of the risk, and operates to facilitate proof of these elements. The CL Act creates a presumption of knowledge as to the plaintiff's awareness of the danger in a category of cases involving "obvious risks". The presumption is set out in s16 of the CL Act which provides:
"16 Persons suffering harm presumed to be aware of obvious risks
(1) If, in an action for damages for breach of duty causing harm, a defence of voluntary assumption of risk is raised by the defendant and the risk is an obvious risk, the plaintiff is taken to have been aware of the existence of the risk unless the plaintiff proves, on the balance of probabilities, that he or she was not aware of the existence of the risk.
(2) For the purpose of this section, a person is aware of the existence of a risk if the person is aware of the existence of the type or kind of risk, even if the person is not aware of the precise nature, extent or manner of occurrence of the risk."
212 The key phrase "obvious risk" is defined in the CL Act as:
"15 Meaning of 'obvious risk'
(1) For the purpose of this Division, an
'obvious risk' to a person who suffers harm is a risk that, in the circumstances, would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of that person.
(2) Obvious risks include risks that are patent or a matter of common knowledge.
(3) A risk of something occurring can be an obvious risk even though it has a low probability of occurring.
(4) A risk can be an obvious risk even if the risk (or a condition or circumstance that gives rise to the risk) is not prominent, conspicuous or physically observable.
(5) A risk is not an obvious risk merely because a warning about the risk has been given."
213 The effect of s15(1) is that the plaintiff is presumed to be aware of a risk where the risk would have been obvious to a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff. Since the CL Act came into effect, the defence of voluntary assumption of risk will not fail merely because the plaintiff's awareness of the risk did not extend to the precise risk that eventuated (s16(2)).
214 It should be noted that the effect of the CL Act is confined to facilitating proof of the first two elements of the defence of "volenti" and does not impinge on the third element of the defence, that the plaintiff must freely and voluntarily agree to accept the risk.
Discussion regarding the elements of the defence
215 I will now consider if the statutory presumption regarding the first and second elements of the defence is invoked ("obvious risk" and knowledge) and, if so, whether it has been displaced by the plaintiff and, further, whether the third element has been proved (acceptance of risk). In this regard I have been assisted by the thorough consideration of the defence of "volenti" by McClellan CJ at CL in Carey. In Carey, McClellan CJ at CL [70] - [99] reviewed the defence at common law in light of the statutory provisions in the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). The New South Wales provisions regarding the defence of volenti are, for all intents and purposes, the same as the provisions in the Tasmanian Act.
216 Before the statutory presumption may apply, the risk must qualify as an "obvious risk". In deciding whether in a particular case the risk qualifies as an "obvious risk", the starting point is a statement of the risk that eventuated in that case. The risk that caused the injury must be identified and defined with precision: Carey at par[91], CG Maloney Pty Ltd v Hutton-Potts [2006] NSWCA 136 at [172] - [175].
217 Adopting this approach it is necessary to avoid generalised statements about the risk that eventuated and to focus on the specific risk that caused the plaintiff's injury. By way of example, to describe the risk in this case as the risk that jockeys are injured during horse races, would be too imprecise and not adequately identify the risk that matured and caused Mr Dodge's injury. A more precise definition of the risk that eventuated in this case is that of a horse and rider falling as a consequence of a jockey shifting in close to the running of another horse with a clearance of no more than one and a quarter lengths, and when the field was tightly bunched at the rail. This characterisation of the risk may be refined further by including facts such as the jockey at fault ignoring warning calls from the jockeys in his pathway.
218 It has been held that the test of a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff comprehends the particular circumstances in which the risk materialised and the harm was suffered (Fallas v Mourlas (supra), per Tobias JA, at [97] - [98], Carey, at 94). The test also attributes the notional person with the knowledge and experience of the plaintiff : Great Lakes Shire Council v Dederer; Roads & Traffic Authority of NSW v Dederer [2006] NSWCA 101, at 151, 152 and 164; Santow JA in CG Maloney Pty Ltd v Hutton-Potts (supra), at 106 - 108_._
219 Counsel for the plaintiff submitted that the evidence does not support a finding that it was common knowledge that a jockey might cut in when only one and a quarter lengths clear and "maintaining". This is a factor to bear in mind but it is not determinative. While the CL Act provides that "obvious risk" includes risks that are patent or common knowledge (s16(2)), the definition does not stipulate that a risk has to be patent or common knowledge to amount to an "obvious risk".
220 To qualify as an obvious risk for the purposes of s15, the risk may have a low probability of occurring (s15(3)). Even though there is ample evidence that it is rare for jockeys to shift inwards when only one and a quarter lengths clear and "maintaining" it does not mean the risk is not an "obvious risk".
221 A person in the position of the plaintiff would encompass the plaintiff's experience as a professional jockey, his level of competency and age, his knowledge of the track at Elwick, a familiarity with the two lengths policy and awareness of the frequency with which it is breached, and an awareness of the spectrum of consequences that can occur if the policy is breached, including falls and injuries in the case of more extreme breaches. A jockey in the plaintiff's position would also be aware of the realities of racing, the race imperative driving each jockey to try to win, and the practical advantage of reaching the rail.
222 I consider that the risk that eventuated was obvious to a reasonable person in the plaintiff's position regardless of how specifically and with what degree of particularity the circumstances in which the risk materialised are described. While there was a low probability of the risk materialising it qualifies as an "obvious risk".
223 Therefore, the plaintiff is taken to be aware of the existence of the risk unless, as provided in s16(1), he proves on the balance of probabilities that he was not aware of the risk. To do this he would need to show that he was not even aware of the existence of the type or kind of risk that eventuated. The kind of risk that eventuated was the risk of a jockey shifting inwards when well short of two lengths clearance, causing a horse to fall. Every experienced jockey would be aware of that risk. The evidence does not suggest that Mr Dodge was not aware of that kind of risk. The presumption under s16 of the CL Act that the plaintiff was aware of the risk of harm that eventuated has not been displaced.
224 The first two elements of the defence of volenti have been proved. The question that remains is whether the plaintiff accepted the risk of the defendant's negligence? (See Ball, per Zeeman J, at 14.)
225 The defendant bears the burden of persuading me of the third element, acceptance of the risk by the plaintiff.
226 Mr Read submitted that the evidence indicates an acknowledgment of risk by the plaintiff but not consent to the harm being occasioned as a consequence. Mr Read referred me to evidence indicating that jockeys rely on each other not to ride as Mr Snell did. My attention was drawn to evidence of Mr McCoull at 219 of the transcript:
"Would you agree with the proposition that jockeys put their lives on the line each time they start a race?... I think if it was that - if it was - if it was quite that - I mean I believe it's a possibility but I don't - I don't believe it's - I wouldn't go and do it if it was - I felt like every time we going to go out I was putting my life on the line but I do agree that it is a possibility"
227 Further evidence from Mr Snell at transcript 475 - 476:
"You rely upon your fellow jockeys not to cross you within two lengths, don't you?...Yes.
The converse of that of course is that McCoull and the other race riders relied upon you in that regard, didn't they?... They did.
And you knew that before you started to cross, didn't you?... I - I knew about the two lengths rule before I started to cross, yes.
And you knew that your fellow jockeys were relying upon you for their safety not to breach it, didn't you?...Yes.
And you knew that your fellow jockeys depended upon you hearing their warnings for their safety, didn't you?... If I can hear them, yes.
But you - you knew that they depended on it so you were listening as hard as you could, weren't you?... I was."
228 While there is no direct evidence that the plaintiff voluntarily accepted the risk of the defendant's negligent conduct, the defendant relies on a necessary inference, drawing my attention to the fact that voluntary assumption of risk will rarely be the subject of direct evidence. It is submitted on behalf of the defendant that "the plaintiff voluntarily undertook all of the risks that commonly attended a horse race between horses ridden by professional jockeys. He was under no compulsion to ride in this or any other race other than the compulsion inherent in his free and voluntary choice to take up and continue in that occupation" (written submissions p13).
229 Whether or not the inference may be drawn depends on the facts of each case. It is useful to have regard to some cases where the courts have declined to draw an inference. It may be noted that in those cases the facts indicate a degree of compulsion or interference with the freedom of choice. It will be seen from these cases that the question that emerges in this regard is, did the plaintiff have a real and practical choice as to whether he exposed himself to that danger?
Examples of cases involving a degree of compulsion
230 In Ball, Zeeman J considered a risk that arose from the plaintiff's employment and plant and equipment with which he was required to work. In considering the requirement that the plaintiff voluntarily incurred the risk Zeeman J, referred to Bowster v Rowley Regis Corporation [1944] 1 KB 476, Scott LJ, and the following extract from the judgment, at 479:
"For the purpose of the rule, if it be a rule, a man cannot be said to be truly 'willing' unless he is in a position to choose freely, and freedom of choice predicates, not only full knowledge of the circumstances on which the exercise of choice is conditioned, so that he may be able to choose wisely, but with the absence from his mind of any feeling of constraint so that nothing shall interfere with the freedom of his will. Without purporting to lay down any rule of universal application, I venture to doubt whether the maxim can very often apply in circumstances of an injury to a servant by the negligence of his master."
231 In Standfield v Uhr [1964] Qd R 66, the plaintiff jockey lost his leg when the horse he was riding at a barrier trial shied at a tractor. Mansfield CJ referred to voluntary assumption of risk as conveying the notion "that a plaintiff freely entering into a relation with a defendant which he knows to be fraught with risk of injury to himself, has agreed to absolve the latter from the obligation of care ordinarily incident thereto."
232 Referring to the facts of that case, Mansfield CJ concluded as follows at 75:
"As to the latter contention, I hold the view that the evidence establishes that the plaintiff was in a dilemma, or in what he might properly assume to be a dilemma, and that he cannot be held to have voluntarily assumed the risk of injury by taking the course which he took.
From the time the plaintiff saw the tractor after the horses commenced galloping until the time when he came into the danger area, only a few seconds had elapsed. His horse was at that time leading the field and if he had pulled up there was a likelihood that he would have interfered with the horses following and thereby caused danger to them and their riders as well as himself. A decision, if there can be said to have been a decision, to continue to gallop, taken in that space of time and in those circumstances, is not in my view a free and voluntary decision because he had no real or practical choice."
233 The cases of Bowster v Rowley Regis Corporation and Standfield v Uhr were considered by McClellan CJ at CL in Carey. The facts of the case involved a cyclist who had collided with a bollard on a pathway at night-time in circumstances where the plaintiff was aware of the risk of hitting unexpected obstacles but failed to advert to the risk when he made the decision to ride on the path. McClellan CJ at CL stated at pars[78] and [79]:
"78 It is not enough to show that a plaintiff merely agreed to accept a risk. The agreement must in a real sense be voluntary. Dixon J stated in The Insurance Commissioner v Joyce [1948] HCA 17; (1948) 77 CLR 39 at 57 that:
' ... under modern authority consent or voluntary assumption of risk is not to be implied where, notwithstanding knowledge, the person concerned has exposed himself to the danger only because of the exigency of the situation in which he stands. If he has no real or practical choice he does not voluntarily consent.'
79 Accordingly, courts have been very reluctant to infer voluntary agreement in cases where the alternatives to accepting the risk are onerous or repugnant, such as where avoiding the risk would require the plaintiff to give up their employment (Smith v Charles Baker & Sons [1891] UKHL 2; [1891] AC 325) or not to rescue another person from danger (Haynes v Harwood & Sons [1935] 1 KB 146 at 157)."
234 In that case McClellan CJ, at par[82], also referred to cases where plaintiffs perceived and fully appreciated a risk but had a genuine belief that the risk would not materialise: Suncorp Insurance & Finance v Blakeney (1993) 18 MVR 361, Canterbury Municipal Council v Taylor [2002] NSWCA 24. In an interesting discussion, McClellan CJ noted the following matters about risks that are obvious to motorists that are not adverted to, at par[104]:
"On a day-to-day basis people expose themselves to known and obvious risks without thinking about them. Everyone knows that when they drive their car there is a risk of being injured by the negligence of other drivers. The risk is obvious but it is not a risk that most people advert to when they get into their cars. It is not a risk that they voluntarily accept, even when their decision to drive is entirely free from external compulsion (such as the need to get to work or to take a relative to hospital and so on). If this were not so then it would be hard to see how, in light of ss 5F and 5G, a driver who is at fault in a collision with another moving vehicle could ever be held to be liable in negligence, except in circumstances where the plaintiff's decision to drive was not free and voluntary in the sense already described. This would have the absurd outcome that people who are injured whilst driving to work could recover from the defendant, whilst people who are injured in exactly the same circumstances could not recover if they were on their way to the cinema, or leaving on a holiday. It is not hard to think of other examples. The point is that a person can be aware of an obvious risk without adverting to it when they expose themselves to the risk."
235 Determining whether an inference of voluntarily acceptance of risk is to be drawn will turn on the facts of each case. The facts of the cases referred to above, are all distinguishable from the present case and it is not a helpful exercise to compare them. However, as illustrations of the application of the test of free and voluntary assent to risk, they assist in an understanding of the test, and likewise the notion of hindrance and impediments that constrain the exercise of choice.
236 The evidence does not give rise to an inference that Mr Dodge voluntarily agreed to or accepted the risk of Mr Snell's negligence. Indeed, the evidence supports a positive conclusion to the contrary. It may be noted that I would have reached that conclusion regardless of the evidence of Mr McCoull and Mr Snell as set out above, that is, without presupposing that all jockeys have the same mindset about the risk that eventuated.
237 The following findings of fact are established by the evidence. It is evident that Mr Dodge would have been aware of the risk of a fall arising from another jockey shifting inwards well short of the two lengths clearance, causing interference and clipping heels. However, his awareness of that risk was in a generalised sense and not the subject of any specific attention or focus; it was merely one of the ways in which he and other jockeys may come to harm; just one of the ways in which other jockeys may ride unsafely putting other jockeys at risk. The risk that materialised was not a risk that he specifically adverted to when he chose to ride on that day, or indeed any day. In this sense, his awareness of it was much like the awareness that motorists have when they set out on a driving journey. His awareness of the risk was accompanied by a belief in his own skill and competence and capacity to manage many situations of risk and, at the outset of the race, a trust of fellow jockeys to ride safely vis-à-vis other jockeys. Furthermore, there was in this case, in a real and practical sense, a lack of choice about the risk. There was nothing that the plaintiff could do to avoid or reduce the risk if he was to work as a successful jockey. I positively conclude that the plaintiff did not voluntarily agree to the risk that eventuated.
238 Accordingly, the defendant has failed to establish the third element of the defence. The defence of volenti fails.
239 Section 20 of the CL Act operates to exclude liability for breach of duty in certain circumstances where a plaintiff was engaged in a dangerous recreational activity. Section 20 provides:
"20 No liability for harm suffered from obvious risks of dangerous recreational activities
(1) A person is not liable for a breach of duty for harm suffered by another person ('the plaintiff') as a result of the materialisation of an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity engaged in by the plaintiff.
(2) This section applies whether or not the plaintiff was aware of the risk."
240 The defendant has pleaded this defence or statutory immunity and the defendant bears the burden of proof with respect to the "necessary factual elements": Fallas (supra), per Basten JA, at 123.
241 The issues raised by counsel in argument give rise to the following questions:
•
Whether the plaintiff was engaged in a recreational activity as defined?
•
Was the risk an obvious risk as defined in s19?
•
Did the harm to the plaintiff result from the materialisation of an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity?
242 It may be noted that it is accepted by the plaintiff that professional horse racing amounts to a dangerous activity. The phrase "dangerous recreational activity" means a recreational activity that involves "a significant degree of risk of physical harm" (CL Act, s19[11]). On the evidence before me there can be no question that the activity of horse racing qualifies as dangerous and satisfies the test in the Act of "a significant risk of physical harm to a person"[12].
Was the plaintiff engaged in a recreational activity?
"'recreational activity' includes -
(a) any sport (whether or not the sport is an organised activity); and
(b) any pursuit or activity engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure."
244 The question that emerges from this trial is whether the activity engaged in by the plaintiff, as a professional sportsman pursuing his occupation, falls within the meaning of "recreational activity". The answer turns on the construction of the CL Act and involves the task of ascertaining the meaning and effect of the words in s19. Despite the fact that the term "recreational activity" and the definition of it is mirrored in similar legislation in Australia, I have not been referred to, or located in my research, any decisions from other jurisdictions which have examined the meaning of "recreational activity" in the context of a dispute about whether the activity engaged in was recreational in nature.
245 The meaning of that provision has been the focus of legal argument. It was argued on behalf of the defendant that horse racing, whether by amateur or professional riders, is a recreational activity within the meaning of s19 of the CL Act. It was argued that the two parts of the definition set out in subpars(a) and (b) are to be read as alternatives despite the use of the word "and" linking the two subparagraphs. It was submitted that dispersive effect is given to the definition, by the word "includes" (Re The Licensing Ordinance (1968) 13 FLR 143 at 146 - 147 per Blackburn J), and by reading the provision in its proper context.
246 It was submitted for the defendant that the phrase "any sport" has a wide application and is not limited to amateur sport. It was argued that if both subpars(a) and (b) need to be satisfied before an activity amounts to a recreational activity, it would have an incongruous result and there is potential for two people in the same sporting activity not to share immunity from liability. It was further submitted for the defendant that horse racing is a sport regardless of whether a jockey makes horse racing his or her occupation and sole or dominant source of income.
247 The arguments for the defendant drew to my attention amendments to the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 ("the WRC Act"), commencing in 2007, affecting jockeys. Previously jockeys had been excluded from workers compensation benefits under the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act, s7. It was submitted that the recent amendments were recognition of the fact, not only that jockeys had previously been excluded from benefits, but also that the nature of horse racing as a sport had the consequence of excluding jockeys from benefits prior to the amendments.
248 It was argued for the plaintiff that the interpretation urged by the defendant leads to a surprising result that could not have been intended. It would mean that professional sportsmen would no longer be able to recover damages from negligent fellow participants. Further, it was submitted that the reforms in the CL Act were not intended to extend to people who participate in activities in the course of their employment, and activities that are not voluntary. It is evident from consideration of the Final Report that the rationale for treating recreational activities and recreational services as a special category justifying reform does not apply to people who participate in recreational activities in the course of their employment (pars4.11 and 4.12). This rationale for the legislation is also evident from the Second Reading Speech.
249 Submissions on behalf of the plaintiff urged an approach that would avoid potential unfairness and injustice. It was submitted that a result that restricted a claimant's common law rights should be avoided because there was not a clear statement in the CL Act to that effect, Grice v State of Queensland [2005] QCA 272; (2006) 1 Qd R 222.
250 On behalf of the plaintiff it was argued that the word "and" in the definition of "recreational activity" should be interpreted conjunctively so that both subparagraphs must apply for the activity to qualify as a recreational activity. The result of this construction is that the words "engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure" in subpar(b) contribute to the meaning of "sport" in subpar(a). The submissions for the plaintiff also relied on the judgment of Ipp JA in Belna Pty Limited v Irwin [2009] NSWCA 46, at pars[13] - [14], as indicating that the two separate limbs of the definition of "recreational activity" have a combined application, and as support for the plaintiff's argument that the word "and" appearing in the definition has a conjunctive effect.
251 I will commence the task of ascertaining the meaning of s19 by considering the principles of statutory interpretation that apply to that task. In Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27, Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ said, at par[47]:
"This Court has stated on many occasions that the task of statutory construction must begin with a consideration of the text itself. Historical considerations and extrinsic materials cannot be relied on to displace the clear meaning of the text. The language which has actually been employed in the text of legislation is the surest guide to legislative intention. The meaning of the text may require consideration of the context, which includes the general purpose and policy of a provision, in particular the mischief it is seeking to remedy."
252 As stated by Brennan CJ, Dawson, Toohey and Gummow JJ in CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd (1997) 187 CLR 384, at 408, instances of general words in a statute being constrained by their context are numerous. Such words may "wear a very different appearance" when read in light of the "mischief which the statute was designed to overcome and of the objects of the legislation". Further, inconvenience or improbability of result may assist the court in preferring to the literal meaning an alternative construction which is reasonably open and more closely conforms to the legislative intent."
253 The process of construction must begin with a consideration of the context. The assistance provided by context does not only arise at some later stage of the process in the event of ambiguity: (CIC Insurance Ltd v Bankstown Football Club Ltd at 408, Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority [1998] HCA 28; (1998) 194 CLR 355, at 381).
254 In Project Blue Sky Inc v Australian Broadcasting Authority (supra) McHugh, Gummow, Kirby and Hayne JJ said at par[78]:
"However, the duty of a court is to give the words of a statutory provision the meaning that the legislature is taken to have intended them to have. Ordinarily, that meaning (the legal meaning) will correspond with the grammatical meaning of the provision. But not always. The context of the words, the consequences of a literal or grammatical construction, the purpose of the statute or the canons of construction may require the words of a legislative provision to be read in a way that does not correspond with the literal or grammatical meaning."
255 It is necessary to prefer a construction that would promote the purpose or object of s19 of the Act: Acts Interpretation Act 1931, s8A.
256 It is permissible to have regard to extrinsic material such as the Final Report or Second Reading speech to provide an interpretation of the provision if the provision is ambiguous or obscure, or to confirm the interpretation conveyed by the ordinary meaning of the provision: Acts Interpretation Act, s8B(1)(a) and (c).
257 The consideration of the meaning of the CL Act, s19, will begin with considering the natural and ordinary meaning of the words in their context. The definition of "recreational activity" is inclusive in nature, signified by the word "includes". Thus the term has a wider application than those activities referred to in (a) and (b). The expansive nature of the definition may be contrasted with the definition of "dangerous recreational activity" in s19 which is confined by the word "means".
258 For various reasons it seems unlikely that Parliament intended (a) and (b) to operate as a dual requirement. If the paragraphs were to operate in this way it would mean that conduct would only amount to a "recreational activity" if it satisfied both (a) and (b) and was both a sport and a pursuit or activity engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure. This would have the effect of limiting the definition of recreational activity to sport. It seems obvious that Parliament sought to extend the section beyond sport. The construction of the provision operating in a dual fashion would also be at odds with the word "any" appearing twice in the provision.
259 It is evident from the wording of the provision that Parliament intended sport to be encompassed within the meaning of "recreational activity" as an additional activity to other pursuits, or activities engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation and leisure. The essence of the plaintiff's submission is that the words "enjoyment, relaxation or leisure" should be seen as qualifying the noun sport. However, the use of separate subparagraphs and the separation of sport from such purposes in the wording of s19 is at least an indication of a contrary intention. As pointed out by Mr Jackson there would have been more concise and effective ways of expressing such a simple proposition.
260 Arguably, too, sport may be engaged in for reasons other than enjoyment, relaxation or leisure. Purposes such as the acquisition of skill, fitness and competition also spring to mind as well as leisure. Alternatively, it might be argued they are all concomitant with the purposes specified in (b): see Belna per Ipp JA at par[14]. I will assume that Mr Jackson's argument is correct and that an activity may amount to a recreational activity if it satisfies subpars(a) or (b) as alternative requirements. Having made that assumption it remains for me to consider the meaning of the provision.
261 The natural and ordinary meaning of the CL Act, s19, regarding "recreational activity" conveys the notion of sport, any kind of sport, as a recreational activity. However, when the provision is read as a whole it is apparent that the word "recreational" has a role in identifying and conveying the reach of the provision and the activities that fall within the provision. The word "recreational" imparts meaning to the word "sport".
262 In considering the ordinary meaning of the word "recreational" it is useful to have regard to dictionary definitions. The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary provides, relevant to this context:
"2 The action of recreating (oneself or another), or fact of being recreated, by some pleasant occupation, pastime or amusement, late M.E. b An instance of this; a pleasurable exercise or employment ... " 3rd ed, Oxford, University Press 1973.
263 The Macquarie Dictionary provides: "n. 1. refreshment by means of some pastime, agreeable exercise, or the like. 2. a pastime, diversion, exercise or other resource affording relation and enjoyment", The Macquarie Library, 2nd ed, 1992.
264 The essence of the dictionary definitions is the notion of a pleasant pastime. Recreational activity is the antithesis of paid employment, and perhaps also toil and unremunerated labour. Duties such as housework or charity work would also seem to be excluded from the ordinary meaning of "recreational activity".
265 Returning to the legislative provision, it seems clear that the word "recreational" contributes to the meaning of the definition and should be given effect. Because the provision operates as an inclusive definition expanding it to include activities beyond the activities mentioned in the two subparagraphs, the word "recreational" must necessarily assist in ascertaining the ambit of the provision.
266 If the provision is read in this way, in accordance with its natural and ordinary meaning, and giving effect to the word "recreational", the operation of the provision is sound and sensible. The provision assists with an understanding of what amounts to a recreational activity but, is not prescriptive. The word "recreational" is over-arching in its effect, and the purpose of the provision is to assist with the ambit of the phrase and the nature of activities covered by the provision within the parameter of being recreational in nature. The provision conveys a wide reach extending to any sport and, indeed, any other activity providing it is for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure. However, it is a given requirement that the activity must be "recreational" and the provision is designed to assist with the breadth of activities that are captured by the phrase.
267 Noting that "any sport" is in a separate paragraph from "any pursuit or activities engaged in for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure" does not indicate that sport is not recreational in nature. It simply acknowledges that sport, particularly organised or competitive sport, is less obviously an activity undertaken for enjoyment, relaxation or leisure. There could be an argument that sport with purposes of the acquisition of skill and fitness should not be regarded as a recreational activity at all. This provision puts that beyond doubt.
268 It is acknowledged that sometimes a statutory definition creates an artifice giving a word or phrase a meaning that bears little resemblance to the ordinary meaning of the word or phrase. There is no indication in s19 that this was Parliament's intention. When effect is given to the word "recreational", the ambit of the provision coincides with the ordinary meaning of "recreational activities". In considering the provision I can see no indication that it was intended by the legislature that the word "recreational" was to be treated as superfluous or to be ignored.
269 It may be noted that this approach to the interpretation of the CL Act is in keeping with the approach taken by Ipp JA in Falvo v Australian Oztag Sports Association (supra) in considering the definition of "dangerous recreational activity" in s5K of the Civil Liability Act 2002 (NSW). Section 5K defines a "dangerous recreational activity" as "a recreational activity that involves a significant risk of physical harm". Ipp JA stated at par[28] that the definition of "dangerous recreational activity" in s5K has to be read as a whole and that this "requires due weight to be given to the word 'dangerous' and that the expression 'significant risk of physical harm' is coloured by the word 'dangerous'." Similarly, here the word "recreational" colours the word "sport".
270 The context of the provision and a consideration of the Act as a whole does not suggest that the exclusion regarding "dangerous recreational activities" was intended to extend to professional sportspeople carrying out their paid occupations. The word "recreational" has prominence in the text, and Div5, excluding liability for breach of duty resulting in harm to a person from a dangerous recreational activity carries the title "dangerous recreational activities". There is nothing to alert the reader to any intention to extend the application of the provision to activities in employment or carrying out an occupation. The Act as a whole indicates an intention to avoid incursions into civil liability arising from employment (see s3B excluding civil liability against employers relating to personal injury).
271 The recent amendment to the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act (s4DC(1)) was relied upon to show that Parliament regarded horse racing as a sport_._ I have proceeded on the assumption that horse racing is a sport. In any other regard, the making of the amendment to the WRC Act does not shed light on the meaning of the CL Act, s19. The approach of having regard to amending legislation to provide insight as to the meaning of legislation passed at an earlier time is to be confined. It may only assist if the earlier statute is ambiguous: Pearce, D C, and Geddes, R S, Statutory Interpretation in Australia, Butterworths, 6th ed, 2006 par3.33. The CL Act, s19, is not ambiguous. Furthermore, the later statute does not shed light on the earlier statute. The amendment does not suggest any intention by Parliament regarding the effect of the CL Act and the situation for jockeys under that Act. It is evident that the amendment to the WRC Act was to redress a long-standing loophole arising from the provisions of the WRC Act (s7: deeming jockeys not to be "workers") which meant that for a long time jockeys had not been covered by the WRC Act.
272 The consequences of the interpretation urged on behalf of the defendant would be far-reaching. It would mean that all professional sportspeople who are injured in carrying out their occupation by the negligence of a fellow sportsman, the negligence of their employer or others owing them a duty of care, would be precluded from seeking damages. Arguably, employees who are engaged in a sport as an occupation such as conducting kayaking or abseiling tours, or teaching others a sport, may also be precluded from pursuing actions for civil damages. There is no indication that Parliament intended such a sweeping change to the common law entitlements of many Australians, or to create such a degree of uncertainty for employees, where it is arguable that they are engaged in hazardous occupations.
273 The background to the legislation is revealing about the intention of Parliament and confirms that the exclusion was only intended to apply to those engaged in sport as a recreational activity or pursuit. As previously noted, many of the provisions of the CL Act are modelled on the recommendations of the Final Report reviewing the law of negligence: pars[8] - [9] above. The purpose of the legislature in enacting ss19 and 20 was to fulfil the objective that a plaintiff who engages in a dangerous recreational activity in circumstances where the risks are obvious is to be regarded as having assumed those risks (Fallas v Mourlas, per Ipp JA, at pars[45] - [46]).
"4.11 The Panel is of the view, however, that a principled reason can be given for treating recreational activities and recreational services as a special category for the purposes of personal injury law, regardless of whether the provider of the service is an NPO or a for-profit organisation. The reason is that people who participate in such activities often do so voluntarily and wholly or predominantly for self-regarding reasons.
4.12 This is not always the case, of course. Members of schools and other institutions may be required to engage in sporting and other recreational activities. Also, people who participate in recreational activities in the course of their employment do not do so voluntarily in the relevant sense. The rationale for treating recreational services and activities as a special case does not apply to such persons. Therefore, any rule limiting liability in respect of recreational services should not apply to them."
275 It is noted that the CL Act, ss19 and 20, do not coincide with the recommendations made by the panel in all respects. However a key recommendation of the panel was to not impinge on those who participate in sporting activities in the course of their employment. The Second Reading Speech regarding the Civil Liability Amendment Bill 2003 (No 46) does not indicate an intention to depart from that key recommendation:
"The third category of reforms are those which emphasise the concept of personal responsibility and the need for each person to accept responsibility for his or her own actions, without always looking for someone else to blame for any misfortune suffered. This is particularly so in relation to recreational activities which a person voluntarily undertakes for their personal enjoyment.
...
These provisions emphasise a person's responsibility for their own safety. There will no longer be a liability for an injury arising from an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity. A dangerous recreational activity is one which is engaged in for sport, enjoyment, relaxation or leisure which involves a significant degree of risk of physical harm."
276 While the word "voluntary" does not appear in the legislation, the Speech reveals an intention to limit the activities to activities that are recreational, and presumably the voluntary nature of those activities was seen as implicit in the definition as drafted.
277 In conclusion, s19 is limited to activities that are recreational and does not extend to activities carried out in the course of employment or occupation. The natural meaning of the words, the context, the purpose of the Act, and the consequences of an alternative construction, reveal that the word "recreational" is to be given effect and meaning. The purpose of the reform revealed by extrinsic materials confirms this interpretation.
278 As a professional jockey racing on this occasion in the course of carrying out his occupation, the plaintiff was not engaged in a recreational activity. The exclusion in s20, does not apply.
280 The term "obvious risk" as defined in s15 of the Act has been considered in the discussion above regarding the defence of volenti. The term "obvious risk" appearing in s20 of the Act has the same meaning as it does in s15 (see s19 of the Act to this effect). In considering the term in the context of the defence of volenti, I decided that the risk to the plaintiff of the defendant's breach of duty resulting in harm was an "obvious risk". I considered that regardless of the degree of specificity of the description of the risk to the plaintiff, it amounted to a risk that was "obvious" as defined in the CL Act.
281 For the reasons set out above in relation to the defence of volenti the risk of the defendant's breach of duty to the plaintiff was an "obvious risk".
"Materialisation of an obvious risk of a dangerous recreational activity"
282 The submission of counsel for the plaintiff was that the harm that resulted to the plaintiff flowed from the gross negligence of the defendant and, in view of the extreme nature of the defendant's negligence and the rarity with which that kind of breach of the two lengths rule occurs, it was not an obvious risk of horse racing as a dangerous recreational activity.
283 In considering whether the risk that materialised was an "obvious risk" of the dangerous recreational activity, it is clear from the definition of "obvious risk" in s15 that it is necessary to have regard to the particular circumstances in which the plaintiff suffered harm (Tobias J at par[98] in Fallas). The facts that Mr Read relied upon coincide with findings I have made about clearance, the stage of the race, and not responding to warning calls.
284 Mr Jackson described the negligent conduct that may be the subject of findings in the event that Mr Dodge was successful as, the "defendant riding his horse inwards when it was not sufficiently clear of Mr McCoull's horse".
285 However the enquiry must go further and have regard to the particular circumstances, and should incorporate the findings made about those circumstances regarding degree of clearance, warning calls, and so on.
286 Mr Read had drawn to my attention comments by Ipp JA in Fallas at [54]:
"54 In my view, when considering whether there has been a materialisation of an obvious risk, a distinction may have to be drawn between a risk of negligent conduct on the part of another and conduct that is grossly negligent. In some circumstances, it may not be sufficient merely to ask whether the risk of harm caused by a person being negligent was obvious. If the conduct that caused the risk amounted to gross negligence, it would be necessary, in my opinion, to determine whether the risk of harm caused by gross negligence of the kind in question was obvious. Otherwise, if - for the purposes of s 5L - the 'risk of negligence' is to be regarded as a descriptive catch-all for the risks of any kind of careless conduct, no matter how extreme, harm caused by grossly negligent conduct could be held to be an obvious risk where in fact such a risk was not obvious at all."
287 I accept that the degree of carelessness by Mr Snell in this case is extreme and amounts to grossly negligent conduct. However, I have found it more helpful for the enquiry under s20 to focus on the detail of the conduct of the defendant and circumstances as I have found them to be, rather than a consideration of whether the risk of harm qualifies as grossly negligent. Indeed, I am not persuaded that the fact that a defendant's conduct may amount to "gross negligence" advances the enquiry about whether the risk of harm caused by a jockey was an obvious risk.
288 As previously noted (when considering the argument regarding "obvious risk"), regardless of the degree of particularity with which Mr Snell's conduct and the circumstances are characterised, the risk that materialised was an "obvious risk". This conclusion is unaffected by whether or not the label of gross negligence attaches to the conduct. While it is not common to see jockeys shift inwards as Mr Snell did in the circumstances as I have found them to be, and, in fact, the nature of the breach of the two lengths rule may be described as relatively rare, Mr Snell's conduct was nonetheless a risk that was obvious to a person in the plaintiff's position.
Conclusion regarding s20
290 The plaintiff's case regarding assessment of damages was based on the evidence of a number of different witnesses: Mr Dodge, Mr Dodge's wife, Alison Dodge, friend and horse trainer Rose Dean, friend and jockey Troy Aitken. A number of medical practitioners and specialists were called as witnesses. Treating medical practitioners, orthopaedic surgeon Professor Einoder and general practitioner, Dr Tim Flanagan, gave evidence. Consultant neurosurgeon Mr Brownbill, psychiatrist Dr Sale, consultant rehabilitation physician Dr David Burke, consultant occupational physician Dr Peter Sharman, occupational therapist Suzanne Ravangnani and Mr Corey Plover, consultant actuary, were also called as witnesses. Evidence relating to quantum of damages was not adduced on behalf of the defendant.
291 Mr Aiken and Ms Dean provided an objective and useful insight into Mr Dodge before and after his fall, and relevant matters regarding the racing industry. This evidence was not contentious. The medical evidence regarding Mr Dodge's physical injuries, psychological condition, and the restrictions and limitations that have resulted from his injuries was not disputed.
292 The principal area of dispute relates to the issue of Mr Dodge's retained earning capacity. The opinions of the rehabilitation experts about Mr Dodge's capacity to work in the future are contentious. The evidence of Ms Ravangnani and her recommendations for Mr Dodge are disputed. It is not necessary for me to resolve all of the issues raised about Ms Ravangnani's recommendations and to make detailed findings about her report. Not all Ms Ravangnani's recommendations were pursued in the plaintiff's claim for damages. Some of her recommendations were accepted by me and I will consider those recommendations in more detail later.
293 It was submitted on behalf of the defendant that Mr Dodge and his wife have "seriously exaggerated his situation". It was submitted that Mrs Dodge had seriously exaggerated Mr Dodge's incapacity to drive and that noting other activities that he has performed since his accident, both Mr Dodge and Mrs Dodge exaggerated his incapacity to perform day-to-day domestic tasks.
"It is submitted that the reality is the plaintiff has relatively little in the way of genuine residual physical restrictions as the result of his injuries and with appropriate psychological input he will very likely make a substantial recovery from the psychological impact which is almost certainly the only real explanation for what otherwise presents itself as simple indolence."
295 That submission underpins the defendant's submissions in relation to all heads of damages.
296 On behalf of the plaintiff it was submitted that the proposition that the plaintiff and his wife have seriously exaggerated his situation was not put to them in cross-examination_._
297 It was further submitted on behalf of the plaintiff's case that the defendant's submissions ignored the psychological difficulties faced by this man. Lack of motivation is at the core of this case; it is the product of depression.
298 Even though the issues of serious exaggeration were not put to Mr Dodge and Mrs Dodge, I will deal with the merits of that submission_._
299 There was limited medical evidence about Mr Dodge's capacity to drive. Dr Sharman's evidence supported a degree of physical incapacity in this regard. Mr Dodge did not give evidence on this point.
300 Mrs Dodge's evidence was that she would not allow him to drive her motor vehicle because "he's become very short tempered and gets frustrated very easily and loses attention". This evidence is consistent with the evidence about Mr Dodge's psychological condition and depressive symptoms. Mrs Dodge's assessment that her husband should not drive is entirely reasonable and responsible, given her observations of her husband's condition and his difficulties. It is difficult to see how the absence of a medical assessment that he is physically incapable of driving undermines her assessment. There is no foundation for any suggestion that she is exaggerating in this regard.
301 The submissions on behalf of the defendant drew attention to activities performed by the plaintiff and contended that Mr Dodge's capacity to perform those activities demonstrated that he and Mrs Dodge had exaggerated their account of his incapacity. The activities relied upon as showing capacity are as follows:
•
Mr Dodge can use an axe to split wood.
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He climbed a roof and assisted in assembling an extendable broom handle and used it to clean his wood heater flue.
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He assembled a bicycle for his son a few months before the trial.
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Mr Dodge uses a wheelbarrow.
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He can play bowls three times a week for three to four hours at a time.
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Mr Dodge walks a weimaraner dog on a lead.
•
He went fishing in a boat.
302 It should be noted that some of these activities were contrasted with Ms Ravangnani's understanding or expectations of what Mr Dodge would have difficulty doing. It would be unfair and illogical to rely upon her understanding of his limitations, lacking evidence of an assertion from Mr Dodge, as a basis for a finding that he had exaggerated his evidence.
303 The evidence relating to these same activities that he is able to do established the following:
•
He uses an axe to split sticks for kindling. He can manage that activity because he does not need to lift the axe up too high.
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He uses a wheelbarrow loaded with only 4 to 5 split logs to wheel from the wood pile to the back door. His son splits the wood for him.
•
He walks the weimarana by always holding the lead with his left hand.
•
He once climbed the roof of his house to help his neighbour who was doing him a favour by cleaning his flue. He was extremely nervous while on the roof thinking of the consequences of a fall and the vulnerability of his neck. It may be noted that the action of turning his wrist to assemble the broom handle is not inconsistent with the medical evidence of his shoulder injury.
•
He went fishing once in his wife's uncle's boat. He accompanied his son and a friend once to the Great Lakes and showed them his fishing spots and they threw in the line for him and he sat with them.
•
Assembling his son's bike at Christmas time was referred to by Mr Dodge as an isolated example of helping his son to make or put something together.
•
Lawn bowling is one of his few social outlets. His wife encourages his participation in bowls as a healthy pastime for him. It does cause his neck and shoulder to ache after a long game. After playing bowls it takes him a day or so to return to his normal pain threshold.
304 I did not find Mr Dodge and his wife Alison Dodge exaggerated their accounts. In fact, I find they gave honest and reliable evidence. I found Mr Dodge gave an unembellished account of relevant matters. Mrs Dodge was a conscientious witness. To a degree her account was affected by a heightened concern consistent with the perspective of a caring family member. Allowances have been made for that.
305 Mr Dodge experiences fluctuating pain levels. It is to be expected that in adjusting to his reduced capacity after his accident that he would over-stretch himself and suffer the consequences of that, and then take time to recover.
306 I turn now to factual findings. I will begin with an overview of matters relevant to assessment of damages and then proceed to consider the various heads of damage that arise in this case.
307 Mr Dodge enjoyed a successful career as a professional jockey. He lived in Longford, Tasmania. The district of Longford has a strong racing community and is the centre of horse training facilities in the north of the State.
308 Mr Dodge was aged 41 at the time of his fall. He was married to Alison Dodge. Mrs Dodge has had a long association with the racing industry. Her step-father is a horse trainer and has stables in Longford. Racing was more than a career; it was a whole way of life. Their social life as a couple, family life and interests revolved around horse racing.
309 Mr Dodge had grown up in Newcastle. He left school at 14 years of age. At the age of 15 he began his apprenticeship as a jockey. He saw it as a "good and reputable" career. As an apprentice and professional jockey he developed his own good name and reputation.
310 Mr Dodge described the moments after the fall. He felt his horse land on him - he knew it was the "worst, crippling blow" he had ever encountered. The pain was severe and he had "no hope of getting up", he had pain from his neck to his waist. He was taken by ambulance to the Royal Hobart Hospital with multiple crush injuries.
311 Mr Dodge's injuries were a fracture involving C6, a grossly displaced right clavicle (collarbone), comminuted fracture to the body of the scapula (shoulder blade), an undisplaced fracture to the second rib on the right side, and fractures to four ribs (1st- 4th) on the left side. He also had a punctured lung and significant plural haematoma between his fractured ribs. He suffered extensive soft tissue injuries. He spent a couple of days in hospital. He was discharged, allowing time for his chest to recover, before surgery on his collarbone. These were life-threatening injuries. The collar bone had been displaced inwards towards his windpipe and major blood vessels. The punctured lung in itself was a serious injury. Mr Dodge was seen by Professor Einoder and in February 2007, he performed surgery and the collarbone was fixed with a plate and screws. His neck was immobilised in a cervical collar and his right upper arm was in a sling.
312 Professor Einoder described the injury to the cervical spine in his report of 29 June 2007 as follows:
" ... a painful stiff neck associated with muscular spasm. The x-ray and CT scan of his cervical spine confirmed that he had a minimally displaced fracture of the spinous process of C6 associated with a decreased height of the body of C6. It was difficult for me to say whether or not the fracture of the vertebral body was new or old. Nevertheless the changes were significant enough to assume that he had an instability of the 5-6 mobile segment and hence was advised to continue to wear the soft collar."
313 I elaborate on some of these matters with reference to Professor Einoder's evidence. The change to the cervical spinous process could be identified as a recent change. Professor Einoder found it difficult to say whether the fracture of the vertebral body of C6 was old or new. He had pre-existing radiological changes, 20 per cent reduction in anterior wedging of the vertebral body, and recent changes were 30 per cent. That may be within the margin of error or additional wedging caused by the accident in January 2007. In cross-examination Professor Einoder agreed the evidence of the wedge fracture through the C6 vertebra shown on radiological examination after his fall in January 2007 is not clear evidence of a fracture of the vertebral body on that date. He also agreed that there is a recorded history of at least one previous fracture through the body of that vertebra. Mr Dodge's neck was painful and stiff. He had not had symptoms before the fall.
314 Professor Einoder attributed Mr Dodge's current symptoms of neck discomfort to a combination of the cervical spine he was born with, wear and tear of his cervical spine, as well as the old injuries and the contribution of the recent injury. Professor Einoder did not agree that Mr Dodge's past history of degeneration was more significant than his current traumatic injury. Professor Einoder explained that it is quite reasonable for somebody to manage, despite the slow accumulation of problems, and then have an incident which basically changes the problem from a tolerable problem to an intolerable problem.
315 Dr Brownbill agreed with Professor Einoder that on radiological grounds it was not possible to say whether the fracture to the vertebral body was a previous fracture or occurred in the accident in January 2007. He may have had an earlier fracture. However, Dr Brownbill explained in assessing the likelihood of when the fracture occurred, that he would take into account the statement of Mr Dodge that he had not suffered any neck pain or problems in the period leading up to his recent injury. Clinical experience shows that the fracture may relate to the recent occurrence if there had been no pre-existing pain or ongoing problems.
316 The evidence establishes that Mr Dodge's neck pain and symptoms resulted from his injury in January 2007. It was submitted by counsel for the defendant that the relevance of the previous fracture and changes relates to the issue of negative contingencies. I accept that in assessing negative contingencies it should be borne in mind that Mr Dodge had had at least one previous fracture to the C6 vertebral body as well as degenerative changes.
317 In August 2007, Professor Einoder told Mr Dodge that it would be inadvisable for him to return to competitive horse riding. In February 2008, Mr Dodge had surgery to remove the plate and screws. Professor Einoder also manipulated his right shoulder joint, obtaining about 80 per cent of the normal range of movement.
318 By February 2008, Mr Dodge's neck and shoulder injuries had stabilised. Mr Dodge has persistent neck discomfort and a constant ache in the lower part of the back of his neck and region of the C6 and C7 spinous processes. Professor Einoder found he had about a "20% decrease in the range of movement of his cervical spine compared to a man who had no difficulty looking over his shoulder while riding a racehorse" (Professor Einoder, March 2008) .
319 Mr Dodge's shoulder joint aches constantly. He has significant limitation of movement. He has no significant external rotation of his shoulder and some limited internal rotation. He is not able to lift any objects that are lateral to his body. He has good grip strength in his right hand but he is not able to lift any significant objects above shoulder level. There is an obvious decrease in size of the right upper limb when compared to the left (despite the fact that he is right-handed): Professor Einoder, Report, March 11 2010.
320 Mr Dodge has stopped fishing and boating since his accident. He has an interest in bowls which he attends three times per week.
321 Before his accident Mr Dodge was a hard working, fit, athletic and energetic man. He was very sociable and described by one of his friends, Mr Aitken, as "a heap of fun, ... king of the one liners". He was very confident. He was a companionable and supportive husband. He had a strong work ethic and would rise early to work each day. His "racing gear" was always immaculately looked after. He had an excellent relationship with his son and they would play like "two kids together."
322 Now, he is irritable and loses concentration. He is rarely happy, and living with him the family "walk on eggshells". Mrs Dodge is committed to the marriage but it is strained.
323 Mr Dodge sleeps poorly at night and gets up late in the day. Sometimes he is still in bed at 4 or 5 o'clock in the afternoon. He lacks motivation: he cannot be bothered turning on the washing machine. He now expects his wife to answer his mobile phone. He is irritable and short tempered with his son. He may get angry if his son laughs or is high spirited, or is watching a television show and the volume is too loud. Mr Dodge does not spend time looking after his son on his own.
324 He lives now a relatively isolated social life. His main social outlet is his lawn bowls. Family and friends see him now as short tempered, bitter and angry. A telling example of his bitterness was an occasion when a friend, Mr Aitken, assisted him by splitting some of his firewood. Mr Dodge told him that he was not a "cripple", that it was the "only thing he could do", and he got very upset that Mr Aitken had taken it upon himself to help. He suffers mood swings and is forgetful, with poor concentration.
325 After his accident Mr Dodge began drinking alcohol to excess. After consuming alcohol his behaviour became aggressive and angry. After a particularly difficult period when Mrs Dodge was very worried about her husband, she took him to his general practitioner, Dr Flanagan, in August 2008. This appointment delved into mental health issues, and an anti-depressant was prescribed for Mr Dodge. His very low moods improved to some extent. Since then he has moderated his consumption of alcohol with some guidance provided by his wife.
326 Mr Dodge was asked about how he feels about the fact he is no longer a jockey, and in what was obviously an understated response he said, "it depresses me at times". He has experienced nightmares about the fall, though these have improved since taking medication. His sleep is poor and disrupted.
327 It is evident that Mr Dodge finds the loss of his career distressing and reminders of his past career painful. Dr Sale has remarked that he misses his previous career and lifestyle, and avoids reminders of his loss. Since the fall Mr Dodge avoids race meetings. He lacks interest and pleasure in racing generally and he does not watch racing on Sky television any more. He shows a lack of interest in the progress of his wife's race horse. Despite strong encouragement from his wife he does not go to the stables to see her horse. On an occasion when family were celebrating a win of a horse owned and trained by family and described as a "family triumph" he became very distressed and was reduced to tears.
328 Mr Dodge feels frustrated about not being able to do the things he used to do. He described getting "angry and frustrated seeing other people doing what I should be out there doing myself". As an example of things he found frustrating, he spoke about jockeys who had ridden his wife's race horse "wrong", not the way she wanted them ridden "and I know I would be able to do that job well" and "I get so frustrated because I know I could have fixed that problem". It is telling that he has "put away" his trophies and photographs of his racing days.
329 He refers to himself as "half the man he used to be".
330 Dr Sale saw Mr Dodge in February 2010. In Dr Sale's opinion Mr Dodge's psychological problems can primarily be seen as an Adjustment Disorder with depressive symptoms, complicated by alcohol use at times.
331 Dr Sale gave evidence that the psychological difficulties experienced by Mr Dodge are a consequence of the injury sustained by Mr Dodge in his fall, reflecting the drastic change to Mr Dodge's circumstances and self-esteem. Dr Sale noted that Mr Dodge had persistent problems with depression that were going to be difficult to remedy and that would have an impact upon his quality of life and his capacity to function occupationally.
332 The plaintiff contends that had he not been injured he would have continued working as a professional jockey. The claim is based on the plaintiff's earnings in the complete financial year (2005/2006) preceding his fall; a gross amount of $47,215. The net weekly income claimed on his behalf is $725.00. The plaintiff's case is that he was likely to remain a jockey well into his 50s, if not his 60s. Once he retired as a professional jockey he had the capacity to pick up work around the industry such as helping his wife manage his father-in-law's stables. That would have provided the plaintiff with an "income stream" after retirement.
333 The defendant's case is that the likelihood is that the plaintiff's earnings would have been much lower, in the order of $375.00 net per week. The defendant points to a history of a fluctuating income and a work history punctuated by injury and time recuperating and not working. The defendant's case is that the plaintiff is not wholly incapacitated from working and has a retained earning capacity. The approach urged on behalf of the defendant is to presume a retirement age of 65 and make an allowance for retained earning capacity, as well as other negative contingencies. It is submitted that Mr Dodge has retained 15 per cent of his earning capacity. Further, that the appropriate discount for adverse contingencies is 15 per cent.
334 This is a case where both counsel have taken a broad approach to the task of assessing Mr Dodge's loss of earning capacity. Predicting the earnings of jockeys is "inherently speculative" (this observation was made in Appo v Stanley (supra), at [103]) and in Mr Dodge's case it is no less so, bearing in mind uncertainties such as his income after retirement as a professional jockey. It is impossible to bring exactitude to the task.
335 A significant question is whether Mr Dodge has a retained earning capacity. Mr Dodge has significant physical limitations. He has decreased range of cervical spine movements (approximately 20 per cent decreased range of movement). He suffers neck pain and stiffness.
336 Mr Dodge has significant pain, weakness and restriction of movement of his right shoulder. He can only lift his right arm a bit above the horizontal plane in abduction and flexion movements. Mr Dodge is not able to lift any objects that are lateral to his body. He has no significant external rotation of the glenohumeral joint.
337 Mr Dodge's neck constantly aches. On a good day it is just a dull ache and sometimes it is a "real bad ache".
338 He does not normally sleep well because of bad dreams and also, if he rolls onto his right shoulder it "really starts aching" and wakes him up. He then has trouble getting back to sleep.
339 Mr Dodge should avoid activities involving heavy lifting, forced cervical spine mobility or holding his neck in a fixed position (Mr Brownbill, report 2 April 2009, P15, at p4). He should not perform any tasks that are likely to jerk or jar his neck (Professor Einoder, 11 March 2010). His physical limitations are stable and there is no prospect that they will improve to any significant degree. His pain levels are expected to continue in a fluctuating manner (Mr Brownbill, P15 at p4).
340 Mr Dodge's depressive symptoms are debilitating. Occupational functioning is adversely affected by his low self-esteem and poor motivation, a product of his depression. He has found it very difficult to adapt to his changed circumstances and his limitations. He is not the least resourceful in that regard.
341 Mr Dodge's adjustment disorder is described as chronic. Dr Sale was asked about Mr Dodge's prognosis. Dr Sale noted that even with the best treatment (referring to treatment by an experienced clinical psychologist) his prognosis was "guarded". His personality or his identity came directly from his prowess as a jockey. Once that was lost to him, his sense of self-worth and how others would view him was significantly diminished.
342 There is a chance that if Mr Dodge could be persuaded to undertake psychological counselling that his depressive symptoms and self-esteem might improve. However, the prospect of him finding psychological counselling palatable is remote. He has avoided it in the past. It would involve him in confronting the need for psychological counselling and his response so far has been denial in that regard.
343 The question of his prognosis after psychological counselling from an experienced clinical psychologist was explored in cross-examination. Dr Sale's response was at transcript 239:
"I wouldn't say more probably than not. I'd say that it's worth trying and it's more than a small chance, it's not a remote chance, but there's a lot of challenges to overcome which I've touched upon, such as his lack of education, intellect, psychological sophistication, they're going to be difficult to get over."
344 I am persuaded that employment in connection with the racing industry, horse training or horse breeding, is out of the question. Employment as a stable hand or trainer is heavy physical work. Horses, particularly race horses, are not always tractable and it is necessary to be able to restrain a horse that is shying or rearing. Mr Dodge's physical limitations would preclude this work. Furthermore, in view of his adjustment disorder, he would be unable to manage the reminders of, and comparison with, his pre-injury work and status in the industry.
345 His physical injuries preclude unskilled heavy labouring work. His physical injuries viewed in isolation would not preclude light manual work (Professor Einoder, report March 5 2008, P21). Of course, debilitating injuries must be viewed in the context of the individual and other limiting factors. In Mr Dodge's case his adjustment disorder and limited skills, expertise and vocational experience beyond the racing industry must be taken into consideration.
346 Mr Dodge's skill set and experience are confined to the vocation of being a professional jockey. They are not transferable to occupations outside the racing and horse training, horse breeding industry. He has been working as a jockey since he was 15 years of age. He has limited education. He left school when he was at 14 years. Evidently he has no inclination for office type work, and is unfamiliar with the use of computers. An indication of his aversion for paper work is that he did not attend to his tax returns for five years in a row. His wife discovered the situation and attended to these returns on his behalf with the assistance of an accountant.
347 His only other work experience was, when an apprentice jockey, he worked in a bottleshop. That work would not now be available to him because of his physical limitations.
348 Mr Dodge cannot think of employment he could manage. The occupational specialists have not been able to make any suggestions as to any work to which he might be suited. Dr Sharman, occupational physician, expressed the opinion that Mr Dodge is "unlikely ever to engage in or work for reward in any occupation or work for which he is reasonably qualified by education, training or experience" (report 4 August 2008). Dr Burke, rehabilitation physician, was in agreement with Dr Sharman's comments with regard to Mr Dodge's prospects of returning to any form of useful employment, and assessed Mr Dodge's prospects of returning to any form of useful employment as "extremely limited" (report 2 February 2010).
349 There is no assessment or opinion to the contrary. The defendant has not made any suggestions.
350 Realistically, Mr Dodge does not have a retained earning capacity. Any capacity retained by him would be most likely productive of a negligible income.
351 It may be noted that the vocational specialists speak mainly in terms of improbabilities of Mr Dodge working in the future, but this does not preclude it as a possibility. Looking beyond the probabilities, there exists a chance of retained earning capacity.
352 Dr Sale describes the chance of improvement after seeing a psychologist as more than a small chance. This must be considered in the context of the poor prospects of Mr Dodge accepting a referral to a psychologist because of his personality makeup. It must also be considered in the context of Mr Dodge's poor prospects of obtaining employment to which he is suited even if his psychological condition improves.
353 Having regard to all of these matters, I consider that there is a speculative chance that Mr Dodge's condition may improve sufficiently so that he would be able to undertake some form of suitable employment. I will proceed on the basis of a 5 per cent deduction for retained earning capacity.
Calculating Mr Dodge's income loss as a professional jockey
354 The plaintiff's claim for past and future income loss is based on his most recent taxation return for the financial year 2005/2006 which discloses a gross income of $47,215. As mentioned earlier, calculating past and future income for a jockey is an inherently speculative exercise. This is acknowledged by the plaintiff. It is asserted that while realistically he could have earned more than he has earned in the past, it is reasonable to proceed on the basis of an annual gross income of $47,215.00.
355 The submissions on behalf of the defendant drew my attention to the plaintiff's taxation returns for the previous financial years which disclose a net income as follows:
2002/2003 net income $4,889.00
2003/2004 net income $7,251.00
2004/2005 net income $29,612.00.
"• The average of his net weekly earnings over the two years to June 2005 and June 2006 is approximately $595.00.
•
The average over all years for which returns are in evidence (excluding the year to June 2007) is approximately $375.00.
•
The average over all years including 2007, if his average weekly earnings to the date of the accident are projected for the whole of that year is approximately $415.00."
357 However, it is important to bear in mind that the previous taxation returns do not present a complete picture of income for those financial years. The taxation returns were prepared on the basis of the Tote print-outs and did not include income received by Mr Dodge for track work, Super Vobis prize money and barrier trials. Information about the amount of income received by Mr Dodge for the period from 2002 - 2006 for these categories of work and prize money is not available. All that can be said is that his income for those financial years was more than disclosed in his taxation returns and that perhaps, in the years that he was more productive, he may have earned significantly more.
358 In assessing Mr Dodge's past and future earning capacity there is clear, uncontradicted evidence that since approximately 2006, work as a jockey has been and continues to be more profitable than earlier years. As a consequence of Betfair entering the racing industry in February 2006 there has been a significant increase in prize money. For example, the prize money for the Hobart Cup has increased from a total of $200,000 to $400,000 dollars[13]. The Moorilla Stakes race is now called the "tote.com.au/stakes", and the prize money for that race in 2010 was $80,000. Jockeys receive 5 per cent of the prize money and should receive a "sling" (gift) of another 5 per cent on top of that for riding a winner.
359 There have been other changes that have improved the earnings of jockeys. There has been introduced a bonus scheme attaching to prize money called "Super Vobis". Breeders can nominate their horses and if a horse is part of the scheme and they win or are placed in selected races included in the scheme, then the breeder receives a bonus amount. Jockeys receive a percentage of 5 per cent of the bonus.
360 Mr Dodge has ridden successfully in the State and has ridden approximately 200 - 300 winners in Tasmania since moving to the State about 20 years ago. He has won the Hobart Cup twice, the Devonport Cup three times and the Darwin Cup.
361 The fee paid to jockeys for barrier trials has also increased and doubled in five years ($20 to $40 per horse) and for track work ($5 to now $10 - $20 per horse). If undertaking track work a jockey may ride ten horses every morning.
362 The very low income disclosed in the taxation returns for financial years ending 2003 and 2004 occurred due to time off work due to injuries. Injuries incurred by jockeys do not produce gaps in income since amendments to the WRC Act in 2007. Jockeys used to be precluded from benefits under the WRC Act. Now they are entitled to benefits under that Act. I return to consider these benefits later when considering negative contingencies.
363 Assessing the income Mr Dodge would have earned if not for his fall in January 2007, is speculative. It must be acknowledged that his last year of earnings was a relatively good year compared to earlier years. However, for various reasons the earnings he would have received after his accident in January 2007, and in the future, would have been more stable compared with the situation before his accident. Further, taking into account all income it is likely that after his accident he would have earned more than disclosed in his most recent taxation return in 2006. Indeed, the 2005 - 2006 gross income disclosed in his taxation return for that year may be treated as a baseline income for Mr Dodge as a professional jockey with an expectation that there would be periods when he would earn markedly more than that.
364 Obviously, the nature of work as a professional jockey is such that the earnings fluctuate depending on all sorts of vagaries of competitive horse racing. In Appo v Stanley (supra) the court adopted the approach of assessing earnings of the jockey on the basis of a "long term sustainable average" for the period in question. I regard that as a sensible and practical approach.
365 It is reasonable to proceed on the basis that the gross income of $47,215 shown in the tax return for the 2005/2006 financial year represents the sort of earnings Mr Dodge would have received after his accident. Adopting a conservative approach, it is the earnings he would have received, if not for his accident, as a long-term sustainable average.
366 One of the issues for consideration is for how long Mr Dodge may have continued to work as a professional jockey. There is no certainty about this issue. Having regard to the evidence in this trial and Mr Dodge's circumstances, it is likely that Mr Dodge's future working life would have been divided into two discrete periods. The first period would be the years from now when he would continue working as a professional jockey until his retirement from racing. In that period it is reasonable to anticipate that he would earn an annual income of more in the earlier years, and that it would taper off towards the end of his career as a professional jockey.
367 The next phase of his working life would have been work within the racing industry, working in stables, training horses. Mr Dodge would not have found it difficult to find this work. He lived in hub of horse training in the north of the State. He was well regarded in the racing industry, and his wife's step-father was a trainer and had stables. It had been his wife's intention to take over her step-father's stables when he retired and run those stables in a business arrangement with her husband. Mr Dodge may then have continued to do track work and help her in the business.
368 It is reasonable to presume that working within the industry after retirement as a professional jockey would be less remunerative than work as a professional jockey. I expect Mr Dodge would still ride if he was fit and able to do so in this period. Retirement as a professional jockey would not necessarily coincide with retirement from track work, and perhaps also, barrier trials. I expect that he would continue with track work after his retirement from racing if he was able to do so. As he aged, his capacity and inclination to ride and carry out the heavy manual labour associated with stable work and training horses would diminish. It is likely that his earnings in this second phase of his working life would reduce as he gets older commensurate with a reducing capacity to perform the heavy physical work.
369 Calculating how long he would have worked as a professional jockey is a speculative exercise. There are few jockeys who work into their 50s let alone their 60s. A jockey in his or her 60s is not unknown but it is rare. There are some considerations persuading me that in Mr Dodge's case it would be reasonable to expect that his career as a professional jockey would be longer than most because:
•
He loved the work.
•
He did not struggle with maintaining his race weight as some other jockeys did.
•
He was a hard working jockey.
•
He did not mind the rigorous daily routine of the work such as early mornings.
370 Acknowledging the inexact nature of forecasting the future career of the plaintiff, I expect that in all likelihood he would have continued racing as a jockey into his early 50s, and then continued working in the racing industry throughout his 50s and into his 60s. On this basis I regard it as reasonable to assume that he would have continued working as a professional jockey for eight years after the trial, and I will set a notional retirement age as a professional jockey as April 2019, when 53 years of age. It is realistic to assume that his earnings as a professional jockey would taper off as he got older.
371 Forecasting his earnings in these two distinct phases of his career is also by nature an inexact exercise. Adopting the approach of working out the "sustainable average earnings" for each period accommodates fluctuations in income and a tapering off at the end of each period.
372 For the period as a professional jockey I allow the amount I have described as his baseline earnings of $753.85 weekly, as claimed by Mr Dodge, with an adjustment for tax payable in the financial year ending 2011. I proceed on the basis that the net weekly loss for that year is $759.11.
373 For the second period of his working life I consider the net average income of $375.00 per week to represent his sustainable average weekly earnings.
374 There is no dispute that he would continue working until aged 65.
375 I am not convinced that he would retire by age 65. But by some stage in his mid to late 60s his work may well have been more in the nature of an interest or hobby. It is reasonable to presume a retirement age of 65 years.
376 I regard weekly net earnings of $375 per week as an appropriate average income for the period from 53 years of age to 65 years. I consider he would have been earning significantly more than that initially, and less than that when he retired. It is a long-term sustainable average income for this period of his working life.
377 The plaintiff claims that an appropriate discount for contingencies for the future is less than 10 per cent based on the evidence of Mr Plover, Consultant Actuary. It is submitted for the plaintiff that in light of amendments to workers compensation legislation in 2007 extending benefits to jockeys since then, a discount for negative contingencies for the past is not appropriate. I accept that submission and the focus of my consideration is the appropriate discount for contingencies for the future. The defendant submits that an appropriate discount for adverse contingencies is 15 per cent. It is submitted that this discount properly takes account of the risk of a career-ending injury.
378 In assessing the discount that should be applied for contingencies or vicissitudes it is necessary to consider those contingencies that relate specifically to Mr Dodge, as well as those that relate generally to professional jockeys. The submissions of the defendant point to contingencies peculiar to the plaintiff including a pre-existing fracture at C5/6 and an assertion that there were signs of a pre-existing alcohol problem.
379 As previously noted, in assessing negative contingencies and Mr Dodge's vulnerabilities and characteristics, Mr Dodge had had at least one previous fracture to the C6 vertebral body, as well as degenerative changes. I take into account that Mr Dodge had a predisposition to disabling neck symptoms and this is taken into account as an adverse contingency pertaining to Mr Dodge. It indicates to an "uncertain extent" that the risk to Mr Dodge was greater than to the average professional jockey (Luntz, H, Assessment of Damages for Personal Injury and Death, Butterworths, 4th ed, 2002, 383 [6.4.8].
380 The defendant relies upon the evidence of Mr Dodge's general practitioner, Dr Flanagan, to base a submission that Mr Dodge had an alcohol problem before his fall.
381 The evidence from Dr Flanagan does not ground an adequate or satisfactory foundation for this submission. Dr Flanagan's evidence on this point was in the realms of supposition. In his evidence-in-chief, Dr Flanagan made reference to signs that Mr Dodge was drinking alcohol to excess. There was an indication that he had observed signs of alcoholism before the accident. It was evident that this indication was made in a somewhat tangential fashion without focussing on the timing of the observations. When some attention was given to this issue his evidence demonstrated that in reality, he could not be certain that his relevant observations were made before Mr Dodge's fall.
382 I turn briefly to mention the Dr Flanagan's evidence. Dr Flanagan gave evidence that Mr Dodge used to rent a house from him and he saw him drinking in the yard of the property "over a number of years". Further, that as at the time when Mr Dodge consulted him on 26 November 2008, Dr Flanagan had seen him walking around the streets drinking from containers of alcohol. Dr Flanagan was not Mr Dodge's usual general practitioner. Mr Dodge first consulted him after his accident on 11 April 2008.
383 It became clear during Dr Flanagan's later evidence that his observation of seeing Mr Dodge walking around the town drinking alcohol was based on one particular occasion around the time of the consultation on 26 November 2008, a considerable period of time after Mr Dodge's accident.
384 When questioned about his evidence and the proposition that the alcohol problem had pre-dated the accident, he referred to the fact that "at least" the plaintiff had a previous breathalyser offence. When asked about the sightings of Mr Dodge drinking alcohol at the property, Dr Flanagan expressed some uncertainty about when Mr Dodge had rented the property from him and whether he had made the observations before Mr Dodge's accident. The evidence from Dr Flanagan, without supporting evidence, provided an inadequate basis for the contention.
385 I note that there was no cross-examination of Mr Dodge or Mrs Dodge about the existence of an alcohol problem before the fall in January 2007. Mrs Dodge's evidence that her husband's problem with alcohol developed after his accident was unchallenged. The evidence of Mr Dodge and others relating to his work performance as a professional jockey, indicative of a person functioning well without an alcohol addiction, was not disputed either.
386 In conclusion, Dr Flanagan's evidence does not satisfactorily support the contention about a pre-existing alcohol problem. There is reliable countervailing evidence. I reject the contention.
387 The major contingencies that are the basis for the discount applied to a claim for loss of future earnings are well-established. In Wynn v NSW Insurance Ministerial Corporation [1995] HCA 53; (1985) 184 CLR 485, Dawson, Toohey, Gaudron and Gummow JJ, agreed with by Brennan CJ, said at 497:
"It is to be remembered that a discount for contingencies or 'vicissitudes' is to take account of matters which might otherwise adversely affect earning capacity and as Professor Luntz notes, death apart, 'sickness, accident, unemployment and industrial disputes are the four major contingencies which expose employees to the risk of loss of income'"
388 In McLennan v Lutrrell [2006] TASSC 44, consideration was given to the weight to be given to these major contingencies as canvassed in Luntz (supra) ch 6. It was pointed out by Evans J at par[41] that on the basis of the figures referred to in Luntz, the appropriate discount for mortality, sickness and accident and industrial disputes is only 2.42 per cent. Luntz contends that even allowing for 5 per cent discount for unemployment the maximum discount should be under 10 per cent in the average case: [6.4.14]. In McLennan v Luttrell, Evans J noted the observation by Luntz, at [6.4.14], that this calculation of the discount for all contingencies is much less than the standard 15 per cent, used in New South Wales, and as observed by Evans J, used in Tasmania as well.
389 The plaintiff claims that an appropriate discount for contingencies for the future is less than 10 per cent based on the evidence of Mr Plover, Consultant Actuary. Mr Plover provided an estimate of an appropriate deduction for vicissitudes for a male jockey, aged 44, and expected to work until either aged 65 or 70. If the retirement age was 65 his estimate of the deductions was 5.6 per cent, if 70 years of age, the estimate for deductions was 6.9 per cent. The vicissitudes were assessed on the basis of heavy manual workers without any deduction for unemployment and strikes.
390 There was criticism levelled at treating heavy manual workers as comparable to jockeys and the injuries received by heavy manual workers as comparable to the injuries received by jockeys. Mr Plover acknowledged that based on evidence of jockey fatalities in Australia, an additional 1 per cent discount should be allowed and a further 1 per cent for injuries making allowance for recent amendments to workers compensation legislation.
391 Jockeys are now entitled to workers compensation benefits: WRC Act_,_ s4DC. It has been pointed out by Mr Jackson that benefits are capped. In the event of a permanent impairment of the kind suffered by Mr Dodge in January 2007, the benefits would terminate after nine years. A further limitation is that his benefits are further capped at 80 per cent of his weekly wage: WRC Act_,_ s69B(1)(c). It is noted also that in the event of an injury that leads to temporary incapacity of between 26 weeks and 78 weeks then his entitlement to benefit is for 90 per cent of his weekly payment. I accept that these considerations should be taken into account in assessing adverse negative contingencies. It is noted that Mr Plover has made allowances for the current situation regarding jockeys and their recently acquired workers compensation benefits.
392 The revised figures provided by Mr Plover take account of the concern raised on behalf of the defendant that Mr Plover's report did not allow for a higher rate of injury and mortality for jockeys compared with heavy manual labourers.
393 Mr Plover took account of a deduction for mortality, total and permanent disablement and deductions for temporary sickness and disability. I accept the conclusions he reached regarding those deductions. He excluded deductions for working days lost as a result of industrial disputes. Whether industrial strikes are included or not makes minimal difference as it is a "negligible contingency": Luntz, [6.4.12].
394 In preparing his calculations Mr Plover was asked to assume that no deduction for unemployment should be made due to Mr Dodge's successful race career. While that factor may justify a lower discount compared with other jockeys, it does not justify making no discount at all. The deduction for unemployment would usually be regarded as a significant deduction in the order of 5 per cent in the average case: Luntz, [6.4.13].
395 In this case, the evidence indicated that Mr Dodge did not have any difficulties in securing race rides and that he was in demand as a jockey.
396 Nonetheless some discount should be made for unemployment. Some allowance should also be made for time spent out of the workforce due to unpaid leave. I consider that 5 per cent would be an appropriate discount to allow for the contingency of unemployment and leave.
397 It was argued that favourable contingencies should be taken into account and operate to counterbalance some of the effect of the negative contingencies. However, the favourable contingency of higher than to be expected earnings was taken into account in determining Mr Dodge's long-term sustainable average earnings.
398 I conclude that the appropriate discount for negative contingencies is that urged on behalf of the defendant, a deduction of 15 per cent. This figure takes account of the adverse contingencies I have referred to and the added risk, idiosyncratic to Mr Dodge, of the pre-existing condition of his neck.
399 Noting the 5 per cent discount for retained earning capacity, I discount the claim of lost earning capacity for the future by 20 per cent.
400 I set out my calculations below. As an explanation for these calculations I note the following:
•
The tax payable on the sum in the years since Mr Dodge's accident has been particularised and is not disputed. The net weekly loss for the financial year ending 30 June 2007, is $725.00 per week, and by financial year ending 2010, it is $753.85 per week.
•
The defendant's net weekly loss for the financial year ending 2011 is $759.11 and that is the basis for future projections of economic loss (CCH Australian Master Tax Guide 2011, par 42-023 for tax payable on $47,215.00)
•
Wage loss for the first period of work until the plaintiff's retirement as a professional jockey involving a period of eight years is set out under "future period: age 45-53". The present value of that future loss as a lump sum has been quantified using the 5 per cent discount tables (CL Act, s28A) with no allowance for mortality, as set out in Table 2 of Luntz at p683 (multiplier 346).
•
Wage loss for the second period of employment commencing in 2019 until retirement age at 65 years, has been worked out by first, making the same calculation set out above. Wage loss for a period of 12 years has been discounted using the 5 per cent tables (multiplier 474) to calculate the present value of the recurring loss over the relevant period. Second, in order to obtain the present value of a loss that will not commence for eight years, Table 1 of Luntz, at p681, has been applied to ascertain the present value of the sum payable in eight years' time. Again, a discount rate of 5 per cent has been applied. This method, the subject of some discussion by Professor Luntz, is appropriate in circumstances where there is to be a recurring future loss commencing after a set period of years: " ... the value of an annuity for the amount of the recurring loss over the relevant period may first be ascertained and then such value must be discounted to its present value". Also discussed is an alternative method which produces a similar result (discussion: Luntz at 360 - 361).
Total past economic loss (to 21 April, 2011): $164,535.12.
Future period: age 45 - 53
Loss of earning capacity for eight years from judgment to April 2019 at $759.11 per week on the 5 per cent tables less 20 per cent.
So, 346 x 759.11 equals $262,652.06 less 20 per cent ($52,530.41) for contingencies: $210,121.65.
Future period: age 53 - 65
Loss of earning capacity from age 53 to age 65 for 12 years commencing in eight years' time.
$375 per week for 12 years with a 5 per cent discount (multiplier 474)
So, 474 x 375 equals $177,750.00.
To derive the present value of that total payable in eight years' time a factor of .6768 is applied.
$177,750.00 x .6768 = $120,301.20 less 20 per cent ($24,060.24) for contingencies: $96,240.96.
Mr Dodge's lost earning capacity for the past is assessed as $164,535.12. His lost earning capacity for the future is assessed as $306,362.61.
401 There is a claim for past gratuitous services involving nursing and personal care and services of a domestic nature, and, for the future, services of a domestic nature.
402 The CL Act, s28B, permits damages for gratuitous services to be awarded in respect of accident-based needs for causes of action that commenced after that Act. Section 28B provides, in part:
"28B Damages for gratuitous services
(1) Damages for gratuitous services may be awarded in respect of gratuitous services required by the person as a result of injuries to that person caused by the negligence of another person.
(2) A person may not recover damages for gratuitous services unless the services have been provided, or are likely to be provided, to that person for more than 6 hours per week and for more than 6 consecutive months.
(3) In calculating damages for gratuitous services -
(a) the hourly rate is not to exceed one-fortieth of adult average weekly earnings; and
(b) the weekly rate is not to exceed adult average weekly earnings."
"'gratuitous services' means services of a domestic nature or services relating to nursing or attendance provided to a person for which that person does not pay or is not liable to pay;".
404 The Civil Liability Amendment Act 2005, amended the CL Act by adding the provisions regarding gratuitous services, and it also repealed the Common Law (Miscellaneous Actions) Act 1986, which had prevented gratuitous services claims in relation to personal injury claims.
405 The effect of s28B(2) is to create a threshold requirement for awards for gratuitous services that the services must have been, or are likely to be provided for more than six hours per week and more than six consecutive months. Counsel's arguments presupposed that the two requirements must both be met. See Harrison v Melham (No 2) [2006] NSWSC 1293; (2005) 46 MVR 8, at par[137].
406 The only gratuitous services that may be the subject of the award are those that are required by the person as a result of the injuries caused by the negligence of the defendant: s28(1) of the CL Act. As submitted by counsel for the defendant, the entitlement is to accident caused needs. The CL Act conforms with the common law that the true basis of a claim for damages with respect to care or services provided gratuitously is the plaintiff's need for those services (regardless of whether it is productive of financial loss): Van Gervan v Fenton [1992] HCA 54; (1992) 175 CLR 327.
407 Legal principles that I regard as governing my consideration of this claim are as follows.
•
The focus is on the reasonable requirements of the plaintiff, not the ideal requirements, with reference to what a person would do if he was spending his own money, yet had sufficient money, was well advised and reasonably careful about his own welfare: Barwick CJ in Arthur Robinson (Grafton) Pty Ltd v Carter [1968] HCA 9; (1968) 122 CLR 649 at 662.
•
Damages are not to be determined by reference to the income forgone by the provider of the service: Van Gervan v Fenton (supra) at 333 - 338 per Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ.
•
Generally speaking damages should be awarded on the basis of the market cost unless the market cost is unreasonable: Van Gervan v Fenton per Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 333 - 334.
•
Damages are not to be reduced merely because the plaintiff was receiving the value of the services, or part of the value of the services, before the accident, and would probably have enjoyed the continuation of that service if the accident had not occurred: Van Gervan v Fenton Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 338, Gaudron J at 350.
•
Recovery is not precluded because the services could be seen as ordinary incidents of family life, or in keeping with notions of marital obligations: Van Gervan v Fenton Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 335, 338, Gaudron J at 350.
•
There is no presumption in favour of retaining gratuitous services and not incurring outside services: Van Gervan v Fenton Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 335 - 337.
408 I turn to a consideration of the evidence relevant to this claim. I consider the situation before and after Mr Dodge's fall in January 2007.
409 Mr Dodge and his wife, Alison Dodge have lived together since late 2001. Their son Adam was born on 7 November 2003. They each have a child from a previous marriage, and Mrs Dodge's daughter also lived with them. Mr Dodge's teenage son came to live with them about two years before the trial. The couple married after the plaintiff's fall in January 2008.
410 At the time of the fall Mrs Dodge worked full-time as a business banking representative for Westpac at a call centre at Mowbray. She "loved" her job and had no plans of giving up her position.
411 Mrs Dodge described her relationship with Mr Dodge before the accident as an "equal relationship". Mr Dodge cooked family meals, such as roasts and barbeques. He accompanied her to the supermarket and helped her unpack the groceries. He helped with the housework and cleaning. He cleaned the shower and toilet and scrubbed the bath. Mrs Dodge would sort the washing and he would hang it on the clothesline. He moved furniture if that needed doing. He helped with spring-cleaning such as washing windows.
412 He performed "handyman" tasks around the home and home repairs, and when they moved house three times, he moved the furniture. Mr Dodge mowed the lawns and he kept a small vegetable garden.
413 The situation in the first three months after Mr Dodge's accident was particularly difficult given Mr Dodge's condition. Despite the gravity of his injuries, he only had a few days in hospital before he was discharged. Mr Dodge was in a neck brace and had his arm in a sling for approximately three months. Mrs Dodge bathed her husband and dried him and in the initial stages, after the accident she also dressed him. She brushed the back of his hair which he was not able to reach and cut up his food.
414 Mrs Dodge gave up her work. She described the care she provided him as "constant" during this time. Her estimate is that she spent 25 - 30 hours per week attending to his needs. She explained: "Adam was quite young, I had the children's needs as well as Kevin's needs, I just didn't have enough hours in the day to be able to get done what I needed to get done".
415 Soon after the fall Mrs Dodge's grandmother came to live with the family as Mrs Dodge could not cope on her own.
416 After approximately three months the care provided was not as constant. However, there was a period commencing about six months after his fall when the care that Mrs Dodge provided for her husband increased. Mr Dodge developed a drinking problem. Mrs Dodge became very concerned about his mental well-being, and very concerned that he would take his own life. She kept constant watch over him and would not leave him alone. Her fear of that ceased in about September 2009.
417 Mrs Dodge returned to work at Westpac for a time but did not last very long and became burnt out and ill. More recently Mrs Dodge has developed her own health concerns and she has had a mini-stroke, leaving her weak on her right side. After Mrs Dodge returned home from hospital, and while recuperating, her husband was not able to offer her assistance.
418 The current situation involving domestic chores is as follows. Mrs Dodge prepares most of the meals and maintains the home. Mr Dodge does some cooking but he has difficulty lifting things in and out of the oven such as a roast or casseroles, or lifting and carrying a saucepan from stove to sink. He struggles using a whisk or hand beater. It was evident that he lacks motivation in assisting with the cooking and other domestic chores. He will use the barbeque if Mrs Dodge pressures him to do so.
419 Mrs Dodge arranges Mr Dodge's appointments and takes him to appointments and puts out his medication for him. Since his accident, Mr Dodge is now forgetful and needs to be reminded of information provided by doctors.
420 Mrs Dodge now works part-time. Mrs Dodge works at the Caltex Service Station at Longford for 10 - 20 hours per week as a console operator. She is also a stable foreperson for her step-father. The work that she performs for her step-father covers the stable and training costs of her race horse. Mrs Dodge's grandmother continues to live with the family.
421 Mr Dodge's eldest son helps his father with home maintenance. He mows the lawns, chops firewood and brings it in. He also does other manual work around the house to help his father. He is intending to leave home soon and join the Army. The family lives in a rented house in Longford. They do not have a vegetable garden. Mrs Dodge now pays someone to do the gardening as needed.
422 Mr and Mrs Dodge moved house in November 2008. Mr Dodge was not able to do the moving as he had done before his accident. Mr Dodge's brother helped them move, taking about a day and a half to do so.
424 The evidence in relation to hours spent attending to gratuitous services for Mr Dodge did not provide precise details and exact information about the number of hours spent on various duties at different times. While the evidence lacks precision, it is nonetheless reliable and not overstated.
425 It can be seen that there are various components to the services provided by Mrs Dodge and Mr Dodge's son: nursing and personal care such as assistance with dressing, showering, organising medication and medical appointments; protective attention and supervision involving a need to be on stand-by to assist as needed; domestic services such as cleaning and cooking, washing clothes and linen, as well as home and garden maintenance.
426 My findings regarding the time spent on these services are as follows. The need for assistance with dressing, showering, drying and cutting up food was significant in the first three months. It gradually diminished so that by three months that was not necessary.
427 Assistance with medication and organising medical appointments continued after the first three months. That assistance has continued at a fairly constant level since. In the second six months after the fall there was time spent providing protective attention and keeping watch as Mr Dodge's mood became very low and his depressive symptoms worsened.
428 Domestic services such as cleaning, cooking, supermarket shopping and washing have been required at a reasonably constant level since the fall. Mr Dodge assists with some cooking now. The evidence suggests that his contribution to housework has been overall minimal since his fall. Whether that is entirely due to his physical incapacity as opposed to the psychological sequelae of his condition is immaterial. Home and garden maintenance have continued to be required at a fairly static level since the fall.
429 While Mrs Dodge performed some of these tasks before Mr Dodge's fall, it arose from a mutual give and take in their relationship and reciprocal assistance provided by Mr Dodge. That choice to provide that assistance in the context of a reciprocating relationship has now been transformed by the defendant's negligence into the need for Mr Dodge to have those services performed for him[14].
430 In assessing the number of hours attributed to Mr Dodge's needs on a gratuitous basis I consider a conservative approach should be taken. This is particularly the case with Mrs Dodge's evidence about not leaving Mr Dodge alone in the period commencing six months after his accident. I do not doubt her concerns for his welfare, the volatility of his moods and that he suffered depression at that time. Mr Dodge was prescribed medication for depression by his general practitioner in August 2008. However, there is a lack of medical support for her fears. There is no reference to suicidal ideation in the medical reports.
431 Taking a conservative approach, it would be reasonable to assess the care provided to Mr Dodge after his accident and the necessary support in terms of domestic services in the first six months as well in excess of ten hours per week.
432 For the first three months a conservative total estimate of time spent on these services would be three hours per day. Approximately two hours a day for nursing and personal care alone would be reasonable for the first three months. There was a need for someone to be on stand-by to assist at certain key points in the day. It is reasonable that assistance would be available during the time that Mr Dodge would take to shower and dress, so that assistance would be provided when needed. Meal times would be another occasion when assistance was needed to cut up his food and set out his medication.
433 In the first three months, another two hours per day for cleaning, cooking, supermarket shopping and washing clothes and linen for Mr Dodge would be reasonable. It is appropriate to assume that some of those domestic responsibilities could be undertaken while being available and on stand-by to assist in personal care.
434 I do not doubt that Mrs Dodge spent much longer than three hours per day in the first three months attending to her husband's needs, caring for him, meal preparation and cleaning and washing linen, and providing protective attention. An indication of the time spent is that Mrs Dodge had to give up work in order to manage looking after her husband and her children, and she needed her grandmother's help on a live-in basis.
435 I also note that a time period of three hours does not make any allowance for home maintenance, gardening and spring cleaning.
436 After the first three months, an estimate of two hours per day for domestic services would be conservative. For the reasons I have mentioned this does not make any allowance for time spent providing a protective watch over Mr Dodge. The time that Mrs Dodge was required to spend attending to Mr Dodge's needs reduced by some degree when Mr Dodge began to undertake some of the cooking and a few of the lighter domestic tasks. Time needed for gardening and home maintenance and spring cleaning would more than make up for that reduction in Mrs Dodge's time spent on attending to the lighter domestic tasks for Mr Dodge.
437 Mr Dodge is eligible for a gratuitous care award. The care provided to him exceeded six hours per week for a continuous period of six months, by a substantial margin.
438 I turn now to the questions of "What are the services required to satisfy the plaintiff's need resulting from the defendant's wrong?" and "What is the value of those services" (Van Gervan v Fenton per Mason CJ, Toohey and McHugh JJ).
439 The claim for gratuitous services is for 7.4 hours per week from the time of the accident. The breakdown is as follows:
Housework - heavy manual tasks such as vacuuming, changing bed linen, hanging washing, meal preparation, garbage - 0.5 hrs per day plus 2 hrs per week
Spring Cleaning - heavier less frequent tasks such as cleaning windows, the refrigerator, the oven, moving furniture, large scale garbage removal etc. 4 days per year
Home maintenance - includes repairs, painting & decorating, cleaning gutters etc - 2 hours per month
440 Dr Peter Sharman regards Ms Ravangnani's assessment of Mr Dodge's needs for personal assistance as realistic (P26 report, dated 22 February 2010). I agree that the assessment is realistic. In fact, the claim significantly underestimates the past and future accident-based care for Mr Dodge because:
•
The claim does not make any allowance for the more intense level of care involving nursing and personal care in the first three months after Mr Dodge's fall. In this regard the claim underestimates the hours of care provided in the past by a significant margin.
•
It presupposes that Mr Dodge is able to perform all the lighter housework tasks and that his incapacity only extends to the heavy manual tasks, and that by reason of his physical and psychological condition, he is not precluded from doing all the cooking, shopping and lighter domestic chores. The claim unrealistically assesses Mr Dodge's past and future capacity.
441 I consider that the proportion of time attributed to the categories of housework, helping bring in shopping and spring-cleaning and gardening is reasonable and does not overstate the time that would be spent on each of those categories of domestic chores.
442 Bearing in mind these observations the claim satisfies the requirement that awards for gratuitous services be conservative, reasonable and not ideally fulfilling needs.
443 What then is the value of those past and future services of 7.4 hours per week? Section 28B(3) of the Act provides a cap on this award:
"(3) In calculating damages for gratuitous services -
(a) the hourly rate is not to exceed one-fortieth of adult average weekly earnings; and
(b) the weekly rate is not to exceed adult average weekly earnings."
"'adult average weekly earnings' means the dollar figure for full-time adult ordinary time earnings for persons set out under the heading 'AVERAGE WEEKLY EARNINGS, Australia: Original' in catalogue number 6302.0 published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics, as amended from time to time;".
445 The amount claimed is for a flat hourly rate of $28.63 for the past and $30.58 for the future. It is evident that the rates involve some kind of working back from a rate of $34.60 per hour provided by occupational therapist Ms Ravangnani in her report dated February 2010. Ms Ravangnani's quoted amount of $34.60 was described by counsel for the plaintiff in his closing address as a "commercial rate".
446 The hourly rate referred to by Ms Ravangnani of $34.60 may be based on the average weekly earnings published by the Australian Bureau of Statistics for November 2009 (Exhibit P7). However, if that is the case, those earnings represent the statutory limit and there is no evidence suggesting that it is the market rate for the work performed.
447 My task is to determine a commercial rate for tasks performed by a nurse's aide, a house cleaner and a gardener and repair person. It would be usual for the Court to receive evidence of the salary or wages paid for comparable work[15]. Such information was not provided on behalf of either party in this case.
448 It is apparent that the figures advanced by counsel for the plaintiff are not contentious, and counsel for the defendant did not submit the figures ought to be rejected, or suggest a lower hourly rate. However, ultimately the award must not exceed what is fair and reasonable between the parties and hence I must ensure that the claim awarded for the hourly rate is not excessive. The figure advanced on behalf of the plaintiff of approximately $30 per hour seems too high as a current hourly rate for housecleaning. It may not be for the other work.
449 Taking a pragmatic approach, acknowledging that bringing exactitude to this task is not possible and that the question of the commercial rate for work performed has not been contentious, I allow for the past nursing and personal care assistance an amount of $28 per hour. For housecleaning and domestic assistance I allow $20 per hour past and future.
450 For the first three months following discharge from hospital there was more than 7.4 hours per week dedicated to nursing assistance. That number of hours shall be allowed at the rate of $28 per hour ($2,486.40). For the time after the first three months to judgment, the hourly rate permitted is that of $20 per hour for 7.4 hours per week ($148 per week for period of 207 weeks to now). The amount allowed for this period is $30,636. The total amount for past gratuitous services is $33,122.40.
451 As for the future, I allow $20 per hour for 7.4 hours per week for the remainder of the plaintiff's life. As a lump sum for future loss a discount rate of 5 per cent is applied (CL Act, s28A(a) stipulating this rate) $148 x 918.9 = $135,997.20 with no allowance for mortality (the tables used were handed up during the trial, '$1 per week factors - improving mortality rates (2009 values), Cumpston Sarjeant Pty Ltd marked 'A').
452 The total amount allowed for future gratuitous services is the amount of $135,997.20. No discount is made for the vicissitudes of life: Sharman v Evans [1977] HCA 8; (1977) 138 CLR 563, at 587.
453 In the event that s28B(3) of the CL Act did not apply and gratuitous services were not compensable, then my determination would have been to allow an amount for domestic services as expenses that Mr Dodge would incur in the future. The evidence persuades me that the plaintiff would pay for domestic services in light of his circumstances, including his wife's current ill-health and his son's plans to leave home. It would be reasonable to assess that the plaintiff would pay for 7.4 hours of domestic services per week.
Medical, hospitalisation and associated expenses
454 The plaintiff claims past hospitalisation expenses. The evidence establishes that hospital fees in connection with Mr Dodge's injuries total $6,202.00. That amount is allowed.
455 Past medical treatment expenses are also claimed amounting to $3,879.00 These expenses are agreed and allowed.
456 Transport expenses relating to medical treatment is agreed in the sum of $334.35 and allowed. An amount of $400 is agreed for unplanned expenses arising from the plaintiff's emergency admission to the Royal Hobart Hospital.
457 Past expenses for prescription medication (pain relief P271 and anti-depressants) is claimed in the sum of $1,200 and not agreed. A portion of that amount, relating to the period 1 January 2008 to 11 March 2010, in the sum of $753.15 is agreed and substantiated by records from the Longford Pharmacy. The plaintiff's case is that the balance sum represents expenses incurred for January 2007 to 1 January 2008. Records for this period were not provided.
458 It is reasonable to suppose that the plaintiff's medication costs would have been at least at the same level as the costs incurred for the first six months in 2008, before he was first prescribed anti- depressants in August 2008. In the period January 2008 to June 2008, Mr Dodge's medication expenses totalled $206 per month. Therefore, for the period of 11 months from discharge from hospital at the end of January 2007 to 1 January 2008, the amount allowed is $378.00.
459 A total amount of $1,131.00 is allowed for medication costs for the period January 2007 to March 2010. Taking into account the cost of medication in the 12 months period ending March 2010 (Exhibit P14), an additional amount of $205.00 (13 months at $15.77 per month) is allowed for the period from March 2010 to the date of judgment. The total amount allowed for past medication costs is $1,336.15.
460 Future medical expenses are particularised as follows:
461 During closing submissions the plaintiff's counsel sought to substantiate an amount of $10,000 as being the amount sought for this claim.
462 The cost of a consultation with a neurosurgeon, as particularised, is not disputed and appears reasonable. Reviews by a neurosurgeon are warranted. Mr Dodge's neck injury is not expected to improve. There is the possibility that a cervical fusion procedure will be required. It may be noted that a claim for the neurosurgical procedure of having the mobile segment at C6/7 fused at a present cost of $10,000 has not been made.
463 The unchallenged opinion of neurosurgeon Mr Brownbill is that Mr Dodge should be reviewed periodically "by his treating doctors, with radiological investigations to determine if there is any increase in instability of the cervical spine or onset of any signs of radiculopathy or myelopathy" (Report of Mr Brownbill, P15). The frequency of these reviews was not specified. I will allow the cost of reviews by Mr Dodge's neurosurgeon every two years.
464 The claim for future medication expenses is based upon the assumption that he will continue taking medication at his current rate. That is a reasonable assumption given the permanent nature of his physical and psychological symptoms with no realistic prospect of improvement. In the past Mr Dodge has been compliant with his medication regime and it is evident that he is conscious of the benefits of the anti-depressant medication he is taking.
465 His medication costs are likely to continue unabated. Review by a general practitioner on a regular basis is reasonable for prescribing medication and monitoring its use. Four appointments per year would be reasonable for this purpose. Consultations with a general practitioner four times per year at a cost of approximately $50 each (see Medicare history statement, P12) is to be expected. This works out to be a cost of approximately $4.00 per week.
466 Mr Dodge's past cost of medication is approximately $7 per week (P14). The total ongoing costs of medication and attending his general practitioner works out to be $11 per week. Biannual review with a neurosurgeon is .54 cents per week. The total weekly sum of $11.54 calculated for the remainder of the plaintiff's life (life expectancy 40 years) discounted by 5 per cent tables (referred to above and again, using the multiplier of 918.9) amounts to $10,604.10. The amount claimed of $10,000 should be allowed.
467 There is a claim of $19,552 for an holistic rehabilitation program "designed to maximise his physical and emotional function, his independence and his quality of life". The recommendation is that the program be implemented over the next 12 months. This claim is based on the evidence of occupational therapist Ms Suzanne Miller Ravangnani. The detail of the program is as follows:
"• Psychotherapy/Life coaching - Mr Dodge requires 12 months of supportive, motivational coaching and assistance as a result of this accident. He requires one session per fortnight for 52 weeks @ $192 per session = $4992 Source: Australian Psychological Society
•
Occupational Therapy - Mr dodge would benefit from a very practical rehabilitation regime which focuses on factual information and very direct advice. He requires ergonomic education with regards his home environment, personal care routine, leisure and social options. He requires practical advice on how to maximise his performance and independence while minimising the aggravation of symptoms. To this end Mr Dodge requires an experienced Occupational Therapist (with ergonomic expertise) for 4 hours per month for 6 months @ $140 per hour = $3360 Source: Average cost of private Occupational Therapy consultation.
•
Supervised exercise - With the approval of his treating doctors, Mr Dodge would benefit from a gentle but effective exercise routine to reactive him and improve his tolerance of physical activity. This should be supervised by a personal trainer / physiotherapist. This may include aquarobics, a gym programme, Pilates, yoga or Qi Gong. He requires three sessions per week for the first 3 months and then two sessions per week for the following 9 months @ $70 per hour for 12 months = $7560.
•
Physiotherapy - In addition to exercise Mr Dodge would benefit from further physiotherapy to treat painful symptoms and maximise his physical function. He requires one session per week for 12 months @ $70 per hour = $3640."
468 In addition there is a claim for costs of travel involving two round trips from Longford to Launceston per week to attend exercise and treatment sessions in the sum of $1,404.00
469 Some of the medical practitioners have expressed a view about the proposed rehabilitation program. Dr Sharman is of the view that Mr Dodge has not improved to the extent that he would be able to participate in a rehabilitation program.
470 Dr Burke considers that it is very doubtful whether there is any useful place for such physical and/or psychological rehabilitation program and/or vocational rehabilitation. He considers that it is too late for such a program and that this man has become "very settled in his disabled state". His pessimism seems to relate to the benefits to be derived from the program in promoting Mr Dodge's return to employment and because he sees his prospects as extremely limited in this regard.
471 I accept that intervention from a psychologist would likely be of benefit to Mr Dodge if he would attend. However, as previously mentioned, the evidence demonstrates that Mr Dodge would not find psychological intervention palatable. I doubt psychotherapy would be worthwhile. There are various reasons for this. Not everyone is suited to psychotherapy. Dr Sale described it as "talking therapy" and said that Mr Dodge would find it difficult to grapple with concepts he would be expected to face (Dr Sale, t238). My own observations of Mr Dodge are that he is someone who is more comfortable talking about concrete and practical matters rather than his feelings. With similar reservations, I am not persuaded that he would find guidance from a "life coach" worthwhile.
472 Occupational therapy and ergonomic education seems sensible, and it would be reasonable to expect that Mr Dodge would benefit from that. I gather that the focus of that therapy would be to assist Mr Dodge in minimising aggravation of his symptoms and making adjustments to his home environment to reduce his pain and discomfort levels. In the absence of evidence justifying 20 hours of occupational assistance, and in light of the fact that 10 hours appears to be a significant amount of time dedicated to assessing and assisting Mr Dodge in this way, I allow 10 hours and an amount of $1,400.
473 The amount claimed for physiotherapy is on the basis of treatment once per week for 12 months. It is not apparent whether Mr Dodge has had any physiotherapy treatment since his fall. It is reasonable to anticipate that if he had physiotherapy offered to him, it would assist in managing his pain and restrictions. I allow 26 consultations, half the rate claimed, at a total amount of $1,820.
474 It is reasonable to expect that Mr Dodge would find supervised exercise helpful. He was previously a fit and athletic person who evidently enjoyed physically challenging himself. There is a reasonable likelihood that an exercise program will improve his mood, general health and sense of well-being. I allow this amount as claimed in the sum of $7,560.
475 The fact that allowance has been made for these expenses such as an exercise program which should enhance Mr Dodge's quality of life, and physiotherapy and occupational therapy which should assist in managing his pain and restrictions, is to be taken into account by me in assessing Mr Dodge's award for pain and suffering and loss of amenities.
476 The amount allowed for rehabilitation is $10,780.00 and $1,000 for travel expenses with an adjustment to those expenses to reflect that the expected number of journeys to Launceston for consultations is less than that claimed.
477 There is a claim for a pillow, memory foam mattress overlay and replacements, electric can opener, food processor, jar pop and 12 volt cordless drill/screwdriver. These claims are based on the evidence of Ms Ravangnani.
478 Dr Peter Sharman, occupational therapist fully supports the recommendations for a pillow and mattress overlay as essential to Mr Dodge's comfort. He does not see that at the moment he needs the kitchen appliances. I am not satisfied that the kitchen items and the cordless drill/screwdriver are warranted. The defendant does not dispute the need for pillow, overlay and replacements.
479 I am satisfied that an allowance for the pillow and overlay as claimed is reasonable and required to address Mr Dodge's discomfort. I allow the cost of a pillow at $230 and a replacement every three years, and mattress foam overlay of $330, with a replacement every 5 years. That is an annual cost of $142.66, and a weekly cost of $2.74. Discounted using the same table regarding Mr Dodge's life expectancy, and applying the factor of 918.9, the sum allowed is $2,517.78. Applying the life expectancy tables previously mentioned and a discount rate of 5 per cent, and the multiplier of 918.9, the sum allowed is $2,517.78.
480 Before Mr Dodge was injured he cut his own firewood. Since his injury Mr Dodge has had to buy it. The defendant does not challenge the claim for the purchase of firewood and the particulars as to frequency and cost.
481 Mr Dodge pays approximately $160 - $165 per load of firewood. As a consequence of his injuries, the plaintiff feels the cold weather, and the house is kept warm through the winter months. In the year before the trial, six to eight loads were purchased. Allowing seven loads per annum at $160 per load since the date of injury until judgment, amounts to $4,480.
482 The plaintiff claims an amount for firewood for the remainder of his life. However, I consider it reasonable to assume that at some stage as Mr Dodge became older he would have chosen to purchase firewood instead of retrieving it himself. I will allow a period of 15 years of purchasing firewood attributed to the injury from the date of judgment. The cost is $1,120 per annum. The weekly value of $21.53 discounted by 5 per cent = $21.53 x 555 = $11,949.15[16].
483 This award of damages is to provide a plaintiff with "some consolation for ... his non-pecuniary loss in respect to pain and suffering and loss of amenities" (Dobson v Jackson [2009] TASSC 118, at [114]). It is necessarily a difficult exercise requiring the "awarding of monetary compensation for that which cannot be measured in money" (Southern Regional Health Board v Grimsey (1998) 8 Tas R 166, at 188).
484 I do not need to traverse the details relevant to this head of damages, as they are set out fully above. It may be noted that the plaintiff will continue to suffer daily pain and discomfort at fluctuating levels. His depressive symptoms are expected to be enduring. His life has been diminished in almost every aspect including his sense of self-worth and identity. He is constantly reminded of his losses and is not able to adjust to his changed circumstances.
485 The sum awarded must be proportionate to the injury and its consequences. It is necessary to ensure there is no overlap with any other items of damage, and, that I take into account damages awarded which may have the effect of improving Mr Dodge's pain levels and amenities of life. In particular, I take into account the allowance for physiotherapy and an exercise program which may have this benefit.
486 Section 28 of the CL Act provides:
"28 Tariffs for damages for non-economic loss (general damages)
(1) In determining damages for non-economic loss, a court may refer to earlier decisions of that or other courts for the purpose of establishing the appropriate award in the proceedings.
(2) For that purpose, the parties to the proceedings or their counsel may bring the court's attention to awards of damages for non-economic loss in those earlier decisions."
487 In view of that provision, counsel for the plaintiff has referred me to awards for general damages in three earlier decisions of this Court: South v James Loughran & Sons Pty Ltd [2003] TASSC 59 (an award of $70,000); Anthony v Tasmanian Alkaloids Pty Ltd [2004] TASSC 118 (award of $60,000); Dobson v Jackson [2009] TASSC 118 (award of $200,000). He also referred to two decisions from other jurisdictions: Durkin v Mornington Racing Club Inc, unreported, County Court of Victoria, Duggan J, 14 September 2006 ($200,000_); Harrison v Melham (No 2_) (2005) 46 MVR ($235,000). These decisions were referred to as providing an indication of the awards for general damages from those jurisdictions.
488 It is not suggested that the decisions from this Court are factually similar. It was submitted by Mr Read that the Tasmanian cases provide an indication that an appropriate award in this case is in the region of $100,000 - $110,000. It was submitted that in view of the CL Act, s28 I may have regard to the much higher awards from other jurisdictions, and I am no longer constrained by that range. It was submitted that the Victorian case of Durkin v The Mornington Racing Club (supra) involving a jockey was similar in some respects.
489 It was submitted for the defendant that only a very moderate award for non-economic loss was appropriate. This argument was based on the premise that the plaintiff was left with limited genuine physical impairment and probably resolvable psychological difficulties. I have rejected the factual basis for that submission. Mr Jackson has not referred me to any awards.
490 Some general observations may be made about the approach of referring to a few isolated cases from other jurisdictions as the basis for a submission that the range reflected by awards from this Court ought to be increased. The cases are too few in number to provide an adequate guide to the range of awards for a particular jurisdiction. While the facts of one of the cases may be broadly similar, the award reflects details of the circumstances of the plaintiff that are quite different to the facts here.
491 The cases from Victoria and New South Wales may not be a representative example of awards from that State. Of course, those awards may also not be representative of other jurisdictions in Australia.
492 The other observation to be made is that the awards referred to from this Court and interstate are difficult to rationalise, and it is difficult to see how they might, together, operate as a guide to future assessments.
493 If I was to treat those particular cases from Victoria and New South Wales as a bench-mark then that would suggest that an amount approaching $200,000 may be appropriate in this case. Such an award would be out of line with other awards from this Court to which I have been referred. In Tasmania that sort of amount is reserved for plaintiffs who have suffered catastrophic injury and severe continuing disability.
494 Having regard to these observations I return to fundamental principles that assist with the task ahead. These principles were stated over 40 years ago by the High Court in Planet Fisheries Pty Ltd v La Rosa [1968] HCA 62; (1968) 119 CLR 118 at 125, and, of course, well before the reforms in the CL Act, but they still provide sound guidance today. Of primary significance here is the principle that there is no "standard" to be derived from a consideration of amounts awarded in other specific cases, and that damages must be fair and reasonable compensation for the injuries received and the disabilities caused. However, it is also right to be aware of and give weight to general ideas of fairness and moderation.
495 The modern approach should be the same, with the refinement that by virtue of CL Act, s28, regard may be had to decisions of other courts in obtaining a general idea of fairness and moderation. I bear in mind the observations I have made about the decisions from Victoria and New South Wales which require a most circumspect approach.
496 Ultimately my consideration of the award in this case will be governed by a careful consideration of the injuries received by Mr Dodge and disabilities caused. Subject to the matters of fundamental principle in Planet Fisheries, I bear in mind other awards of general damages made in this jurisdiction and the awards to which I have been referred from this Court, and also other courts.
497 In view of the matters above, I assess general damages in the sum of $80,000.
499 Taking an overall view of the total amount I am satisfied that it is just and reasonable and that the plaintiff is entitled to an award of $772,895.00. There will be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant for that amount.
[2] The CL Act does not apply to civil liability relating to an injury to which Division 2 of Part X of the Workers Rehabilitation and Compensation Act 1988 applies (CL Act, s3B).
[4] The panel recommended that the "negligence calculus" be embodied in the legislation. See [7.17] and recommendation 28.
[5] It is intended to address the danger that a court will conclude that because a risk can be described as 'not insignificant' it would be negligent not to take precautions against it: (par7.16 of the Final Report).
[6] Roads and Traffic Authority of NSW v Refrigerated Roadways Pty Limited [2009] NSWCA 263 at 443.
[7] Photograph 6 reveals that Mr Snell was laterally closer to Mr McCoull than Mr Smith was to Mr McCoull, and Mr Snell was on an inward path.
[8] Officiated outside Australia at the Dubai World Cup meeting and worked on panels of six Dubai World Cups. He has represented Australia at Asian Racing Conferences, from an integrity aspect, from 1997 in South Africa and up until 2007 in Dubai. He has represented Australia on the Harmonisation of Rules Panel for the Asian Racing Conference (which included jurisdictions from all world racing nations).
[9] In viewing the side on frames, the stride of the horses must be borne in mind, as when a horse's hooves are collected underneath the horse, then the distance between it and another horse appears greater. Frames 17 and 18 show this. Photograph 17 shows the horse's hooves collected and the head of McCoull's horse held in, while in photograph 18 its head is extended in a more natural position and the hooves of both horses are extended and overlap.
[10] See previous discussion at par 18.
[11] The relevant principles are found in Falvo v Australian Oztag Sports Association (2006) NSWCA 17, Fallas v Mourlas (supra) and Carey (supra). The test is objective, with a requirement to focus on the particular activities engaged in by the plaintiff and the actual circumstances giving rise to harm. The risk must have a real chance of materialising and the seriousness of the injury that may result is a relevant consideration.
[12] Hitchens, P L, et al, The incidence of race-day jockey falls in Australia, 2002 - 2006, Medical Journal of Australia (2009) 190 (2), 83.
[13] 65 per cent of prize money to the winner, 15 per cent, 10 and 5 per cent for second, third and fourth place.
[14] See Van Gervan v Fenton per Mason, Toohey and McHugh JJ at 333.
[15] Gaudron J in Van Gervan at 348.
[16] Luntz, 4th ed, Table 2 at 683.
Dodge
Snell [2011] TASSC 19
(1980) 146 CLR 40
(1967) 116 CLR 383
(2009) 239 CLR 27
(1997) 187 CLR 384
(1998) 194 CLR 355
(1992) 175 CLR 327
(1968) 119 CLR 118
(2009) 239 CLR 420
(1996) 40 NSWLR 155
(1961) 106 CLR 112
(2005) 223 CLR 422
(1950) 80 CLR 292
(1948) 77 CLR 39
(1993) 18 MVR 361
(1968) 13 FLR 143
(2006) 1 Qd R 222
(1985) 184 CLR 485
(2005) 46 MVR 8
(1968) 122 CLR 649
(1977) 138 CLR 563
(1998) 8 Tas R 166