Balance of convenience
25 The plaintiff submits that if TFM and KRI are not restrained from holding their second meeting of creditors, and from thereafter executing the DOCAs recommended by the administrators, three risks will arise. The plaintiff submits that the balance of convenience favours restraining the conduct to avoid those risks.
26 The first element of risk that the plaintiff identifies is in relation to the relation-back day. It submits that if there is no interim relief, and the DOCA resolutions are adopted at the second meetings of creditors and the DOCAs are executed, but later the case for the setting aside of the DOCAs is found to be good, the result will be that under s 91 item 10 the relation-back day will be the date of the administration, i.e. 30 June 2020.
27 In contrast, if the interim relief is granted and the plaintiff is later successful in setting aside the administration and then in winding-up the companies, or ending the administration by winding-up the companies, under s 91 item 2 of the Act the relation-back day will be 22 June 2020, being the day on which the winding-up application was filed. Although the plaintiff is not able to point to any particular transaction having occurred in the eight day period calculated with reference to the different relation-back days, the plaintiff submits that there is a prospect that something may have occurred in that period which will then be beyond the reach of liquidators. In that event, the different relation-back days would be prejudicial to the plaintiff and other creditors.
28 However, the plaintiff's reference to s 91 item 10 would appear to be mistaken. It is s 91 item 11 which will apply on the first scenario with the result that the relation-back days on each scenario will be the same, namely the date that the application for winding-up was filed. Depending on the events, it is possible that s 91 item 4 would apply, but that would have the same result.
29 There is therefore no prejudice in relation to the relation-back days flowing from whether interim relief is or is not granted.
30 The second element of risk is that if the meetings go ahead and the DOCAs are executed in circumstances where they are later terminated, unnecessary fees and expenses may be incurred by the already insolvent defendants with only limited, if any, benefit to creditors. I accept that this is relevant prejudice to take into account, although it too can be given only limited weight in view of it being unknown what further fees and expenses might be incurred.
31 The third element of risk is that although the Court has the power to set aside the DOCAs, it cannot set aside transactions entered into while the companies operated under the DOCAs. The proposed DOCAs include conclusion of litigation funding agreements on terms which are unclear on the information before me. The plaintiff submits that there is at least a risk that the funding agreements will not be able to be set aside if the DOCAs are executed and performed pending determination of the substantive proceedings.
32 The defendants point out that the liquidators have the power to disclaim or adopt any contracts, which would include the litigation funding agreements. However, the plaintiff's point remains good, at least to the extent that there may be costs, even substantial costs, attached to terminating such agreements.
33 I therefore accept that there is some prejudice to the plaintiff and the other creditors in relation to the third element.
34 If interim relief is granted and then the plaintiff fails on final relief with the result that the creditors meetings and the DOCAs go ahead, there will be limited prejudice to the defendants. All that would have occurred is that the meetings and the DOCAs were delayed. In circumstances where the defendant companies are not trading and the question of final relief can be decided urgently, the prejudice of delay will not be significant.
35 The defendants' principal submission is that the Court would only restrain the holding of the second meetings if they would cause irreparable prejudice to the plaintiff's claims for final relief. They submit that no such prejudice of any kind is identified in the evidence. They submit that it is not generally appropriate to restrain the holding of a second creditors' meeting where, as in this case, there are available remedies, after the meetings, for the substance of the plaintiff's complaints. In that regard, they refer to Re Ten Network [2017] NSWSC 1247 at [49]-[51] and [127].
36 In that case, Black J (at [49]) identified, and apparently accepted, the submission that the existence of remedies under s 445D of the Act provides a strong reason for the court to decline to intervene before a second meeting of creditors is held. Reference was made to the observations of the plurality of the High Court in Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc v City of Swan [2010] HCA 11; 240 CLR 509 at [30]-[32], including that:
Earlier provisions required court approval before the scheme was effective; Pt 5.3A provides for disallowance by the Court after the deed has been made.
37 Black J observed (at [51]) that in determining any subsequent application under s 445D of the Act, brought on the basis that the s 439A report was materially misleading or omitted material information - which are complaints in this case, the court would have a discretion whether to grant relief if the relevant information would not have affected the voting at the second creditors meeting. Reference was made to Re Recycling Holdings Pty Ltd [2015] NSWSC 1016; 107 ACSR 406 at [72]-[73] and [80]-[81]. His Honour concluded that "these matters would generally tend against granting the injunctive relief that is sought in an application of this kind, although they are not conclusive that such relief could never be granted or should not be granted in this case".
38 His Honour also observed (at [127]) that "it is important that the Court does not, in applications of this kind, deal with matters that are properly dealt with after the event, when creditors' views are known, and a full factual examination of the issues can be undertaken without the time pressures of an urgent application for final interlocutory relief". His Honour was not persuaded that the court should seek to determine, in that case, any substantive application at that point, rather than in the context of an application properly brought under s 445D of the Act.
39 The defendants rightly observe that it is at this stage unknown what will occur at the creditors meetings. It may be that they resolve to wind-up the companies, or to enter into the DOCAs, or to end the administrations (s 439C of the Act). The first and third of those possibilities would render the substantive relief sought by the plaintiffs, or at least much of it, redundant. It is really the second possibility, the resolution to execute the DOCAs, which could then lead to the execution of the DOCAs and the prejudice that the plaintiff complains of.
40 I am satisfied, particularly with reference to the reasoning in Re Ten Network, that there is insufficient justification in this case to intervene and restrain the creditors meetings. In view of the identification of serious issues to be tried, particularly with regard to the conduct of the administrators and the potential to bring the administrations to an end, and the prejudice that will flow, or might flow, from the execution of the DOCAs, I have considered whether it is appropriate and justified to allow the meetings to go ahead and to restrain only the execution of the DOCAs in the event that resolutions are passed.
41 There are considerations weighing against that course. First, the fact of execution of the DOCAs being restrained may itself weigh in the creditors' consideration of whether or not to adopt the resolutions. That will have the effect of the court interfering in the process of the creditors meetings contrary to the principles discussed in Re Ten Network and Mighty River at [66]. Secondly, mere resolution at the meetings that the companies execute the DOCAs has legal impacts on what creditors can then do (s 444C of the Act). Thus, restraining the execution of the DOCAs but leaving the creditors to adopt the resolutions will create unjustifiable uncertainty.