Crosby Textor Research Strategies Results Pty Limited v Syed

Facts

1. In the substantive proceedings in this Court, the plaintiff sues Mr Syed, his wife, related companies and a bank in connection with an alleged fraud which Mr Syed is said to have perpetrated on the plaintiff whilst in its employ from 2008 until his employment was terminated for cause in January 2019. The plaintiff alleges that Mr Syed stole more than $3 million whilst working as, initially, an assistant accountant and then as financial controller then on an annual salary of $185,000 plus superannuation. The plaintiff seeks to recover these monies inter alia through tracing remedies, including a proprietary claim against Ms Parveen under the second limb in Barnes v Addy (1874) LR 9 Ch App 244. The evidence on this motion indicated that Ms Parveen used some of the plaintiff's funds, including by various trips to Mecca in 2017. Luxury hotel bills were paid from the plaintiff's bank accounts, including the Royal Suite at Raffles Hotel in Mecca, the Oberoi Madina in Saudi Arabia and Raffles Makkah Palace in Mecca.
2. The alleged fraud came to the notice of the plaintiff in January 2019. The plaintiff retained the services of forensic accountant, Emma Levett. In February 2019, the plaintiff reported the matter to the police. Mr Syed says he and his wife separated, although his wife has agreed to let him reside in the family home with their children, given his poor financial position.
3. On 28 February 2019, these proceedings commenced before the Duty Judge. Robb J made the freezing order, including in respect of a property in Rhodes which was then scheduled to be auctioned on 10 March 2019. The advertisement included a description that the "Vendor is highly motivated". Mr Syed and his wife had purchased the property in 2015 for $1.775 million, as joint tenants. It appears that the auction did not proceed on that occasion.
4. On 18 April 2019, Ms Parveen was joined to these proceedings as the second defendant. On 3 May 2019, Ms Parveen commenced proceedings against her husband in the Family Court of Australia seeking an adjustment of property between them. Orders were sought to transfer these proceedings to the Family Court. The plaintiff appeared as an intervener in the Family Court proceedings.
5. On 14 June 2019, criminal proceedings were commenced and 404 counts have been laid of dishonestly obtaining financial advantage by deception pursuant to section 192E(1)(b) of the Crimes Act 1900 (NSW). The total amount alleged to have been obtained by fraud exceeds $2.5 million; the maximum penalty for a single contravention of the provision is ten years imprisonment. Mr Syed has instructed his solicitors that he is innocent of all charges and will vigorously defend the matter.
6. In January 2020, Mr Syed's solicitor advised the plaintiff that he wished to sell the Rhodes property. A long period of negotiation followed as to if, and how, that could be done.
7. On 27 February 2020, the Family Court proceedings were dismissed as the legal representatives for the husband and wife had ceased to act and there had been no appearance at a directions hearing.
8. On 1 March 2020, the Rhodes property was sold for $1.75 million. The plaintiff's solicitors expressed concern at the time that entering into the contract for sale of the property was a breach of the freezing order. Also, the proposed sale price was said to be lower than the market value of the property and its original listing price. Ultimately, on 8 May 2020, the plaintiff, Mr Syed and Ms Parveen entered into a "Deed of Agreement re freezing orders", which provided that the proceeds of sale would be paid into Court. Clause 2.1(a) of the deed provided: Mr Syed and Ms Parveen irrevocably agree in respect of the Rhodes Property that they: (a) will: (i) direct the proceeds of sale, on completion of the Rhodes Contract, being the sale price, less Selling Costs and the amount of the payment required to discharge the registered mortgage on the title of the Rhodes Property; and (ii) on forfeit of the deposit on the Rhodes Contract, direct the deposit and any interest earned thereon, to be paid into the Supreme Court of NSW in the Proceedings pending the final determination of the Proceedings, or agreement between [the plaintiff], Mr Syed and Ms Parveen …
9. The deed provided for Mr Syed and Ms Parveen to provide an irrevocable authority and direction to their solicitor acting on the sale to pay the net proceeds of sale into Court. In addition, their solicitor was obliged to provide an undertaking to the plaintiff, acknowledging receipt of the irrevocable authority and direction from his clients and undertaking to comply with it. Clause 4 of the deed then provided: 4.1 Upon receipt by [the plaintiff's] Solicitors' of a copy of the irrevocable authority … and the [solicitor's] undertaking …, Mr Syed, Ms Parveen and [the plaintiff] will each take all steps necessary to have orders made varying the 1 May 2019 Freezing Order to permit the sale of the Rhodes Property in accordance with the Rhodes Contract and this Deed. … 4.3 Following the making of the orders in accordance with clause 4.1 …, [the plaintiff] will remove the notation of the Freezing Orders on the title of the Rhodes Property … on or before completion of … sale to enable the sale to complete but only if Mr Syed and Ms Parveen each comply strictly with their promises and obligations in this Deed.
10. Finally, clause 6.7 of the deed provided: Amendment This Deed may only be varied or replaced by a Deed executed by the parties.
11. On 26 May 2020, Rein J made orders by consent, varying the freezing order to permit sale of the Rhodes property in accordance with the deed. On 1 June 2020, sale of the Rhodes property was completed and, on 2 June 2020, the net proceeds of $726,391.40 were paid into Court.
12. The plaintiff's forensic accountants have been able to trace some $287,000 into the money now in Court. It is apparent from the plaintiff's evidence that the tracing task has been time consuming, laborious, and, itself, expensive. There are a large number of transactions and, consequently, a large number of requests made to banks for documentation to ascertain where the monies were initially paid from the plaintiff's bank accounts, and where the funds were paid thereafter. So far, the tracing exercise appears to have been done from 1 January 2015 onwards. The tracing exercise is on-going. A further $176,677.50 has been paid into Court by the sixth defendant and the plaintiff has yet to embark upon tracing into those funds.
13. On 13 July 2020, Mr Syed was excused from filing a defence in these proceedings. Mr Syed is entitled to exercise his privilege against self-incrimination, and has done so. The Court does not draw any adverse inference by reason of Mr Syed exercising this important right.
14. As to the criminal proceedings, Mr Syed is yet to be committed for trial. Mr Giang-Nguyen described efforts to obtain documents on subpoena from the plaintiff in the Downing Centre Local Court, as requested by Mr Syed's forensic accountant. Mr Giang-Nguyen said that Local Court Magistrate Kemp has refused to grant the plaintiff's application to set aside the subpoena and has ordered the plaintiff to produce the documents on 10 December 2020. Once the documents are received, further work will be needed to liaise with the forensic accountant to make a "no bill" application or have the matter committed for trial in the District Court.
15. Mr Syed has had trouble gaining new employment in the field of accounting but, since December 2019, has worked as a contractor/consultant earning some $2,500 per month. He also receives a Centrelink payment in the sum of some $855 per fortnight. Ms Parveen pays for household expenses while Mr Syed assists with payment of his son's school fees.
16. Mr Syed has few funds in his bank accounts. Mr Syed says he has no other bank accounts in Australia or the rest of the world. The contents of safety deposit boxes are said to be items of sentimental value only. Mr Syed is a shareholder in two other companies, which have no assets. Mr Syed has a self-managed superannuation fund with his wife, which has a bank account with some $13,000 and had an investment in a property, which he understands has been paid into court in these proceedings. Mr Syed also holds some shares valued at approximately $24,000, which he would be happy to sell to fund his lawyers but the assets are presently frozen. He has no other substantial assets from which to fund his defence. The plaintiff notes that the exceptions contained in the freezing order for living expenses and legal expenses permit Mr Syed to use these assets for those purposes but objects to the funds in Court being drawn upon.
17. Mr Syed wishes to use $200,000 drawn from funds in Court to pay his legal representatives in these proceedings, including in respect of the costs of this motion, and also to place his legal representatives in the criminal proceedings in funds to obtain a forensic accounting report and bring a "no bill" application to the Director of Public Prosecutions, which it is hoped will bring the criminal proceedings to an end.
18. Mr Syed's criminal law solicitor, Adam Houda, has more than 20 years' experience in criminal law. Mr Houda's firm has incurred legal expenses in excess of $50,000 of which Mr Syed has paid only $10,000. Despite Mr Syed's inability to pay, Mr Houda says he has stayed in the matter out of care for his client. Mr Houda estimated that the forensic accountant is likely to charge some $35,000 and a "no bill" application is likely to cost more than $152,000. Should the matter proceed to trial, it was likely to take some eight weeks and require senior and junior counsel to be briefed. The suggested costs of such a trial was $768,000 which, obviously enough, exceeds the amount in Court. For the moment, however, the amount sought to be released is that sufficient to pay what he already owes to his legal representatives and to fund the completion of a forensic accounting report and a "no bill" application. If funds are not released from the monies in Court, then the criminal law solicitors and forensic accountant will not be in a position to continue to act for Mr Syed in the criminal law proceedings.
19. Mr Syed's solicitor in these proceedings, Mr Alameddine, says his firm is owed some $50,000 in outstanding invoices and an estimated further $13,000 to $16,500 has been incurred in respect of this motion. Mr Alameddine will not be in a position to continue to act for Mr Syed in these proceedings unless funds are released for payment of his current and anticipated legal costs.
20. Whilst Ms Parveen initially provided funds to pay his former solicitor, Mr Syed says that his wife is not in a position to assist him further. Of $6,800 paid to Mr Syed's solicitors in these proceedings, $5,800 was paid by Ms Parveen. Of $16,000 paid to his criminal law solicitors, $4,000 was paid by Ms Parveen and the balance paid from Mr Syed's income from consultancy work. Of $10,000 paid to Mr Syed's forensic accountant, $4,000 was paid by Ms Parveen and the balance from Jobseeker payments and consultancy work. Ms Parveen is separately represented in these proceedings and currently pays all of their rent and living expenses.
21. Mr Syed does not have any legal training and does not know how to defend these proceedings or the criminal proceedings without legal representation.

Submissions

1. The defendant submitted that, unless the freezing order is varied as sought, Mr Syed will be deprived of the resources necessary to fund his defence of these and related criminal proceedings. A freezing order is not to give security to a plaintiff for a judgment it hopes to obtain, and which he fears might not be satisfied. A freezing order operates only to enable a court to protect its process from abuse in relation to the enforcement of its orders: Patrick Stevedores Operations No 2 Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia (No 3) (1998) 195 CLR 1; [1998] HCA 30; (1998) 72 ALJR 873 at 892.
2. A defendant subject to a freezing order should be able to have access to his assets for living expenses, payment of debts and legal expenses: Clark Equipment Credit of Australia Ltd v Como Factors Pty Ltd (1998) 14 NSWLR 552 at 569; Glenwood Management Group Pty Ltd v Mayo [1991] 2 VR 49 at 55-56; Frigo v Culhaci [1998] NSWCA 88; Practice Note SC Gen 14 Supreme Court - Freezing Orders (also known as 'Mareva orders' or 'asset preservations orders'), paragraph 12. Including an express carve-out permitting access to assets for ordinary living expenses and reasonable legal expenses in a freezing order have been described as "the general default position": Deputy Commissioner of Taxation v Bollands (2012) 90 ATR 679; [2012] FCA 1050 at [22]. The rationale behind it is that any person the subject of a freezing order should not be deprived of reasonable legal advice to contest the merits of the substantive claim against which the order is based: Goumas v McIntosh [2002] NSWSC 713 at [27].
3. As the freezing order pertains to the entirety of Mr Syed's assets, it was not necessary for him to demonstrate that he has no other assets from which he could fund his defence: cf A v C (No 2) [1981] 2 All ER 126; Australian Iron & Steel Pty Ltd v Buck [1982] 2 NSWLR 889 at 890. Nonetheless, Mr Syed has given a full account of his assets.
4. Funds in court may be paid out to those entitled or their solicitor: rule 41.11 of the Uniform Civil Procedure Rules 2005 (NSW). The Court has a general discretion to determine the release of the funds: Thomson v Golden Destiny Investments Pty Ltd (No 2) [2015] NSWSC 1929 at [151]. The Court may permit payment out of that money if it is satisfied that the release of the funds is necessary to permit the payer (here, Mr Syed and Ms Parveen), to contest the proceedings: Elford v Minty [2017] NSWSC 1455.
5. Enabling Mr Syed to access assets for the purposes of defending the criminal proceedings was said to be in accordance with principle. Where criminal proceedings arise out of the same factual matrix relied upon to obtain a freezing order, it is in both the interests of justice and also the public interest to ensure that Mr Syed is able to defend himself: Council of the Law Society v O'Brien [2019] NSWSC 1879 at [24]. There was no reason to decline to vary the freezing order in this case: Mr Syed faced a large number of criminal charges, convictions for which would place his liberty at stake. Mr Syed would not be properly able to defend himself without use of the funds. Mr Syed will face a significant task defending the criminal proceedings by reason of the sheer number of transactions said to have occurred and the amount in total which he is said to have stolen.
6. Although the plaintiff alleged that it could trace misappropriated monies into the property, Mr Syed submitted that it was not immediately clear how the tracing exercise had been done, and whether it accorded with principle, in particular, whether regard had been had to the rule in Re Hallett's Estate (1880) 13 Ch D 696 such that, where monies are withdrawn from a mixed fund, the account holder is taken to have withdrawn his own funds first. Mr Syed will put the plaintiff to strict proof in respect of its contention that it can trace the plaintiff's funds into the funds paid into court and the extent to which it can demonstrate a proprietary interest. So far, the plaintiff has only been able to trace some $287,000. Further, it was submitted that the plaintiff accepted that Ms Parveen was entitled to half of the proceeds of sale, as she held an interest in the property as joint tenants. As I understood it, however, this was the plaintiff's alternate submission. It was the plaintiff's primary submission that it was entitled to trace into the whole of the proceeds of sale by reason of the fact that the plaintiff has a proprietary claim against Ms Parveen for also having made use of the money said to have been stolen by Mr Syed.
7. The plaintiff submitted that the "Deed of Agreement re freezing orders" points strongly to an exercise of discretion against permitting the monies to be paid out of Court: JKB Holdings Pty Limited v de la Vega [2013] NSWSC 501 per Lindsay J. As stated in Paino v Hofbauer (1998) 13 NSWLR 193 by McHugh J (with whom Clarke JJA and Samuels J agreed) at 198: When a party asks that a consent order based on a contract should be set aside or varied and the underlying contract could not be set aside or varied, the case would need to be exceptional before the Court would exercise its discretion in favour of an applicant. See also Short v Crawley (No 42) [2009] NSWSC 1110 at [45]-[75].
8. The plaintiff submitted that the Court is required to manage the funds in court at its discretion; a guiding factor in this regard is the purpose for which the funds were paid in. This purpose is to be gleaned from the order which required or allowed the payment in. The parties are entitled to insist that the funds in court be properly administered and applied for the purpose for which they were paid. By reason of the terms of the deed and order made on 26 May 2020, the purpose for the payment into court was that the net proceeds of the sale of the Rhodes property would be "security" for the plaintiff's claims in the proceedings for the duration of the proceedings. Mr Syed's application for the payment of funds out of court seeks to have the Court act in a way that is inconsistent with the purpose the funds were paid in, and the entitlement of the parties that the funds in court will be managed in accordance with the purpose they were paid in. For these reasons, his application for payment of funds out of court should be refused. Absent the plaintiff's agreement, the Court should not permit payment out until final determination of the proceedings; otherwise it will not be acting in accordance with the purpose for which the funds were paid in. Further, the funds in court were subject to a trust when paid in, which persisted: JKB Holdings Pty Ltd v de la Vega at [101].
9. Secondly, the plaintiff submitted that the funds were impressed with a trust in favour of the plaintiff by reason of Mr Syed's fraud: Black v S Freedman & Co [1910] HCA 58; (1910) 12 CLR 105 at 110; Re Hallet's Estate at 708; Rheem Australia Pty Ltd v McInnes [2020] NSWSC 1313 at [128], [221] [241] per Parker J; Russell Gould Pty Ltd v Ramangkura (2014) 87 NSWLR 552; [2014] NSWCA 310 at [31]-[33] per Barrett JA (with whom Bathurst CJ and Ward JA agreed). The plaintiff claims a proprietary interest in the funds in Court, in which case, there is no predisposition to allow access to trust funds for payment of a defendant's living or legal expenses: Re Courtenay House Capital Trading Group Pty Limited (in liquidation) (2018) 133 ACSR 451; [2018] NSWSC 1918 at [51]; Petar v Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc [2006] NSWCA 277 at [59]-[60] and [85]. Further, to permit the funds to be used to pay legal costs may be a waste of alleged trust funds to no purpose where the defence cannot be funded to completion: Petar v Macedonian at [83]. Where there is a prima facie case that the property is trust property, the Court should be attentive to protect trust property: Petar v Macedonian at [85].
10. The plaintiff also submitted that there is no evidence that Mr Syed has applied for legal aid. The estimate of the costs of the criminal trial were said to be a guess, given that no plea had yet been entered.

Consideration

1. The legal principles were as advanced by the plaintiff and Mr Syed. The question is how these principles should be applied to the facts at hand noting, of course, that there is a limit to what Mr Syed can say in respect of the evidentiary material relied upon by the plaintiff as he has chosen to exercise his right to silence. Accepting that, there is a substantial amount of material in support of the plaintiff's contention on this application that Mr Syed appears to have defrauded the plaintiff for amounts in excess of $3 million over several years. The tracing exercise undertaken by the plaintiff thus far has been undertaken from 1 January 2015 onwards. There are several years of Mr Syed's employ yet to be explored, noting that he commenced employment with the plaintiff in 2008. There is also a significant amount of evidence which indicates that the plaintiff may be entitled to the proprietary relief it seeks, including against Ms Parveen. Of course, at a final hearing, the plaintiff's evidence will be tested thoroughly and the defendants may advance evidence which puts a different complexion on the transactions identified by the plaintiff's forensic accountants as suspicious.
2. In JKB Holdings Pty Ltd v de la Vega, Lindsay J considered the principles concerning an application for payment out of funds paid into court "pending court order or written agreement between the parties": at [90]. When the parties have given close attention to the precise scope of what the fund paid into court would secure, the preferable view is that it was intended to secure any monetary liability of one to the other that might be established in the proceedings which includes any costs order: [88]-[92]. At [99]: At least in proceedings in which parties have agreed that moneys be paid into court "to abide the order of the court" in circumstances in which there is no pre-existing trust, the right of the claimant of funds in court may, generally, be a right to due administration of the funds in court, and a right to be heard about disposition of those funds, rather than a right of property: Harmer v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1991) 173 CLR 264 at 272-274 …
3. His Honour observed that, if the funds in court are subject to a pre-existing trust, they remain so: [101]. At [111]: … funds paid into court for a particular purpose associated, as it must be, with the administration of justice by the court, are dedicated to that purpose and orders made by the court in pursuit of that purpose. It is not open to claimants to the funds, by private agreement unattended by an order of the court, to divert the funds away from a purpose to which they are dedicated or to override orders of the court.
4. The plaintiff did not contend that the deed, considered in light of JKB Holdings, deprived the Court of power to amend the freezing order or permit the funds in Court to be paid out as requested by Mr Syed, but rather that the existence of the deed and the circumstances in which the money was paid into Court pointed strongly in favour of refusing the orders sought. Accepting that, I also agree with the submissions of Mr Syed's counsel that the deed should be viewed against the context in which it was entered into, where freezing orders had been made and the deed was a convenient way of dealing with the circumstances in which the plaintiff agreed to vary the freezing order to permit the Rhodes property to be sold. I note that it was also in the plaintiff's interests that the defendants' assets were reduced to monetary form and placed with the court. Thus, the deed is a factor which I will take into account, but it is not determinative.
5. There is a risk of injustice to My Syed if he cannot use the proceeds of sale of the Rhodes property to fund his legal expenses, in particular, to defend legal proceedings where a penal sentence may be imposed. There is also an obvious risk of injustice if the plaintiff who, on the face of it, has a proprietary claim to a substantial portion of the monies presently in court - and, as further tracing work is completed, may be able to trace into more or all of these funds - has those monies expended on those legal costs. That may have the effect of compounding the loss suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the alleged fraud.
6. Ultimately the question is whether Mr Syed should be allowed to use what may well be the plaintiff's money to defend himself. In Polly Peck International Plc v Nadir (No 2) [1992] 4 All ER 769, Scott LJ stated at 784: There is, in general, no reason why a defendant should be permitted to use money belonging to another in order to pay his legal costs or other expenses. The objection in principle to the grant of a Mareva injunction to which I have referred does not apply to an injunction to preserve a fund that, in the contention of PPI, belongs to PPI.
7. As Garling J noted in Birketu Pty Ltd v Westpac Banking Corporation (No 2) [2018] NSWSC 494 at [60]-[61]: 60 In light of Birketu's proprietary claim to the money in the accounts subject to the Freezing Order, there is an "obvious risk of injustice" to Birketu if the Clarke Motion is successful. If Birketu ultimately succeeds in obtaining final relief, its funds will have been used to finance Mr Clarke's unsuccessful defence, compounding the loss suffered as a consequence of the alleged fraud. 61 Accordingly, a "careful and anxious judgment" is required, whereby the Court must assess whether any injustice to Birketu will be outweighed by any potential injustice to Mr Clarke if he is precluded from accessing funds, and is therefore perhaps denied the opportunity to advance an arguable defence: Sundt Wrigley Co Ltd v Wrigley (Court of Appeal (UK), 23rd June 1993, unrep), Bingham MR, cited in Halifax v Chandler [2001] EWCA Civ 1750 at [17]. In Birketu, Garling J was satisfied that the applicant should not be allowed to access money to which he had no legal or moral claim to enable him to spend it on private representation of his choice: at [63], citing Commonwealth of Australia v Jansenderger (Unreported, Supreme Court of Victoria, 3 October 1985).
8. Birketu v Westpac was followed by Black J in Re Courtenay House: at [49]. Further, at [51]: … the usual position when making freezing orders is that an allowance is made for living expenses and legal expenses … [D]ifferent considerations may apply in respect of trust property and there is no predisposition to allow access to trust funds for payment of a defendant's living and legal expenses: Petar v Macedonian Orthodox Community Church St Petka Inc [2006] NSWCA 277 at [59]; Badman v Drake [2008] NSWSC 968 at [6]; Australian Spirit Management Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Taxation [2012] NSWSC 123 at [11]. The [defendants] also recognised the relevance of the strength or otherwise of the Plaintiffs' case and that the Court may have regard to the balance of justice between permitting the Defendants to expend funds which might belong to the Plaintiffs, and refusing to allow them to expend funds which might belong to them: Independent Trustee Services Ltd v GP Noble Trustees Ltd [2009] EWHC 161 (Ch) at [6].
9. In Courtenay House, Black J considered that the plaintiffs had a good claim and the defendants had other assets with which to fund their defence. His Honour did not accept that the plaintiffs' application to vary the freezing orders to exclude the payment of living expenses and legal expenses from specified bank accounts prevented the defendants from defending themselves "as distinct from reserving monies that are substantially, even if not wholly, trust monies for the benefit of parties who have a strong claim to them": at [52].
10. Re Courtenay House is somewhat different to the facts at hand in that Mr Syed apparently does not have other assets which he could realise in order to fund his defence in these and related criminal proceedings. There do, however, appear to be some other avenues available to Mr Syed to fund his legal expenses. He is working, although not earning a great deal of money. He has been able to enter into an instalment arrangement with his lawyers to pay their fees, although does not appear to have adhered to that arrangement. He is living with his wife, who is taking care of household expenses. He has borrowed money from his wife in the past. His wife appears to be in employment.
11. Having regard to the quality and nature of the case against the plaintiff, the amount of money allegedly defrauded, the period of time which it appears that the forensic accountants work have examined thus far and have yet to examine, I am concerned that making the orders sought by Mr Syed may have the consequence that he will be using money belonging to the plaintiff in order to pay his legal costs, compounding the loss suffered by the plaintiff as a consequence of the alleged fraud. I consider that the potential injustice to the plaintiff outweighs the potential injustice to Mr Syed. I decline to make the orders sought.

Orders

1. I make the following orders: 1. Leave granted to the first defendant to file in Court: 1. the affidavit of Tarek Kheir sworn 19 November 2020; and 2. the affidavit of Mohammed Syed sworn 19 November 2020. 1. Leave granted to the first defendant to amend the amount in prayer 3(a) of his Notice of Motion to $66,000 which is initialled by me and dated today. 2. Dismiss the notice of motion filed by the first defendant on 24 July 2020 with costs. 3. Dismiss the plaintiff's motion filed on 14 August, 2020 with no order as to costs.

DISCLAIMER - Every effort has been made to comply with suppression orders or statutory provisions prohibiting publication that may apply to this judgment or decision. The onus remains on any person using material in the judgment or decision to ensure that the intended use of that material does not breach any such order or provision. Further enquiries may be directed to the Registry of the Court or Tribunal in which it was generated. Decision last updated: 11 December 2020