Consideration
25 The legislation upon which the applicants rely provides the Court with broad discretionary powers to grant relief to trustees (pursuant to s 76 Trusts Act) and liquidators (pursuant to s 1318 Corporations Act) in circumstances where such persons could otherwise be personally liable. The relevant legislation provides as follows:
Trusts Act
76 Power of court to relieve trustee from personal liability
If it appears to the court that a trustee, whether appointed by the court or otherwise, is, or may be, personally liable for any breach of trust, whether the transaction alleged to be a breach of trust occurred before or after the commencement of this Act, but has acted honestly and reasonably, and ought fairly to be excused for the breach of trust and for omitting to obtain the directions of the court in the matter in which the trustee committed the breach, then the court may relieve the trustee either wholly or partly from personal liability for that breach.
Corporations Act
Power to grant relief
(1) If, in any civil proceeding against a person to whom this section applies for negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty in a capacity as such a person, it appears to the court before which the proceedings are taken that the person is or may be liable in respect of the negligence, default or breach but that the person has acted honestly and that, having regard to all the circumstances of the case, including those connected with the person's appointment, the person ought fairly to be excused for the negligence, default or breach, the court may relieve the person either wholly or partly from liability on such terms as the court thinks fit.
(2) Where a person to whom this section applies has reason to apprehend that any claim will or might be made against the person in respect of any negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty in a capacity as such a person, the person may apply to the Court for relief, and the Court has the same power to relieve the person as it would have had under subsection (1) if it had been a court before which proceedings against the person for negligence, default, breach of trust or breach of duty had been brought.
(3) …
(4) This section applies to a person who is:
….
(d) a receiver, receiver and manager, liquidator or other person appointed or directed by the Court to carry out any duty under this Act in relation to a corporation.
…
26 The applicants also rely on s 94 of the Trusts Act which empowers the Court to make orders to aid parties where a transaction would be inexpedient, difficult or impracticable without the Court's assistance. Specifically, s 94 provides:
94 Court's jurisdiction to make other orders
(1) Where in the opinion of the court any sale, lease, mortgage, surrender, release or other disposition, or any purchase, investment, acquisition, retention, expenditure or other transaction is expedient in the management or administration of any property vested in a trustee, or would be in the best interests of the persons, or the majority of the persons, beneficially interested under the trust, but it is inexpedient or difficult or impracticable to effect the disposition or transaction without the assistance of the court, or it or they can not be effected by reason of the absence of any power for that purpose vested in the trustee by the trust instrument (if any) or by law, the court may by order confer upon the trustee, either generally or in any particular instance, the necessary power for the purpose, on such terms, and subject to such provisions and conditions (if any) as the court may think fit, and may direct in what manner any money authorised to be expended, and the costs of any transaction, are to be paid or borne, and as to the incidence thereof between capital and income.
(2) ….
(3) An application to the court under this section may be made by the trustees, or by any of them, or by any person beneficially interested under the trust.
27 Finally, s 479(3) of the Corporations Act empowers a liquidator to apply to the Court for directions in relation to any particular matter arising under the winding up. This section is expressed in very wide terms - Re Tietyens Investments Pty Ltd [1999] FCA 206 at [67]; Coats v Southern Cross Airlines Holdings Ltd (in liq) (1998) 16 ACLC 1393 at 1400.
28 In seeking relief, the applicants rely on the decision of Gordon J in Caterpillar Financial Australia Ltd v Ovens Nominees Pty Ltd [2011] FCA 677. There are clearly strong similarities between the facts before her Honour in that case and the facts before me. In Caterpillar the background was described as follows:
2. On 10 February 2011, the Company was wound up by Court order and the Liquidator was appointed. The Company is recorded as trustee of the Trust constituted by a deed of trust dated 25 November 2002 (the Trust Deed).
3. The Liquidator's investigations into the affairs of the Company revealed that the Company acted only as trustee of the Trust and in no other capacity and that all assets owned by the Company are held by it as trustee of the Trust and all liabilities incurred by the Company were incurred by it in its capacity as trustee of the Trust.
4. The principal asset of the Company consists of real property at 109 Panorama Drive, Doonan in the State of Queensland (the Queensland Property) which property is held by the Company as trustee of the Trust. Westpac Banking Corporation (the secured lender) (Westpac) holds a first registered mortgage over the Queensland Property.
5. In addition to Westpac as a secured creditor, the Liquidator's investigations have identified other general unsecured creditors. These other general unsecured creditors have a claim against the Company which, in turn, has a right of indemnity out of the Trust Assets.
6. Clause 7.5 (b)(i) of the Trust Deed provides that the trustee will cease to be the trustee immediately if an official liquidator is appointed. Clause 7.2 of the Trust Deed provides that the appointor of the Trust may, by registered deed at any time, appoint a new trustee in the place of any trustee who resigns or ceases to be a trustee by operation of law. The evidence disclosed that Donna Anne Mottek (Ms Mottek), as appointor of the Trust, has not since the winding up of the Company exercised the power to appoint a replacement trustee under cl 7.2 of the Trust Deed and has no intention to exercise that power in the future.
7. As a result, the Company is currently a bare trustee and holds the assets of the Trust (including the Queensland Property) for the beneficiaries of the Trust.
8. As bare trustee, the Company has limited powers to deal with the assets of the Trust. The rights of exoneration and indemnity are not otherwise affected and the creditors' rights of recourse against the assets of the Trust remain unaffected.
9. The Liquidator formed the view that the appropriate course is for the Liquidator on behalf of the Company as bare trustee to be given powers necessary to deal with the assets of the Company the subject of the Trust so as to realise those assets and otherwise account for those assets in the ordinary course of the winding up of the Company as corporate trustee.
29 The only distinction of note between the facts in Caterpillar and those before me is that in this proceeding the liquidator has sold all of the assets of the company, compared with the circumstances in Caterpillar where a number of assets remained unsold at the time of the relevant application. While notable, I do not consider this distinction material in the circumstances of this case.
30 Like the case before me, the liquidator in Caterpillar applied to the Court for relief:
pursuant to s 479 and s 1318 of the Corporations Act;
pursuant to s 67 of the Trustee Act 1958 (Vic) which is in substantially identical terms to s 76 of the Trusts Act; and
pursuant to s 63 of the Trustee Act 1958 (Vic) which is in substantially identical terms to s 94 of the Trusts Act.
31 In considering the application before the Court in Caterpillar, Gordon J said as follows:
26. There is no present likelihood of a new trustee being appointed. The appointor will not act and she is the only beneficiary of the Trust. No creditor has moved for appointment of a new trustee. The Company is and will remain a bare trustee. It may still hold the assets of the Trust. Its duties, powers and rights are limited to protecting the Trust assets: see, by way of example, Commissioner of Taxation v Bruton Holdings Pty Limited (in liq) [2008] FCAFC 184 at [79]; Commissioner of Taxation v Bruton Holdings Pty Limited (in liq) [2010] FCA 978 at [52] and Herdegen v Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1988) 84 ALR 271 at 281. However, the bare trustee retains its right of indemnity or exoneration and its lien over the assets of the Trust.
32 Later in the judgment her Honour continued:
35. As is apparent, there are two questions. First, is it appropriate despite the absence of any power vested in the Company to sell assets of the Trust, for the Court to confer upon the Company the power of sale of the assets of the Trust (s 63 of the Trustee Act) and, if so, is it appropriate for the Court to excuse the Liquidator from selling the BMW when the Company did not have that power of sale.
36. The answer to the first question is yes. The Company became a bare trustee of the assets of the Trust immediately upon the winding up of the Company and the appointment of the Liquidator: see [26] above. Next, the Company acted only as trustee of the Trust and in no other capacity and all assets owned by the Company are held by it as trustee of the Trust and all liabilities incurred by the Company were incurred by it in its capacity as trustee of the Trust: see [3] above. Thirdly, where, as has occurred here, the appointor is unwilling for whatever reason to appoint a new trustee, it is appropriate for the Court to confer upon the Company the power of sale of the assets of the Trust pursuant to s 63 of the Trustee Act subject, of course, to the duties prescribed by that Act.
37. The next question concerns the fact that the BMW was sold when there was no power of sale conferred. No explanation was proffered by the Liquidator as to why or how that occurred. As a result, the Liquidator was called to give viva voce evidence at the hearing of the application.
38. The explanation is important because the duties and obligations differ depending on whether the Liquidator acted at a time when he knew or had reason to know that the Company was a bare trustee. If he did not know and did not have reason to know, the duties of a trustee cannot be imposed. The Liquidator is, however, compelled in equity to return the trust property and must pay compensation if this is not done. If, on the other hand, he did know or have reason to know, then the trustee must safeguard the property and account for it: Ford HAJ and Lee WA, The Law of Trusts, 4th ed, 2010, Thomson Legal & Regulatory Group Limited.
39. The Court referred the Liquidator to s 67 of the Trustee Act. In any event, s 67 will not assist a trustee which has failed to adduce evidence of honesty and reasonableness. In dealing with an equivalent provision in the United Kingdom, the Privy Council in National Trustees Co of Australasia Ltd v General Finance Co of Australasia Ltd [1905] AC 373 (PC) at 381 stated that:
Unless both [honesty and reasonableness] are proved the Court cannot help the trustees; but if both are made out, there is then a case for the Court to consider whether the trustee ought fairly to be excused for the breach, looking at all the circumstances.
See also Re Stuart [1897] 2 Ch 583 at 592 and Wilkie v McCalla (No 3) [1905] VicLawRp 45; [1905] VLR 278 at 286, 293.
40. However, in Kerferd v Perpetual Executors and Trustees Association of Australasia Ltd [1893] VicLawRp 104; (1893) 19 VLR 700 at 706, Holroyd J stated that if a trustee's conduct would have been authorised by the Court had the trustee sought its directions, the trustee may expect to be excused.
41. As noted earlier, the Liquidator was called to give evidence and the Court was able to ask questions about the circumstances in which the BMW was sold. In general terms, the Liquidator's evidence was that the BMW was a motor vehicle leased from BMW Finance, which was sold at public auction by Grays Auctioneers for a price not less than the value placed on the vehicle by the auctioneers. The BMW was sold with the approval of BMW Finance. The Liquidator has accounted to BMW Finance for the payout under the lease agreement and retains the balance (approximately $15,000) in his capacity as Liquidator. The Liquidator's evidence, which I accept, was that the BMW was sold before the Liquidator was aware of the issues concerning the Trust Deed. The BMW was not sold at an undervalue. His conduct was both honest and reasonable.
42. In those circumstances, I consider that it is appropriate to grant the Liquidator a declaration pursuant to s 1318 of the Corporations Act and further or alternatively s 67 of the Trustee Act that in his capacity as liquidator he acted honestly, and ought fairly to be excused, for any breaches, failures or omissions, relating to the administration of the Company in relation to the sale of the BMW.
33 In my view the reasoning of her Honour is equally applicable to the facts before me.
34 Similarly to circumstances in Caterpillar, it appears that since the application for winding up of the company was filed, the company has been a bare trustee of the Trust. As the learned judge observed in Caterpillar, a bare trustee does not have a power of sale: Caterpillar at [26]; cf ISPT Nominees Pty Ltd v Chief Commissioner of State Revenue (2003) NSWLR 196 at [248], [278]; Joyce v Cam [2004] NSWSC 621 at [35]. However the material before the Court in this proceeding supports a finding that the liquidator sold the assets of the company in the reasonable and honest belief that he was entitled to do so pursuant to his rights and duties as the liquidator of the company, and in the absence of information from persons directly connected with the company as to the existence of the Trust. The liquidator was clearly also under some pressure from the lessor of the premises at which the assets were located to remove them, and in light of both the risk of the company being forcibly removed from the leased premises and the high cost of rent to continue to store the assets at the leased premises (para 13 of the affidavit of William John Fletcher sworn 23 May 2012).
35 There are no submissions before the Court supporting a finding that the liquidator acted otherwise than honestly and reasonably at all times. The application before the Court is not opposed.
36 In the circumstances I consider it appropriate to make the orders sought by the applicants.
I certify that the preceding thirty-six (36) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Collier.