Duty Book/ Workload Management Issues
459 It is clear from the evidence of Supt Redfern that he formed a very adverse and unfavourable view of Mr Eaton's work performance and his ability to manage his workload, based on the Duty Book for weeks 7 to 12 of his second attempt at Session 4 with its inextricable link to the issue of the two profiles Mr Eaton had as at 13/14 April (issues relating to the two profiles will be dealt with further below). That view was also made in the context of Sgt Fitzgerald's Report and email to Sgt Dunn about the events of the 13 and 14 April. (To be dealt with further below).
460 He then applied this same adverse and unfavourable view to the Duty Book for weeks 1 to 6 of Session 4 (second attempt) and indeed, went further, and said that he had no confidence in the Duty Books earlier completed, notwithstanding that, on his evidence, he did not conduct any sort of detailed examination of any of those Duty Books nor indeed did he speak to any of the supervisory police officers involved about Mr Eaton's work performance (including any supervisory officers associated with that most recent Duty Book).
461 The only person he spoke to was the EDO, Sgt Dunn. Whilst it is true that she failed this Duty Book, she also indicated that she discussed other options with Supt Redfern, including passing Mr Eaton on to Session 5, but with a greater degree of supervision (supervision she acknowledged could have been given), but he declined to adopt any of the options she raised.
462 I also note that Detective Inspector Egan - Lee in agreeing with the findings made by A/Inspector Dowling and being satisfied that a "full and complete investigation has taken place", concurred with his findings that whilst "Untruthfulness" could not be established it was more than evident that Mr Eaton had been "misleading", in the information supplied, "whether intentional or not". He was also a similar belief that some "managerial action" should be implemented to provide Mr Eaton with "guidance" in this area and believed that a "Remedial Performance Agreement" should be entered into between Mr Eaton and a supervisor from his team for a period of three months before being permitted to proceed to confirmation as a Constable of Police.
463 For Supt Redfern to raise doubts about the Duty Books completed in 2007 ignores the fact that at that time Mr Eaton only had his PLAC profile so there could be no issue that the range of work he was undertaking was not fully available to his supervisors for their oversight. Nor do I consider that there could have been any issue that he was "actively concealing" his workload.
464 I have very carefully examined and analysed all Mr Eaton's Duty Books in some detail (including all Sections and all Skills).
465 The Duty Books for Session 3 clearly show a Probationary Constable who was working well and progressing, not only well, but at an above average level; achieving at or above benchmarks; receiving positive comments and praise from his supervisors (both FTO's and Field Supervisors), comments which Mr Eaton also acknowledged in a positive and appreciative way.
466 These two Duty Books also show that he was "buddied" for 15 and 16 shifts respectively, where he was supervised by a senior officer (either SC Latham or Const Vojnikovic weeks 1-6, and Const Vijnikovic in weeks 7 - 12, as taken from the Daily Activity Report). Both Books show appropriate and commendable attention to detail on the part of all supervisory officers involved in completing all required sections. His Work Log Screens listed respectively, 1 Case but no Events, and 2 Cases and 1 Event.
467 Mr Eaton duly passed subjects PPP231 and PPP232, both in relation to academic and Duty Book requirements.
468 The two Duty Books for his first attempt at Session 4 again indicate that he was progressing well and above average, performing at or above benchmarks and receiving positive comments and praise. The only comments raising issues about his performance being the two comments by SC Suters in relation to the MVA (as noted above) and a comment by Sgt Dunn about the Duty Book for week 1 to 6 being handed in late, with the risk of failing the subject should his Book be submitted late for week 12. However Sgt Dunn also noted "Good work David a very pleasing report". I should also indicate that it was noted in the Duty Book for weeks 7 to 12 that the FTO (Const Dinsdale) had not ranked his performance in the appropriate column. It was flagged that Mr Eaton had to ensure that this took place. However I would also have thought there was an equal (if not greater) obligation on the FTO to ensure that this ranking was undertaken.
469 I also noted that there appeared to be less direct one-on-one supervision (particularly in weeks 7 to 12) as there were only 7 and 2 shifts respectively noted as having been "buddied". Although there were 31 incidents listed in the Daily Activity Report with Mr Eaton undertaking a "Leading " role in 7, there were some 9 different senior officers listed as participating in the incidents so listed.
470 There was no evidence before the Commission in any way whatsoever about this "buddying" and its relationship/importance to the ongoing training of probationary constables. However there is the possibility that there is a direct correlation between the number of shifts so noted by the particular FTO and the number of incidents listed in the Daily Activity Report in which Mr Eaton either observed, assisted or played a leading role and which involved that particular FTO. However this information does not consistently correlate through all subsequent Duty Books. It is not possible to draw any conclusions about whether or not the quite significant change between Session 3 and Session 4 has any implications in relation to the level of supervision that was being provided. However it is impossible not to note that very significant difference in those numbers as between Session 3 and both Sessions 4.
471 His Work Log Screen (which could only have been the PLAC profile) showed respectively - 7 Events, 3 CIDS messages, 4 Cases and 5 Events, 3 CIDS messages, 8 Cases.
472 Mr Eaton then failed academic subject PPP242. He also failed PPP241, however that was not due to any failure in relation to his Duty Book, which he passed, but rather because he failed to complete his academic assignments.
473 This was the first sign of the very real difficulty he was having in managing his workload in terms of his ability to manage and balance both his academic and practical duties. It is apparent that he was putting more effort into his Duty Book than into the academic side of his studies. His evidence also was that he was having relationship problems at this time
474 He then went on secondment to the CCU from 7 December 2007 to 9 February 2007, a period of two months. Whilst Supt Redfern maintained that supervision of Mr Eaton carried on at the CCU, there is no actual evidence as to the extent of that in any practical way before the Commission, given that his Duty Book for weeks 7 to 12 of Session 4 was signed off by Sgt Dunn on 5 December 2007, before he went to the CCU.
475 The Duty Book for the second attempt at weeks 1 to 6 of Session 4 (commenced on his return to Parramatta) start to show some significant difference when compared to the Duty Books of 2007. Firstly, the Daily Activity Report and Self-assessment pages were not signed off by Mr Eaton and in the past, in relation to a least two Duty Books the relevant FTO had also ticked that area. The failure to sign does not appear to have been commented on by his FTO, SC Latham. Significantly there was no indication of shifts carried out with the FTO in the apprpriate space, merely a handwritten question mark. There is no indication as to whether that notation was inserted by SC Latham or Sgt Dowling, although Sgt Dowling had left that entry blank and put a cross next it in his section of the Field Supervisors Report. There were also fewer incidents noted in the Daily Activity Report (only 11, with Mr Eaton taking a "Leading" role in 5), than had been recorded in earlier Duty Books, none of which involved SC Latham. The Work Log Screen only noted 5 CIDs messages and 5 Cases. Sgt Dowling had commented under the log "greater attention to be given to his caseload".
476 Sgt Dowling also went on to comment that Mr Eaton was " coming along at a steady pace" but then went on to say "however believe greater time should be spent on his events & case management. Something I believe will improve as he develops his time management skills. With greater exposure to the job I feel P/Cs Eaton's (illegible word) will continue to improve".
477 Notwithstanding the issue about Mr Eaton having the two profiles and which profile was shown on 13/14 April, the above comment would certainly seem to suggest that Sgt Dowling had in fact, either seen Mr Eaton's Events, or had some knowledge of Mr Eaton's Events, arising from his supervision of the Duty Book.
478 I also note that in Mr Eaton's Response to the Notice, that on this issue he indicated his belief that Sgt Dowling may have mistakenly entered "5" in the CIDS messages instead of in Events. He wrote that he did not recall receiving one CIDS message whilst on secondment to the CCU let alone the five that would have still been active on 10 March 2008, only a month after completing that secondment, if that notation was correct. On that basis, as well as noting the comment made by Sgt Dowling, he believed that he had provided Sgt Dowling with his PLAC profile as part of the Duty Book assessment.
479 Initially, in the Notice issued to Mr Eaton, there was an allegation of deception raised in relation to 10 March 2008 when Sgt Dowling signed off on the Duty Book. That allegation did not appear in subsequent s 80(3) Order. No information was provided to Mr Eaton about this allegation, as he also noted in his Response.
480 I also note that Sgt Dowling was not called to give evidence in this matter. This will be commented on further below.
481 It was SC Latham who picked up on the fact that, whilst Mr Eaton was working in most areas above the standard at which he should be working, she specifically commented that "he may need some supervision in relation to case and time management" which she also noted had been discussed with EDO Hedges. She also gave evidence that she had spoken to Mr Eaton about his time management, asked him if he had any issues with his workload or had problems and he told her he was not managing his workload, there was too much to do and he didn't know what to do first. She also indicated that he seemed "a little upset" about this and she told him she would speak to EDO Hedges about managing his workload. She then spoke to Sgt Hedges in early March and told her that Mr Eaton was having difficulty managing his work and noted this in completing the FTO report.
482 Significantly it was the evidence of both Sgt Hedges and Sgt Dunn that no follow-up whatsoever was made by either EDO, in relation to this very specific flagging of this issue by SC Latham. The only follow-up that took place specifically related to the MVA that had gone statute barred way back on 30 September 2007.
483 The Duty Book for weeks 7 to 12, (the one signed by A/Sgt Sardelich) showed a significant increase in both the number and type of incidents listed in the Daily Activity Report (22, with Mr Eaton taking a "Leading" role in 16) involving some seven different senior officers. Const Dinsdale was the FTO and noted 7 shifts as being performed with the PC although when one goes to the Daily Activity Report he is only listed on 4 incidents. Again Mr Eaton failed to sign or date the pages in his section of the Duty Book and there is no comment about that or ticking off of that by the FTO. Nevertheless all incidents were rated as satisfactory and again there were positive comments and praise from both the FTO and Field Supervisor in relation to all skills assessed including Skill Units 7 and 8.
484 I also note that in the reference SC Sardelich subsequently provided to CSU in relation to Mr Eaton's appeal, he indicated that he "still fully endorsed" all assessments made and said that whilst "it was not signed at the time due to this issue, every other aspect of his Policing development was progressing well as stated in the Duty Book."
485 This of course was a reference that Supt Redfern had not read (as indicated in his reply to Detective Inspector Nibbs letter).
486 Taking this Duty Book in isolation from the issue of the dual profiles, it is difficult, if not impossible to discern any perceptible difference in the standard and content between this Book and the Duty Books presented and signed off in 2007 and understand the basis upon which Supt Redfern came to the unshakeable view that his work performance was unsatisfactory and he would not make a good police officer and that the Duty Book should be failed.
487 Of course the consequence of failing his Duty Book was even more significant in that this meant a double failure of PPP242 (notwithstanding that it was not the Duty Book that had been the reason for his failure at the first attempt but the academic subjects, and these were successfully passed in this second attempt). Such double failure meant automatic exclusion from the ADPP which was grounds, in and of itself, for dismissal of a Probationary Constable.
488 Supt Redfern maintained that the issue of Mr Eaton's integrity was not taken into account in failing the Duty Book. Sgt Dunn certainly said it was as far as she was concerned.
489 I find it difficult to accept that evidence from Supt Redfern. It seems to me abundantly clear that the whole basis of his consideration of Mr Eaton's workload issues and the Duty Book (even if one leaves aside the specific issue of the deliberate misleading of the two officers) was predicated on the fact was that he had been "actively concealing his workload". I do not see how Supt. Redfern can say that he separated out the issue of integrity from that consideration. "Actively concealing" would also imply a deliberate intention attached to such actions.
490 I also note that even Detective Inspector Nibbs in his 9 July 2009 letter to Supt. Redfern seemed to have formed a similar doubt about this conclusion as follows:
I note the reasons advanced in your report dated 16/7/2008 for not accepting the conclusions reached by Sgt. Dowling and Det. Insp. Egan-Lee in relation to adverse factual findings about the issue of un-truthfulness, and that you wrote that their "....reports comprehensively traversed the available evidence and I do not propose to review all the material." It appears that the adverse finding as to the officer's integrity subsequently was relied upon, in part, to justify the award of an "unsatisfactory" grade for ADPP subject PPP241.
491 Supt Redfern had noted in handwriting beside this paragraph .. "NOT THE CASE!"
492 If the integrity issue was removed, that would only leave the issue of the dual profiles and the 14 outstanding Events on Mr Eaton's PLAC profile which did not come to light until 14 April, as being the only basis for raising issues about his workload management and as a consequence failing this Duty Book (notwithstanding that they were all cleared up with the assistance of Const Dzendolet), as well as the statute barred MVA which had been missed by seven supervising officers, as noted above.