© 2026 Zoe. All rights reserved.
Zoe is a legal information platform. Always consult the Federal Register of Legislation for authoritative text.
[2005] WASC 67
Supreme Court of WA
2005-04-29
Mr J, Wheeler J
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA -v- ROBINSWOOD PTY LTD [2005] WASC 67
HEARD : 29 OCTOBER, 1-5, 8-12, 16-18, 22-25, 29 NOVEMBER, 2, 6-8 DECEMBER 2004
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Taxation - Failure to deduct or remit income tax instalments - Obligations of employers under the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 Act (Cth) - Pattern of concealment - Failure to keep records - Keeping of false records - Employer - Definition - Person who pays wages
Employment law - Whether individuals were employees or independent contractors - Control and integration - Relevant factors
Evidence - Prima facie evidence - Effect of legislation making documents prima facie evidence
Res judicata - Issue estoppel - Double jeopardy - Whether double punishment
Constitutional law - Validity of general interest charge provisions in A New Tax System (Pay As You Go) Act 1999 (Cth) - Whether law imposing taxation
Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336
Caratti v The Queen [2000] WASCA 279; (2000) 22 WAR 527
Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853
Collector of Customs (NSW) v Southern Shipping Co Ltd [1962] HCA 20; (1962) 107 CLR 279
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Robinswood Pty Ltd (2001) 24 WAR 284; [2001] WASC 191
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia v Dyonna Pty Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA; 8 January 1993
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia v Robinswood Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 1
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia v Robinswood Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 229
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia v Robinswood Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 230
Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298
Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 208 ALR 1; [2004] HCA 34
Leeth v The Commonwealth of Australia [1992] HCA 29; (1992) 174 CLR 455
Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia [1994] HCA 9; (1994) 179 CLR 155
Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) 211 ALR 18; [2004] HCA 53
Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589
Re Dymond [1959] HCA 22; (1959) 101 CLR 11
Re Hartland & Hyde Pty Ltd (in liq) (1997) 97 ATC 5114
Re S & N (Nominees) Pty Ltd (in liq) (1984) 68 FLR 441
Safe Sport Australia Pty Ltd v Puma Australia Pty Ltd (1985) 4 IPR 120
Saxe v Kellett [1970] VicRp 79; [1970] VR 600
Administration of the Territory of Papua New Guinea v Daera Guba [1973] HCA 59; (1973) 130 CLR 353
Air Caledonia International v The Commonwealth of Australia (1988) 165 CLR 462
Airservices Australia v Canadian International Airlines Ltd (1999) 202 CLR 133
Alucraft Pty Ltd (in liq) v Grocon Ltd (No 1) [1996] VicRp 72; [1996] 2 VR 377
Anderson v The Queen (1992) 60 SASR 90
Australian Tape Manufacturers Association Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia [1993] HCA 10; (1993) 176 CLR 480
BHP Iron Ore Pty Ltd v Westraint Resources Pty Ltd [2002] WASCA 18
Blair v Curran [1939] HCA 23; (1939) 62 CLR 464
Bonython v The Queen (1984) 38 SASR 45
Boranga v Flintoff (1997) 19 WAR 1
Brady v Thornton [1947] HCA 29; (1947) 75 CLR 140
Briggs v James Hardie & Co Pty Ltd (1989) 16 NSWLR 549
Browns Transport Pty Ltd v Kropp [1958] HCA 49; (1958) 100 CLR 117
Chamberlain v Deputy Commissioner of Taxation [1988] HCA 21; (1988) 164 CLR 502
Clare & Peach v The Queen [1995] 2 Cr App Rep 333
Clark v Ryan [1960] HCA 42; (1960) 103 CLR 486
Codelfa Construction Pty Ltd v State Rail Authority of New South Wales [1982] HCA 24; (1982) 149 CLR 337
Commissioner for Government Transport v Adamcik [1961] HCA 43; (1961) 106 CLR 292
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Szlazko, unreported; SCt of NSW; 1 October 1997
Commonwealth of Australia v Mewett (1997) 191 CLR 471
Commonwealth of Australia v The Melbourne Harbour Trust Commissioners [1922] HCA 31; (1922) 31 CLR 1
Creasy v Hot Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] WASCA 206
Dennis Willcox Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 79 ALR 267
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v DTR Securities Pty Ltd (1988) 165 CLR 56
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation of the Commonwealth of Australia v Moorebank Pty Ltd [1988] HCA 29; (1988) 165 CLR 55
FAI Traders Insurance Co Ltd v Savoy Plaza Pty Ltd [1993] VicRp 76; [1993] 2 VR 343
Fernandez v Tubemakers of Australia Ltd [1975] 2 NSWLR 190
FGT Custodians Pty Ltd v Fagenblat [2003] VSCA 33
Forstaff v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue [2004] NSWSC 573; (2004) 56 ATR 302
Georgiadis v Australian and Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (1994) 179 CLR 297
Hart v MacDonald [1910] HCA 13; (1910) 10 CLR 417
HG v The Queen [1999] HCA 2; (1999) 197 CLR 414
Hide and Skin Trading Pty Ltd v Oceanic Meat Traders Ltd (1990) 20 NSWLR 310
Hoyer v United States [1955] USCA8 130; 223 F2d 134 (1995)
James Miller & Partners Ltd v Whitworth Street Estates (Manchester) Ltd [1970] AC 583
Makita (Australia) Pty Ltd v Sprowles [2001] NSWCA 305; (2001) 52 NSWLR 705
Markovina v The Queen (1996) 16 WAR 354
Massey v Crown Life Insurance Co [1977] EWCA Civ 12; [1978] 1 WLR 676
Matthews v Chicory Marketing Board (Vic) [1938] HCA 38; (1938) 60 CLR 263
McDaniel v United States [1965] USCA5 337; 343 F2d 785 (1965)
Morgan v Banning (1999) 20 WAR 474
Nationwide News Pty Ltd v Wills [1992] HCA 46; (1992) 177 CLR 1
Nesterczuk v Mortimore [1965] HCA 60; (1965) 115 CLR 140
Northern Suburbs General Cemetery Reserve Trust v The Commonwealth of Australia [1993] HCA 12; (1993) 176 CLR 555
Osborne v The Commonwealth of Australia [1911] HCA 19; (1911) 12 CLR 321
Paric v John Holland (Constructions) Pty Ltd [1985] HCA 58; (1985) 59 ALJR 844
Posgold (Big Bell) Pty Ltd v Placer (Western Australia) Pty Ltd (1999) 21 WAR 350
Potts v Miller [1940] HCA 43; (1940) 64 CLR 282
Pownall v Conlan Management Pty Ltd (1995) 12 WAR 370
Purkess v Crittenden [1965] HCA 34; (1965) 114 CLR 164
Quick v Stoland Pty Ltd [1998] FCA 1200; (1998) 87 FCR 371
R v Duncan [1969] 2 NSWR 675
R v G (1997) 42 NSWLR 451
R v Hally [1962] Qd R 214
R v Mitchell [1971] VicRp 5; [1971] VR 46
R v Scheel (1979) 42 CCC (2d) 31
R v Seifert (1955) 73 WN (NSW) 358
R v Simmonds [1969] 1 QB 685
R v Tucker [1907] SALR 30
R v Turner [1975] 1 QB 834
Ramsay v Pigram [1968] HCA 34; (1968) 118 CLR 271
Ramsay v Watson [1961] HCA 65; (1961) 108 CLR 642
Re Malley; Ex Parte Gardner [2001] WASCA 29
Re Montecatini's Patent Application (1973) 47 ALJR 161
Re The Corporations Law and Tricorp Pty Ltd (1991) 91 ATC 5016
Reardon Smith Line Pty Ltd v Hansen-Tangen [1976] 1 WLR 989
Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 7) (1987) 14 NSWLR 104
Ritz Hotel Ltd v Charles of the Ritz Ltd (No 20) (1988) 14 NSWLR 124
Roy Morgan Research Centre Pty Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (Vic) (1996) 33 ATR 361
Salomon v A Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22
Schellenberg v Tunnel Holdings Pty Ltd [2000] HCA 18; (2000) 200 CLR 121
SFJ Pty Ltd v Brady Constructions Co Pty Ltd [2001] VSC 487
Sharrment Pty Ltd v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy [1988] FCA 179; (1988) 18 FCR 449
Smith v ANL Ltd [2000] HCA 26; (2000) 204 CLR 493
Smith v The Queen [1970] HCA 48; (1970) 121 CLR 572
Southern Group Ltd v Smith (1997) 37 ATR 107
Sportsvision Australia Pty Ltd v Tallglen Pty Ltd (1998) 44 NSWLR 103
State Chamber of Commerce and Industry v The Commonwealth of Australia [1987] HCA 38; (1987) 163 CLR 329
State Rail Authority of New South Wales v Earthline Constructions Pty Ltd (in liq) [1999] HCA 3; (1999) 73 ALJR 306
Stevens v Brodribb Sawmilling Co Pty Ltd (1986) 160 CLR 16
Trade Practices Commission v Arnotts Ltd (1990) 21 FCR 324
Vabu Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1996) 33 ATR 537
Value Engineering (Australasia) Pty Ltd v State Commissioner of Taxation (1985) 16 ATR 296
Weldon v Neal (1887) 19 QBD 394
White v Australian and New Zealand Theatres Ltd [1943] HCA 6; (1943) 67 CLR 266
World Book (Australia) Pty Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1992) 27 NSWLR 377
Zurich Australian Insurance Ltd v AMEC Services Pty Ltd & FAI General Insurance Co Ltd, unreported; FCt SCt of WA; Library No 980139; 31 March 1998
1 There are six actions before the Court concerned with recovery of allegedly unremitted and undeducted group tax instalments, penalties and interest. By order made 20 December 2001 they have been consolidated, with Robinswood being the lead action. The same issues arise in each action, although in respect of Maddeliene Caratti an additional issue arises from her defence. All the defendants save Maddeliene Caratti are companies; Maddeliene Caratti is sued as the surviving member of what is alleged to have been a partnership between herself and Sergio Caratti.
2 The three companies Grangefield, Excelco Mining and Mine Exc Pty Ltd are unrepresented. Shortly before trial a liquidator was appointed in respect of those companies. The plaintiff applied to proceed against them notwithstanding that they were in liquidation, and by communication with the solicitors for the plaintiff, the liquidator advised that he did not object to that course. For reasons published on 4 November 2004 I granted leave to proceed against those companies (Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia v Robinswood Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 229).
3 The allegations in respect of the various entities will be more easily understood if some brief statutory background is given. At the relevant time, the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 (Cth) ("the Act") provided that an employer who ordinarily had in his employment 10 or more employees from whose salary or wages he was required to make deductions, was to be registered as a group employer. The Commissioner was able to register as a group employer any employer or any person acting on behalf of two or more employers; the evidence was that it was sometimes convenient for one of a group of related companies to be responsible for the liabilities of all, in respect of all employees of that group. The responsibilities of group employers included the making of deductions of income tax from wages paid to employees, remitting those deductions on a monthly basis to the Commissioner, and the issuing to each employee of a group certificate setting out the total amounts of deductions made during a financial year.
4 All employers, other than group employers, who paid salary or wages from which a deduction was required to be made, were required to keep a tax deduction sheet in a form authorised by the Commissioner, to enter the details of salary and wages paid and deductions made on that sheet, and to purchase tax stamps of a value equal to the amount of the deductions made during the relevant period. The stamps were to be purchased on effectively a four weekly basis, and at the end of the financial year such an employer was required to deliver prescribed documents both to the employee and the Commissioner; the precise details do not need to be set out, but the purpose was to provide to both the employee and the Commissioner a summary of the year's wages and deductions.
5 All of the defendant companies, and some other entities I will shortly mention, were members of what could be called the "Caratti Group" ("the Group"). I use that expression loosely to refer to a number of entities carrying out a variety of businesses (and in some cases apparently carrying out no business at all) which were controlled by members of the Caratti family. Most were solely owned by members of that family.
6 The Caratti family until 23 May 1992 consisted of Sergio Caratti, his wife Maddeliene, and his sons John (the elder) and Allen. Sergio died on 23 May 1992. He was also known as "Mick". Although Sergio was described by numerous witnesses as having a very strong or dominant personality, and although it is clear from the evidence that he had some involvement in the operations of the Group entities at various times (for example, there is evidence that he was responsible for the engaging of various workers from time to time, and there is evidence of his involvement in the setting up of Excelco (WA)), his formal role in relation to the Group appears to have been limited. He was a director of some of the defendants for a very short period in the early part of 1989, and for another short period in the early part of 1991. He was a shareholder for a short period in Mine Exc, Venetian and Robinswood from November 1991. So far as the documentary record is concerned, his name appears on only two of the many thousands of documents in this case; one of those is an employment agency document which refers to him as the contact person, and the other is a record relating to a workers' compensation claim.
7 Maddeliene had extensive involvement with the keeping of the books and records of the company, and the authorisation and writing of cheques. She appears to have worked principally at the Group offices at 515-517 Great Eastern Highway in Redcliffe ("the Redcliffe office"). She had direct and indirect shareholdings in a number of companies in the Group, and was a director of Robinswood and of Venetian. In addition, it is alleged that she was a member of the S & M Caratti partnership.
8 Allen appears to have been most actively involved in the running of certain farm businesses at Howick and Warriup. He appears to have had direct and indirect shareholding at various times in the majority of the companies of the Group.
9 John was directly and indirectly a shareholder of almost all of the Group companies, and was also a director of all save for the "sham" company Keystyle Holdings, and a company not of importance in this action called Zel Nominees. It is clear that he had an active role over a wide range of the Group's enterprises. For example, he was often named on documents as the contact person in relation to the engagement of workers; he was the person to whom enquiries about the issuance of group certificates were often directed; and after his father's death he appears to have been the person to whom enquiries about the activities of the companies in the Group were usually directed.
10 At the Redcliffe office there were three staff. They were Cedric Raphael, an accountant, who died in 1993; Isaac Ellison, also an accountant; and Wendy Bottcher, a receptionist/secretary. They appear to have been the only people, apart from members of the Caratti family, with overall responsibility for the books and records of the Group. Members of the family and those three staff members comprised the administrative centre of the Group's businesses.
11 There were a variety of businesses carried on by entities in the Group. They fell broadly into the categories of mining, farming, earthmoving and land development. There was also a workshop at Redcliffe which provided a service in relation to the many types of vehicles required for such enterprises.
12 The farms were called Yuna, to the east of Geraldton; Bullfinch and Marvel Loch, between Perth and Kalgoorlie; Mount Barker, at Mount Barker; and Esperance, Mount Ney, Warriup and Howick, located in the areas surrounding Esperance. The land development was at Malaga, a little to the north of Perth. Earthmoving took place on the railway project to the north of Perth, and in areas generally north of Kalgoorlie. Mining activities took place broadly in an area from Leinster in the north, to areas a little to the south of and outside Kalgoorlie, and additionally at Hatters Hill outside Mount Barker.
13 Of the many hundreds of workers engaged in these various enterprises between July 1988 and June 1994, a significant number received payments from more than one of the Group entities (and often from more than two of them; for example, Wendy Bottcher received payments from five different Group entities over that period). Sometimes that appears to have been a matter of deliberate policy, as in instances where normal time payments were made by one entity and overtime payments were made by another. Sometimes it appears that the worker moved from one of the various businesses I have referred to, to another of them. At other times, there seems to have been no obvious system or reason for payments being made in that way.
14 The Group entities relevant to an understanding of these reasons are summarised below. I begin with those which are not defendants to this action.
15 Dyonna Pty Ltd was registered with the Australian Taxation Office ("the ATO") as a group employer from 1989 to 1992. Workers engaged by Dyonna were initially paid from what was designated a "contract paying services" account, but were later paid by Robinswood. Over time, amounts remitted to the ATO for Dyonna were insufficient to cover tax deducted from apparent wages paid directly by that company. Dyonna was wound up by order of this Court on the petition of the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation in 1992. Its income tax returns from 1989 through to 1992 showed it as not trading, having no income, no expenses and no employees.
16 Dyonna is of relevance in these proceedings for three reasons. One is that the provision of a group certificate to Dyonna employees by those controlling the Group is alleged to constitute an admission that those persons to whom group certificates were given were in fact employees rather than independent contractors, and that the payments they received were net payments of wages from which tax had been deducted. I do not understand that allegation to be seriously contested.
17 It is also submitted by the defendants that, in respect of any worker to whom Dyonna issued a group certificate, Dyonna is to be regarded as the sole employer. That is not so, for reasons I develop later.
18 The other relevance of Dyonna is that it is put by the defendants that the order of this Court winding up Dyonna for the non-remittance of tax gives rise to an issue estoppel between the ATO and the present defendants. It is said that the earlier order establishes that certain individuals were Dyonna employees and not employees of any of the present defendants. I will return to that issue later.
19 Keystyle Holdings Pty Ltd was incorporated in May 1992. It was registered as a group employer. It issued group certificates and made remittances to the ATO. Its bank statements indicate that it made no wage payments and never had funds with which to make payments in the nature of salary and wages. It had no income and no assets and never carried on any operation. The remittances made by it to the ATO used funds deposited into its account shortly before the cheques were written. Remittances of group tax "on behalf of" Keystyle were also made directly by Robinswood or by other Group entities (exhibit 14911). Those workers who received group certificates from Keystyle generally received all of their remuneration from Robinswood.
20 The directors of Keystyle were Mr Kitenbergs and Mr Drayton. Each of them was by occupation a farmhand, and a long-term worker for the Group. Each of them became a director because Sergio Caratti asked him to do so. Mr Kitenbergs was told that for some reason Sergio himself was not able to become a director; Mr Drayton was told nothing about Mr Caratti's reasons. Mr Kitenbergs was told that the purpose of Keystyle was something to do with group tax, while Mr Drayton found out some time after he had become a director that that was the purpose of the company. No directors' meetings were held; indeed, neither man ever talked to the other about the company and each became aware of the other's existence as a director some time into his own directorship. Neither was issued with any shares in the company.
21 Each man from time to time received in the mail (Mr Kitenbergs through mail directed to his father's house, which was the registered address of Keystyle, Mr Drayton at the farm) a variety of blank documents. These included group certificate forms which were completely blank and cheques which were completely blank. They arrived with no covering letter and with some form of post-it note attached indicating where each man was to sign. The post-it notes were themselves unsigned and the handwriting was not known to either man. Each simply signed where he was requested to do so, and returned the forms to the Redcliffe office by post. Neither was aware of whether Keystyle had any employees, although Mr Kitenbergs assumed that that was the case once he had been asked to sign group certificate forms. Neither man appeared to know whether there was any money in the account when he signed cheques. Mr Kitenbergs knew that there was a Keystyle account because on one occasion when he was in Rivervale with Sergio Caratti, Sergio had instructed him to open an account for Keystyle at the Westpac Bank there. He had done so and had left the various forms and cheque books given to him by the Bank at the Redcliffe office.
22 The plaintiff submits that the existence of Keystyle is explicable only on the basis that its purposes were to create an illusion that members of the Group were making some attempt to comply with their responsibilities under the Act, and to direct attention away from those members of the Group which actually employed large numbers of workers (in respect of whom no or inadequate amounts of tax had been deducted and remitted). I accept that submission. The creation of Keystyle appears to be part of a deliberate pattern of concealment, other elements of which I will deal with later.
23 Since some amounts were remitted by Keystyle in purported compliance with the obligations of a group employer, those amounts should be credited to the Group so as to reduce any liability which would otherwise exist. In the plaintiff's calculations those amounts have been applied to the debt of Robinswood. I accept that course as being appropriate, since it was Robinswood that principally paid those persons who were provided with group certificates by Keystyle.
24 A company called Excelcon Pty Ltd commenced operations in June 1988. In May 1991 its name changed to Excelco (WA) Pty Ltd. It was a registered group employer. It engaged in contract mining work. The initial directors were a Mr Morris, a Mr Hall and a Mr Ash. Some time after the middle of 1991, Sergio Caratti was approached for financial support and after a variety of discussions the Group became involved, and John Caratti became a director in September 1991. For most of the relevant period the directors were Mr Morris and John Caratti, and the shares were held equally by Mr Morris and a Group company, the directors of which were John and Maddeliene Caratti. Because of developing financial problems, Excelco (WA) was unable to continue with its contractual work, as a result of which John Caratti formed Excelco Mining Pty Ltd in October 1992. John Caratti and Mr Morris were the two shareholders and directors of that company. It took over contractual work which had been performed by Excelco (WA), using the same workers and the same equipment as had been used by Excelco (WA). Excelco (WA) and its successor Excelco Mining paid those involved in mining and earthmoving to the north, west and east of Kalgoorlie, and sometimes paid those in the Redcliffe office.
25 Robinswood Pty Ltd paid a larger number of workers, in more diverse areas of employment, than any of the other Group entities. It was the entity which primarily paid all of the workers on the various farms. In addition, it paid workers on the northern railway, some earthmoving workers at Coolgardie, some workers involved in land development at Malaga, and workers in the Redcliffe office and at the Redcliffe workshop.
26 Next in terms of volume seems to have been Mine Exc Pty Ltd which, as its name suggests, paid a significant number of workers in mining and earthmoving activities, in the vicinity of Kalgoorlie/Boulder. It also made payments to those in the Redcliffe office and workshop. S & M Caratti and Venetian Nominees Pty Ltd paid those involved in the Malaga development. Grangefield Holdings Pty Ltd paid workers at the mine in Leinster and in the Redcliffe office and workshop.
27 For the purpose of this action, a broad summary of relevant activity is that Robinswood effectively ran the farms (and, the defendants suggest, Malaga); S & M Caratti and Venetian ran, or at least paid, the workers in Malaga; while Mine Exc, both Excelcos, and Grangefield ran a variety of mining and earthmoving operations, Grangefield being effectively confined to the one mining operation at Leinster.
28 There are a number of unusual features of both the pleadings and the evidence in this case. I turn to the pleadings first. A claim of this kind necessarily rests in the majority of cases - this being no exception - upon a very large number of relatively small payments to a number of individuals. In the present case, there were some 704 individuals who were said to be employees in respect of whom the correct amounts of tax had either not been deducted or, if deducted, not remitted. Their employment took place over a period of some six years. Although many were not employed continuously for the whole period, some being employed for only a matter of weeks or even days, there were obviously a very large number of payments in issue. Further, as I have noted, payments in respect of one individual might be received from a number of different entities over that period of time. The case was pleaded in a way which identified each of those payments, in a manner I will shortly describe.
29 An additional factor in the present case which was of relevance both to the pleadings and the evidence was the fact that John, Allen and Maddeliene Caratti had been tried on an indictment alleging that between 1988 and 1994 they conspired with each other and with the deceased Sergio Caratti to defraud the Commonwealth. The conspiracy alleged in that proceeding was essentially that there was a continuing agreement to deprive the Commissioner of Taxation of tax instalment deductions. The Crown sought to prove in the criminal proceedings that, in pursuance of the conspiracy, various Group entities had engaged in failure to deduct or remit the correct amounts of tax instalments in relation to workers engaged by them. The payments in respect of which that conduct occurred were alleged to be, in effect, the payments the subject of the present action. There was not complete identity between the allegations, but the schedules sought to be proved before me in the present case, which I will shortly describe, are very largely identical with the schedules used in the criminal trial.
30 During the course of that criminal trial the Crown called witnesses who fell into a number of groups. The largest group was that of individual workers who described the details of their work for one or more of the Group entities. There were 66 of those. There were some persons who were involved in the organisation or business of one or more of the relevant Group entities. There were officers employed by the plaintiff. In addition there were Australian Federal Police officers and bank officers who proved large numbers of documents, including large numbers of original and copy cheques. There were in excess of 7,500 exhibits in all, largely documentary. The trial occupied some four months.
31 Allen Caratti was acquitted by direction of the learned trial Judge; Maddeliene Caratti was acquitted; and John Caratti was convicted. John appealed against conviction and his appeal was dismissed (Caratti v The Queen [2000] WASCA 279; (2000) 22 WAR 527). Certain observations of the Court of Criminal Appeal in that case are of relevance to objections to the admissibility of evidence in the present trial and I deal with those matters later.
32 In its statements of claim in these proceedings, the plaintiff pleaded that the defendants were at all material times employers, other than group employers (save for Mine Exc which was a group employer). The obligations of employers are pleaded. The pleading then proceeds in terms of different schedules. In respect of Sch A, it is pleaded that at material times the relevant defendant deducted an amount from the salary or wages paid to employees listed in Sch A but refused or failed to affix tax stamps of a face value equal to each amount so deducted ("non-remission"). Schedule A is a lengthy schedule, divided into lines referring to individual defendants, and listing very large numbers of individual payments. Each payment is given a line number. The date of the payment is identified and the details then provided are: name of payee; gross amount; deduction; allowance (if any - usually there are none); and the cheque by which the payment is made (where identifiable - most are). There is then a "document number"; and against each individual line under this heading there is a list of the documents which are alleged to be relevant to the allegations in the other columns. The documents are listed by means of image numbers, with each document being imaged and provided by CD Rom accompanying the pleading. Unusually, then, it can be seen that the pleading discloses not only the allegations of material fact but also a very significant portion of the evidence upon which the plaintiff relies. Similar allegations, modified to reflect the obligations of a group employer, are made about Mine Exc.
33 Schedule B then, in relation to each relevant four week period for the remission of tax stamp amounts, sets out the total of the principal amounts alleged to be owing for each of those periods, together with the total of relevant penalty amounts calculated for those periods. It is further pleaded (although as a matter of law the pleading is probably strictly unnecessary) that additional amounts continue to accrue on the unpaid principal and penalty amounts pursuant to s 221G(4A)(d)(ii) of the Act. Again, the allegations in respect of Mine Exc are modified to reflect its different status.
34 It is then pleaded in the statements of claim that during the relevant period the defendants paid salary or wages to employees particularised in Sch C but wrongly refused or failed to deduct the full amounts from those salaries or wages as required by the Act ("non-deduction"). Schedule C is in a form very similar to Sch A. However, it contains columns for "gross pay" and for "additional pay" (some workers being alleged to have received more than one payment on a relevant date), a column for the amount of "tax deducted" (if any), a column for the "net pay" and further columns showing the amount of tax which should have been deducted, with the difference between that amount and the amount, if any, actually deducted. As in Sch A, relevant evidentiary documents are identified.
35 In Sch C there is also a column which records, in respect of each employee, whether or not the person had filled out an employment declaration. An employment declaration was a document which could be filled out by an employee wishing to claim the tax free threshold. Where it had been provided, the employer could deduct tax at a lower rate than was required in respect of employees who had not furnished such declarations.
36 Schedule D sets out, in relation to each four-week period, the total amounts which it is alleged each defendant failed to deduct, together with the relevant penalty pursuant to s 221EAA.
37 There is, in the statements of claim, a global pleading that all of the persons referred to in the schedules were employees, and various indicia of employment are pleaded; for example, it is pleaded that the relevant defendant directed and controlled those persons in relation to the type of work they carried out, where they carried it out, and the manner in which they carried it out. Rather than pleading these matters individually with respect to each of the 704 alleged employees, the statements of claim make no distinction between any of those employees and the global pleading to which I have referred is to be taken as applying to each of them. It is the plaintiff's contention that the employment relationship of the type pleaded is proved by reference to the documents identified in respect of each alleged employee, in the context of the other evidence I shall later describe.
38 I come to describe the documents in more detail later. However, they fall into a number of categories. Some are documents which prove an employment relationship directly; for example, in respect of some of the persons named, there are documents unambiguously demonstrating that in respect of the particular person, one or more of the Group entities paying that person has deducted amounts of tax from the payments. Such deductions are required only in respect of employees, so that (unless there were reason to believe the document was issued inadvertently) such documents constitute an admission on the part of the paying entity, that the person is an employee. Documents of this kind include group certificates, and payslips which, in respect of an individual, identify a calculation of tax or a deduction of an amount in respect of tax. Other documents are more ambiguous in nature. In respect of some of the persons named, it is also the plaintiff's contention that evidence which was given either by that person or about that person, at the criminal trial, demonstrates that an employment relationship existed between that person and a Group entity.
39 Although the defendants had a variety of objections to the pleadings in the form which I have described, I was of the view, for reasons which I gave on 3 August 2001 (Deputy Commissioner of Taxation (Cth) v Robinswood Pty Ltd (2001) 24 WAR 284; [2001] WASC 191) that this form of pleading adequately informed the defendants of the case which they were required to meet.
40 Also on 3 August 2001 (ibid), I gave my reasons for granting the plaintiff's application in respect of the evidence at the criminal trial. That application was that, pursuant to O 29 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), large portions of the transcript of the evidence from the criminal trial be received as the evidence in these proceedings, and that certain documentary evidence tendered at the criminal trial be received as evidence in these proceedings.
41 The orders which I in due course made, were to the effect described above, together with orders that each defendant notify the plaintiff on or before a specified date in relation to any witness for the plaintiff (including those witnesses whose evidence was to be received in the manner I have described) if the defendants wished to have the witness produced for cross-examination at trial. No such notification was given.
42 As preparation for the trial proceeded, the plaintiff also sought to adduce in evidence a number of additional statements and affidavits. These largely identified documents, additional to those tendered in evidence at the criminal trial, which the plaintiff sought to prove. A process of negotiation between the parties ensued in respect of those documents, and in the end the affidavits and the additional documents were received by consent. The only evidentiary issue remaining related to the evidence of Mr Sutherland, which I describe shortly.
43 To the extent that it is necessary to refer to the transcript of the evidence in the criminal trial in the course of these reasons, I do so by use of the abbreviation "CT", while the abbreviation "T" refers to evidence or submissions in the course of this trial proper. All of the many documents on the database received exhibit numbers which reflect their numbers in the database. A variety of additional documents were tendered during the course of these proceedings, and they have received consecutive exhibit numbers with the prefix "T" identifying them as documents tendered in that way.
44 Two defences were filed, being a composite defence of Robinswood and the other corporate defendants, and a defence of Maddeliene Caratti. They are almost identical. As noted earlier, there is an additional defence upon which Maddeliene Caratti seeks to rely.
45 It is admitted that the plaintiff is the Deputy Commissioner of Taxation. It is also admitted that certain sums were paid to the plaintiff by the various defendants and that the defendants are entitled to credit for those sums. Otherwise, the defences contain a blanket denial of all of the assertions in the statements of claim. More detailed denials follow. The defendants do not admit that the names listed in the various schedules are the names of natural persons, or that the relevant defendant was an employer of any of them, or that any payment made to them (if they existed) was in the nature of salary or wages. There is a positive assertion that, assuming that the persons named do exist, and were paid by the defendants, that the persons were independent contractors, and so not employees within the meaning of the Act. There are further specific pleas of res judicata and/or issue estoppel, a plea relating to s 221Q(1) of the Act, and certain constitutional defences, with which I deal later.
46 In a late amendment to the composite defence and to the defence of Maddeliene Caratti, shortly prior to trial, it was asserted that, in any event, if the individuals, or any of them, had been engaged, they had been engaged by Sergio Caratti and that they were independent contractors of Sergio. There was no evidence which could have supported this pleading. Although it does not appear to have been formally abandoned during the course of the trial, no reliance was placed upon it in the submissions of the defendants.
47 For present purposes, it is enough to note that the plaintiff is put to proof of all of the allegations in the statements of claim, save for the plaintiff's existence and ability to bring this action. As the trial developed, the defendants' counsel accepted that the names in the schedules were the names of natural persons. That part of the defence was expressly abandoned in closing.
48 At trial, the way in which it was submitted that the plaintiff had failed to establish its case, leaving aside the positive defences which I have noted, seems to me to have fallen into a number of broad, related, categories. First, it was submitted that there was such a diversity of documentation and evidence in relation to the various individuals that it was not possible to determine the case as it were by "sample". It was asserted that it would be necessary for me to consider each individual line, and to consider whether on the balance of probabilities the person there named had been proved to be an employee to whom salary or wages were paid, and in respect of whom there had been a failure to deduct or remit income tax instalments. It was submitted that the fact that names of a number of individuals appeared in Group records together, permitted no inference that they were paid on the same basis. It was submitted that, at least in relation to a very large number of entries, there was nothing to suggest that it should be concluded on the balance of probabilities that the persons were employees rather than independent contractors. In a related submission, it was submitted that in a significant number of cases where the plaintiff asserted that payments had been made net, that I should find that they had been made gross or that, at least, there was no reason to infer that they were net rather than gross.
49 It was submitted that, because of the particular nature of the plaintiff's claims, the standard of proof required of the plaintiff, while it was the balance of probabilities, was also such as to require that "exactness of proof" described in Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336. I am not persuaded that that is so. However, I should add that, for reasons which I now turn to explain, I am very firmly of the view that the plaintiff has established that those persons named in the schedules were employees of the relevant defendants and, conversely, that the relevant defendants were employers. I am also firmly persuaded that the amounts calculated have been calculated on a correct basis (save for certain calculations I note during the course of these reasons, in which, because assumptions favourable to the defendants have been made, the amounts calculated as owing may be somewhat less than those which would be lawfully due to the plaintiff).
50 It is to the general question of the way in which the plaintiff has proved that the relevant persons are employees and that tax was or should have been deducted and remitted in respect of them, in particular amounts, that I now turn.
51 Although Mr Sutherland gave evidence at the criminal trial, his evidence at that trial was not relied upon by the plaintiff. Instead, he gave evidence in the present proceedings, both orally and by means of a number of affidavits (the most voluminous being a three volume affidavit of March 2002). His evidence occupied approximately 12 days of hearing, with the majority of that being cross-examination.
52 Mr Sutherland commenced work in the Inspections Section of the ATO in June 1986, initially working as a Clerical Assistant Grade 1. He has no formal professional training, although he has had in-house training in the ATO. He was promoted and rotated through a variety of positions. By November 1989, he had been promoted to an Inspector in the Inspections Section. In that capacity he conducted field inspections in Perth and many regional areas of Western Australia, approximately 230 in total. That involved examination and analysis of the business records of the relevant business so as to identify discrepancies and irregularities, if any. If any discrepancies were identified, he would discuss those with the proprietor of the business in question and determine whether there had been compliance with the relevant statutory provisions.
53 In August 1990 he became a Source Deduction Auditor, with duties similar to those of the Inspector position but somewhat broader. He was at that stage one of a team of auditors looking at compliance by individuals and in industry groups. In that capacity he conducted approximately 150 audits, again in Perth and regional areas, including retail and wholesale businesses of various kinds. Those businesses included building and construction, earthmoving, mining and agricultural and horticultural businesses. From early 1994 - that is for approximately 10 years now - he has worked almost exclusively on matters connected with these proceedings.
54 In April 1994 search warrants were executed by Australian Federal Police officers over Caratti related premises, and he studied documents seized as a result of those. He has, over the years, studied and analysed many thousands of documents. He was the person responsible for compiling the various schedules to which I have referred, and the documents identified in those schedules are documents which he has considered to be relevant to the individuals against whose names those documents are listed. As well as compiling the schedules, he has also put data derived from many of the documents referred to in the schedules into spreadsheets and computer programs which are designed to calculate deductions and remittances which should have been made by employers in respect of gross payments of a given amount. He has, in addition, manually calculated, by reference to tables compiled by the ATO, what gross payment must have been made in respect of any given individual, in order to arrive at a known net figure (an activity often referred to as "grossing up"). This latter task was undertaken in respect of those persons who Mr Sutherland considered to have been paid net, but in respect of whom no record was maintained by the relevant entity as to the gross amount paid or payable to that person. He has also calculated the amounts of penalties payable in respect of the various amounts either not deducted or not remitted.
55 It is submitted on behalf of the plaintiff that Mr Sutherland's consideration of the vast number of documents in evidence in these proceedings has enabled Mr Sutherland to have a detailed knowledge of them. That submission was demonstrated, during the course of Mr Sutherland's evidence, to be correct. Mr Sutherland's grasp of the detail of this case was extremely impressive. It became evident that, without recourse to notes or other aids, he knew, in respect of most of the 704 employees, which entity was the relevant employer alleged and which documents or categories of documents were relevant to that individual. During the course of cross-examination, he often suggested, in answer to a question about some aspect of the work or remuneration of a particular individual, that it would be useful to "open document XYZ", selecting one document out of the very many documents in evidence in respect of particular persons. He was almost invariably correct in his prediction that a document would prove to be relevant to the question asked. Although, as would be expected, there were times when he paused to reflect upon questions put to him, in the general run of cases his response to any given question was swift, confident, and, as could be ascertained by reference to the relevant documents, accurate. My impression of his responses in cross-examination was that he was at pains to be both accurate and fair.
56 In addition to compiling the schedules to the statements of claim, Mr Sutherland also compiled a number of other schedules, collectively referred to at trial as the "Sutherland Schedules", putting the results of his examination of documents and his conclusions into a somewhat different form. The Combined Hyperlink Schedule includes all payments in alphabetical order by name of payee, containing hyperlinks to relevant documents. It contains a list of the workers who are alleged to have been employees of one or more of eight Group entities within the relevant periods. Two entities included in that schedule, which are not part of the present actions, were Dyonna and Excelco (WA). Those entities were included for the same reasons as non-defendant entities were included in the Relevant Transactions Schedule.
57 The Relevant Transactions Schedule includes all other transactions which are considered to be relevant in calculating failure to deduct amounts or tending to establish the status of payees. Although those are payments made by entities not defendants to this action, they are relevant for a number of reasons. Some, for example payments made by Excelco (WA), are relevant because they go to showing continuity of employment. For example, an M Richards in the 1992 financial year received payments from time to time from Robinswood, and if regard were had only to those payments, it would appear that he worked for Robinswood only sporadically. However, the inclusion of Excelco (WA) payments made to M Richards shows that his employment by Group entities was of a more continuous nature. Further, the inclusion of such payments allows for the reconciliation of the total of wages paid to him with Group records such as group certificates, which purport to cover the full financial year.
58 In other cases, payments by non-defendant entities are relevant to calculate the amount of tax which should have been deducted in respect of a person. For example, an N Gobby was paid normal time wages by Dyonna, and received a cash payment, apparently for overtime, from Robinswood, on the same date. Because of the progressive nature of the tax scale, the total amount paid to an individual on a particular date is required to be known in order to calculate the total amount which should be deducted by way of tax. The Dyonna payment is therefore necessary to be included in order to calculate the amount of tax attributable to the sum paid by Robinswood.
59 The Master Schedule includes all transactions made by the particular Group entities which are the defendants in this action. It includes details of payments to individuals only where a defendant is considered to be the individual's employer. Those payments, too, are in alphabetical order of payee.
60 There were also certain spreadsheets produced by Mr Sutherland demonstrating his calculations of late payment penalty interest and of the general interest charge, including the making of allowances for certain sums actually remitted by Group entities from time to time. I do not understand any issue to be taken with these calculations, assuming that Mr Sutherland's other schedules are admissible.
61 Mr Sutherland also swore a variety of affidavits, and produced witness statements, which were the subject of objection. The most substantial of the affidavits, with his oral evidence generally, was the subject of an objection which was in principle the same as the objection which was made to the admissibility of the Sutherland Schedules, and I deal with that matter in a moment. I turn first to more limited objections to some documents.
62 So far as the third witness statement of Mr Sutherland dated 21 August 2003 is concerned, there was an objection on the basis of relevance in relation to a number of matters. Essentially, this witness statement identifies workers paid by Dyonna in the period 1 July 1988 to 30 April 1992, some 20 in all. It also identifies those issued group certificates by Dyonna and not by any other Group entity, but who were also paid by other Group entities, some 12 in all; and those persons issued group certificates by Dyonna, but not paid by it (being paid by other Group entities), some 21 in all. It identifies and explains the ATO account for Dyonna. The relevance of all of this material is that it is directed towards the res judicata/issue estoppel argument which the defendant makes in relation to Dyonna, and with which I deal later.
63 There were objections to the fourth and fifth witness statements of Mr Sutherland of 29 January 2004 and 3 February 2004. It appears to me that it is probably necessary to review the question of the admissibility of those statements based upon the course taken at trial. They were largely responsive to written statements of John Caratti and Isaac Ellison which were filed by the defendants. At all times between the filing of those statements and the close of the plaintiff's case, it was anticipated that those persons would be called to give evidence on behalf of the defendants and it was appropriate for the plaintiff, not wishing to split its case, to give such rebutting evidence as might be considered necessary. However, neither John Caratti nor Ellison gave evidence.
64 So far as the fourth statement was concerned, I took the view that only par 19, in which Mr Sutherland referred to an examination of documents and his failure to find any document which appeared to require any individual to take responsibility for deducting or remitting their own income tax, was a matter of evidence. In relation to the other paragraphs, it appeared to me that they were argumentative, as asserted by the defendants. In effect, they directed attention to particular documents which, in Mr Sutherland's view, controverted various assertions made by John Caratti. I said that I would accept them as submissions. It seems to me that the documents pointed to are relevant, notwithstanding the failure of John Caratti to give evidence, to a number of issues raised by the defendants and, in particular, to the issue of whether persons named in the schedules, or any of them, were engaged as employees or independent contractors. I have referred to that witness statement in order to ascertain what documents the plaintiff might rely on in relation to that issue, but have otherwise not had regard to its contents. Similarly, to the extent that the fifth statement refers to documents relevant to the activities of individual workers, I considered those documents, but have not relied upon Mr Sutherland's characterisation of them.
65 Apart from these more limited objections, there arises, then, the general question of the admissibility of the Sutherland Schedules and the other affidavits and witness statements of Mr Sutherland. As I understand it, the objections are on broadly the following grounds. First, it is said that Mr Sutherland is not an expert in any relevant field. Further, it is objected that the schedules contain opinions and draw conclusions regarding matters such as employment status, which are for the Court rather than the witness. There is, in addition, objection taken to Mr Sutherland speaking of his understanding of aspects of taxation law. That objection is, I think, linked to the objection in relation to the drawing of conclusions by Mr Sutherland.
66 It seems to me that there was no real dispute about the proposition that, by virtue of his training and experience, Mr Sutherland was a person who had expertise in the field of the selection and operation of computer programmes, and in the use of spreadsheets, tables and other aids in order to perform the task of calculating the amount of tax payable on any particular amount of income, the amount of gross income required to produce a particular payment net of tax, and penalties and interest. I would unhesitatingly accept those aspects of his evidence.
67 So far as any broader basis of expertise is concerned, it seems to me that the objections face two principal difficulties. One is that they are inconsistent with the relevant law as explained by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Caratti v The Queen (supra), to which I turn in a moment. The second is that they involve a misapprehension, as I see it, of Mr Sutherland's task. He is presented as the person able to express an opinion on any ultimate, or even intermediate, conclusions of fact. For example, where Mr Sutherland refers to a person as an "employee", while that is in form an expression of opinion, it is, as was explained in his evidence, a conclusion which rests upon the presence of one or another of a variety of identifiable factors.
68 The description "employee" is Mr Sutherland's shorthand expressing, in effect, his conclusion formed as a result of his examination of documents that one or another of a variety of factors is present. Those factors are explained in his evidence. They include, for example, the existence of a group certificate for that person issued by a Group entity, or the existence of business records of a relevant entity showing a calculation of tax in respect of that person or (probably most contentiously) the existence of an entry for that person on a business record of a Group entity which appears in form identical to entries made in the same business records in respect of persons who are described as "known" employees (that is, persons in respect of whom some more explicit record of their employment status, such as a group certificate, exists).
69 It is accepted by the plaintiff that I may or may not form the view that any of the documents of the type described might lead to a conclusion that a person is an employee. If I accept that every such document leads to that conclusion, then I would be able to characterise a person as an "employee" simply by reference to the schedules. If, however, it seems to me in respect of any document or class of documents that such a conclusion does not flow from them, then it would be necessary for those persons to be excluded from the list of employees.
70 I understand from submissions made by the plaintiff that, as a general rule, if I were able to describe particular classes of documents which it seemed to me would not lead to a conclusion that a person was an employee, it would be possible to search the database for persons so classified only because of the existence of such documents, and to remove them. Similarly, it is plainly the case that if by reason of other evidence I formed the view that a particular person or persons were not employees, their names would be required to be removed from the list in the schedules. I could form that view based upon evidence given at the criminal trial, for example. Had there been witnesses called on behalf of the defendant, I might have also reached that view by reference to such evidence.
71 It can be seen, then, that Mr Sutherland's expertise amounts essentially to his being the person who has a very close familiarity with a very large number of documents and who, by reason of his training, his experience in other taxation matters, and his familiarity with these documents, is able to classify them and organise them in a way which may well be of assistance to the Court. In my view, the training and experience of Mr Sutherland, to which I have already referred, together with his study of the documents involved in this case for a period of approximately 10 years, clearly enables him to be considered an expert in that respect.
72 In relation to objections which were couched in very similar terms to the objections in this case, which were made in respect of Mr Sutherland's evidence at the criminal trial (which evidence was in very similar terms to the evidence given before me), the Court of Criminal Appeal in Caratti v The Queen was of the view that Mr Sutherland's evidence, including the Sutherland Schedules, was admissible. The relevant reasons commence at [300] of the reasons of the Chief Justice, with whom Kennedy and Anderson JJ agreed. In my view, it is necessary only to quote from [347], in which his Honour sets out his conclusion about the evidence of Mr Sutherland. It reads as follows:
"For these reasons, the fact that the evidence given by Mr Sutherland did not constitute expert evidence in the traditional sense, but was more in the nature of use of a person's skill in working with accounts to prepare and present schedules of assistance to the jury, constituted no valid objection to the admissibility of the Schedules. Likewise, I do not consider that there was any substance in the objection that the Schedules contained conclusions which were based upon assumptions of fact which were the sole and exclusive preserve of the jury. As will appear, the learned judge made it clear to the jury that it was for them to be satisfied of the existence of the facts assumed by Mr Sutherland before they could act on the Schedules themselves."
73 Save that the role of fact-finder in this case is mine, and not that of a jury, it is my view that those observations are appropriate to be applied to Mr Sutherland's evidence in this case. It was therefore my view that that material is admissible, and it was for that reason that I accepted it as evidence.
74 The documents referred to by Mr Sutherland fall, as I have indicated, into a number of categories, and Mr Sutherland categorised various workers in different ways, depending upon what documents were available for a particular worker. Adopting the categories which emerged during the course of trial, I briefly describe them and my own conclusions about them as follows.
75 Approximately 80 individuals were referred to by Mr Sutherland as either "known" or "acknowledged" employees, which expressions were interchangeable. These were persons in respect of whom a Group entity had submitted to the ATO at least one of:
• a wage record for the individual showing gross payments and tax deductions;
• a group certificate that was issued to the individual showing gross payments and tax deductions; or
76 Mr Sutherland took into account only those documents which were presented to the ATO during the course of the ATO's inquiries. Excluded from this category were the many cases in which documents such as wage records and employment declarations existed, they being found and seized under the search warrant, but the relevant records were never shown to the ATO or its officers.
77 In relation to documents in this category, Mr Sutherland concluded that those persons could, by virtue of those documents alone, be regarded as employees. They were not necessarily to be regarded as employees of the entity from which they obtained the group certificate or other document, for reasons which I will later discuss.
78 There was no evidence that any of the documents described by Mr Sutherland (that is, group certificates and the like) were issued inadvertently to any individual. In those circumstances, it seems to me that the only conclusion which can rationally be drawn from the issuing of such a document and its presentation to the ATO was that the individual in question was a person who was an employee in respect of whom there was an obligation to deduct and to remit tax.
79 It assists in understanding a later category of documents to note that the documents referred to by Mr Sutherland - that is, group certificates and similar unambiguous documents, shown to the ATO - were generally not the only documents which existed in relation to known or acknowledged employees. The existence of other documents upon which the names of known or acknowledged employees were shown, and records of payments made to those individuals, also served as a foundation for the classification of other persons as employees. I describe that process in more detail in a moment. However, it is convenient at present to select the names of some of the individuals who are known employees, and describe the sorts of documents which exist in relation to them. Some examples are:
• N Anderson: group certificates exist for this person showing the employer to be either Dyonna or Keystyle. Until 6 May 1992, there are also records showing that Dyonna paid money to him (apparently by way of wages). From that date, the payments were made by Robinswood. Payments by Robinswood continued to be made even during the period covered by the group certificate issued by Keystyle. Many internal Group documents exist recording amounts paid to this individual on different dates, and recording in the same document payments made to others.
• G Black: this person was issued a group certificate by Mine Exc. He also appears on a Mine Exc wages analysis book. His name appears in a cash payments book, along with the names of many other persons. In addition, he kept his own record of payments made to him. It shows that he was regularly paid on the same date in two different ways; he was paid a cheque made out to him for an amount, and an additional cheque made out to cash in another amount.
• A Beanland: this individual was issued with a Mine Exc group certificate, and calculations exist in the records of Mine Exc showing gross and net payments.
• R Olman: this individual was issued with a Dyonna group certificate. His name appears in the Yuna Farm Operational Results for the months in which he received payments. In the book which is entitled "Farm Operational Results", his name regularly appears with the names of many other persons, who were being paid in respect of the same period. His name appears in the Farm Operational Results book under the "Wages and Salaries" column with the names of others, only some of whom are known employees. The Farm Operational Results also show expenditure on such matters as fuel (broken down by type of fuel), fertilisers (broken down by type of fertiliser), Telecom and some other expenses. His name appears in the Yuna Farm wages book, in columns in which the names of other individuals are also recorded. In these columns, as well as the names of other individuals, there is also an entry entitled "Approx Tax" and a figure inserted in the column in respect of that amount.
80 In relation to a smaller number of employees, there are documents, which have not been submitted to the ATO but were obtained from the records of one of the Group entities, which indicate gross wages, tax instalment deductions and net wages. For example, in relation to a P White, in July of 1989, there were payslips which recorded a week ending date, hours worked, an entry "less tax" with a figure against it, and an entry "net wage" with a figure against that. Again, in the absence of any other explanation for the existence of such a document, it is my view that the conclusion must follow that the payments recorded in the payslips to P White were paid to him as an employee in respect of whom there was an obligation to deduct and remit tax.
81 There was also a significant number of individuals in respect of whom employment declarations had been completed, either partially or wholly. Many declarations had not been presented to the ATO, but rather, had been kept at the Redcliffe office. There is no reason for a person to complete, or to be asked to complete, an employment declaration, unless the person is an employee in respect of whom there is an obligation to deduct tax, since the purpose of the declaration is to affect the amount of tax which is required to be deducted and remitted. The most likely explanation for the existence of such documents in respect of individuals is that the individuals were persons who were employees, in respect of whom there was an obligation to deduct and remit tax. The inference appears to me to be weaker in this case than in the two previous categories mentioned. Since the documents were not presented to the ATO, it is possible, for example, that there were, in some instances, persons being asked to complete such documents by local managers who were mistaken as to their status.
82 For the majority of individuals, the inference that a person was an employee who was paid wages from which tax either was or should have been deducted is an inference which can only be drawn after a painstaking examination and cross-referencing of a considerable number of documents. I give a number of examples of this process, chosen at random from those individuals who do not fall into the categories referred to above.
There seems to be only one relevant payment to this person. There is cheque drawn by Mine Exc payable to this person. There is a cheque requisition recording that the payment was made for the "W/E" (apparently an abbreviation for "week ending") and a date. The cheque requisition and the cheque correspond in amount. There is an original and a copy cash book, each containing the same entries and each showing that cheque number and the correct amount, but recording it as a payment to "Airport Hardware" in the "Cash Purchases" column of the cash book. These entries appear to be part of a pattern of deliberate concealment, to which I refer later, and it appears to me that an inference can be drawn from that concealment. For the moment, however, it should be noted that the amount paid to R Alexander was $574.50. Precisely the same amount has been paid by Mine Exc to a very large number of individuals, both during the same week as the payment was made to R Alexander and during a period of months preceding and following that date. In respect of some of those other payments to other individuals, payslips record the amount as a payment in the nature of net wages. Leaving aside for the moment the false entries in the cash books, one is left with a payment which is apparently a payment to a natural person, in an amount which is the same as the amount of many other payments made to many other natural persons by the same company at about the same time, some of whom appear, from records relating to them, to be employees. From that fact alone, one could, in my view, draw an inference that the payment was one in the nature of net salary or wages. The apparently short duration of his work for Mine Exc weakens that inference somewhat in respect of R Alexander. An alternative inference might be that the payment was payment in the nature of a payment to an independent contractor and that the similarity in amount to other amounts is a coincidence. However, there is an absence in the records of the Group entities of any document presented by R Alexander. If he or she were an independent contractor, one would have expected an invoice or something of that kind. There is no invoice from "Airport Hardware".
This individual was paid amounts at weekly intervals for the period 23/11/93 to 13/4/94. Looking at one of those lines, line 425 of the Master Schedule relates to the week ending 23/11/93, and shows a cheque to G Anderson drawn on the Bella Guarda 1977 No 2 account (a Robinswood account). The name G Anderson appears in the "Wages" column of a book of wage and fuel summaries, and appears in the Mount Ney wage and fuel analysis spreadsheet in the "Wages" column. In that column, there also appear the names of N Anderson, who is a known employee, and K Farquhar, who is also a known employee. At the foot of the "Wages" column in which all of those names appear, is a line showing an entry for "Approx Tax" and a figure against that amount. There is a timesheet for that week which records G Anderson as carting hay and moving field bins, with a rate specified on the timesheet of $150 per week. Line 430 of the Master Schedule for 6/1/94 is very similar, save that the timesheet records G Anderson on that occasion as being a chaser bin driver at Howick Farm. There are, then, a number of aspects of these documents which would suggest that G Anderson was an employee. The timesheets reveal activities of a type likely to be carried out by wages employees, rather than by independent contractors. The payments are regular in timing and amount. The name of the individual appears in more than one document under a column headed "Wages". It appears to be treated in the same way as the names of those who are known employees. Further, there is, in relation to apparently to all of the persons in the relevant column of the spreadsheet, a reference to an approximate figure of tax.
This individual was paid at regular intervals for a period of approximately four years from July 1988 to July 1992. The payments were made from an account called the Norm Tunbridge No 2 account, an account operated by the farm manager at Yuna Farm. In respect of some of these payments at least, there have been located cheque requisition forms relating to the Norm Tunbridge No 2 account and containing the entry "Wages", with a total figure next to it. Attached to the cheque requisition form is a breakdown of the total figure by name and amount, with the name of M Jones appearing in that list. Some of the other names are names of known employees, for example, that of R Olman. The name M Jones is also to be found in the Farm Operational Results for the relevant period, appearing under the "Wages" column, and appearing again with the names of known employees. It should be noted that in the relevant Farm Operational Results books, there is not only a "Wages and Salaries" column, but there is, on occasion (for example, for the month of July 1990), a separate column for payments to contractors and other services such as "Shearing Contractors" and "SECWA". There is also in these Farm Operational Results a separate heading for "Repairs and Maintenance" under which there are entries such as "Arjeff Engineering". For M Jones, the regularity of payments, both in time and in amount and the long period over which they were made, tend to suggest that they were payments of wages. All of the relevant documents which have been located describe them as payments of wages, and treat them in the same way as payments to persons who are known employees.
83 It can be seen, from the three examples quoted, that the strength of the inference which can be drawn varies from individual to individual. In relation to M Jones, there would appear to be a very strong inference that the person was an employee in respect of whom tax should have been deducted and remitted. That is because of the period of time over which the payments were made, their regularity in amount, the term "Wages" in internal Group records, and the treatment of the individual identically with known employees (and differently from apparent contractors). In relation to G Anderson, the inference is also strong, but for slightly different reasons. The bracketing of the name of G Anderson with the names of known employees and its appearance under the entry "Wages" in the relevant books is similar to the way in which the name of M Jones was treated. The period of time over which the payments were made was much shorter. However, the timesheets showing the tasks in which G Anderson was actually engaged also point to the relevant inference. In relation to R Alexander, the documentary record is sparser. There is only the circumstance that the payment is identical in amount to a very large number of payments made to others at about the same time, some of whom were known employees. The inference in that case would be relatively weak. It is strengthened, however, by the absence of any record suggesting that the payment was of any character other than salary or wages, and by the misrepresentation of the payment in the cash books.
84 On occasions, other documents which do not readily fall into any particular category may be relevant. For example, M Anders was a person to whom regular payments were made during the period 28/11/89 to 17/4/90. As with the other individuals mentioned, in respect of whom there were Farm Operational Results, the name M Anders appears in the relevant Farm Operational Results recorded as a wage payment. Other documents show that the person was a cook. In addition, however, there is a first medical certificate presented by this person which records her employer as being the Carattis. Another "miscellaneous" document concerns J Brown; there is an employment agency record which shows that a particular amount "Clear" was offered, which suggests that an after-tax payment was being discussed (exhibit 14108, p44). In relation to S Moyle, there are JobStart wage subsidy documents. I do not think it is necessary to refer to all the documents of this kind, which exist in relation to a relatively small number of workers.
85 As well as named individuals, it should be noted that in relation to lines 1604 - 2009, there is no individual to whom a payment is allocated as wages; they are simply cash cheques. However, they were drawn on the Mine Exc account, at about the same time as normal time wages, and the number of these cheques correlates with the number of "normal time" wages payments made to individuals. Sometimes cash cheques in the same batch had been signed on the rear by individual employees, and so were able to be allocated to those employees. The inference I would draw would be that these cheques were issued as payment for overtime, in the same way as the cash overtime payments for G Black which I described earlier. Because it is difficult to reconstruct with accuracy the appropriate tax rate for unknown individuals, Mr Sutherland explained that he adopted a conservative approach, which would mean that any error in his calculation would operate in favour of the defendants.
86 In respect of categories numbered (i) and (ii) above, the documents relating to those workers would clearly suffice, taken alone, to lead to a finding that they were employees. In relation to category (iii), there is an inference that they were employees, but the inference is weaker. In relation to category (iv), the documents vary significantly. In many of those cases, a process of cross-referencing would readily lead to the finding that a person was an employee, and that a payment was a payment of wages, while in some other cases the inference is weak. In all the cases in category (iv), however, there is, in my view, evidence which would establish, in the absence of any document or oral evidence tending to contradict such an inference, that the payments were payments of wages to employees.
87 That conclusion is not based on an examination of all the documents in each individual line. Rather, my methodology has been as follows.
88 In relation to those individuals, payments to whom were the subject of cross-examination of Mr Sutherland by counsel for the defendants, I examined all the documents in at least one of the lines which related to each of them, either during the course of cross-examination or during the evening of the day on which cross-examination in respect of that individual took place. Generally, I only examined one or two lines relating to each of those individuals. This was in part because an examination of the lines reveals that the same, or similar, documents tend to recur in relation to a particular employee, and in part because I assumed that, in the absence of any evidence pointing to a contrary conclusion, a person engaged as an employee on one occasion was likely to have been an employee on all other occasions. Approximately half the individuals were the subject of cross-examination.
89 In relation to those individuals who were not the subject of cross-examination, in each case I read Mr Sutherland's summaries of the documents which he had examined, and looked also at one of the line entries relating to that individual. Because I had considered the individuals the subject of cross-examination prior to undertaking this exercise, I had gained some familiarity with the documents which most commonly appeared in the line entries. I therefore did not view the individual documents, unless they appeared to be documents with which I was unfamiliar.
90 I am satisfied that I have sampled the schedules in sufficient detail to be able to form a view concerning their content and reliability. In my view, the schedules standing alone would, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, establish that the individuals were employees who were paid wages. However, there is other material bearing on this question, which I now describe.
91 Looking at the question of whether a person is to be regarded as an employee or an independent contractor, some of the questions which may require consideration, include the degree to which the person is directed in the tasks he or she is to undertake, as opposed to using his or her own skill and expertise to achieve a particular result (the manner being left to the worker) and the extent to which the person is integrated in the ordinary operations of the business in which he or she is engaged. These questions are often of particular relevance where, as here, the precise terms of engagement, which may never in any event have been clearly articulated by either party, are not known. Subsidiary questions might sometimes arise, such as a question of who supplied equipment which was necessary for the person to use in completion of that task.
92 Turning first to the question of equipment, it is clear from the evidence relating to mechanical repairs that a very significant quantity of equipment was provided by the Group entities, particularly in relation to the farms. The evidence given at the criminal trial by the various workers who were called there reveals that although some used their own tools, particularly tools of a smaller kind, large items of equipment such as ploughing machinery were supplied to them.
93 So far as control was concerned, all of the evidence at the criminal trial pointed in the direction of supervision and direction by one or the other of the members of the Caratti family, or by managers engaged by them, of the activities which workers carried out. For example, Mr N Anderson, who was the manager at the Mount Ney farm, said that he would decide what tasks workers on the farm would do, and would keep a record on a daily basis of the days or hours that they worked (CT 2259). Mr T Hine, another farm manager, gave evidence that he would fire workers if they were not satisfactory, that he decided what they would do on the farm each day, and that they were not required to use their own plant, tools or equipment to work on the farms (CT 2683 - 4). To like effect, Mr Sutcliffe said that, in relation to people working on the farm, they were required to work under his direction and instruction and that the farm provided equipment if it was needed (CT 3123). Farm workers confirmed that that was the case (eg, G Copeland, CT 2870; B Costigan, CT 2880).
94 The various timesheets in evidence demonstrate that farm workers were paid on an hourly, daily or weekly rate. There is no evidence of any person being engaged to complete a particular task, with the engagement specified in terms of the task. For example, rather than an invoice specifying that a person had ploughed three fields, there would be a timesheet indicating that a person had ploughed for a particular number of hours. The fact that numerous individuals performed different types of tasks - for example, one individual might on one day be raking, on another day baling, and on a third day ploughing - tends to confirm that they were directed to tasks as required, as the managers had suggested. Further, when regard is had to the sort of work undertaken by the farm workers, they were clearly an integral part of the operation of the businesses in which they were engaged.
95 All of the factors referred to above would tend to suggest that the individuals engaged on the farms were employees rather than independent contractors.
96 Similar principles apply in relation to mine workers, although the evidence of supervision comes largely from the workers themselves, rather than from their supervisors. For example, Mr J Nelson worked under the supervision of a Mr Smith, and his work was driving a dump truck (CT 2487 - 9). Mr M MacNamara was a truck driver and plant operator for Mine Exc who was given his instructions by the site supervisor (CT 2501). Similar evidence was given by Mr V MacNamara, who also spoke of an hourly rate (CT 2509, 2513), by Mr N Gobby, who also noted that the trucks which he drove were owned by the Carattis (CT 2530 - 1) and by Mr G Constant (CT 2570).
97 Although, as I have noted earlier, only a relatively small proportion - about 10 per cent - of the alleged employees gave evidence at the criminal trial, the evidence of each of them tends to confirm that those engaged in the farms and in the mining enterprises were employees, and counsel for the defendants was unable to point to any of their evidence which detracted from that proposition.
98 Of those workers who gave evidence, more than 30 gave evidence of seeking to obtain a group certificate from a Group entity, but being unsuccessful in doing so. Two aspects of that evidence are of significance. First, the fact that workers regarded themselves as entitled to, or required to, obtain a group certificate is material from which an inference could be drawn that each of those workers regarded himself or herself as an employee from whose wages tax had been deducted. It does not matter, for the purposes of that inference, to whom the workers made the request.
99 It is also the case that, on some occasions, the worker made a request to John or Allen Caratti. In none of the cases was the response received to the effect that no group certificate should issue because the person was not an employee. In these cases, the inference which might be drawn from the workers' conduct is stronger. In the majority of those cases, the request was made, the worker was told that a certificate would be forthcoming or that inquiries would be made, and no group certificate ever arrived.
100 In a very small minority of cases, however, either John or Allen Caratti responded in a way which fits with the pattern of concealment which I will shortly describe. For example, when L MacFarlane asked John Caratti for a group certificate, John Caratti's response was that he would give him the money that had been deducted for tax if he would say "I went fishing" (CT 2398). Brian Costigan had a number of discussions with Allen Caratti about tax; Mr Costigan seems to have been under the impression that the Group companies should have been remitting Mr Costigan's tax, but were not doing so. Eventually, when he was unable to obtain group certificates, he suggested instead to Allen Caratti that Allen could fill out a prescribed payments form which would see Mr Costigan treated as a contractor for taxation purposes. His evidence was that Allen Caratti's response was to tear up the form with words to the effect of "You don't want to give these bastards your money", adding that "they" would not be able to trace the cheques that Mr Costigan received (CT 2881 - 2).
101 In relation to the group certificates, then, the evidence of more than 30 workers supports a conclusion that those workers considered that they were employees; in a smaller number of cases, the response of one of the Carattis supports an inference that the members of the Caratti family considered those persons to be employees; and in a very small minority of cases, the response leads to an inference that members of the Caratti family were actively attempting to conceal from the ATO the fact that they had certain employees.
102 There is a considerable body of evidence from which it may be inferred that it was the policy of the Group to conduct its affairs in a way which would conceal from the ATO the true position with respect to employees. That evidence includes a failure to keep records, or dishonesty about whether such records existed, and the keeping of false records. There is also some evidence given by those who had dealings with the Group which further tends to support the inference that members of the Caratti family had a policy of taking steps to ensure that their liability to deduct and remit tax was not known to the ATO. I discuss some of the more significant examples of this pattern below.
103 An example of simple concealment of records relates to the Bella Guarda 1977 No 2 account. This was an account from which most of the farm workers were paid. The evidence at the criminal trial of Mr John Hudson-Taylor, an employee of the ATO, was that, as a result of having examined seized records which led him to the view that there should be an account named the Bella Guarda 1977 No 2 account, he asked John Caratti about it. John Caratti answered that the account did not exist. However, it plainly did. A very large number of cheques were drawn on that account and paid to individual workers. By way of example, one of the individuals paid from the Bella Guarda 1977 No 2 account was a Mr T Homewood. Not only does Mr Homewood's name appear in a variety of documents, internal to the Group, analysing wage and salary expenses, but there is also in evidence an image of a "Post-it" note, showing his name, a gross figure, a figure for tax and a net amount, and a copy of a letter addressed to Mrs Caratti seeking a group certificate for the work done.
104 In considerable numbers of instances, understated wage records of individuals who were known employees were produced to the ATO. For example, in relation to Mr K Farquhar, cheques drawn on the Bella Guarda 1977 No 2 account show certain amounts being paid to him on a weekly basis. A document created by the manager of the Mount Ney farm, where he worked, records wages paid to him for the year 1989, including payments during weeks where no Bella Guarda 1977 No 2 account cheque was able to be located, and the amounts are consistent with the amounts paid weekly as evidenced by the cheques which have been recovered. The farm accounts, which record a variety of outgoings, also record amounts which reconcile with the cheques and the manager's wage document. However, a wage record produced to the ATO in the name of the same individual, which is consistent with the group certificate issued, shows gross wages approximately $10,000 less for the 1989 financial year than were revealed by the internal records, and tax deductions of approximately $3000 less than revealed by the internal records, with the result that Robinswood understated, in its official records produced to the ATO, the amount which it was required to remit by approximately $3000 in that financial year in respect of that individual.
105 A number of witnesses at the criminal trial confirmed that their group certificates from Group entities understated the income they actually received. Examples are W Lang (CT 2583 - 97) and R Klomp (CT 3107). K Matthews (CT 3136) received a group certificate with an untaxed "travelling allowance" shown on it, but was not aware of receiving any travel allowance. I discuss the "travel allowance" mechanism later.
106 A common device is the classification of payments under a false heading in the books of the various Group entities. Where a payment appears which some documents record as a payment of wages, or a payment to an individual, while others record it as something else, in an apparently systematic way, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that that system had as its purpose concealment, for profit.
107 The incorrect classification of wage expenses as something else can be seen in Robinswood's income tax return for the year ending June 1993, signed by John Caratti and prepared by Isaac Ellison. The profit and loss statement in that return contains no reference to wages. There is a small item of $5000, approximately, for contractors, described as "External labour costs" and a "Repairs and maintenance" expense of $1,761,408. However, there is also in evidence a copy of a draft profit and loss statement for the year ending June 1992, together with Isaac Ellison's handwritten figures for 1993, seized by the Australian Federal Police from the Redcliffe office. On that draft, there is a heading for wages of $263,422 for 1992 and $646,234 for 1993. At the foot of the document, there is a note to John Caratti from Mr Ellison, drawing attention to a number of points. Against the item "Wages", the note reads: "Will have to be grouped with Repairs and Maintenance".
108 In the books of Grangefield, two sets of books were kept for a particular period. They recorded the same cheque numbers and showed a number of payments being made on a regular basis. In the first cash book, a number of payments to individuals were recorded with the notation "Wages". In the second cash book, the same payments were recorded in the column entitled "Repairs and Maintenance". There were timesheets and diaries for individuals which suggested that the payments in each case were payments to employees. The inference to be drawn is that the set of books with the notation "Repairs and Maintenance" was one intended to be produced to the ATO if necessary, while the other showed the true position.
109 A pattern of falsification of entries in the books of various Group entities can be seen in relation to workers such as T Patten, A Hockley and W Davies, all of whom were paid at different times by S & M Caratti, Venetian Nominees and Robinswood. Going to payments to Mr Davies, for example, by S & M Caratti, for a particular period, it can be seen that he received separate payments of $619.90 and $288 for the same period. A calculation attached to a cheque requisition form in relation to the Malaga project shows two separate calculations in respect of him; the first is 38 hours at $10 per hour, leading to the after-tax fortnightly rate of $619.90. There is also, however, an "O/T" (that is, overtime) calculation of 24 hours at $12 per hour, giving a total of $288. The cheque butt for cheque 327340 (for $619.90) shows a cheque payable to W Davies was made out. However, the cheque butt in respect of cheque 327344 for the sum of $288 is made out to "Morgan". When one looks at the actual cheque 327344, which has been recovered, it is made out to "Cash".
110 In Robinswood, the concealment was effected somewhat differently. Looking at the same three individuals, they are recorded in the books of Robinswood in the "Wages" column as receiving payments which are recorded and which have particular cheque numbers. Immediately thereafter are again three entries for "Morgan Equipment", with particular cheque numbers. They appear in the "Cash Payments" column. No invoices or other documents relating to claims for payment by Morgan Equipment have been recovered. In that situation, I would draw the inference that the payments recorded against the name Morgan Equipment in the Robinswood cash book were, in fact, overtime payments to the three individuals who were paid in that way in S & M Caratti and Venetian Nominees. I would also draw the inference that false entries were made in order to conceal the fact that payments were made to various individuals of wages from which tax should have been deducted and remitted.
111 In relation to the falsified cheque butts, there is some evidence bearing upon the question of whether that was, as it plainly appeared to be, a deliberate concealment. Mrs Terry Ferrier, who gave evidence at the criminal trial, was the proprietor of a secretarial and bookkeeping business which did work relating to Excelco (WA) in August 1991. She made up wage slips, payslips and wrote out cheques, while John Caratti would sign the cheques and provide the appropriate hourly rate. She made calculations in relation to gross pay and tax and made the cheques up appropriately for net pay. At the end of the first month, having calculated the total amount of tax, she asked John Caratti whether he wanted her to make out a tax cheque for the ATO. He said that he did not and that she should "just leave that with me". Her evidence was also that, although on the cheque butts she referred to the payments to employees as "wages", on the second or third occasion on which she made up the pays, John Caratti told her not to write the word "wages" next to the name and amount (CT 3655 - 3658, 3660, 3677).
112 Another example of a similar pattern of false recording of payments of wages as payments for services of various kinds appears in the books of Robinswood relating to payments to N Gobby. A Robinswood cash book shows a cash payment to "Ross's Repair Service" in the amount of $300 for a cheque which is numbered 419866. However, the cheque itself was made out to "Cash" and it bears a signature on the rear of R Gobby, identified in evidence at the criminal trial as being the signature of the wife of N Gobby. Mr Gobby's evidence at the criminal trial was that he was invariably paid by two cheques, one in his name and one made out to cash. Similar evidence of being paid by two cheques or sometimes paid by cheque with additional cash-in-hand was given by a number of witnesses at the criminal trial, whose work stretched across a variety of the Group enterprises. As well as Mr Gobby, there was Mr Piahana (CT 2630 - 2631, Venetian), Mr W F Lang (CT 2593, Mine Exc) and D Bacon (CT 2410, Mine Exc).
113 In relation to Mine Exc, there were two sets of cash books, covering overlapping periods of time (the first being 28 February 1989 to 31 October 1990 and the second being 1 July 1989 to 29 June 1990, and 1 July 1990 to 21 December 1990). The cash books record the same cheque numbers, for the overlapping periods. However, one cash book shows a wage column with a large number of payments to individuals recorded as wages. The second set shows a wage column which has only a small number of workers, with the same cheque numbers recorded as apparently payments to trade creditors. Further, the amounts shown in the second set of cash books which are recorded as wages often record amounts less than payments recorded in either the first set of cash books, or in other records such as cheque requisitions and the actual cheques. The inference which I draw from the existence of the two sets of cash books was that one was intended to record the true amounts of wages paid, while the other was intended to misrepresent the position in the event of inquiries by the ATO. No other probable inference was suggested on the part of the defendants.
114 On occasion there are inexplicable amounts recorded by way of travel allowance, or other allowance. These, too, seem to have been for the purpose of disguising taxable wages as non-taxable allowances. For example, in respect of M Richards, reconstruction of his wages for the 1993 financial year based on timesheets and cheques so far as they have been located, show that he was paid approximately $39,000 in gross wages, with tax instalment deductions of approximately $4500 made. However, his group certificate for that year, which was issued by Keystyle, shows a gross wage of $23,500 and a "travel allowance" of $6500, with tax instalment deductions of approximately $3600. The timesheets and other documents show no amount of travel allowance in respect of Mr Richards.
115 Further light is shed on the use of the "travel allowance" by exhibit 13922, a collection of documents relating to Keystyle. There is in that bundle, a letter of 21 June 1993 from Mrs Patten to John Caratti requesting her husband's group certificate. A note from John Caratti in the bundle is not easy to follow, but suggests that Mr Patten's accountants had telephoned, or that he had telephoned seeking information for his accountants. It sets out an amount, and then poses the question, "Could this be our certificate plus travelling allowance - or do we do another GC [group certificate]". The suggestion is, it seems to me, that a group certificate is not something which is simply derived by consulting accurate records. In relation to Keystyle, it should further be noted that the note goes on to say that Dyonna was "gone" mid-December and the note raises the question "give a [sic - to ?] Keystyle Holding ??" which appears to me to suggest that Mr Patten is to be arbitrarily transferred to Keystyle as his apparent "employer". The next note, also in Mr Caratti's handwriting, reads: "What's the best to do? Give a increased '92 GC? or show a Travelling Allowance? Do we give a small one from Keystyle for '93 till Dec/Jan? What are your suggestions - which will not expose us!" (emphasis in original). Against the background which I have described, I draw the inference that this note was requesting guidance as to how Mr Patten could be provided with some record which would be acceptable to him and to the ATO, and which would not expose a pattern of concealment.
116 A different sort of "allowance" appears in respect of Mr Ellison, the Group's accountant. By a letter dated 19 November 1993 on Robinswood letterhead, addressed to the National Australia Bank, John Caratti advised that Mr Ellison's gross pay was at that stage $807.68, with tax deductions of $132.45, leaving a net pay of $675.23. In addition, Mr Caratti referred to "a non-taxable benefit of $230 per week in cash". That payment does not appear in any statements of Mr Ellison's income made to the ATO. No other documents suggest how Mr Ellison became entitled to such a payment or why it was not taxable.
117 In relation to Excelco Mining, some evidence bearing on the attitude of Caratti family members to employment and tax-related matters was given by Mr Morris, who had the day-to-day running of Excelco (WA). Sergio Caratti had said to him that Mr Morris was not to be involved in employing wages employees and that Sergio would refer to such employees as "contractors". In fact, Mr Morris hired the majority of the employees and did so on the basis that they were wages employees with taxation to be deducted in the normal way. He had a discussion with John Caratti about the fact that, so far as Mr Morris was aware, tax had not been remitted on a regular basis, and asked when it was going to occur. John Caratti said that Excelco (WA) could not afford to pay the tax in one lump sum and that instalments would have to be paid. When Excelco Mining was set up, it was clear to Mr Morris from discussions with John Caratti that there would be no payslips for employees and that people who were employed would be employed as contractors. However, in his hiring of workers for both Excelco (WA) and Excelco Mining, Mr Morris did not give effect to the mechanism of employing people as contractors. Indeed, it was never explained to him how that could be done. Mr Morris' evidence suggests that "contractor" was simply a label applied to workers in respect of whom members of the Caratti family did not propose to deduct and/or remit tax.
118 The plaintiff tendered, as part of its case, a transcript of an interview conducted between Detective Sergeant Turner and Mr Isaac Ellison who, it will be remembered, was one of the Group's two accountants. Mr Sutherland was present for that interview and asked a number of questions during it. Counsel for the defendants asked me to have regard to certain matters within that interview, which it was submitted were favourable to the defendants. I have had regard to those matters, but I do not view them in the same way as counsel for the defendants.
119 Mr Ellison said that he was the in-house accountant for the Group, one of two up to June 1991 and since then the only accountant employed by the Group. Very early in the interview, Mr Ellison advised that he did not handle, write up, or pay any wages to any staff member, that being handled by the Carattis.
120 He was also at pains to say very early in the interview that, although he would, in the preparation of financial statements, pick up wages from cash books and other books of prime entry, he used the term "wages and salaries loosely ... because ... to the best of my knowledge ... there were many contractors that were employed on the farm. This was an arrangement I was told by old man Mister Caratti many many years ago ... ". He went on to explain that "old Mister Caratti", who I understand to be Sergio, never wanted the "problem" of having to remit tax instalments. He was "given to understand" by John and Allen on various occasions that they were carrying out that original arrangement of Sergio's.
121 He said that wages was not an area that he was directly involved with. A clear theme, in my view, of Mr Ellison's interview was that he was concerned to distance himself from any part of the operations of the Group businesses which might be relevant to taxation. Explaining his relationship with the Carattis, and his own philosophy, he said: "To some extent they're very insular people, you know, they don't like you to know too much. As I said to you earlier on, that's probably the best way to operate, then if you know if anything is not quite right well then if you're not a party to it you know, I suppose ... ". Mr Ellison plainly took the view that there were things about the Group enterprises which it was better for him not to know.
122 Although wages were not his area, according to Mr Ellison, he was specific from time to time about whether people were employees or contractors. For example, in relation to the Redcliffe workshop he said, "they employ a number of subcontractors who actually - you know, on the wage system they are just contractors, there's ... about three or four of them ... and they are not part and parcel of a wage structure". He also said, however, that he did not have much to do with that apart from picking up the payment from the cash book. He said that he just prepared the group certificates according to what John Caratti told him was required. A constant theme of the interview was that he never knew how particular people were employed and that the Carattis supplied him with any information necessary for wages and salaries and tax-related matters. His occasional assertions that workers, or groups of workers, were contractors, must be read in the light of his frequent disclaiming of any relevant knowledge.
123 In relation to Keystyle, when asked whether there was any attempt to make any monthly or quarterly remittances of tax deducted for Keystyle (given that it was registered as a Group employer) his answer was: "With a lot of perseverance, with a lot of demanding, with a lot of input from me, otherwise nothing would ever be done". The perseverance and the demanding apparently were directed at the Carattis and, in particular, at John.
124 When asked about whether he was aware of any cash payments being made to employees to supplement wages, Mr Ellison said that he had "heard that they are - that is happening". He did not mention his own $230 "non-taxable benefit" in that context. When asked about that, he said it was a "bonus". He said that he realised tax was being deducted and not being remitted for some reason or another, and that it should have been done, but that he did not "run the place". He said that when he raised that with the Carattis, their attitude was that they would do it "as soon as funds are available".
125 In a comment which sheds further light on the apparently unjustified travel allowances appearing on some group certificates, Mr Ellison made the following comment when asked to explain a document containing a reference to a travel allowance:
" ... this is Jan Tunbridge, the manageress of the Yuna farm. See, what she does, every year she sends down these types of figures for the purposes of a preparation of their group certificate. As I said, she works it out and she expects the certificate to comply with what she actually pays, but invariably that never happened."
"Well, the Caratti's [sic] said: 'oh, no, that's too much and - you know, it's not right. It's not - should have got travelling allowance so he can reduce the tax or what - - - '"
126 When asked to explain the manila folders, which he kept, reflecting Farm Operational Results, he explained that that was because Sergio wanted to know every month what the farms were spending. In relation to the wage and salary columns, he said he would have picked those figures up from the farm books. His explanation of his reason for keeping them, and of the figures which they contained was:
" ... I for my own information have to keep those farm operational results going ... because if ever the bank says to me, as they will well do in a couple of weeks time: what were your financial figures for the end of June ninety four, I can't very well turn round and say we didn't pay wages to anybody. You know what I mean, fair enough they may not want to declare that but for my own internal accounting purposes - I mean I have to - otherwise the bank is going to say: you must have paid wages to these people otherwise who was running the farms?"
127 In relation to the Excelco (WA) cash book, when asked why he would not have included a wages column in that cash book, which he kept, he said that he did not know, "Unless repairs, maintenance, subcontract would actually stand for wages ... the term 'subcontract' and 'wages' are interchangeable. You know, and - we never really knew even until now who was a wage employee and who was a subcontractor".
128 In relation to the farm operational books containing columns for wages and figures for "Approx Tax", Mr Ellison said that he had said to Sergio Caratti that: "If we don't put some approximation of tax we're not going to know the true situation because I'm not to know that at the end of the year they don't want to give a group certificate". He said it was necessary to have some estimate of what the taxation liability was. He said that once the Australian Federal Police had executed the search warrant at the Redcliffe office, John Caratti had said to him that he was not to keep such accounts any more.
129 The peculiar thing about his explanation of the Farm Operational Results, of course, was that if there had been kept true figures reflecting what gross and net wages were actually paid, and if the intention had been that the Group entities would comply with the requirements of the income tax legislation, then it would have been a simple matter for Mr Ellison to have obtained the correct figures to insert in the column, so as to have an accurate picture (rather than some approximation) of what monthly expenditure was. The clear inference to be drawn is that those persons mentioned in the "Wages" column were, indeed, wages employees, but that it was intended only to provide sufficient group certificates and to remit sufficient amounts of tax to the ATO to give the illusion that the Group entities were complying with their obligations. The "Approx Tax" figure would therefore be explicable on the basis that it was understood that some tax would have to be remitted, and that this was an estimate of what those controlling the Group thought they could get away with.
130 I would summarise the effect of Mr Ellison's interview in this way. He was, for some of the period, one of the two accountants for the Group, and for some of the relevant period the only accountant for the Group. He had been employed by the Group for a long time and had an intimate knowledge of its operations. Although he said that he was not involved in critical questions of hiring and paying workers, he was involved in the preparation of group certificates and documents which reflected the operating results of various entities, and was in a position to speak knowledgeably about some matters relevant to this case. To the extent that he made admissions, it is my view that those admissions may be regarded as admissions of the Group entities. He admitted that at times tax was not remitted as required. He admitted that the Carattis would at times arbitrarily change the amounts of which the ATO would be advised as being income tax deducted, in order to reduce the amount of tax apparently payable, for example, by reclassifying some amounts as travel allowance. As the Group accountant, he alleged that he made efforts to ensure that his employers would deduct and remit tax.
131 The defendants rely upon his interview, in that it was submitted by their counsel that he explained that many of those persons whose names appeared in the wage and salary columns of internal Group documents could well be contractors, since it was the policy of Sergio, and later of other members of the family, to ensure that wherever possible persons were hired as contractors, rather than employees. That explanation seems to me to be preposterous, and I would not accept it. If it was, indeed, a policy of such importance that Sergio (a man of forceful personality), and later other members of the family, had "insisted" that persons be employed as contractors wherever possible, one would have expected that they would have also insisted that documents would reflect the extent to which that policy was being carried out; that is, that there would be a careful separation between contractors and employees. Further, the operational results had as their sole purpose ensuring that monthly expenditure could be carefully monitored. The only rational way to do that would be to distinguish between contractors, in respect of whom no tax liability arose, and wages employees. The operational results go so far as to distinguish between different categories of fuel, and there would seem to be no reason, other than one based on a dishonest attempt to avoid liability for taxation, that the same distinction could not have been made between wages employees and contractors. Further, as I have noted earlier in discussing other aspects of the evidence, there are internal documents which clearly show what might be called "true" contractors, such as entries for shearing contractors.
132 There was a striking absence of evidence in certain areas in the present case. The evidence of Mr Sutherland was that, in respect of all of the relevant individuals, he had discovered in the records of the defendants to which he had had access (being those produced to the ATO by the Group, and those seized by the Australian Federal Police from the Group) no invoice or other document apparently prepared or presented by any of them which resembled an invoice or claim of a type which might be made by an independent contractor. Nor did he locate any document under the PPS ("Prescribed Payment System") of a type which one might expect where a contractor was hired, in respect of any of those individuals. The defendants produced no document, in relation to any relevant individual, which resembled an invoice.
133 It was, I think, faintly submitted at one stage that the documents which I have described as timesheets might be considered to be invoices, but an inspection of them shows them to be documents apparently prepared in relation to (rather than by) particular individuals showing no more than a record of the time worked and the amount of money therefore due, by the application of a simple hourly rate. They do not resemble the sort of invoice that one would expect from a contractor engaged for even a simple undertaking.
134 So far as oral evidence was concerned, there was no evidence from any member of the Caratti family, although a person identified by counsel for the defendants as John Caratti appeared to assist him for most of the trial. Nor did the defendants call any person, such as an employee from the Redcliffe office, or any of the farm managers, or managers of any of their other enterprises, to explain the way in which workers in those enterprises had been engaged and paid, or to explain any of the documents tendered by the plaintiff. In a case such as the present, which turns on the inference to be drawn from large numbers of documents, that is a remarkable omission. It is particularly so, in circumstances where the plaintiff alleged from the commencement of its opening address that there was material which clearly and strongly pointed to an inference of a dishonest pattern of concealment of taxation liability, and where that submission was developed in detail during the course of the evidence.
135 In those circumstances, it appears to me that this is a case in which it would be appropriate to apply the principle found in Jones v Dunkel [1959] HCA 8; (1959) 101 CLR 298. Although the principle was somewhat differently enunciated in the different reasons of Kitto, Menzies and Windeyer JJ, for present purposes it seems to me that it is adequately summarised by the headnote, which states that:
" ... any inference favourable to the plaintiff for which there was ground in the evidence might be more confidently drawn when a person presumably able to put the true complexion on the facts relied upon as the ground for the inference has not been called as a witness by the defendant and the evidence provides no sufficient explanation of his absence."
136 In the present case, there is no explanation for the absence of witnesses from the Caratti family, although, having regard to Maddeliene Caratti's age, it may be that she would have found the experience of giving evidence more stressful than perhaps some other witnesses. However, there was nothing to suggest that either John or Allen, each of whom appears to have been deeply involved in the activities of certain of the Group entities, would not have been able to give evidence. There was nothing to suggest Mr Ellison could not have been called. Nor was there anything to suggest that the defendants could not locate at least some of the various persons engaged by them over time to assist in the conduct of their affairs and who were directly involved in the hiring and remuneration of workers.
137 It is not the case that the defendants called no evidence. They tendered document T 66 which was a statement of a Mr Falconer, who had been for some 40 years engaged in agriculture in Western Australia as a consultant, farm business manager and farmer. His statement was to the effect that, in a variety of areas, particularly in relation to ploughing and seeding, grain cartage, and mulesing, it was "common but not universal" for larger farm operations to use contractors. He said in relation to crop spraying, it was "common and almost universally the practice" that larger farm operations would use contractors. For machinery maintenance, he said it was "normal for routine minor maintenance to be carried out by farm staff or contractors", but that major maintenance was "almost universally carried out by contractors". He then described in some detail how contractors would carry out those processes, in circumstances where contractors were engaged. His statement also said, however, that he had "limited direct involvement with the Caratti farming operations". He was unable to give evidence as to the way in which the Group entities in question here carried on their operations. His statement therefore does no more than confirm what one would in any event expect to be the case; that is, that particular sorts of tasks might be carried out by employees or contractors, depending upon the requirements of the particular operation. It sheds no light on the nature of the engagement of any individual in question in this case.
138 In my view, the documentary evidence produced by Mr Sutherland leads to an inference that all of the relevant individuals were employees. I would be prepared to infer, from the documents alone, that the relevant individuals were employees. However, that inference is greatly strengthened by an apparent pattern of concealment explicable only by a desire to avoid taxation liability, and by the failure of the defendants to call any person with an intimate knowledge of the Group's operations to give evidence to the contrary. It is strengthened also, in many cases, by the oral evidence from the criminal trial and by the absence of documents, such as invoices, which might suggest that particular persons were contractors.
139 An important element in the submissions made on behalf of the defendants was that, even if payments were received by individuals which were payments of salary and wages from which tax should have been deducted and remitted, it did not follow that the entity paying the salary and wages was necessarily the employer; hence, it did not follow that that entity was liable for any amounts of tax undeducted and unremitted. The submission is of practical significance because of the practice of paying numerous individuals from accounts held by different entities, either at different times or at the same time, and because of the practice of issuing group certificates showing Dyonna and Keystyle as the employers of many individuals. Those latter two companies are, of course, not defendants, and their financial position and status has been explained earlier in these reasons.
140 The submissions of the defendants were broadly to the effect that it was necessary for me in each case to find the "true" employer of the worker in the common law sense, by looking at whatever the indicia of employment might be, and determining, in effect, with which entity the worker appeared to have the most substantial relation. That submission is, in my view, inconsistent with s 221A(1) of the Act as it was at all relevant times. In that section, which is a definition section, "employer" was defined as follows:
"'employer' means a person who pays or is liable to pay any salary or wages ... "
141 The Act in its terms, then, defined an employer to be either a person who is liable to pay salary or wages (which would appear generally to accord with common law concepts) or any person who in fact pays salary or wages.
142 The defendants' counsel postulated a variety of hypothetical situations in which a person might pay salary or wages, yet not be an employer, even within that definition. On analysis, they appear to me to be hypothetical situations in which either one person pays salary or wages purely as agent for, and on behalf of, another, so that that other is the person who is to be regarded as actually paying the salary or wages; or alternatively they are situations where one person advances funds by way of loan or otherwise to another person, to enable that other person to pay the salary or wages; again in that situation the other person would be the payer.
143 The plain meaning of s 221A is that it is possible for two persons, being the one who actually pays wages, and the one who under a contract of employment is liable to pay the wages, to each be liable to make appropriate deductions and to remit them to the Commissioner of Taxation. I note that, in the only other decisions counsel have been able to locate which deal with this section, the view which I have just expressed was taken: Re S & N (Nominees) Pty Ltd (in liq) (1984) 68 FLR 441, Re Hartland & Hyde Pty Ltd (in liq) (1997) 97 ATC 5114.
144 As a result of the statutory definition, and in the absence of any evidence suggesting that those entities of the Group which paid salary and wages were paying them as agent for some other entity, it is my view that, in respect of each payment to each individual, the entity listed in the Master Schedule as making the payment is to be considered the "employer", and therefore as being liable to deduct and remit tax in an appropriate amount in respect of that individual.
145 The statutory definition, in my view, answers another submission made on behalf of the defendant Maddeliene Caratti. In respect of her, it is submitted that there is no evidence that there was in existence a partnership between herself and Sergio Caratti, so that it would be wrong to attribute the payments of S & M Caratti to her. However, it seems to me that the position is as follows. If there was a partnership, then the definition of "employer" which provided that, in the case of a partnership, the expression includes each partner (s 221A(1)) fixes her with liability. If not, then Maddeliene Caratti should be regarded as the person who paid the wages of the relevant individuals. The account from which they were paid - the S & M Caratti account - was a joint account of Sergio and Maddeliene, with Sergio and Maddeliene severally able to operate it (exhibit T 14112, page 2). As I have noted, Sergio did not sign the relevant documents. Rather, all of the cheques on this account were signed by Maddeliene.
146 There was a submission made in respect of S & M Caratti and Venetian Nominees, that they were to be regarded as, in effect, the agents of Robinswood in paying wages, with the relevant accounts to be regarded as accounts in the nature of imprest accounts. That submission was based on a similarity in form between cheque requisitions made in relation to the Norm Tunbridge No 2 account, which it was common ground was an imprest account, and requisitions relating to wages paid out of the S & M Caratti and Venetian Nominees accounts. An example of the latter type of document is exhibit 13620, a cheque requisition headed "The Century Park Project/Malaga Project". It is a requisition for funds to be drawn from the Bella Guarda 1977 No 3 account, which was a Robinswood account. There is attached to the cheque requisition a list of employees and wages due. In respect of requisitions of this type, the funds were then channelled into either the S & M Caratti or the Venetian Nominees account and were paid to the employees from those accounts. Similarly, with the Norm Tunbridge No 2 account cheque requisitions in respect of wages took a similar form, with the amounts being transferred from a Robinswood account into the Norm Tunbridge No 2 account and the wages being paid by Mr Tunbridge.
147 While the similarity in form of the relevant cheque requisitions could lead to an inference that the S & M Caratti and Venetian Nominees accounts were also accounts in the nature of imprest accounts, there are significant differences. Norm Tunbridge was himself an employee of Robinswood, and one would hardly expect an employee to pay from his own funds the wages of other employees of his employer. S & M Caratti and Venetian Nominees, on the other hand, were distinct entities in the ownership of the same family. There is no commercial or practical reason for supposing that one was an agent of any of the others, and one would look primarily to the books of account of the Group in order to determine the relationship between those entities, if any.
148 Looking first at Venetian Nominees, it is significant that the land at Malaga which was the subject of the subdivision project was owned by Venetian Nominees (having been formerly owned by S & M Caratti). When it paid wages, then, Venetian was paying for work which was an improvement to an asset owned by it. There is nothing in the accounts to suggest that Venetian held the land as trustee or agent, or otherwise than on its own account. Further, the bank account which Venetian operated was called Venetian Nominees P/L "trading as the Century Park Project", which also suggests that Venetian Nominees was itself a trading entity.
149 So far as S & M Caratti were concerned, a number of cheque requisitions of the type which I have described contained the notation "Malaga contractor" (eg, 13675). Since the payments involved were payments of wages, rather than payments to contractors, the inference would appear to be that S & M Caratti as an entity was itself the relevant contractor. Further, the 1990 tax return for Robinswood shows an unsecured loan to S & M Caratti as a non-current asset. While there is nothing to indicate how that amount is calculated, it demonstrates that the relationship was not simply one of agency.
150 Further, as I have noted, it was by no means unusual for individuals to be paid by more than one Group entity at different times, or even at the same time, in circumstances where there would appear to be no legal or commercial reason for adopting that course. The mere fact that the source of funds for the payment of individuals paid by one entity, is another Group entity, does not therefore suggest that any relationship of agency existed between the two at any particular time.
151 If it were necessary to determine the matter, I would be inclined to the view that the S & M Caratti payments to individuals should be regarded as payments from a partnership of Sergio and Maddeliene, rather than payments made by those persons in their individual capacities. That conclusion is primarily based on the notation in the 1990 tax return, and upon some tax return calculations which also appear to relate to an unsecured loan to S & M Caratti (exhibit 13908, pages 187, 224). The matters outlined above lead me to the view that each of Venetian Nominees and S & M Caratti should be regarded, not as an agent of another Group entity as employer, but as employers themselves within the relevant statutory definition and therefore liable to deduct and remit tax in respect of those wages which they paid.
152 Even where an individual is an employee and payment can be described as a payment of wages, the defendants submitted that it was not clear whether a particular payment was a net payment - that is, a payment from which tax was deducted, although some or all of the tax so deducted was not remitted to the ATO - or was a gross payment, from which no tax was deducted at all.
153 Mr Sutherland approached the task of determining whether a payment was net or gross in the following way. On occasion, there was direct evidence suggesting that a particular payment to a particular individual was a net payment. An example of that is the payment to Mr Homewood, in respect of which exhibits 14068 pages 4 - 8 and 14426 show a calculation of a gross wage, a tax deduction, and a net figure which corresponds to the figure actually paid to Mr Homewood; other documents relating to Mr Homewood include a statutory declaration which he has filed with his income tax return, and notations on document 14068 which state that a group certificate would issue, apparently signed by Maddeliene Caratti.
154 Sometimes a time and wages book contained columns for total hours worked, deductions, gross and tax amounts. Cheque requisitions sometimes contained the reference to a payment being "net", and so on. Where there was a document or documents relating to a payment to a person which established that that payment was net, an inference may also be drawn in relation to other payments to the same person which appear to be similar in nature, that those payments were also net. Alternatively, in the same way that cross-referencing of documents relating to different individuals establishes that those paid in the same way as "known" employees were also employees, cross-referencing of payments in respect of individuals, where there is evidence to establish that the payment to the individual was net, may have the effect of establishing that other individuals, paid apparently in the same way and at about the same time, also received net payments.
155 The question of whether a particular payment was gross or net is relevant to establish the quantum of the liability of a defendant in relation to that payment. Annexure 9 to the opening submissions of the plaintiff demonstrates how the characterisation of a payment as either gross or net will affect the liability of the employer. In summary, where a payment is gross, the employer is liable for an amount (excluding the late payment penalty) equivalent to the amount of tax which should have been deducted. However, where a payment is net, the employer is liable for the amount of tax deducted and not remitted, and also for a failure to remit penalty equal to 20 per cent of the amount of tax either deducted or assumed to have been deducted, but not remitted. That is, other things being equal, an assumption that a payment was gross would result in a lower level of liability than an assumption that it was net.
156 The difference is not very significant; Mr Sutherland's evidence was that even if all of the persons named on exhibit T 68 (a document relied upon by the defendants) were paid gross, the change in his calculation, before interest, would total approximately $5000 (T 2069 - 70).
157 Counsel for the defendants challenged the assumption made that where a document or documents relating to one employee tends to establish that a payment was net, the same assumption may be made in relation to other employees apparently paid in a similar way by the same entity. The challenge to this methodology had two broad limbs. The first related to apparent non-declaration of income by some individuals. The second pointed to passages in the evidence of the criminal trial, and to concessions apparently made by Mr Sutherland in cross-examination, in order to suggest that the methodology was flawed in at least some cases (and therefore should not be relied on generally).
158 In relation to the tax return issue, Mr Sutherland was extensively cross-examined as to which individuals of the 704 contained in the schedules could be ascertained to have lodged tax returns for any relevant year, and which of those had shown that they had derived income from a Group entity. Where there was a group certificate or an employment declaration form showing a tax file number, Mr Sutherland was able to locate relevant tax returns. In relation to a large number of other persons, constituting the majority of named individuals, it was not possible to say whether or not the person had lodged a tax return. That is because in most cases there were no full names or other identifying details. It was not possible therefore, for example, to determine which of the many individuals bearing that surname and that same first initial, which might be found in the ATO's records, corresponded with the individual of the same surname and initial in the schedules. The task was complicated by the fact that some individuals appeared to have their names misspelt; what appear to be entries for the same individual appear in the schedules in a number of cases with slight variations in the spelling. Thus, where a return could not be located, it did not mean necessarily that there was no return.
159 However, in other cases, returns have been located for a person who was a relevant individual. In some of those cases, the person had referred to income derived from a Group entity, often by way of the provision of figures in a statutory declaration. In many other cases, the individual had apparently not lodged returns which referred to income derived from a Group entity. Sometimes it is not clear whether an identified person who does appear to be an individual on the list has declared income from a Group entity or not. That is because sometimes individuals describe income in their returns in a way which is confusing. An example is a Mr Clarkson, who declared workers' compensation income for a relevant year. There is some indication that Mr Clarkson received workers' compensation payment from a Group entity, but it is not clear whether this is the income which he referred to in his return.
160 It is, however, clear from the returns which have been able to be linked to relevant individuals, that not all individuals who were paid by Group entities declared the income which they received from those Group entities. It is submitted that the inference to be drawn from the failure to declare that income is that the income must be gross. That is because it is argued if the income had been net, the relevant worker would have had an incentive to declare the income so as to receive any refund possibly due to him or her. I do not accept that that is the most logical inference to draw.
161 There are many reasons why a person might not lodge a tax return, or might not refer to particular income in it. The evidence in the criminal trial reveals that most of the individuals involved were relatively unskilled and relatively unsophisticated workers, without a clear understanding of the taxation system. It may be that many of them were not aware of what the correct procedure to follow would be, if they did not receive a group certificate. It may be that they did not wish to disclose income received because it could affect the amount of welfare benefits to which they were entitled, or amounts such as child support which they were required to pay. It may simply have been that they considered the whole process to be too much trouble.
162 Support for the alternative inferences is to be found in a number of places. If one looks at the evidence at the criminal trial, a variety of responses to the failure of the Carattis to supply group certificates, from those workers who sought them, is evidence. Mrs Bacon did put in a tax return, but did not include Group-derived income simply because she did not have a group certificate (CT 2412.) Mr Piahana did put in a tax return, and in relation to Group-derived income simply put in a "guesstimate" of what that was (CT 2635). Mr Klomp sought a group certificate, but then lost interest in that process as it was "pretty obvious I wasn't going to get any tax back anyhow" (CT 3108). A document which Mr Sutherland prepared shows the sorts of returns which were lodged, and the sorts of income which they contained. It demonstrates that some workers were receiving income in the nature of social security benefits, which might well have been affected by the amount of income which they received from all sources. I would therefore not draw any inference as to the nature of the payment from the fact that, in some cases which are able to be identified, Group-derived income was not included in an income tax return lodged by an individual.
163 In relation to the passages of evidence from the criminal trial, upon which Mr Sutherland was cross-examined at this trial, and in relation to which he agreed that certain of those passages did or might indicate that particular persons were paid gross, it is my view that a fair reading of the whole of the evidence of the relevant person (in some cases taken together with other evidence) makes it clear that they either were not saying that they were paid gross, or that, if they were, that evidence cannot be relied upon. I think it is sufficient to give a number of examples, rather than painstakingly go through the whole of the evidence upon which Mr Sutherland was cross-examined.
164 Because he is said to have indicated that some 27 persons were or may have been paid gross, I turn first to the evidence of Mr N Anderson, who was a farm manager. The first thing that should be noted is that his response that employees were paid gross was in response to a series of double-barrelled leading questions. He was taken in some detail through an hypothetical scenario where he might be short of employees for one reason or another and he would have to go out to the local pub or to the backpackers to round up as many possible employees as he could. It was put to him that he would not know them and that they might or might not be good workers. He agreed with all of those propositions. He was then asked the following questions:
"These people never came back to you asking for group certificates ever, did they?---No.
Of course not. And the reason is that you knew and they knew they didn't want to be paid on a net basis. They wanted a day's pay for a day's work if you were lucky enough to get it out of them. Am I right or wrong?---That's correct." (CT 2315 - 6)
165 He was then asked what would happen if he needed a specific job done for a day or two, and after some discussion of that scenario, the following exchange occurred:
"You knew that they wanted to be paid gross and didn't want to pay tax, didn't you?---I assumed so, yes." (CT 2315 - 6)
166 It should be noted that one of the workers identified by Mr Anderson as a farm worker and therefore presumably included in this response, is Mr D Hudson, and I will turn to Mr Hudson in a moment. For present purposes, it is enough to note that each of the two responses of Mr Anderson which would appear to suggest that he agreed that workers were paid gross or wished to be paid gross, are responses to more than one question. The first rolled-up proposition which included reference to "a day's pay for a day's work" lacks clear focus. The second is directed both to the proposition that people wanted to be paid gross and to the proposition that they did not wish to pay tax, propositions which are not necessarily related. Both appear to be confined to the situation where workers were "rounded up" at short notice.
167 In responding to non-leading questions about taxation arrangements, Mr Anderson had earlier said:
"So far as people working on the farms were concerned, when you were hiring them what was the arrangement about tax, if any?---I assumed through the years it was a net payment and nobody come back to us.
Is that what you told them when you employed them?---I don't think I ever discussed it with them.
Anyway, you assumed it was a net payment?---Yes.
In your dealings with people you were hiring?---Yes." (CT 2201)
Later questioning revealed that Mr Anderson's wife, not Mr Anderson, was the person who distributed pay to the workers.
168 As I have noted, one of the workers identified by Mr Anderson was Mr D Hudson. Mr Hudson's name also figures on the defendants' list of witnesses who gave evidence that they were paid gross. Mr Hudson did give evidence during the course of his cross-examination, over a number of pages starting at CT 3348, about whether or not he understood there was an obligation to file tax returns in Australia (Mr Hudson being a New Zealander). The impression is gleaned that he may well have been paid gross. However, during the course of his evidence-in-chief, the following exchange had occurred (relating to the two cheques, one to cash and one in Mr Hudson's name, that he said he had received):
"Can you tell us whether or not tax was taken out of them?---No.
You can't tell us that? Is that what you're saying?---There was a form that came with the cheque.
What kind of form?---A little typewritten slip that said 190 - between $190 and $200 have been deducted for tax." (CT 3340)
169 Clearly, the scenario put to Mr Anderson about hiring employees who always wished to be, and were, paid gross was not applicable in relation to Mr Hudson. I think it fair to say that the real thrust of Mr Anderson's evidence was that he was not at all sure upon what basis farm workers were hired.
170 The lack of clarity demonstrated by Mr Anderson about how farm workers were hired appears to have been widespread. Mr Tunbridge was another farm manager, and reliance is placed by the defendants upon his evidence also to demonstrate that a number of workers were hired on a gross basis. In relation to his own tax, Mr Tunbridge had the following to say:
"What is the situation in relation to tax on what you get paid?---With me I have always paid my own tax.
Could you just explain that a little bit more? What does it mean in terms of the money that you receive by way of cheque? Is there tax taken out of that when you get it or not?---My wife should be able to answer that. I don't think I can properly." (CT 3154)
"When you hire people to work on the farm what arrangements do you make with them, if any, about how they are to be paid and what they are to be paid?---Just - just what they are going to get gross.
How do you know what the pay rate is to be?---I don't know what the pay rate is even now. My wife knows. She pays - does that.
Who actually hires people to work on the farm from time to time - you or your wife?---I do.
What do you tell them then about what the pay rate will be for the individuals you hire?---Well, we just tell them it's $12 an hour, or whatever - whatever the other fellows are getting.
What do you tell them about tax?---Well, I really haven't told them. I just surmise that that's fixed up somewhere along the track." (CT 3154)
171 It should be noted that one of the employees identified by Mr Tunbridge was a Mr Olman, who was a person who fell into the category of "known" employee.
172 The only other person whose evidence I wish to mention from the list relied upon by the defendants is Mr Drayton, who gave very firm evidence that he paid his own tax, explaining that: "I was employed under the jurisprudence of having a wage and accommodating to the tax situation of it myself" (CT 3406). His evidence at the criminal trial, in 1999, was that he thought that he had filed tax returns showing that no tax had been deducted (CT 3406).
173 However, Mr Sutherland gave evidence (T 1994 and exhibit 14206, page 8) that in 1989, Mr Drayton had lodged a tax return with a statutory declaration annexed. In that statutory declaration, he had said that the payments which he received were net payments. Mr Sutherland explained that when the ATO contacted his employer, the ATO was told by the Group that Mr Drayton received gross contract payments, and he was assessed on that basis. By the time he came to give evidence at the criminal trial, then, he may well have understood that he was supposed to have paid his own tax.
174 I would not accept, based on the evidence pointed out by counsel for the defendants, that there is any reason to question Mr Sutherland's methodology in determining whether payments were made on a net or gross basis. It appears to me to be a logical methodology, which I would adopt for the purposes of determining the quantum of the liability of the various defendants. I should note that, in cases where there was nothing to indicate either way, even by cross-referencing to documents of employees in a like situation, whether a payment was net or gross, Mr Sutherland has assumed it to be gross. That, as I have pointed out, is an assumption most favourable to the defendants and I am content to adopt it for the purposes of this action.
175 As noted earlier, the purpose of an employment declaration is to enable an employee to claim the general exemption; its practical effect is to reduce the rate at which tax must be deducted. The statutory obligation in relation to such forms is to return them, when completed, to the ATO. However, wherever an employment declaration appeared to exist for an individual, even if it had not been fully completed, Mr Sutherland calculated the relevant deductions at a rate which would apply to an employee who had completed such a declaration and claimed the general exemption. In some cases, he also assumed that an employment declaration may have been completed despite the lack of any documentary evidence to show that one existed. That assumption was based on anecdotal evidence available to him; in particular, statements made by some farm managers that they had all employees complete employment declarations as a matter of routine on the farms which they managed. He also assumed that where an employee was a "known" employee, the employee would have completed an employment declaration for the relevant employer.
176 Further, cross-referencing of a variety of documents led Mr Sutherland to the conclusion that employers in the Group generally calculated tax instalment deductions at a rate which would apply only to an employee who had completed an employment declaration and claimed the general exemption, but applying that rate across the board for any employee regardless of whether such a declaration had been completed or not. That is, Mr Sutherland concluded that employers in the Group calculated tax instalment deductions at a rate appropriate to employees who had completed employment declarations in respect of every individual who received net wages. Therefore, where a payment was, on Mr Sutherland's analysis, a net wage, he applied that rate whether there was evidence of a completed employment declaration or not.
177 In some cases, the interaction of these assumptions would mean that there is a liability both for failure to remit and failure to deduct. To take an example, in line 9598, the entry for G McKay, the calculation would work as follows. G McKay was employed at Howick Farm and there was no evidence suggesting that an employment declaration was, in fact, completed. There is evidence only of the net wage paid, so that the gross wage and tax instalment deduction has to be reconstructed. The rate used for the reconstruction was one based upon an employee who had completed an employment declaration and claimed the general exemption. On that basis, a gross wage of $385 with a tax deduction of $85 was arrived at. There is a liability for failure to remit in respect of the $85. However, because there was, in fact, no evidence to suggest that any employment declaration had been completed in respect of the individual, the employer, Robinswood, also became liable for failing to deduct at the correct rate. The correct rate on a gross figure of $385 would have been $193.45, where there was no employment declaration. The difference between this amount and the $85 previously calculated is the amount of the failure to deduct, with Robinswood incurring a liability for that amount in addition to the failure to remit amount.
178 Although it is important to understand how the assumptions work, there is not, as I understand it, any issue taken with any of the assumptions in relation to employment declarations. The assumption that employment declarations did exist in relation to the calculation of liability in respect of certain individuals, although, as Mr Sutherland pointed out, not strictly in accordance with the legislation, was one which provided a degree of practical fairness in circumstances where, in many instances, it would have been open to an employee to have completed an employment declaration and, had that been done, it would have been appropriate for the employee to be taxed at that rate.
179 In addition to the evidence which I have discussed, the plaintiff submitted that, in relation to all defendants, I should rely upon certificates tendered pursuant to s 221R of the Act and s 255 - 45 of Sch 1 of the Taxation Administration Act 1953 (Cth). Section 221R relevantly provides that in an action against a person for the recovery of an amount payable to the Commissioner under the provisions of that Division, a certificate in writing signed by certain persons, and certifying certain matters "shall be prima facie evidence of the matter stated in the certificate". Section 255 - 45 provides that a certificate stating one or more of certain matters covered in subs (2) of that section and signed by certain designated persons "is prima facie evidence of the matter or matters in a proceeding to recover an amount of a tax-related liability".
180 In my view, it is preferable in this case to determine the issues raised by the statements of claim upon the evidence adduced by the plaintiff other than the certificates, with the exception of one issue relating to Mine Exc.
181 The effect of legislation making documents "prima facie evidence" is succinctly summarised in par 195-3260 of the online edition of Cross on Evidence current at 13 January 2005. It reads:
"Where a document is made 'prima facie evidence' of a matter under the legislation, it gives rise to a statutory presumption, sufficient to prove the fact according to the criminal standard of proof unless a reasonable doubt as to its existence is raised by other evidence. Where there is contrary evidence, the certificate will be of no weight." (footnotes omitted)
182 The final statement that where there is contrary evidence the certificate will be of "no weight" is not borne out by all of the authorities to which reference is made in the footnote. For example, in Saxe v Kellett [1970] VicRp 79; [1970] VR 600, Anderson J notes that where there is other evidence besides the certificate, the certificate "loses much of its strength and force" (page 602). He later appeared to consider that the certificate in question in that case had "lost all its efficacy" (page 603), but that appears to have been because of the strength of the contrary evidence, rather than merely because of the existence of contrary evidence. In other cases, to which reference is not made in the footnote to the relevant passage of Cross, it is asserted that if evidence is given inconsistent with the fact proved by the prima facie evidence, the tribunal must determine whether the fact is proved "on the whole of the evidence" (which expression would presumably include the existence of the certificate): Safe Sport Australia Pty Ltd v Puma Australia Pty Ltd (1985) 4 IPR 120 at 124, per King J (and cases there cited).
183 In the present case, although the defendants adduced, as I have noted, little evidence, they also sought to establish that the plaintiff had failed to prove its case in certain respects, and that certain matters asserted in the defences had been proved, by reference to portions of the evidence adduced by the plaintiff. It being asserted that there was, based upon the evidence, a doubt as to the existence of the facts asserted in the certificates, I took the view that it was appropriate for me to determine "on the whole of the evidence" whether the plaintiff had proved its case. On one reading of the authorities referred to in Cross, and the other authorities to which I have referred, it might have been sufficient for me simply to have considered the evidence which was alleged to cast doubt on the existence of the facts asserted in the certificates and, having found that that evidence did not have the effect of casting doubt upon those matters, to have given judgment based on the certificates.
184 However, it has not been necessary for me to take that course. I am satisfied that the evidence adduced by the plaintiff, whether regard is had to the certificate or not, establishes the facts pleaded by the plaintiff.
185 There is one matter in respect of which my finding is based upon the certificate. That is the status of Mine Exc. The certificate pursuant to s 221R asserts, at par 1, that Mine Exc is, or was, on 30 June 1999 a group employer. There being no evidence said to be capable of casting doubt on that assertion, the certificate is sufficient to prove Mine Exc's status as a group employer.
186 The plaintiff also submitted that it would be open to me, in respect of certain of the defendants, and in respect of certain alleged employees, to make findings based upon admissions which it was contended had been made by or on behalf of the defendants. Those alleged admissions fell into two categories.
187 The first category of alleged admissions was an admission of liability in respect of the whole of the amount claimed by the plaintiff, which was said to have been made by the payment of the sums claimed by the plaintiff (exclusive of costs) by Venetian Nominees and Maddeliene Caratti, shortly prior to trial. I described those payments and the statements made by and on behalf of the defendants which accompanied them in my reasons for decision delivered on 4 November 2004 (Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia v Robinswood Pty Ltd [2004] WASC 230). The second category of admissions was said to be in respect of certain alleged employees and to be contained in correspondence from the defendants' solicitors Sceales & Co to the ATO. Issues arose as to whether they were admissions, and whether the correspondence attracted the privilege attached to settlement negotiations.
188 Because of the conclusions which I have reached in relation to the evidence, it is not necessary for me to consider whether I should give judgment on any alleged admissions.
189 In par 14 of the composite defence of the defendants appears the following pleading:
"14. Further or in the alternative if, which is not admitted, any of the names listed in Schedule A and Schedule C is that of a natural person and that person was employed during the material times pleaded in paragraph 2, 4 and 13 of the Claim, then by reason of res judicata the plaintiff is prevented from putting in suit in these proceedings the issue that, prior to 1 July 1992, the said persons were employees of the defendant, since in action COY 133 of 1992 (the 'Former Proceedings') between the plaintiff and Dyonna Pty Ltd in the Supreme Court of Western Australia, the same issue was put in suit by the plaintiff, heard and brought into judgement on 8 January 1993 in favour of the plaintiff.
PARTICULARS OF RES JUDICATA
In Former Proceedings it was necessarily put in suit by the plaintiff and finally determined that prior to 1 July 1992:
(a) Dyonna Pty Ltd was the group employer of the said persons;
(b) Dyonna Pty Ltd was the group employer of persons employed at the several work locations alleged in the Former proceedings;
(c) Dyonna Pty Ltd was the party liable to the plaintiff for group tax deducted and penalties levied with respect to the employment of the said persons and persons at the said work locations.
15. Further or in the alternative if, which is not admitted, any of the names listed in Schedule A and Schedule C is that of a natural person and that person was employed during the material times pleaded in paragraph 2, 4 and 13 of the Claim, and the issue of such employment did not merge in the judgement in the Former Proceedings, then the plaintiff is now estopped from:
(a) putting upon the record in the present proceedings a plea that the defendant was the employer to the extent that the same is inconsistent with the Former Proceedings, and;
(b) asserting the defendant is the employer contrary to the facts established in the Former Proceedings, thereby seeking a judgement in the present proceedings which conflicts with that in the Former Proceedings.
PARTICULARS GROUNDING THE PLEA
OF ISSUE ESTOPPEL
In the Former Proceedings the plaintiff asserted as an issue of fact that the said persons were, prior to 1 July 1992, employees of Dyonna Pty Ltd and that issue was necessarily heard and decided in the plaintiffs favour in those proceedings."
190 For some reason, the defence of Maddeliene Caratti, although very similar, is not identical; it omits particular (b). Although no relevant individuals in respect of whom the res judicata plea is said to arise are identified in the defences, the defendants on 13 November 2002 filed a document particularising the allegation.
191 The nature of the "former proceedings" does not appear from the pleadings. The facts appear from an affidavit of Mr Sutherland sworn 24 October 2002.
192 A petition for winding up Dyonna was filed in the Supreme Court on behalf of the plaintiff in the present proceedings on 28 April 1992. The petition was amended by leave on 11 November 1992. It claimed that Dyonna was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of almost $97,000, with $66,000 approximately being tax instalment deductions made from the wages or salary of various employees from July 1989 through to June 1991, due but unpaid, and the remainder being penalties.
193 On 16 December 1992, Acting Master Hawkins made orders that Dyonna be wound up and that a Mr Honey be appointed as liquidator. The Acting Master's reasons set out the contentions of the parties as they appeared at that time. It appears from those reasons that John Caratti swore an affidavit opposing the petition, although admitting that there had been an under-remittance for the financial year ending June 1990 in an amount of approximately $2000. He referred to numerous negotiations which he alleged had taken place over many years between Dyonna and officers of the plaintiff. He alleged that there was a consolidated compromise between Dyonna, the plaintiff and Mine Exc. Further affidavits were then filed on behalf of the plaintiff. John Caratti swore further affidavits in reply. Mr Ellison also swore an affidavit opposing the petition. The Acting Master found that, based upon par 10 of Mr Caratti's affidavit of 2 December 1992, Dyonna had admitted that it was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of nearly $37,000, or alternatively that by Mr Ellison's affidavit it had admitted that it was indebted to the plaintiff in the sum of $36,000. He continued:
"Any dispute as to whether or not the balance of the amount claimed is owed by the company to the petitioner could be resolved by any liquidator (if appointed) on the receipt of any proof of debt lodged by the Commissioner in the company's liquidation." (Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia v Dyonna Pty Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA; 8 January 1993, page 16)
194 Mr Sutherland deposes that subsequent calculations by the plaintiff revealed that John Caratti's admission overstated the true position and that, in fact, the debts were of the order of approximately $16,000, proof of debt for that sum being subsequently lodged with the liquidator. The liquidator's report shows that the assets available to the liquidator proved to fall far short of even that amount.
195 For the purpose of these proceedings, Mr Sutherland has compared the amounts and transactions referred to in the schedules in the present proceedings for each defendant with the amounts and transactions that formed the basis of the proof of debt provided to the liquidator in October 1996. Various schedules which he has prepared for the purpose of that comparison are contained in his affidavit of 24 October 2002. There is no overlap between the proof of debt and the amounts claimed in the present action, as a matter of fact.
196 It seems to me that, rather than res judicata, which requires that the very right or cause of action put in suit has in the former proceedings passed into judgment (Port of Melbourne Authority v Anshun Pty Ltd [1981] HCA 45; (1981) 147 CLR 589 at 597), the defendants are really attempting to raise an issue estoppel. That appears to me to be the case, since in the former proceedings there was no claim by the plaintiff to be entitled to judgment against any person in respect of any amounts of undeducted or unremitted tax. Rather, the "cause of action" as it appears from the petition was that Dyonna had failed to pay on a demand made for an alleged debt, and was insolvent.
197 Issue estoppel arises wherever in further litigation a state of law or fact is alleged or denied, the existence of which is a matter necessarily decided by a prior judgment or order (Anshun at 597). In Carl Zeiss Stiftung v Rayner & Keeler Ltd (No 2) [1967] 1 AC 853 at 935, Lord Guest set out the requirements for issue estoppel as being:
• the judicial decision which is said to create the estoppel is final; and
• the parties to the judicial decision or their privies are the same persons as the parties to proceedings in which the estoppel is raised or their privies
(applied in Kuligowski v Metrobus (2004) 208 ALR 1; [2004] HCA 34).
198 In the former proceeding, the parties were the present plaintiff and Dyonna, Dyonna not being a party in these proceedings. There is no pleading that the present defendants are privies of Dyonna, and it is difficult to see how such a pleading could arise. Leaving aside the question of non-identity of parties, however, the most fundamental problem with the defence appears to be that neither as a matter of law nor as a matter of fact do the same issues arise in this proceeding as in the former proceeding.
199 Although in the former proceeding there was no pleading in the usual sense setting out the issues, it seems to me that they emerge from a combination of the petition, the reasons of the Acting Master and, of course, from the legislative framework. The issues for the Acting Master were:
• did the plaintiff claim that Dyonna was indebted to him;
200 The question of whether the amount the subject of the alleged debt was actually due and payable (as distinct from the question as to whether it was genuinely disputed) did not arise. The question of what underlying facts gave rise to the alleged debt arose only in the most general sense; that is, it was noted in the proceedings that the debt was allegedly in respect of unremitted tax instalments, but there is nothing to suggest that the identity of the alleged employees in respect of whom the moneys were unremitted was of importance.
201 By the time the Acting Master came to make his decision, the only issue in dispute in the proceedings was whether Dyonna was insolvent. It was admitted (apparently erroneously as matters later transpired) that there was a debt of at least a particular sum, and the precise components of that debt were of no importance in the proceedings and were not in issue.
202 If one goes behind an attempt to tease out what legally was in issue in the proceedings, and one looks to the underlying question of whether the debt claimed in those proceedings had any relationship to the amounts claimed in these proceedings, Mr Sutherland's affidavit is decisive of that issue. There is no overlap. Issue estoppel therefore cannot arise.
203 Paragraph 35 of the defence of Maddeliene Caratti raises what is said to be a "res judicata", but which appears to me to be in substance a plea raising the issue of double jeopardy in relation to Maddeliene Caratti, because of the prior acquittal of Maddeliene Caratti in the criminal prosecution. It is, I think, sufficient to set out the particulars. They are as follows:
"(a) that a prosecution was instituted against the defendant by complaints filed in the Perth Court of Petty Sessions on or about 8 December 1994 alleging that she did conspire with co-accused John Michael Caratti and Allen Bruce Caratti to defraud the Commonwealth contrary to s 86 of the Crimes Act 1914 (as amended);
(b) that pursuant to the said prosecution the defendant was indicted with the said co-accused and the deceased Sergio Caratti and stood trial in the Supreme Court of Western Australia between 1 February 1999 and 4 June 1999 (the 'Trial');
(c) the defendant pleaded not guilty to the indictment of conspiracy;
(d) at the conclusion of the Trial the defendant was acquitted upon the said indictment;
(e) that the overt acts alleged against the defendant said to implicate her in the said conspiracy, and of which evidence was led against her at the Trial, comprised inter alia the same acts and omissions alleged against the defendant in paragraphs 5 and 15 of the Claim;
(f) that each of the said acts and omissions alleged against the defendant was an allegation of an act or omission comprising an offence under either s 221EAA, 221F or s 221G in Division 2 of Part VI of the Act constituted by that act or omission;
(g) the issues of fact joined between the defendant and the prosecution at the Trial comprising the overt acts alleged against the defendant necessarily raised for determination by the jury the existence of the same elements of liability now sought to be established against the defendant in this action;
(h) the verdict at the Trial was a verdict upon those issues rendered in favour of the defendant;
(i) at the Trial the issue of liability for failure to deduct or remit was found to be that of the co-accused John Michael Caratti and the right of the plaintiff to recover the sums claimed in the present action against John Michael Caratti at the conclusions of the Trial vested in the plaintiff pursuant to s 21B(1)(c) of the Crimes Act 1914 (as amended), the plaintiff then being entitled to an order in the nature of a judgement against the said John Michael Caratti alone for those sums."
204 I have discussed the relevant principles in my earlier interlocutory decision in this matter, in which I granted leave only to Maddeliene Caratti to raise the issues: Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for the Commonwealth of Australia v Robinswood Pty Ltd [2003] WASC 1, [15] - [26]. That discussion, in my view, adequately summarises the issues for present purposes, and I do not repeat it.
205 Although there was no concession made by counsel for Maddeliene Caratti in relation to this pleading, the submission was not further developed either orally or in writing at trial. Having reviewed the legislation and the cases which I read at the time of my earlier decision, I am now of the view, which I tentatively expressed at trial, that I had been "generous" in considering that a defence of this kind was arguable in relation to Maddeliene Caratti. It seems to me that it must fail. Although I canvassed a number of difficulties standing in the way of this defence in my earlier reasons, there are two in particular which lead me to the view that the defence fails.
206 As I pointed out in those earlier reasons, the present action against Maddeliene Caratti, as against all of the defendants, was incapable of falling within the terms of s 221NB of the Act. That is, the statutory prohibition on double jeopardy, which is of a limited kind, was not applicable as a matter of construction. I also pointed out in [16] of those earlier reasons that s 8ZE of the Taxation Administration Act, which also dealt with a species of double jeopardy, was not applicable. The existence of s 8ZE of the Taxation Administration Act and s 221NB, however, indicates that the legislature has expressly considered the question of circumstances in which prosecutions and civil proceedings are to be in the alternative to each other. In my view, the common law principles, to the extent that they might otherwise have applied, are impliedly excluded. I am fortified in that conclusion by the heading to s 221NB, which read, "Penalties to be alternative to prosecution for certain offences".
207 Turning to broader questions of principle, if one looks to the principles relating to double jeopardy to which it seemed to me that Maddeliene Caratti appeals, there is here no potential breach of the principle of "incontrovertibility". As I pointed out in my reasons earlier, the central question in the criminal trial appears to have been that of whether there was an agreement of the kind alleged by the prosecution. The non-deduction and non-remitting of tax in any individual instance was a particular merely of the overt acts upon which the prosecution relied. The element of agreement is entirely missing in the present action; for the purposes of establishing the liability of Maddeliene Caratti in these proceedings, it matters not whether she deliberately refrained from complying with her obligations, whether she agreed with others to take steps to refrain from complying with those obligations, or whether she inadvertently or through poor advice, without any culpable mental element, failed to deduct and remit the sums claimed.
208 So far as the principle of "double punishment" is concerned, these proceedings are not punitive. Primarily they are proceedings to recover a debt allegedly owed to the Commonwealth. The alleged debt consists of a component representing the sums which it is alleged should have been deducted and remitted (that is, a component which simply requires Maddeliene Caratti to pay what she should have paid in the first place), together with amounts described as penalties and amounts described as interest. As can be seen from the calculations in the various schedules, the amounts claimed by way of penalty are relatively modest, and the amount of interest does not appear to be punitive. It is not submitted by the defendants that they are other than amounts which would reasonably compensate the Commonwealth for being kept out of the money owed to it for a considerable period of time.
209 Finally, in relation to the "double punishment" issue, I should add, for the sake of completeness, that it appears to be suggested in par (i) of the particulars that Maddeliene Caratti was in jeopardy at the criminal trial, in relation to the amounts claimed in this action against her, had she been convicted. However, the power to order reparation pursuant to s 21B(1)(c) of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) is discretionary. It does not appear to permit an order in relation to interest.
210 Paragraphs 20 through to 22 of the consolidated defence deal with this issue. It is pleaded that, pursuant to s 221Q(1) of the Act, the plaintiff was "by reason of the satisfaction pleaded in paragraph 16 hereof" under a duty with respect to each person in Sch A "to apply an amount equal to the amount of the deductions in satisfaction of any tax payable by that person". The reference to par 16 is an error; it may be that there was an earlier par 16 which was relevant. However, the thrust of par 20 is that the plaintiff was under a duty to apply an amount equal to the amount of the deductions for which the defendants are said to be liable in satisfaction of tax payable by individuals. It is then pleaded that, in breach of a duty to act fairly pleaded in par 16 [sic - 18?] and in breach of the statutory duty pleaded in par 19 [sic - 20?], the plaintiff had failed to apply the amount pleaded in Sch A in satisfaction of tax payable by any of the persons therein named. The conclusion pleaded in par 22 is that, by reason of that failure, the amounts claimed in the action "are not amounts payable to the Commissioner within the meaning of s 221R(1) of the Act and no statutory debt upon the defendant is created thereunder".
211 Paraphrased, s 221Q(1) provided that, where the Commissioner is satisfied that an employer has made deductions from salary or wages of an employee and has not issued a group certificate or delivered a tax stamp sheet in respect of that salary or wages, the Commissioner is to apply an amount equal to the amount of the deductions in satisfaction of any tax payable by the employee, in the same manner as if a group certificate had been received. Section 221R(1) provides that an amount payable to the Commissioner under the provisions of that division shall be a debt due to the Commonwealth, and payable to the Commissioner, and may be sued for.
212 The evidentiary basis of the defence appears to come down to the following passage from Mr Sutherland's cross-examination:
"I'm going to put it to you that you are aware in fact that for many of these people, including those who filed a tax return, no credit has been passed under section 221Q of the Act with respect to their income taxation returns?---I don't know." (T 1575)
213 Shortly thereafter Mr Sutherland agreed that he could attempt to find that information. So far as I can tell from a search of the transcript, s 221Q was not mentioned again until closing submissions. There is therefore no evidence that the plaintiff had failed to apply any amount pursuant to s 221Q.
214 In any event, there is nothing in s 221Q and s 221R to suggest that they are interdependent. The duty which arises under s 221Q, assuming it to be enforceable, is apparently owed to and enforceable by the individual employees. There is nothing in the Act to suggest that no liability arises in the employer until any credit is given, or there is an undertaking to give credit, pursuant to s 221Q. In my view, this plea must fail.
215 Paragraphs 35 to 39 of the composite amended defence, paraphrased, contend that, because ss 221G(4A)(d)(i) and (ii) of the Act are not listed in the table contained within s 8AAB(4) of Div 1 of Pt IIA of the Taxation Administration Act ("the table"), the defendants are not liable for the amount of the General Interest Charge ("GIC"). That misunderstands, in my view, the effect of s 8AAB(4) and of the table. The sections of the Act listed in the table are sections that were in force at the time that the Taxation Administration Act was amended to insert the table (it having effect from 1 July 1999). Immediately prefacing the table are the words: "The following table is an index of the provisions of the Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 that deal with liability to the charge [being the GIC]". However, s 221G(4A)(d) was repealed in 1995 by Act number 170 of 1995, and therefore was no longer in force at the time of the introduction of the 1999 provisions. The provision which specifies that the GIC is applicable to the amounts pleaded by the plaintiff is item 93 of Pt II, Sch 2 of the A New Tax System (Pay As You Go) Act 1999 (Cth), which came into effect on 22 December 1999. It provides that an amount that a person owes to the Commonwealth directly under a taxation law (including a law that has been repealed or amended) and that became payable at any time before 1 July 1999 and remains unpaid at the beginning of 1 July 1999, attracts the GIC.
216 Paragraph 39 of the composite amended defence, which appears to assume that it was necessary for the plaintiff to elect whether to claim the GIC or not, I think misunderstands the nature of the claim made. Prior to 30 June 1999, the penalties claimed are those under the Act, and subsequent to that date the claim is for the GIC, so that there is no doubling up of any penalty claimed or of any interest, and it is not necessary for the plaintiff to make any election.
217 There are two limbs to this defence. First, it is pleaded that A New Tax System (Pay As You Go) Act is an Act imposing taxation, with item 93 of Pt II, Sch 2 (the GIC provisions) introducing into that law a second or subsequent subject of taxation contrary to s 55 of the Constitution.
218 In my view, this contention fails for the reason that the A New Tax System (Pay As You Go) Act and item 93 of Sch 2 in particular, is not a law "imposing taxation". For a law to be characterised as one imposing taxation, it must create a liability to tax, as distinct from merely prescribing who is to pay a tax or providing for the assessment, collection and recovery of a tax which is imposed by other provisions. This distinction is a longstanding one in relation to s 55: see, for example, Re Dymond [1959] HCA 22; (1959) 101 CLR 11, at 19 - 21 (per Fullagar J, with whom Dixon CJ, Kitto and Windeyer JJ agreed); Collector of Customs (NSW) v Southern Shipping Co Ltd [1962] HCA 20; (1962) 107 CLR 279, particularly per Dixon CJ at 288 and Permanent Trustee Australia Ltd v Commissioner of State Revenue (2004) 211 ALR 18; [2004] HCA 53 at [68] (per Gleeson CJ, Gummow, Hayne, Callinan and Heydon JJ). In my view, the imposition of a GIC in relation to a tax debt, the liability to interest arising because a tax is already imposed by other legislation, is a secondary and ancillary measure, for the protection of the revenue, and not in itself an imposition of a tax. That is so at least where, as here, the rate of interest which is imposed is not suggested to be exceptional or to be wholly disproportionate to, for example, the amounts of interest which might be recovered in ordinary commercial transactions.
219 Next, it is pleaded that item 93 discriminates against taxpayers who owed debts as at 1 July 1999. That is said to be "contrary to the implied guarantees of equality under the law and freedom from double punishment" (par 40(b) consolidated defence). It is submitted that the provision impugned renders such taxpayers liable to accrual of a GIC upon interest already accrued and "retrospectively and arbitrarily" increases civil penalties.
220 The constitutional principle underlying the argument is said to be that which stems from the judgment of Deane and Toohey JJ in Leeth v The Commonwealth of Australia [1992] HCA 29; (1992) 174 CLR 455. In my view, it is not necessary to consider whether the Constitution gives rise to principles of the kind pleaded, or what the scope of such principles might be. It seems to me that, from 1 July 1999, item 93 treats equally all taxpayers owing amounts to the Commonwealth directly under a taxation law and unpaid prior to 1 July 1999. It imposes upon those taxpayers a liability for interest which is proportionate to the amount remaining unpaid. I am unable to see that as giving rise to any unfair discrimination. So far as the retrospectivity point is concerned, the argument of the defendants would require that, whenever liability to penalties or interest on debts due to the Commonwealth was imposed, those debtors who had failed to pay prior to the legislation imposing the interest or penalty should be exempted; that is, that those who had failed to comply with their obligations the longest should be treated more favourably than those whose debts were recent. If there is a constitutional principle either requiring equality between citizens, or prohibiting certain sorts of retrospectivity, it is my view that it cannot operate in the way posited by the defendants.
221 Finally, I should note that the defendants also plead that item 93 (the GIC) constitutes an acquisition of property other than on just terms, contrary to s 51(xxxi) of the Constitution. It is in the nature of a law with respect to taxation that a quid pro quo which could constitute "just terms" would render the exercise of the power pointless: Mutual Pools & Staff Pty Ltd v The Commonwealth of Australia [1994] HCA 9; (1994) 179 CLR 155. Similarly, a law requiring interest to be paid upon an outstanding taxation debt, which is itself ancillary to a law imposing taxation, must necessarily fall outside the scope of the constitutional requirement for just terms.
222 It is my view that the plaintiff has made out its claim, in respect of each defendant, subject to some minor amendments in respect of Robinswood to reflect errors noted during the course of the trial. These amendments are: in respect of S Keohane, the deletion from the Combined and Master Schedules and Sch A of line 7573 (it being acknowledged that it duplicates the information in line 7553); and in respect of M Caid, the alteration of those schedules at lines 1512-1515 so that the amount shown as gross is $536 and that shown as a tax instalment deduction is $116. Consequential amendments to the Robinswood Sch C would be the alteration of lines 1512-1515 so that the amounts shown are identical with line 1511, and the deletion of line 7573. Cumulative totals which include those amounts would require consequential recalculation.
223 I propose to order that the plaintiff prepare a minute showing the amounts owing at the date of judgment, in accordance with the conclusions above, and confer with the defendants' solicitors concerning that minute. In order to facilitate that course, I am making these reasons available to the parties on the morning of the day prior to that fixed for delivery of judgment.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA -v- ROBINSWOOD PTY LTD [2005] WASC 67 (S)
HEARD : 29 OCTOBER, 1-5, 8-12, 16-18, 22-25, 29 NOVEMBER, 2, 6-8 DECEMBER 2004, 29 APRIL, 12 MAY 2005
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
BETWEEN : DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF TAXATION FOR THE COMMONWEALTH OF AUSTRALIA
Practice and procedure - Costs - Special costs orders - Whether matter of unusual complexity - Whether costs should be apportioned between defendants - Turns on own facts
Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA), s 215
Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA), O 66 r 2(e)
Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson [2002] WASC 150(S)
Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1979) 28 ALR 201
Verdell Pty Ltd v F & G Nominees Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 58(S2)
1 WHEELER J: I have had the opportunity of reading the two sets of written submissions. I commence with a little background, which is that on 28 April I made available my written reasons in this matter for collection from 10 am, with judgment to be delivered at 2.15 pm on the 29th, the following day.
2 Paragraph 223 of those reasons directed the plaintiff to recalculate an amount in relation to the defendant Robinswood and directed the parties to confer in relation to the quantum of the judgment. There was no direction that there be a conferral in relation to costs. It appears the calculation took longer than I had expected, and the plaintiff's calculations were available only very close to the time of judgment, which was delivered at 2.15 pm. At that stage only Maddeliene Caratti and Venetian Nominees were represented by counsel. Though the solicitors for Robinswood, at that stage at least, remained on the record, it appears that they took the view it was not appropriate to appear because of the recent voluntary administration of that company.
3 The plaintiff moved for orders for judgment in specified amounts and sought predictable costs orders, they being that the defendants pay the plaintiff's costs and orders lifting the scale limit in respect of various items. Counsel for the defendants was, he said, embarrassed and wished to check the quantum of calculation in relation to the two defendants I have already mentioned, that is, Venetian Nominees and Maddeliene Caratti, and wished for further time to develop submissions in relation to whether there should be some apportionment of costs between the defendants. He foreshadowed also that he might wish to make submissions about aspects of the motion to lift the scale limits.
4 It appeared that, because of the time taken by the calculation of quantum, the plaintiff at that stage had not - until very shortly prior to judgment - advised the defendants' counsel of the orders which would be sought in relation to costs. I gave those two defendants until 4 pm the following Thursday, 5 May, to make further written submissions, with the plaintiff some few further days to make another written response. Detailed written submissions were received from the two defendants, prepared by counsel.
(1) No issue was taken with the plaintiff's calculations of the quantum of the defendants' liability, and I therefore will make orders proposed by the plaintiff in that respect. Because of the statutory interest accruing from day-to-day, and to avoid the necessity of recalculation, I will, as the parties agree appears to be the appropriate course, date my orders from 29 April.
(2) Next, I noticed the submissions went well beyond those foreshadowed, seeking, inter alia, orders that the plaintiff pay the two defendants' costs of the trial.
(3) The submissions were accompanied by two affidavits, although no leave had been given to file the affidavits. However, the letters which were annexed to the affidavits were material which I had before me at an earlier time and I do propose to take notice of them.
(4) It seemed to me that those submissions were wholly without merit.
6 This last view led me to cause a letter to be written to the parties offering the defendants the opportunity to make oral submissions with a view to persuading me that the issues that they raised were fairly arguable. It appeared to me that if they were not, it would not be just to put the plaintiff to the expense of reply. I have heard the oral submissions. I remain of the view that the issues raised by the defendants are not fairly arguable. I note that the written and oral submissions were made by counsel who were not the trial counsel, and I assume for that reason counsel were not as acutely aware as I am of their lack of merit, my view being formed, at least in significant part, by my experience over the whole course of this matter, including the numerous interlocutory applications.
7 I now deal with the submissions made, taking the written submissions first of Ms Coulson, in reverse order.
8 Order 59 r 9 of the Rules of the Supreme Court 1971 (WA) is raised. It is applicable to applications in chambers, not to moving for orders on the delivery of judgment and seems to me to be quite irrelevant.
9 Next, and significantly, the whole of the plaintiff's application for special costs orders and for a certificate for second counsel is opposed on the basis that none of the factors in s 215 of the Legal Practice Act 2003 (WA) are applicable.
10 Some part of that submission is occupied with the proposition that the plaintiff's minute is defective, in that it does not indicate the grounds upon which the plaintiff seeks to rely, and that there is no affidavit evidence supporting the contention of unusual difficulty or complexity, or even indicating that the scale limit has been exceeded. Astonishingly, my own earlier decision in Verdell Pty Ltd v F & G Nominees Pty Ltd [2002] WASC 58(S2) was cited in Ms Coulson's written submissions in that context. I say "astonishingly" because a considerable portion of that earlier decision was devoted to explaining that it is not necessary to waste time and incur costs in preparing long (or indeed any) affidavits explaining to a trial Judge what she already knows as a result of having been present for the trial. It is where a trial Judge may not be aware of what had led to unusual costs that evidence and explanation is necessary.
11 In this case I was not only the trial Judge, but I managed this matter since its entry into the long causes list in, I think, 2001. I have sat through numerous interlocutory applications in which counsel for the defendants referred to the unusual complexity of the matter and of the difficulties occasioned to his instructing solicitors as a result. I have dealt with the novel pleading and evidentiary points and novel abuse of process arguments. I have had at trial numerous charts, spreadsheets, written submissions and other documents to assist me to understand the intricate and interlinked affairs of the six defendants. My reasons delivered on 29 April refer to the complex cross-referencing of thousands of documents, and their cross-referencing with the evidence given at the criminal trial, which was necessary for the plaintiff to make out its case. I am perfectly satisfied that this matter was of unusual complexity and I have no doubt that the prescribed scale items must have been exceeded, and in respect of at least some items very considerably exceeded.
12 It is also my view that the matter was difficult. To an extent it did not have to be, but the conduct of the trial by the defendants made it so. There was a blanket refusal to admit even obvious facts. For example, it was not until during the closing stages of the trial that counsel for the defendants conceded that those whose names appeared in the relevant schedules were indeed natural persons. There were unsuccessful appeals by the defendants from interlocutory rulings. Constitutional arguments were raised.
13 Further, there were dramatic shifts in the defendants' case and in the defendants' running of their case. For example, shortly prior to trial the defence was amended to allege that all of those persons, if they were natural persons, in the schedules were engaged by Sergio Caratti. That allegation was not relied on at trial, although I do not actually recall it being expressly abandoned. Lengthy witness statements were produced from two proposed witnesses for the defendants and Mr Sutherland was cross-examined on them at length. Those witnesses did not give evidence. The defendants insisted until shortly prior to trial that the plaintiff call a significant number of witnesses and, just before trial and at trial, then agreed that their evidence could be admitted by consent. Not long before the trial two of the defendants had a liquidator appointed, apparently at the instigation of those controlling the defendants.
14 The list I have recited is not exhaustive. It does, I think, reveal, however, that the progress of this matter went beyond the evolutionary change and development that any action will naturally undergo as trial approaches and during trial, and involved more than mere issues of fact, however complex. For that reason, the plaintiff could not rely upon a coherent and consistent "case theory" on the part of the defendants but had to prepare for any eventuality.
15 The matter was of unusual difficulty. I have to say that at times it appeared to me during the course of the management of this case that the plaintiff's obviously meticulous preparation for trial was obsessive and over-meticulous, but with hindsight I do not now think that it was.
16 Because of the difficulty and complexity of the matter, I would increase the scale items as requested by the plaintiff by removing the limits. It will, of course, be up to the taxing officer to determine how far in excess of scale costs have properly been incurred.
17 Because of the reasons outlined above and because of the importance of the action to the plaintiff involving, as it does, a significant amount of money, I would certify for two counsel.
18 I turn then to the question of whether costs should be apportioned between the defendants and I can deal with that, I hope, relatively briefly. These matters were consolidated at an early stage pursuant to O 83 r 1. There was a consolidated defence in relation to all defendants but Maddeliene Caratti and her defence differed from the others only in that I permitted her to raise an issue which the other defendants were not permitted to raise. For those defendants not then in liquidation the same issues were run at trial by counsel without differentiation, save that again in relation to Maddeliene Caratti and Venetian Nominees additional matters were raised.
19 Order 66 r 2(e) provides that if there are several defendants and the plaintiff has a verdict against them, each of them shall be liable to the plaintiff for the entire costs although they defended separately (defending separately did not occur in this case). There is a proviso allowing the Court from time to time to make an order or orders as between several defendants apportioning the liability as between themselves and the recovery of contribution.
20 In my view, that ordinary principle of joint and several liability provided by O 66 r 2(e) is applicable to this consolidated action. There is one verdict - that is, one judgment - although different amounts are specified in relation to the different defendants.
21 It is suggested that I should depart from the joint and several liability rule because either: the evidence relating to these two defendants occupied significantly less time; or the quantum ordered was smaller in relation to them. It seems to me the latter is not an adequate reason for departure.
22 As to the former, I have referred in my reasons delivered 29 April to the interlinking of the evidence in relation to all of those defendants and see no need to repeat all that I have said in those written reasons. The evidence in relation to these defendants was more than merely the evidence which directly related to their employees. It encompassed a significant body of other evidence. I should add that there were, in addition to the joint and interlinked issues, additional issues raised by these two defendants which the other defendants did not raise, they being the imprest account argument in relation to both defendants and, in relation to Maddeliene Caratti, an issue about whether there was a partnership and an abuse of process argument. The role of these defendants in the trial was therefore a substantial one and, in my view, the joint and several liability rule should apply.
23 I should add that it was suggested in the oral submissions this morning that it would be unjust for these two defendants to be at risk of the whole of the costs, given that a number of defendants are in liquidation and may be unable to meet any order for costs. As to that, I refer to Trade Practices Commission v Nicholas Enterprises Pty Ltd (1979) 28 ALR 201, a decision of Fisher J of the Federal Court, followed by Templeman J in Eastland Technology Australia Pty Ltd v Whisson [2002] WASC 150(S). In relation to a very similar submission in a complex matter, Fisher J said, having researched the issue and found little authority on the point, that the plaintiff as the successful party is prima facie entitled by way of indemnity to its costs of the action, and that if one of the unsuccessful defendants is unable or unwilling to meet its share of the obligation, the misfortune should be that of its "partner in crime" and not of the plaintiff. It seems to me that that is an appropriate principle to follow.
24 I deal next with the alleged settlement offer. On 3 September 2004 these defendants wrote to the Australian Taxation Office; not to the Australian Government Solicitor, the solicitors for the plaintiff, nor even to the Perth office, but to the Albury-Wodonga office where account payments are settled. They wrote in the following terms. In relation to Venetian Nominees, the letter read:
"Dear sir. We attach our cheque for $110,000 in full and final settlement of our debt and all costs in this matter."
25 That letter, although it refers to "this matter", contains no reference to the action, or other reference. It has been written on Venetian Nominees' letterhead with Venetian Nominees' addresses. A similar letter was written by Maddeliene Caratti. The letter simply bears her name and the Redcliffe office address and reads:
"Dear sir. I attach a cheque for $45,000 in full and final settlement of my debt and all costs in this matter."
26 Again, although there is a reference to "this matter", there is nothing identifying the matter or alluding to the fact that there is an action on foot.
27 The amounts which were paid were the amounts which were said at about that time to be the amounts which the Australian Taxation Office had advised these defendants were owing - there seems to be no issue about that - rounded up to the nearest $1000. If one were to regard it as an offer of settlement, there would be about $500 in respect of each defendant over the amount of the debt which might be thought to be referable to costs.
28 On that very shaky foundation in the first set of written submissions the following propositions are built: that it was an offer of settlement; that the offer was accepted; or that, if it was not accepted, the failure to accept was unreasonable and the defendants should have their costs after that date. It is that last proposition which is really reinforced by the oral submissions this morning.
29 So far from being clearly an offer, it was at the time at which that correspondence came to light baffling to the plaintiff and to me what was intended by the payment. Before trial the plaintiff moved for judgment on the basis that the payments and accompanying letters constituted an admission of liability, a submission which was renewed on the first day of the trial. There was argument about that and in reasons delivered on 4 November last year I held that I was not prepared to find that there had been any admissions. I did not find there had been an offer to settle, although that was, as I noted, one possible interpretation. Counsel for the defendants at the time had then, of course, the opportunity to say that if it was not clear that there was an offer to settle, his instructions were that it was and that such an offer was reiterated. He did not. I still do not know what to make of that payment and I would not be prepared to make any positive finding about what it was meant to be. However, payment was made.
30 Even if there had been an offer to settle in those terms, however, in my view it would be far from unreasonable for the plaintiff to reject an offer which gave it but $500 in costs in respect of each defendant at that time. The plaintiff was, of course, wholly successful at trial against all defendants and I can now, having heard the evidence, say that it seems to me that on the facts that success was always inevitable. The plaintiff's costs by September of last year would have been in the hundreds of thousands of dollars and perhaps even in the millions. It is, it seems to me, preposterous to suggest that the plaintiff should have settled for the sums offered in respect of these defendants as to costs.
31 Finally, in supplementary written submissions for which I gave no leave, but which I nevertheless consider, the defendants raised the question of the costs reserved in respect of the plaintiff's application during the course of the trial to amend the statement of claim, which application was withdrawn. That application was precipitated by the defendants' late amendment of their defence to raise the issue of Sergio Caratti's role. It was withdrawn because I foreshadowed that it seemed to me that it might lead to some adjournment of the trial and not because of any ruling on my part that it lacked merit. In those circumstances, it seems to me that it is appropriate not to regard it as a discrete event and to allow the plaintiff to have the costs of that argument and that application.
32 I am also asked to make a direction to the taxing officer in relation to the preparation which must necessarily have been undertaken in relation to the criminal trial. I do not think it is necessary to make a direction. I would observe that, of course, the plaintiff is entitled to its costs of this trial and not of any previous trials and I am sure the taxing officer will be astute to ensure that there is no double counting of earlier preparation. I would also expect, of course, the taxing officer to take into account the observations I have made this morning about the difficulty and complexity of the trial and the manner in which it was run.
Deputy Commissioner of Taxation for The Commonwealth of Australia
Robinswood Pty Ltd [2005] WASC 67
(1938) 60 CLR 336
(2000) 22 WAR 527
(1962) 107 CLR 279
(2001) 24 WAR 284
(1959) 101 CLR 298
(2004) 208 ALR 1
(1992) 174 CLR 455
(1994) 179 CLR 155
(2004) 211 ALR 18
(1981) 147 CLR 589
(1959) 101 CLR 11
(1984) 68 FLR 441
(1985) 4 IPR 120
(1973) 130 CLR 353
(1988) 165 CLR 462
(1999) 202 CLR 133
(1992) 60 SASR 90
(1993) 176 CLR 480
(1939) 62 CLR 464
(1984) 38 SASR 45
(1997) 19 WAR 1
(1947) 75 CLR 140
(1989) 16 NSWLR 549
(1958) 100 CLR 117
(1988) 164 CLR 502
(1960) 103 CLR 486
(1982) 149 CLR 337
(1961) 106 CLR 292
(1997) 191 CLR 471
(1922) 31 CLR 1
(1988) 79 ALR 267
(1988) 165 CLR 56
(1988) 165 CLR 55
(1994) 179 CLR 297
(1910) 10 CLR 417
(1999) 197 CLR 414
(1990) 20 NSWLR 310
(2001) 52 NSWLR 705
(1996) 16 WAR 354
(1938) 60 CLR 263
(1999) 20 WAR 474
(1992) 177 CLR 1
(1965) 115 CLR 140
(1993) 176 CLR 555
(1911) 12 CLR 321
(1985) 59 ALJR 844
(1999) 21 WAR 350
(1940) 64 CLR 282
(1995) 12 WAR 370
(1965) 114 CLR 164
(1998) 87 FCR 371
(1997) 42 NSWLR 451
(1968) 118 CLR 271
(1961) 108 CLR 642
(1973) 47 ALJR 161
(1987) 14 NSWLR 104
(1988) 14 NSWLR 124
(2000) 200 CLR 121
(1988) 18 FCR 449
(2000) 204 CLR 493
(1970) 121 CLR 572
(1998) 44 NSWLR 103
(1987) 163 CLR 329
(1999) 73 ALJR 306
(1986) 160 CLR 16
(1990) 21 FCR 324
(1943) 67 CLR 266
(1992) 27 NSWLR 377
(1979) 28 ALR 201