The relevant principles
9 As a very general proposition, it is recognised that there are broadly three purposes for imposing penalties for breaches of industrial law: punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation. See: Ponzio v B & P Caelli Constructions Pty Ltd [2007] FCAFC 65 at [93], (2007) 158 FCR 543 at 559 (approved in Director, Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union [2015] FCAFC 59 at [68] to [69], (2015) 105 ACSR 403 at 427 to 428); Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Upton [2015] FCA 672 at [9] per Gilmour J.
10 And when assessing the penalty to be imposed, a Court must give careful attention to the maximum penalty that may be imposed: Markarian v R [2005] HCA 25, (2005) 228 CLR 357 at 372. Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne and Callinan JJ there held that:
[31] … careful attention to maximum penalties will almost always be required, first because the legislature has legislated for them; secondly, because they invite comparison between the worst possible case and the case before the court at the time; and thirdly, because in that regard they do provide, taken and balanced with all of the other relevant factors, a yardstick.
Although that case involved sentencing principles to be applied in respect to a criminal offence, these observations nevertheless remain apposite to the imposition of civil penalties: Minister for the Environment v Karstens [2015] FCA 649 at [21] per Jagot J.
11 The task of fixing the quantum of a penalty to be imposed has been said to be a process of "instinctive synthesis": Australian Ophthalmic Supplies Pty Ltd v McAlary-Smith [2008] FCAFC 8, (2008) 165 FCR 560 at [26] to [28] per Gray J; at [54] per Graham J.
12 Notwithstanding this "instinctive synthesis", many decisions of this Court have attempted to give greater content to, or greater clarification of, the reasoning process to be followed by providing a list - albeit in a non-exhaustive manner - of those considerations which may assume relevance. In Kelly v Fitzpatrick [2007] FCA 1080 at [14], (2007) 166 IR 14 at 18 to 19 Tracey J set forth one such list as follows:
the nature and extent of the conduct which led to the breaches;
the circumstances in which that conduct took place;
the nature and extent of any loss or damage sustained as a result of the breaches;
whether there had been similar previous conduct by the respondent;
whether the breaches were properly distinct or arose out of the one course of conduct;
the size of the business enterprise involved;
whether or not the breaches were deliberate;
whether senior management was involved in the breaches;
whether the party committing the breach had exhibited contrition;
whether the party committing the breach had taken corrective action;
whether the party committing the breach had co-operated with the enforcement authorities;
the need to ensure compliance with minimum standards by provision of an effective means for investigation and enforcement of employee entitlements; and
the need for specific and general deterrence.
As his Honour has subsequently pointed out, "each of these considerations has the potential to have both an ameliorative and aggravating impact in the course of the instinctive synthesis": Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2015] FCA 407 at [91]. See also: Australian Federation of Air Pilots v HNZ Australia Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 755 at [28] per Mortimer J.
13 When addressing the question of whether "the breaches were properly distinct or arose out of the same course of conduct", Middleton and Gordon JJ observed in Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union v Cahill [2010] FCAFC 39, (2010) 269 ALR 1 at 12 to 13:
[39] … [A] "course of conduct" or the "one transaction principle" is not a concept peculiar to the industrial context. It is a concept which arises in the criminal context generally and one which may be relevant to the proper exercise of the sentencing discretion. The principle recognises that where there is an interrelationship between the legal and factual elements of two or more offences for which an offender has been charged, care must be taken to ensure that the offender is not punished twice for what is essentially the same criminality. That requires careful identification of what is "the same criminality" and that is necessarily a factually specific enquiry. Bare identity of motive for commission of separate offences will seldom suffice to establish the same criminality in separate and distinct offending acts or omissions.
…
[41] … [T]he principle recognises that where there is an interrelationship between the legal and factual elements of two or more offences for which an offender has been charged, the court must ensure that the offender is not punished twice for the same conduct. In other words, where two offences arise as a result of the same or related conduct that is not a disentitling factor to the application of the single course of conduct principle but a reason why a court may have regard to that principle, as one of the applicable sentencing principles, to guide it in the exercise of the sentencing discretion … It is a tool of analysis … which a court is not compelled to utilise …
[42] A court is not compelled to utilise the principle because … "[d]iscretionary judgments require the weighing of elements, not the formulation of adjustable rules or benchmarks". The exercise of the sentencing discretion does not fall to be exercised in a vacuum. It is a matter of judgment to be exercised according to the facts of each case and having regard to conflicting sentencing objectives …
14 When addressing the relevance of deterrence, Perram J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Singtel Optus Pty Ltd (No 4) [2011] FCA 761, (2011) 282 ALR 246 at 265 helpfully summarised some of the principles as follows:
[75] How should the above factors be approached in the formulation of a penalty or penalties? One begins of course, with the obvious: the purpose of a penalty is deterrence; deterrence of the contravener, no doubt, but deterrence also of those onlookers who might, but for the penalty inflicted on the contravener, be tempted to engage in the same behaviour themselves. In the realm of financial penalties for economic wrongs this latter aspect of the punishment is especially important. The principal purpose of a financial penalty in this context is, as French J has observed, "to put a price on contravention that is sufficiently high to deter repetition by the contravener and by others who might be tempted to contravene the Act": Trade Practices Commission v CSR Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-076 at 52,152. I regard this as an important matter and take comfort from the Full Court's explanation in NW Frozen Foods Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (1996) 71 FCR 285 ; 141 ALR 640 that the "Court should not leave room for any impression of weakness in its resolve to impose penalties sufficient to ensure the deterrence, not only of the parties actually before it, but also of others who might be tempted to think that contravention would pay, and detection lead merely to a compliance program for the future" at CLR 294-5; ALR 648 per Burchett and Kiefel JJ.
Factual errors led to an appeal being allowed: Singtel Optus Pty Ltd v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2012] FCAFC 20 at [45] to [50], (2012) 287 ALR 249 at 261. But in respect to the "proper place of deterrence" in quantifying the penalty to be imposed, Keane CJ, Finn and Gilmour JJ expressed substantial agreement with the approach of the primary Judge as follows:
[62] There may be room for debate as to the proper place of deterrence in the punishment of some kinds of offences, such as crimes of passion; but in relation to offences of calculation by a corporation where the only punishment is a fine, the punishment must be fixed with a view to ensuring that the penalty is not such as to be regarded by that offender or others as an acceptable cost of doing business. The primary judge was right to proceed on the basis that the claims of deterrence in this case were so strong as to warrant a penalty that would upset any calculations of profitability. The purpose of Optus's conduct was to generate sales, and hence, profits. The advertising deployed by Optus was calculated to win business from its rivals. The same share of business might not have been attracted by a more balanced presentation of the advantages of the plans. There is no reason to doubt that Optus knows its business sufficiently well that it is safe to proceed on the footing that its course of conduct in the campaign reflected informed calculation. While one cannot isolate the profits attributable to the campaign, it is necessary and desirable to impose a penalty which is apt to affect in a substantial way the profitability of Optus's misconduct.
[63] Generally speaking, those engaged in trade and commerce must be deterred from the cynical calculation involved in weighing up the risk of penalty against the profits to be made from contravention. The primary judge did not engage in a surgical exercise calculated to deprive Optus of the profits referable to the increase in business generated by the campaign. It cannot seriously be suggested that this Honour was concerned to engage in an exercise in "profit stripping". To so describe his Honour's approach is to distract from the legitimate claims of deterrence in a case like the present: (2012) 287 ALR at 265.
See also: DP World Sydney Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 2) [2014] FCA 596 at [18], (2014) 318 ALR 22 at 27 per Flick J; Minister for the Environment v Karstens [2015] FCA 649 at [23] per Jagot J.
15 It is also relevant to consider the past conduct of those involved in a contravention: Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Stephenson [2014] FCA 1432, (2014) 146 ALD 75. The following observations were there expressed by White J in respect to past contraventions by the CFMEU:
The CFMEU record
[76] The Director provided a schedule of the occasions on which the CFMEU has been dealt with by courts for non-contraventions of industrial legislation. It is fair to describe the CFMEU record as dismal.
[77] Since 1999, the CFMEU has had penalties imposed on it by a court on numerous occasions. Many of the court decisions involved multiple contraventions. Of particular relevance presently is that before 1 March 2014, the CFMEU and/or its employees have been dealt with for contraventions of right of entry provisions on 13 occasions, involving some 40 separate contraventions. In addition, since the subject contraventions, Mansfield J in Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Cartledge [2014] FCA 1047 (delivered on 2 October 2014) (DFWBI v Cartledge), imposed penalties on the CFMEU and its employees in respect of seven different contraventions of s 500 of the FW Act committed on 19 and 20 March 2014. The record indicates an attitude of indifference by the CFMEU to compliance with the requirements of the legislation regarding the exercise of rights of entry. It also indicates that deterrence must be a prominent consideration in the fixing of penalties in the present cases.
Counsel for the Respondents in the present case did not cavil with the proposition that the Court in the present case could take into account when assessing the penalty to be imposed the history of past contraventions of the Fair Work Act or its predecessor and, in particular, the history of past contraventions of statutory provisions comparable to those in issue in the present proceeding. Although accepting such propositions, Counsel for the Respondents properly posed the necessary qualification that any assessment of penalty must be guided by the facts and circumstances of each individual case that may come before the Court.
16 Having taken into account each of those considerations relevant to a quantification of the penalty to be imposed, it remains necessary to consider whether the penalty otherwise considered appropriate is proportionate to the gravity of the contravening conduct: Australian Building and Construction Commissioner v Construction, Forestry, Mining and Energy Union (No 2) [2010] FCA 977 at [5], (2010) 199 IR 373 at 376 per Barker J. The "totality principle", as it has been called, has been explained by Middleton J in Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v AGL Sales Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1030 as follows:
[61] Lastly, I must consider the totality principle, parity and deterrence.
[62] With respect to the totality principle, it is trite law that the total penalty for related offences should not exceed what is proper for the entire contravening conduct involved … Put another way, the totality principle involves a final consideration of the sum of the penalties determined. Goldberg J, in Safeway Stores [(1997) 145 ALR 36 at 53] noted that the Court:
must, as an initial step, impose a penalty appropriate for each contravention and then as a check, at the end of the process, consider whether the aggregate is appropriate for the total contravening conduct involved.
See also: Director of the Fair Work Building Industry Inspectorate v Upton [2015] FCA 672 at [9] to [11] per Gilmour J.