DIA18 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs
[2021] FCA 1143
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Federal Court of Australia
Decision date
2021-09-28
Before
Burley J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (8 paragraphs)
- The applications for leave to raise proposed grounds 2 and 3 in SAD 180 of 2020 and proposed ground 2 in SAD 179 of 2020 be dismissed.
- The appeals be dismissed with costs. Note: Entry of orders is dealt with in Rule 39.32 of the Federal Court Rules 2011.
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
- INTRODUCTION [1]
- THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE [8] 2.1 The law [8] 2.2 DIB's proposed ground 2 [11] 2.3 DIB's proposed ground 3 [23] 2.4 Leave to raise new grounds [26]
- DISPOSITION [27]
- INTRODUCTION 1 These proceedings are constituted as two separate appeals from a judgment and orders made by the Federal Circuit Court of Australia (FCCA) on 11 November 2020, whereby the appellants' applications for judicial review of two decisions made by the Administrative Appeals Tribunal were dismissed: DIA18 v Minister for Immigration & Anor and DIB18 & Ors v Minister for Immigration & Anor [2020] FCCA 3049. 2 The adult appellants are a male citizen (DIA) and a female citizen (DIB) of Vietnam who travelled on the same boat to Australia and arrived on 19 March 2011 with no documentation. They met whilst in immigration detention, but were separated relatively soon after their arrival in Australia. On 24 June 2011, DIA escaped from immigration detention and travelled to country Victoria. On 4 April 2012, DIB escaped from immigration detention and travelled to Melbourne where she got in touch with DIA. On 12 July 2012 they were caught by the authorities and released into community detention. In February 2013 they had a daughter (DIC). They were married on 16 February 2014. In November 2014 they had a son (DID). 3 The background to the appellants' attempts to secure visas to reside in Australia may be summarised briefly as follows: (1) On 21 March 2011, DIB took part in an entry interview with an officer of the Department of Immigration during which she claimed to be a 15 year old orphaned minor who would face a real chance of harm for being a homeless child in Vietnam. On 13 July 2011 she made a statement with the assistance of a Vietnamese interpreter and a migration agent, where she claimed she would face harm if returned to Vietnam. On 15 July 2011 she was interviewed again, and she repeated her claims. The Department subsequently rejected her claims for protection. (2) On 23 March 2011 DIA took part in an entry interview with an officer of the Department during which he claimed to be a 15 year old orphan. (3) DIB sought merits review of the rejection of her claims. On 19 January 2012 she was interviewed by an independent assessor and repeated her claim to fear harm in Vietnam as a result of being a homeless street child. On 15 May 2012 the assessor upheld the Department's decision not to grant DIB a protection visa. She then sought judicial review of the decision in the Federal Magistrates' Court (as the FCCA was then known) but subsequently withdrew her application. (4) On 23 December 2015 the whole family applied for an XE-790 Safe Haven Enterprise visa (SHEV). DIA and DIB advanced individual claims for protection. Both recanted from their earlier statements that they were orphaned minors, instead advancing the separate claims set out below. Both claimed protection on behalf of their children as part of the family unit. (5) A delegate of the Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs refused to grant the protection visas. (6) On 25 October 2016 the appellants applied to the Tribunal for merits review of the delegate's decision. The Tribunal conducted a hearing for DIB and the children on 19 March 2018 and a separate hearing in relation to the claims advanced by DIA on 21 March 2018. (7) On 31 May 2018 the Tribunal delivered two decisions, one in relation to the claims advanced by DIB on her own behalf and on behalf of DIC and DID and the other in relation to the claims advanced by DIA on his own behalf and on behalf of DIC and DID. Both decisions affirmed the decisions of the delegate not to grant the appellants protection visas. (8) The appellants then filed separate applications for judicial review of the decisions of the Tribunal, DIA filing one on his own behalf only, and DIB filing one on her own behalf and on behalf of DIC and DID. (9) The FCCA considered both applications and dismissed them on 11 November 2020. (10) The appellants filed two separate appeals from the decision of the FCCA to this Court. The appeal advanced by DIA is designated SAD179/2020 and the appeal advanced on behalf of DIB and the children is designated SAD180/2020. 4 On appeal to this Court the appellants were represented pro bono by Cameron Jackson of counsel. He filed submissions for the appellants which sought leave to rely on grounds of appeal not raised before the FCCA. During the course of the hearing Mr Jackson sensibly abandoned the first of those grounds. The remaining grounds rely principally upon the claims advanced by DIB concerning her fears of sexual harassment if she and her daughter are returned to Vietnam. In the appeal advanced by DIB, DIC and DID in SAD180/2020 the grounds relied upon are: 2. The Tribunal failed to comply with section 425 of the Migration Act, because it failed to provide the Appellant with a genuine opportunity to appear before it to present evidence and argument with respect to the issues arising on the review. 2.1 The Tribunal failed to raise the topic of [DIB18's] history of sexual abuse as a child and sexual harassment as a female worker in Vietnam, and her claim to fear harm for herself and her daughter from similar abuse and harassment should they be returned to Vietnam. 2.2 The failure was material, because it could have affected the outcome. 3. The Tribunal failed to give proper, genuine, and realistic consideration to the Appellant's claims…with respect to sexual abuse and harassment in Vietnam, and/or failed to engage in an active intellectual process with that evidence. 5 The appeal advanced by DIA relies on the same alleged jurisdictional errors, on the basis that the whole family made a single application for a protection visa. The Minister, who was represented at the hearing by Sparke Helmore, solicitors, accepts that the consequence of a finding of jurisdictional error based on DIB's claims would be that the decision of the Tribunal in the DIA's claim would also be vitiated. The basis for the Minister's concession is summarised by the equivalent reasoning approved of by Kenny J in CDN16 v Minister for Immigration, Citizenship, Migrant Services and Multicultural Affairs [2021] FCA 699 at [161] and [174], namely, but for the jurisdictional error, the Tribunal may have found that DIB satisfied the requirements of s 36(2)(a) or (aa) of the Migration Act 1958 (Cth) and clause 790.221(2) of Schedule 2 to the Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth). Accordingly, the Tribunal might have found that DIA satisfied the requirements of s 36(2)(b) or (c) and clause 790.221(3) of Schedule 2 to the Regulations on the basis that DIA is a "member of the same family unit" as DIB, and might have granted DIA a SHEV. 6 The hearing proceeded on the basis that the question of leave and, if leave were to be granted, the appeal itself, would be argued at the same time. 7 For the reasons set out below I decline leave to rely on the proposed grounds of appeal and accordingly dismiss the appeal with costs.