Eskdale
43 First, while the Deputy Commissioner has no judgment against Carluke Capital as the trustee of the Trust, the defendants conceded at the hearing that they do not dispute that a substantial debt exists in favour of the Deputy Commissioner based on the RBA.
44 Second, in relation to the issue of a right of indemnity in Carluke Capital against Eskdale for unpaid tax liabilities of Carluke Capital, the defendants submit that the Deputy Commissioner's claim is "novel". I do not consider this claim to be novel. On the facts of this case it appears that not only is Carluke Capital insolvent and directionless, but the only assets it appeared to have until it was removed as trustee were assets of the Trust. Similarly, the evidence of Ms Hofmeister is that the only assets of Eskdale are the assets of the Trust.
45 The Trust is indebted to the Deputy Commissioner in the amount identified as unpaid tax liabilities set out in the "Carluke Capital" RBA. I do not accept the submission of the defendants that the reference to "Carluke Capital" in the RBA is ambiguous - as was clear from the undisputed fact that the Account Number on the RBA is the ABN of the Trust, the RBA clearly refers to the Trust and its tax liability. I accept that the Deputy Commissioner is a creditor of the Trust, and, to that extent, Eskdale in its capacity as trustee of the Trust.
46 Principles relevant to the right of indemnity of a trustee, the effect of transfer to a new trustee and a creditor's right of subrogation were recently considered by the Court of Appeal in Agusta Pty Ltd v Provident Capital Ltd [2012] NSWCA 26. In that case Barrett JA for the Court observed (in summary):
A trustee's right thus to be indemnified out of trust assets for all debts duly and properly incurred as trustee is a right exercisable prospectively by way of exoneration or retrospectively by way of reimbursement (see Re Blundell (1888) 40 Ch D 370 at 376-7). The right arises simply as an incident of the office of trustee (Worrall v Harford [1802] EngR 342; (1802) 8 Ves Jun 4; (1802) 32 ER 250) (at [38]).
The right of a trustee to be indemnified out of trust property is often described as a charge or lien: see, for example, Vacuum Oil Co Pty Ltd v Wiltshire (1945) 72 CLR 319; Octavo Investments Pty Ltd v Knight (1979) 144 CLR 360 (at [41]).
Before a trustee actually pays debts that have given it a preferred beneficial interest in the trust assets, the interest enures for the benefit of the unpaid creditors. Creditors themselves may have resort to the assets of the trust to the extent of the liabilities incurred by the trustee (at [70]).
47 In Queensland, a trustee's right of reimbursement also arises by operation of s 72 of the Trusts Act 1973 (Qld) which provides:
Reimbursement of trustee out of trust property
A trustee may reimburse himself or herself for or pay or discharge out of the trust property all expenses reasonably incurred in or about the execution of the trusts or powers.
48 On the facts of this case it is clear that Eskdale merely operates as a shell for the purposes of the Trust. It has no interest in any assets other than Trust assets. I consider that not only does Carluke Capital have a right of indemnity against the assets of the Trust which were transferred to Eskdale, but the Deputy Commissioner has a right of subrogation against those assets as a creditor of Carluke Capital and the Trust. I reject the submission that the Deputy Commissioner has no standing to seek orders against Eskdale in respect of the appointment of a provisional liquidator to or for the winding up of that company.
49 Third, while in relation to the substantive claim against Eskdale the defendants dispute that there is a "justifiable lack of confidence" in the conduct and management of Eskdale's affairs, I find that a lack of confidence is justified. On the facts, it is clear that:
Ms Hofmeister is the sole director of Eskdale.
Eskdale became trustee of the Trust following the issue of a position paper by the ATO on 14 November 2011 where substantial tax liabilities were identified in respect of the Trust, and immediately prior to the bankruptcy of Mr Maxwell Hofmeister on 26 February 2013.
Properties of the Trust have been liquidated, and the proceeds placed in, inter alia, a bank account operated by Ms Hofmeister.
In a number of unexplained transactions, substantial sums have been removed from the bank account operated by Ms Hofmeister, to destinations unknown.
50 In my view it is reasonable to conclude that the affairs of the Trust are being conducted in a manner which presumably benefits interests associated with Ms Hofmeister, and disregards the interests of creditors of the Trust.
51 Fourth, I reject the submissions of the defendants that the conduct of the Deputy Commissioner constitutes an abuse of process, and that he lacks "clean hands" in the equitable sense, because allegedly the claim of the Deputy Commissioner can properly be described as a claim for double recovery of tax. The defendants relied upon the affidavit of Mr Maletz, in particular paras 10, 18(d), 21, 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27. These paragraphs detail, inter alia, tax refunds to the Trust and to Mr Maxwell Hofmeister from the ATO. In my view however:
To the extent that this evidence is reliable, it simply details historical events relating to the endeavours of the parties to regularise the tax positions of, inter alia, the Trust and Mr Maxwell Hofmeister. I note that proposed assessments have been issued, presumably pursuant to ATO Practice Statement Law Administration PS LA 2006/7.
There is absolutely no evidence to support a claim of abuse of process or collateral purpose by the Deputy Commissioner.
As I noted earlier in this judgment, there is no dispute by the defendants that a debt exists from the Trust to the Commonwealth based on the RBA.
Complaints raised by the defendants concerning the details of tax liabilities owed in respect of the Trust appear in the nature of objections which could have been raised by Carluke Capital, but were not (and currently cannot be in light of the absence of management of Carluke Capital). Indeed the case relied upon by the defendants - Federal Commissioner of Taxation v Grimaldi (No 9) (2009) 181 FCR 275 - concerned a challenge to the operation of s 177 of the ITAA 1936 as between two taxpayers rather than any facts analogous to the situation currently before the Court.
52 Fifth, I am not persuaded of the alleged importance of Eskdale remaining free from the appointment of a provisional liquidator to enable the company to deal with any claim by Carluke Capital, or by any liquidator of Carluke Capital or anyone else (including the Deputy Commissioner) to a right of indemnity from the assets of the Trust. I also reject the submission of the defendants that the Deputy Commissioner cannot maintain a contention of a right of indemnity by Carluke Capital against Eskdale because the success of the Deputy Commissioner must involve findings of bad faith on the part of Carluke Capital. This submission of the defendants is, in my view, implausible, self-serving and illogical. Carluke Capital and Eskdale are companies owned and controlled by the same family. Any claim of "bad faith" would potentially equally apply to members of the Hofmeister family and Eskdale itself. to permit Carluke Capital and Eskdale to rely on alleged bad faith of Carluke Capital in these circumstances would be, in my view, in itself inequitable.
53 Sixth, circumstances where it is appropriate for the Court to appoint a provisional liquidator are well-settled. As Gordon J recently observed in Australian Securities and Investments Commission v ActiveSuper Pty Ltd (No 2) (2013) 93 ACSR 189; [2013] FCA 234:
16. In [Australian Securities Commission v Solomon (1996) 19 ACSR 73] at 80 Tamberlin J listed six principles concerning the appointment of a provisional liquidator, which are often cited in this context:
(a) The court should only appoint a provisional liquidator where it is satisfied that there is a valid and duly authorised winding up application and that there is a reasonable prospect that a winding up order will be made: see Debelle J in Re J N Taylor Holdings Ltd; Zempilas v J N Taylor Holdings Ltd [1991] NTSC 15; (1991) 3 ACSR 516; 9 ACLC 1 at 12-3.
(b) The fact that the assets of the corporation may be at risk is a relevant consideration.
(c) The provisional liquidator's primary duty is to preserve the status quo to ensure the least possible harm to all concerned and to enable the court to decide, after a further examination, whether the company should be wound up: Re Carapark Industries Pty Ltd (in liq) (1966) 9 FLR 297; 86 WN (Pt 1)(NSW) 165 at 171.
(d) The court should consider the degree of urgency, the need established by the applicant creditor and the balance of convenience: Re Club Mediterranean Pty Ltd (1975) 11 SASR 481 at 484 per Bright J. The power is a broad one and circumstances will vary greatly. Commercial affairs are infinitely complex and various and it is inappropriate to limit the power by restricting its exercise to fixed categories or classes of circumstances or fact.
(e) It may be appropriate to appoint a provisional liquidator in the public interest where there is a need for an independent examination of the state of accounts of the corporation by someone other than the directors: Tickle v Crest Insurance Co of Australia Ltd (1984) 2 ACLC 493.
(f) Where the affairs of the company have been carried on casually and without due regard to legal requirements so as to leave the court with no confidence that the company's affairs would be properly conducted with due regard for the interests of shareholders, it may be appropriate to appoint a provisional liquidator: see Montgomery Windsor (NSW) Pty Ltd v Ilopa Pty Ltd (1984) 2 ACLC 224.
54 Events to which I have referred in this judgment, including the timing and facts of the removal of Carluke Capital and the appointment of Eskdale as trustee of the Trust, and the execution of a loan and mortgage document in respect of trust properties in favour of Ms Carrie Hofmeister, must be viewed as highly suspicious. This is particularly so in circumstances where significant tax debts have been alleged against the Trust and the realisation of Trust assets has promptly lead to dissipation of Trust funds in an unexplained manner. As I have already observed, the only apparent asset of Carluke Capital which could in any fashion be put toward satisfaction of its own debts as trustee is its right of indemnity against Eskdale. I do not accept the submission of the defendants that this right of indemnity could not be enforced against Eskdale or even that there is any doubt concerning its enforceability. In the current situation where it appears that not only Carluke Capital, but more recently Eskdale has been stripped of assets by Hofmeister family, and a reasonable inference can be drawn that the stripping of assets was for the benefit of the Hofmeister family, the proper order is that a provisional liquidator be appointed to safeguard the remaining assets of the Trust.
55 I note the submission of the defendants concerning the costs associated with the appointment of a provisional liquidator, compared with the current orders in place to freeze Trust assets including the payment of money into Court. In my view, however, such orders, while effective in the short term, are inadequate to permit further investigation into Trust affairs including the whereabouts of assets already dissipated. Further, for reasons I have already explained I consider it likely that any return of control of Trust assets to Eskdale would result in further - and possibly complete - dissipation, to the prejudice of creditors.
56 Finally the Deputy Commissioner has submitted that Eskdale itself is hopelessly insolvent. To the extent that it is trustee of a Trust where liabilities appear to significantly outweigh assets, this seems true. In any event, however, there appear to be grounds before the Court to support an order that Eskdale be wound up on the just and equitable ground in s 461(1)(k) of the Corporations Act. In particular, I note the decision in Australian Securities Commission v AS Nominees Ltd (1995) 62 FCR 504 where Finn J found that the relevant trustee company was not insolvent but nonetheless was prepared to order that it be wound up where trust businesses had been mismanaged.