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Mr Snell looked to his inside and it was plain for him to see that he was only one and a quarter lengths clear of Mr McCoull. He was maintaining that clearance. The nose of McCoull's mount was almost on his horse's tail. Mr Snell would know that that meant his mount's rear heels were inside or extremely close to McCoull's mount's heels.
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While Mr Snell looked, he did not have a proper look. He either paid no attention to what he was looking at and failed to observe the lack of clearance between his horse and Colonel Parker, or he paid attention and proceeded regardless, taking a calculated risk, despite the fact that the distance of only one and a quarter lengths was fraught with risk.
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Mr Snell assumed he could shift Mr McCoull across laterally some distance if he interfered with Mr McCoull's running. He could not see Kane Bandy and Tal Jack to the inside of Mr McCoull's mount as his view of them was obscured by Mr McCoull. It was evident to him that his view was obscured. Regardless of these considerations, he started to shift across.
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There were calls from Mr McCoull which were made in sufficient time to amount to a warning to Mr Snell. Mr Snell either ignored those calls or they did not register because he was not paying attention. Either way he was not as mindful as he should have been of the obvious prospect of a rider to the inside of Mr McCoull being obscured from view. In addition, he was not mindful of the fact that a reason for the call may have been to alert him to the fact that he was causing interference and that there was not enough room. He also was not alert to the fact that the call/s were to inform him of the presence of another rider. He continued on his inward path, ignoring the call/s and/or not paying attention to them, pursuing his objective to get to the rail.
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In shifting inwards Mr Snell got so close side by side to Mr McCoull, that an experienced jockey in McCoull's position would take evasive action in order to avoid clipping heels and in doing so would deviate from his rightful running. Mr McCoull then took evasive action by restraining his mount. Mr Snell then realised that he had created a situation of peril for the other riders because he was inside Mr McCoull's heels and/or he heard Mr Bandy's call, and with that realisation, he straightened up. However, it was too late to avoid the impact on the other riders and the falls occurred.
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Mr Snell shifted inwards when the clearance was obviously inadequate and there was a real risk of heels clipping and Mr McCoull's mount falling. It was a breach of the two lengths policy of a kind which is relatively rare. It was particularly dangerous because Mr McCoull's capacity to avoid the danger was minimal. He had no room to his inside and, while he could restrain his mount, he had horses racing and close behind him, and in reality barely any time to increase the distance between him and Mr Snell. Mr McCoull did what he could by restraining his mount, but he could not prevent the fall.
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Although Mr Snell's decision to cross was based on a judgment that was made in a very short space of time, it was a decision that jockeys are trained and well-equipped to make.
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There was no subjective justification for such a poor decision to shift inwards. It was very early in the race and there was plenty of time to reach the rail before the first turn in the track.