The appeal
33 For ease of expression, I will continue to refer to the applicants as the "applicants" rather than as the appellants.
34 The applicants' grounds of appeal have been set out above.
35 The applicants' submissions in relation to ground 1 can be summarised as follows:
(a) Before it can be determined whether assistance can or cannot reasonably be provided by relatives or obtained from community services, it is necessary for findings to be made as to the nature and extent of the assistance required by the person in need of care. That arises by implication from reg 1.15AA(1)(b), read with reg 1.15AA(1)(e).
(b) That submission is supported by authority. It was held, in Biyiksiz v Minister for Immigration & Multicultural & Indigenous Affairs [2004] FCA 814 (Biyiksiz) at [20] that the words "cannot reasonably be obtained" must be construed by reference to reasonableness from the point of view of the person requiring assistance, and not only by reference to the reasonable availability of the assistance from other sources. In El-Chahini v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection (2018) 74 AAR 224; [2018] FCA 202 (El-Chahini), Jagot J held at [21] that "[i]t is not apparent that the Tribunal has engaged with the actual needs of the mother for assistance and the impact of those needs on the capacity of her daughter in Young and adult grandchildren, all of whom are married, working and have their own families, to provide such assistance".
(c) The needs of the person requiring care are integral to the questions of whether care cannot reasonably be provided by relatives or obtained from community sources. It goes without saying that some relatives can give certain kinds of care but not others. It is thus necessary, and implicit in reg 1.15AA(1)(e), that the Tribunal make findings as to what assistance is necessary before it can make findings as to whether assistance cannot reasonably be provided or obtained. The Federal Circuit Court's contrary findings were in error.
36 The applicants' submissions in relation to ground 2 can be summarised as follows:
(a) It may be inferred from the Federal Circuit Court's reference at [29] to the Tribunal's identification of the Certificate, and its reference at [30] to the Tribunal taking into account the Certificate, that the Court found that the Tribunal did identify the nature of the assistance required by the applicant's mother.
(b) If that is the inference to be drawn from the Court's reasons, then the Court was incorrect. The Tribunal's reference to the Certificate and to the applicant's mother suffering multiple medical conditions including Alzheimer's disease does not constitute a finding as to the nature or extent of assistance required by the applicant's mother. There is no reference in the Tribunal's reasons to the specific needs of the applicant's mother. The Tribunal found that the applicant's sister could provide substantial care, including at night ([32]-[33]). But it also acknowledged that her husband required assistance. The evidence was that the applicant's mother requires, "24/7" assistance with all aspects of daily life. This includes help with basic hygiene, feeding, showering and changing her incontinence pad.
37 It is convenient to consider the two grounds of appeal together.
38 The issue may be stated as whether the primary judge erred in not holding that the Tribunal fell into jurisdictional error in its consideration of whether the applicant met the requirement in paragraph (e) of reg 1.15AA(1) of the Migration Regulations (set out above). Paragraph (e) commences with a reference to "the assistance". This is evidently a reference to the assistance described in sub-paragraph (b)(iv) of the regulation. That sub-paragraph sets out a requirement that, because of the medical condition (being the medical condition referred to earlier in paragraph (b)) "the person has, and will continue for at least two years to have, a need for direct assistance in attending to the practical aspects of daily life".
39 I accept that, in forming a view, for the purposes of paragraph (e), as to whether the assistance cannot reasonably be (a) provided by any other relative of the resident (being a relative who is an Australian citizen, an Australian permanent resident or an eligible New Zealand citizen), or (b) obtained from welfare, hospital, nursing or community services in Australia, it is necessary for the Tribunal to have regard to the nature and extent of the relevant person's need for direct assistance in attending to the practical aspects of daily life. However, I do not accept the proposition that it is necessary for the Tribunal to make express findings about those matters. The terms of the regulation do not require express findings to be made. Further, the purpose and context of the regulation do not support the implication of a requirement to make express findings. In particular, reg 1.15AA(3) provides that the Minister (or the Tribunal standing in the shoes of the Minister) is to take the opinion in the Certificate on a matter mentioned in paragraph (1)(b) "to be correct" for the purposes of deciding whether an applicant satisfies a criterion that the applicant is a carer.
40 In the present case, I do not consider that the Tribunal fell into error by failing to have regard to the nature and extent of the applicant's mother's need for direct assistance in attending to the practical aspects of daily life.
41 First, the Tribunal referred to the Certificate at [5] and [11] of its reasons. The Certificate contained a description of the applicant's mother's medical conditions and the care she required. It contained details about the nature and extent of the applicant's mother's care requirements. Although the Tribunal did not set out details of those matters in its reasons, I infer that the Tribunal was aware of those matters from its consideration of the Certificate.
42 Secondly, while it is true that the focus of the Tribunal's consideration at [27]-[57] of its reasons was on the availability of the relatives to provide assistance, rather than on the nature and extent of the applicant's mother's care requirements, this appears to reflect the way the applicants' case was presented to the delegate and the Tribunal: see [8] and [16]-[19] of the Tribunal's decision.
43 Thirdly, a major factual issue before the Tribunal was whether the applicant's sister (with whom the mother had previously lived) could reasonably provide assistance. The Tribunal dealt with this issue at [31]-[33]. Because the sister had previously provided care for the mother, there was no real issue that she was capable in principle of providing the type of care the mother required. The issue was, rather, whether she was available to do so, given the need to care for her husband. In this context, it is unsurprising that the Tribunal did not refer in any detail to the applicant's mother's care requirements in this part of its reasons.
44 Further, in the course of considering whether the relatives could reasonably provide assistance, the Tribunal made a number of references to the applicant's mother's care requirements. This tends to confirm that it was aware of those requirements. I note in particular:
In [33], the Tribunal referred to the applicant's sister providing assistance during "the day and at night".
In [40], the Tribunal found that one of the applicant's brothers could reasonably provide substantial assistance, including by providing "transport, shopping, household chores, company and supervision" for his mother.
In [43], the Tribunal found that it would be reasonable for one of the granddaughters (of the applicant's mother) to provide assistance, including "general supervision, personal care and hygiene, cooking, cleaning and general household chores".
45 In light of these matters, I consider that the Tribunal did not err by failing to have regard to the nature and extent of the applicant's mother's need for direct assistance in attending to the practical aspects of daily life.
46 I do not consider there to be any inconsistency between the reasons set out above and the judgment of Jagot J in El-Chahini at [21]. In that case, Jagot J held that the Tribunal had not "engaged with the actual needs of the mother for assistance and the impact of those needs on the capacity of her daughter … and adult grandchildren, all of whom are married, working and have their own families, to provide such assistance". In the present case, in contrast, for the reasons set out above, I consider that the Tribunal did engage with the actual needs of the applicant's mother for assistance.
47 I note that in Biyiksiz it was held at [20] that the words "cannot reasonably be obtained" must be construed by reference to reasonableness from the point of view of the person requiring assistance. In this case, the Tribunal's reasons do not suggest that it made any such error.
48 For these reasons, I conclude that no error has been established in the conclusions of the primary judge.