The reasons of the primary judge
60 The primary judge dismissed the application.
61 It was not disputed below that the reports to creditors contained errors. As the primary judge said at J [63]-[64]:
It was not in dispute that the reports to creditors for TFM and KRI each contain errors. Chief among them, Decon argues, were the twin errors of the substantial understatement of Decon's judgment debt ($6,355,352.46 represented to be $ nil) and the very substantial overstatement of TFM and KRI's alleged cross-claims quantified at $17 million, but unsupported by any evidence or consideration of whether there is actually any basis for the claim in the first place. Such an assessment of the cross-claim is also contrary to the companies' (then) senior counsel's earlier statement to the Court of Appeal that the value of the claim was only 'slightly above' Decon's judgment debt and not millions of dollars above it. The report to creditors for KRI also wrongly reported debts to Shanghai Yilian and under a CLG Facility in the order of $1,404,000 and $8,300,000, (which are now claimed to be mere 'typographical errors') while the TFM Report to creditors stated that Ms Weili Jia was a creditor of the company in an amount of $4,980,000 without mentioning the fact (now alleged by the Administrators) that this debt had been assumed from KRI.
Decon stresses that the sums comprised by the errors in the reports to creditors for each of TFM and KRI are significant, in excess of several millions of dollars. Moreover, the misleading presentation to creditors of the size and strength of the companies' alleged claim against Decon is particularly significant in circumstances where the litigation against Decon and the payment of proceeds from that litigation, forms a central plank of the DOCAs. Those matters might, therefore, have affected the outcome of the vote on the DOCAs and therefore justify the exercise of the power in s 445D(1)(a).
62 It was also not in dispute that the reports to creditors "contain[ed] little or no discussion of a number of the financial agreements and security arrangements entered into by TFM and KRI after completion of the Epping Development, some of which involved related parties, and many of which did not have an apparent purpose that benefitted the companies". See J [67]. Decon contended below that that omission was material within the meaning of s 445D(1)(c) of the Act. The primary judge put Decon's contention along those lines as follows at J [68]:
Decon argues that had creditors been aware of the companies' actions in the lead up to their insolvency in July 2019 (if not earlier) then there is a very real likelihood that some or all of them would have voted to wind up the companies so that a liquidator could be appointed to investigate and interrogate whether any of those transactions were defeasible and voidable within the meaning of Pt 5.7B, Div 2 of the Corporations Act. This not only provides justification for the Court to exercise its discretion under s 445D(1)(c), but in the circumstances also constitutes an injustice to creditors (who have otherwise lost the opportunity to make an informed choice as to whether such investigations and interrogations should occur) within the meaning s 445D(1)(e). Furthermore, the combination of these matters renders the DOCAs contrary to the interests of TFM and KRI's creditors as a whole.
63 Having then set out the substance of Decon's case with respect to s 445D(1)(f)(i) (unfairly prejudicial or discriminatory against Decon and Vannella) and s 445D(1)(g) (detriment to commercial morality), among other things, his Honour made various findings, which are the subject of this appeal.
64 Under the heading "Consideration" and the sub-heading "Overview", his Honour made the following general observations at J [98]-[99]:
Before dealing with the detail of the various facts and transactions raised by Decon, I propose setting out some general considerations which are relevant to the approach I have taken to the complaints raised.
Having regard to authorities such as [Britax Childcare Pty Ltd v Infa Products Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 848; (2016) 115 ACSR 322] and Mediterranean Olives Financial Pty Ltd v Loaders Traders Pty Ltd (No 2) [2011] FCA 178, the key question is whether the Administrators have adequately performed their statutory duty to investigate such that they have a sufficient basis to recommend a DOCA instead of liquidation.
65 The primary judge then summarised the general, and uncontroversial, principles applicable under s 445D(1) of the Act and then continued at J [117]-[120]:
I accept the Administrators' submission that the failure to recognise the judgment debts at the first meeting of creditors is something of a distraction now because it has no bearing on the outcome of the ultimate decision to adopt the DOCAs. The debts were recognised at the second creditors meeting. The explanation given by Mr Melluish for not recognising the judgment debts at the first meeting by reason of the existing cross-claim was in my view plausible and falls within the discretionary range of decision-making which is appropriate for an administrator. I do not consider that the decision reflected any bias against Decon, and it is difficult to see how any material prejudice arises given that Decon was admitted for the full amount of its judgment debt at the second meeting.
Speaking generally again, in relation to the various errors or omissions in reports to creditors, taken individually or indeed cumulatively, I am not satisfied that they are, objectively viewed, sufficiently 'material' in the sense used in the legislation to the vote of the creditors. I was not persuaded that objectively viewed there were errors or omissions which might realistically have affected the outcome on the DOCA vote [citing Bidald Consulting Pty Ltd v Miles Special Builders Pty Ltd [2005] NSWSC 1235; (2005) 226 ALR 510 (at [292]-[294])].
At all times for these single purpose companies, the fundamental issue for the Administrators was the likely comparative return to creditors by entry into the DOCA on the one hand or liquidation on the other. There was no prospect of a return to trade. In my assessment, the Administrators have conducted that exercise sensibly and have applied their skill and expertise to the evaluation of the comparative prospects of recovery by creditors in the two situations.
Another way to approach the analysis is to ask the question whether, if hypothetically voting came down to a casting vote of the Administrators, it would have been appropriate for the Administrators to support the DOCAs. That is to be answered in this case at least, by reference to the question of whether there is a realistic prospect of a better return under a liquidation such that entry into the DOCA would be unfairly prejudicial to Decon. I consider that in that hypothetical scenario it would be appropriate for the Administrators to support the DOCA with a casting vote. Indeed, the Administrators have deposed to the fact that, even in light of errors identified by Decon which they have accepted, they are still of the view that the DOCAs will provide a better prospect of return than under a liquidation and would have exercised any casting vote accordingly.
66 His Honour then dealt with the debate between the parties about the companies' likely date of insolvency, as follows (J [122]):
Decon has also raised a question about the actual date of insolvency as assessed by the Administrators. Decon's argument relies on statements made by the companies' then senior counsel to the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal to the effect that, absent a stay of Decon's judgment debt obtained in 2019, the companies were insolvent. When read together with statements recorded by Stevenson J that the companies had acknowledged their debt to Decon 'as long ago as 11 October 2018', Decon says it is reasonably arguable that the companies were indeed insolvent from at least October 2018. In their reports, the Administrators' view, on the basis of the investigations carried out, was that the companies were insolvent from at least June 2019. Decon has led no further evidence to support its asserted date of insolvency and while it may be an arguable position, I do not see this as being a fertile field of complaint.
67 Next, he turned to Decon's complaint that the deed administrators did not treat the companies as separate entities, as follows (J [123]-[124]):
Another argument advanced for Decon is that the Administrators failed to recognise the importance of different creditors for different companies within the group such that treating TDH, KRI and TFM as though they are all part of one group entity fails to distinguish between the financial consequences attaching to the separate entities in their own right. The approach taken by the Administrators was essentially that although securities were given over the real property of both KRI and TFM, those companies derived the benefit of the Epping Development. In relation to the Administrators' effectively proceeding on a group basis, the rationale of that decision was that the benefit of the purchase of the land accrued to KRI and TFM. The Administrators considered it was therefore appropriate for those companies to bear some burden in exchange for the benefit. I will come to the detail of these transactions in due course.
I am not persuaded that the Administrators relevantly erred in this regard. Other than some relatively minor errors in the amounts involved, the two companies shared the same creditors as might be expected because they were engaged in what would typically be understood as a joint enterprise. It has not been shown that this gloss, if it be fairly so described, resulted in any adverse or incorrect outcome for creditors as a whole, or even Decon specifically.
68 His Honour then summarised his views about whether or not the deed administrators had erred in forming the view that there were not realistic prospects of a greater recovery under liquidation, and whether Decon had discharged its onus in that regard, as follows:
125 There is an important question of onus. It seems clear from Britax (at [91]), Mediterranean Olives (at [179]) and Bidald (at [138]) that the onus rests upon the plaintiff to establish that s 445D(1) has been engaged. There is some suggestion by Besanko J in Adelaide Brighton Cement Limited, in the matter of Concrete Supply Pty Ltd v Concrete Supply Pty Ltd (Subject to Deed of Company Arrangement) (No 4) [2019] FCA 1846 (at [1384]) that while the plaintiff has the onus to show the section applies, it may be within the discretion of the Court to treat that onus as shifting. Either way, in this case the consideration for the Court is whether or not there are realistic prospects of a greater recovery under liquidation (and that the Administrators were in error in concluding otherwise) and whether Decon has discharged its onus of establishing that fact. I am not satisfied that it has. Generally speaking but importantly, there is some prospect of establishing some possible breaches, but there is little to no evidence as to the likely benefits of doing so in a recovery sense. That matter must be approached in a practical way guided by suitable expertise based on experience and qualifications. I am satisfied that the Administrators have approached the question in this manner. Relevant to the Administrators' recovery assessment was the understanding that the former director, Mr Eric Zhang, owns only one real property with an estimated value of between $1.6 million and $2.2 million however during cross-examination Mr Melluish conceded that the Administrators were not aware of the exact financial positions of Mr Eric Zhang or TDH. The current director, Mr Guoqiang Zhang was only appointed in April 2020 and would not be of interest in relation to transactions occurring prior to that time. In any event, he does not own real property in Australia. The former director does own shares in TDH. The value of those shares is quite unclear. Although Mr Melluish did ask for that information, he was not provided with it. He had no power of compulsion to obtain the information.
…
128 Dealing again, at a general level at this stage, the security granted to Shanghai Yilian arose in 27 November 2018 when KRI and TFM guaranteed TFM's debt to Shanghai Yilian. It does not appear to be challenged that TFM provided part of the purchase price for the Epping land through a loan from United Investment Australia Holdings Ltd and in turn from Shanghai Yilian. The Administrators proceeded on the basis that it was appropriate in the circumstances for TFM and KRI to assume obligations to Shanghai Yilian because TFM's obligations arose from that purchase in which TFM and KRI derived a direct and material financial interest. In a liquidation perhaps there might be some scope for challenging an approach on this basis but there may also be weaknesses in the challenge and certainly there would be a danger of spending good money in a somewhat speculative pursuit.
129 In any event, as disclosed in the creditors' report for TFM, the assessment of the Administrators was that there would be difficulty in pursuing or further investigating the dealings with Shanghai Yilian because they appear to have arisen in November 2018 when the Administrators regarded the insolvency date as being between June and September 2019. Similar considerations apply to the other impugned transactions which I examine in more detail below.
…
131 As to oppression or prejudice, Decon would need to establish that any oppression or prejudice was unreasonable. It points to the terms of the DOCAs which provide for pursuit of the cross-claim against Decon. This does not constitute material prejudice in the sense explained by the authorities. There is no suggestion that this course could not be pursued under a liquidation. Decon has not been treated as a separate class of creditor against which adverse considerations would be applied.
69 Having made those general observations, his Honour turned to consider the application of principles in more detail, relevantly with respect to the CLG Share Agreement, the Shanghai Yilian Loan, the Weili Jia Loan and the securities provided to TDH, as follows:
The CLG Share Agreement
160 Next, and as noted above (at [26]-[28] and [75(b)]), there is an issue concerning the CLG Share Agreement. Decon asserts, amongst other things, that the Administrators have inappropriately treated an equity contribution as a loan, which it says warrants further investigation. Again, it is not at all apparent how this investigation could improve the likely return to unsecured creditors. In my view, there is nothing to suggest that the payment to CLG appears to have been for an improper purpose and it follows that it is relatively immaterial to the interests of creditors whether this payment is characterised as repayment of a loan or an equity contribution. What is important is that the TFM Report correctly characterises the dealings between TFM and CLG as, effectively, giving rise to an obligation owed by TFM in circumstances where the shares taken up by CLG were subject to redemption at the option of CLG (and as to which such redemption did occur). Equally, the KRI Report correctly characterises the dealings between KRI and CLG as, effectively, a transaction which required KRI to adhere to repayment obligations in circumstances where the shares taken up by CLG were subject to redemption at the option of CLG (and as to which such redemption did occur). Decon says that no thought appears to have been given by the Administrators to the limits and requirements of s 256B(1) or s 257A, including, specifically, whether the share redemption materially prejudiced TFM's creditors. The share redemption appears, in this way, Decon argues, to have been a breach of directors' duties. In my view, while there may be some unanswered questions as to the process adopted which gave rise to this liability and perhaps the application of these statutory provisions ought to have been mentioned to creditors, in the end, it is quite unclear how further exploration of this issue is likely to be of greater benefit to creditors.
161 KRI was the guarantor for obligations owed by TFM to CLG concerning the Epping Development in which both entities had a direct interest. Nevertheless, CLG was not recorded as a creditor in the KRI Report.
162 At [18] to [21] of the POC, Decon asserts
Transactions warranting investigation
18. On or about 3 April 2018, TFM entered into a share subscription agreement with CLG Corporate Pty Ltd and Eric Zhang valued at $8.3 million by which CLG Corporate Pty Ltd agreed to pay $8.3 million to TFM to subscribe for shares in TFM.
19. By about October 2018, TFM had purported to repay to CLG Corporate the money paid under the share subscription agreement pleaded above in paragraph 18 (probably using money borrowed from another lender).
…
21. On or about 27 November 2018, TFM and KRI (as guarantors) entered into a loan agreement between Shanghai Yilian Investment Management Co Ltd (as lender) and Tasman Funds Management Pty Ltd (as borrower) valued at $4,751,455 secured by mortgages over the Epping Development.
163 The circumstances referred to at [18] and [19] of the POC are addressed in the Creditors' Reports as follows:
(a) on or about 3 April 2018, TFM obtained $8.3 million under the CLG Share Agreement;
(b) of the $8.3 million obtained, $6,937,576.18 was received by TFM and the balance accounted for brokerage and other fees, professional costs, and an advanced calculation of a preferred dividend;
(c) $119,601 of the $6,937,576.18 was used to pay interest, costs, and expenses to Ms Weili Jia;
(d) the remaining $6,720,000 was used to pay down the obligation owed by Tasman Funds to Shanghai Yilian;
(e) in the CLG Share Agreement, cl 4.1(e) obliged TFM to redeem the shares;
(f) clause 5.1 provided that redemption was to occur on the earlier of 10 business days after CLG notified TFM of an event of default or on the 'Redemption Date';
(g) clause 12.1 of the Agreement defines the term 'Redemption Date' as 'the date that is six (6) months after the date of this document', which was 3 October 2018;
(h) …
164 In these circumstances, it is difficult to see how any further investigation or interrogation of the transaction concerning CLG presents any realistic prospect of a better return to creditors in a winding up scenario than that presented by the DOCAs.
…
The Shanghai Yilian Loan
168 In relation to the description and treatment of the Loan from Shanghai Yilian, at [48], [49], [61] and [62] of the POC, Decon asserts:
48. The TFM Report stated that Shanghai [Yilian] Investment Management Co Ltd was a secured creditor of TFM in the amount of $1,404,000.
49. At the time of the TFM Report, Shanghai [Yilian] Investment Management Co Ltd was not a creditor of TFM.
…
61. The KRI Report stated that Shanghai Yilian Investment Management Co Ltd was a secured creditor of KRI in the amount of $1,404,000.
62. At the time of the KRI Report, Shanghai Yilian Investment Management Co Ltd was not a creditor of KRI.
169 It will be recalled that on 27 November 2018, TFM and KRI (as guarantors) entered a loan agreement between Shanghai Yilian (as lender) and Tasman Funds (as borrower) valued at $4,751,455. In December 2018, Shanghai Yilian registered mortgages over seven apartments in the Epping Development by way of security (see above at [30]). In reality, the Shanghai Yilian Loan appears to have formalised Shanghai Yilian's intent to continue its line of credit to Tasman Funds following a default on repayment of a loan of $11.7 million that was entered into via a 'Cooperation Deed' in October 2015 to finance the purchase of the Epping Development land. The practical effect therefore, of the Shanghai Yilian Loan was to adjust the amount owing by Tasman Funds and grant Shanghai Yilian security over the apartments owned by TFM.
170 As deposed to in the First Melluish Affidavit, in the Report on Company Activities and Property (ROCAP) for TFM, the director, Mr Guoqiang Zhang recorded Shanghai Yilian (referred to in the document as United Investment) as a secured creditor for $1,511,740.11. In the Creditors' Reports, the Administrators listed Shanghai Yilian as a secured creditor of both companies in the full amount of its proof of debt, by which Shanghai Yilian claimed $1,404,000 in the administration.
171 The Administrators accept that Shanghai Yilian was inadvertently and incorrectly recorded as a secured creditor of KRI in the KRI Report when it ought to have been recorded as an unsecured creditor on the basis that KRI only guaranteed the TFM debt to Shanghai Yilian. However again, this error was not reflected in the quantification of the likely return to unsecured creditors. In the Creditors' Reports, the Administrators calculated that after realising the value of its security against TFM, Shanghai Yilian would be entitled to prove as an unsecured creditor of both companies in the shortfall amount of $223,091.
172 Again, the Administrators contend that the actual and relevant circumstances concerning Shanghai Yilian (as referred to at [21] of the POC), are addressed in the Creditors' Reports, the relevant circumstances (as foreshadowed above) being that:
(a) a loan was initially procured from United Investments for Tasman Funds in the sum of $11.7 million which became an obligation owed by Tasman Funds to Shanghai Yilian (whether by formal novation or otherwise);
(b) whether by 'supplemental deed' (being a reference to a document not in evidence) or by 'Loan Agreement', TFM and KRI became corporate guarantors of the debt owed by Tasman Funds to Shanghai Yilian;
(c) in addition to becoming corporate guarantors, Shanghai Yilian was granted security as a consequence of a previous failure by Tasman Funds and TFM (as guarantor) to adhere to their repayment obligations under the 'supplemental deed';
(d) the security was conferred from TFM to Shanghai Yilian over eight apartments of which two remained unsold as at the time TFM entered voluntary administration;
(e) the estimated realisation of the properties the subject of the security will likely result in Shanghai Yilian being able to prove as an unsecured creditor in both the TFM and the KRI administrations for $223,091;
(f) the TFM Report disclosed the circumstances surrounding the Shanghai Yilian position as a creditor of TFM at clause 12.7.2 concerning 'Uncommercial Transactions' - namely, that on and from 27 November 2018, Shanghai Yilian became a secured creditor of TFM;
(g) the TFM Report disclosed that the difficulty with pursuing or further investigating the dealings with Shanghai Yilian is that they appear to have arisen in October 2018 where, in the view of the Administrators, TFM and KRI were not insolvent until somewhere between June and September 2019;
(h) it is not clear why the relationship between TFM, KRI and Tasman Funds is relevant when Tasman Funds is not seeking to prove in the administration of either TFM or KRI and, on no view is Shanghai Yilian a 'close associate' of TFM or KRI (or Tasman Funds) for s 588FDA of the Corporations Act purposes; and
(i) insofar as the grant of security (and indeed the assumption of obligations by way of agreeing to guarantee debt owed by Tasman Funds to Shanghai Yilian) is concerned, the Administrators proceeded on the basis that it was appropriate for TFM and KRI to assume such obligations in circumstances where both TFM and KRI had a direct and material financial interest in, and derived a benefit from, their respective interests in the Epping Development.
…
174 The Administrators' view remains that whatever the mechanism of borrowing, TFM's secured obligation arises from the purchase of the land used for the Epping Development in which TFM and KRI had a 'direct and material financial interest'.
175 The difficulty, in my view, with the complaints raised by Decon is that, in circumstances where the $11.7 million borrowed by Tasman Funds was for the benefit of TFM and KRI acquiring the land the subject of the Epping Development, it is difficult to see how a failure of Tasman Funds to pay off that debt is something that TFM or KRI could ignore where Tasman Funds could and would, presumably, turn to TFM and KRI for recoupment as the parties who benefitted from the advance of those funds in the first instance. It is difficult to see, particularly having regard to the dates of the transactions, how any further investigation or interrogation of the transactions concerning Shanghai Yilian presents any realistic prospect of a better return to creditors in a winding up scenario than what is presented by the DOCAs.
176 Further, the consideration of challenging the arrangements which had been put in place with Shanghai Yilian was set out in the TFM Report. TFM's creditors voted the way they did in any event.
The Weili Jia Loan
177 Amongst the complex transactional history for assessment by the Administrators was the circumstance of a loan from Ms Weili Jia. Decon complains that the unsecured loan from Ms Weili Jia could be an uncommercial transaction.
178 At [22], [46] and [47] of the POC Decon contends:
22. The Administrators contend that on about 22 February 2019 TFM entered into a deed by which TFM assumed obligations owed by KRI to [Ms] Weili Jia (or "Weili Jila") in circumstances in which the existing debt was owed by only KRI to Weili [Jia].
…
46. The TFM Report stated that [Ms] Weili Jia (or "Weili [Jia]") was an unsecured creditor of TFM in the amount of $4,307,224.89.
47. At the time of the TFM Report, [Ms] Weili Jia was not a creditor of TFM or, if [Ms] Weili Jia was a creditor, [Ms] Weili Jia's claim arose in circumstances pleaded in paragraph 22 without disclosure of those circumstances.
179 As to [46] and [47] of the POC, it was appropriate for the Administrators to admit Ms Weili Jia as a creditor of TFM as there was evidence to support the debt. The circumstances concerning Ms Weili Jia are addressed in the Creditors' Reports and, the Administrators contend, do not give rise to any clearly identifiable voidable transaction claim, the relevant circumstances being that:
(a) on or about 13 February 2018, KRI borrowed the amount of HK$30 million (being the equivalent of approximately AU$4,980,000) from Ms Weili Jia and Yanping Zhu (the Weili Jia Loan) to partly satisfy loan obligations owed to Shanghai Yilian;
(b) the Administrators were provided with evidence to substantiate the making of the abovementioned loan;
(c) an extension agreement in respect of the above loan arrangements was entered on or about 22 February 2019, where TFM agreed to also become a borrower in respect of the Weili Jia Loan (Weili Jia Extension);
(d) pursuant to the Weili Jia Extension, the term of the underlying loan (at that stage HK$23 million) was extended to 31 March 2020;
(e) the inclusion of TFM as a borrower under the Weili Jia Extension is not unusual in circumstances where the borrowers were seeking an extension of credit and the lender had sought to have recourse against TFM, as a borrower, and additional comfort was provided from TDH, who is also a party to arrangements with Ms Weili Jia, as guarantor;
(f) prima facie, the Administrators contend, there is no wrongdoing where one company provides security for, or guarantees, another's debts when operating in a corporate group and particularly where they are engaged in a common endeavour;
(g) these circumstances, amongst others, were explained in correspondence from the Administrators' solicitors to Decon's solicitors prior to the second meeting of creditors;
(h) the fact that the copy of the Weili Jia Extension cited by the Administrators was not executed by Ms Jia does not, at least, prima facie, detract from the fact that she has acted in accordance with the terms of the agreement by forbearing any enforcement action against KRI and where she had lodged a proof of debt in the administrations of both TFM and KRI; and
(i) in respect of whether or not TFM or KRI ought to have borrowed money from Ms Jia in the first instance, having regard to the fact that the monies borrowed were used to satisfy the debt owed to Shanghai Yilian by Tasman Funds, the position is the same as the Shanghai Yilian Loan, namely, that:
(i) it was appropriate for TFM and KRI to assume such obligations in circumstances where both TFM and KRI had a direct and material financial interest in, and derived a benefit from, their respective interests in the Epping Development; and
(ii) in circumstances where the $11.7 million borrowed by Tasman Funds was for the benefit of TFM and KRI acquiring the land the subject of the Epping Development, it is difficult to see how a failure of Tasman Funds to pay off that debt is something that TFM or KRI had the option of ignoring when Tasman Funds could and would, presumably, turn to TFM and KRI for recoupment as the parties who benefitted from the advance of those funds in the first instance.
180 It is difficult to either identify any material error or to see how any further investigation or interrogation of the transaction concerning Ms Weili Jia presents any realistic prospect of a better return to creditors in a winding up scenario than what is presented by the DOCAs.
…
The TDH Loans
192 At [26] and [27] of the POC Decon asserts that
26. On or about 22 November 2019, TFM (as borrower) entered into a loan agreement with TDH (as lender) valued at $3,254,099.86 secured by mortgages over the Epping Development and which was of no apparent benefit to TFM.
27. Further, at some point presently unknown to the Plaintiff, each of TFM and KRI entered into loan agreements and/or borrowed money from TDH such that, as at about 30 June 2020:
a. TFM owed $3,254,099.86 to TDH; and
b. KRI owed $2,376,808.43 to TDH,
and with no apparent benefit to TFM or KRI.
193 Decon, effectively, contends that the loans from TDH are related-party transactions, uncommercial transactions, or unreasonable director-related transactions. The Administrators' position is that circumstances referred to at [26] of the POC were addressed in the TFM Report and the circumstances referred to at [27] of the POC were addressed in the KRI Report. The Administrators' view is that:
(a) TDH and TFM are indeed related parties;
(b) the advances made from TDH to TFM appear to have begun in June 2015 and were initially on an informal basis without the benefit of any documentation or formal agreement between TDH and TFM (but being recorded in accounting entries);
(c) the advances made from TDH to KRI appear to have begun in December 2017 and were initially on an informal basis without the benefit of any documentation or formal agreement between TDH and TFM (but being recorded in accounting entries);
(d) in respect of TFM:
(i) on or about 18 October 2019, TDH and TFM entered into a loan and related security agreement which addressed past and future borrowings (the TFM-TDH Loan);
(ii) the facility offered by TDH to TFM pursuant to the TFM-TDH Loan was on an 'as requested' basis capped at the 'principal sum';
(iii) the 'principal sum' at the time of entering the agreement was in the amount of $11,891,313.44;
(iv) a ledger containing the dates of the various advances made by TDH to TFM up to the date of the Loan is set out at Sch 2 to the Loan;
(v) the Administrators have seen payment receipts which corroborate the account which appears at Sch 2 of the TFM-TDH Loan;
(e) in respect of KRI:
(i) on or about 18 October 2019, TDH and KRI entered into a loan and related security agreement which addressed past and future borrowings (the KRI-TDH Loan);
(ii) the facility offered by TDH to KRI pursuant to the Loan was on an 'as requested' basis capped at the 'principal sum';
(iii) the 'principal sum' at the time of entering the agreement [was] in the amount of $2,756,103.16;
(iv) a ledger containing the dates of the various advances made by TDH to KRI up to the date of the Loan is set out at Sch 2 to the Loan;
(v) the Administrators have seen payment receipts which corroborate the account which appears at Sch 2 of the KRI-TDH Loan;
(f) from the Administrators' investigations, the purpose of the related party borrowing by TFM and KRI was to provide working capital for use in the Epping Development, namely, to meet the ongoing holding costs, ongoing interest charges under various other loan arrangements and the costs of ongoing litigation and solicitor fees;
(g) the TFM Report discloses that the dealings between TDH and TFM may give rise to:
(i) an unfair preference claim to the value of $277,231; and
(ii) an uncommercial transaction claim in the circumstances described in this way in the TFM Report:
The granting of the security to TDH may be classified as an uncommercial transaction only in so far as it secures any amount greater than $830,282.99 plus interest at 15%. Notwithstanding this, should TDH's claim be limited to $830,282 plus GST, I have calculated in section 8.8 of this report that there is estimated to be a deficiency to ALLPAAP creditors.
(h) a similar disclosure appears in the KRI Report:
(i) a related-party voidable transaction claim pursuant to s 588FE(4) of the Corporations Act with a potential value of $69,856.62;
(ii) an uncommercial transaction claim qualified in the KRI Report in the following way:
The granting of the security to TDH may be classified as an uncommercial transaction only in so far as it secures any amount greater than $10,000 plus interest at 15%. However, my review has revealed that although the 22 apartments remain unsold, all of these properties are subject to a mortgage held by a financier, which has priority over the TDH security. Accordingly, I do not consider that TDH will derive any benefit from being granted the security.
194 In respect of what, if any, effect a setting aside of the grant of a security interest to TDH over the eight relevant apartments would have, it is unlikely, in the Administrators' submission which I accept, that this would improve the return to unsecured creditors in either a DOCA or liquidation scenario and could potentially worsen the position because:
(a) TDH would be entitled to prove for its debt (whether secured or unsecured) in a liquidation scenario - a circumstance which does not arise under the DOCAs;
(b) under the DOCAs, should TDH prevail in establishing a security interest over the eight properties the subject of Decon's caveat claim then unsecured creditors stand to benefit from 50% of the net realised proceeds of those properties - a circumstance which does not arise under a liquidation scenario; and
(c) in any event, if either TDH or Decon prevail in respect of the caveat contest between them, there will be no funds flowing to unsecured creditors as other ALLPAAP security interest holders who have suffered a deficit on their security will be the next in the priority waterfall to recover ahead of ordinary unsecured creditors.
195 It is difficult to see how any further investigation or interrogation of the transaction concerning TDH presents any realistic prospect of a better return to creditors in a winding up scenario than what is presented by the DOCAs. Potential recoveries against TDH were brought to the attention of the voting creditors prior to the second meeting of creditors and the creditors voted in the way that they did in any event.
70 Under the heading "Findings on the relief sought by Decon", his Honour continued:
196 I have discussed the question of onus above (at [125]). It is not incumbent on an administrator to prove the sufficiency of their report. In cases such as the present, an estimated comparison between the outcome of the DOCA and the likely outcome of a liquidation is relevant to the exercise of the Court's discretion. This comparison requires analysis of the position of the company as at the time of the making of the application.
197 In circumstances where no contrary analysis has been presented as to the return to creditors on a liquidation as opposed to the return under the DOCAs, and given the explanations provided by the Administrators, it is difficult to be satisfied that Decon is entitled to relief. However valid its suspicions as to transactions may be, it is most important to also consider the likely benefits of liquidation to creditors.
198 Decon also complains of the omission of information with reference to s 445D(1)(c) of the Corporations Act. Decon maintains in substance that certain matters were either not sufficiently investigated or omitted from the Creditors' Reports.
199 Bearing in mind throughout the need for Administrators to provide a timely and practical service, I consider that the Creditors' Reports provide a sufficient degree of detail of the funding arrangements made available by the TFM DOCA and the KRI DOCA for the Company to pursue the cross-claim. In any event, this potential recovery was immaterial to the Administrators' recommendation.
Injustice - s 445D(1)(e)
200 For the reasons set out above, contrary to [92(c)] of the POC, there is no injustice caused by creditors voting in favour of the TFM DOCA and the KRI DOCA instead of electing to further investigate and potentially pursue speculative causes of action which face uncertainties and difficulties in terms of their funding, prospects of success, and prospects of enforcement and recovery.
201 None of these matters was hidden or concealed from the creditors of either TFM or KRI and, indeed, formed the basis of the Administrators' recommendations expressed in the Creditors' Reports in the first instance.
Oppressive or unfairly prejudicial, or unfairly discriminatory against - s 445D(1)(f)(i)
...
204 In terms of unfair discrimination, none of the concerns surrounding different treatment of the dissenting creditors which arise where a DOCA attempts to deviate from the usual pari passu distribution to creditors of the same class, arises in the present case.
Contrary to the interests of the creditors of the company as a whole - s 445D(1)(f)(ii)
205 It follows that for these reasons, and particularly in respect of [s 445D(1)(f)(ii)], contrary to [92(e)] of the POC, the TFM DOCA and the KRI DOCA are not contrary to the interests of the creditors of the company as a whole. The Administrators' well-founded position is that the unsecured creditors are likely to receive a higher return under the DOCA than if the company proceeds to a liquidation.
Commercial morality - s 445D(1)(g)
206 In relation to [92(f)(i)] of the POC, the circumstances concerning the investigation of the 'relevant transactions' are dealt with above (at [160]-[195]). The Administrators' position is that there is no obvious basis for the provisions of s 445D(1)(g) to be invoked. I accept this contention for the reasons stated in relation to each of the transactions that Decon seeks to impugn.