The States themselves are, of course, artificial entities. The parties to the compact which is the Constitution were the people of the federating Colonies [41] . It is the people who, in a basic sense, now constitute the individual States just as, in the aggregate and with the people of the Territories, they constitute the Commonwealth. The implied confinement or restriction of Commonwealth legislative powers to preclude the singling out of the States and their instrumentalities for discriminatory treatment has, however, been uniformly defined in terms which protect only the artificial entities or organs of government rather than the constituent people. Any constitutional protection of the people themselves from arbitrary or discriminatory treatment must be found, if at all, in other express or implied doctrines or provisions. Nonetheless, the implication which protects the States and their instrumentalities is relevant for present purposes for two reasons. First, it would be somewhat surprising if the Constitution, which is concerned with matters of substance, embodied a general principle which protected the States and their instrumentalities from being singled out by Commonwealth laws for discriminatory treatment but provided no similar protection of the people who constitute the Commonwealth and the States. Secondly, the Constitution's adoption, by implication rather than express statement, of the general principle protecting the States and their instrumentalities from discriminatory treatment illustrates the general approach of the framers of the Constitution to the underlying doctrines or principles upon which it is structured. That approach was to incorporate underlying doctrines or principles by implication drawn both from the nature of the Federation and from any particular express provisions of the Constitution which reflect or implement those doctrines or principles. In the context of that approach, specific provisions of the Constitution which reflect or implement some underlying doctrine or principle are properly to be seen as a manifestation of it and not as a basis for denying its existence by invoking the inappropriate rule of expressio unius [42] . Thus, the specific provisions of the Constitution preserving and protecting the Constitutions (Constitution, s. 106), powers (s. 107), laws (s. 108) and territory (s. 123) of the States do not preclude the implication of a more general principle protecting their continued existence and political viability. Again, the Constitution contains no detailed statement of the content or implications of the doctrine of the separation of judicial power from executive and legislative powers which it implements by expressly vesting the judicial power of the Commonwealth in Ch. III courts (s. 71), the legislative power of the Commonwealth in the Parliament (s. 51) and the executive power of the Commonwealth in the Crown (s. 61). The adoption of that doctrine of the common law [43] as part of the very structure of the Constitution is, however, apparent. Reference must, for example, be made to it and its historical content to understand what is involved in the "judicial power of the Commonwealth" [44] .