Cook v ASP Ship Management

The proceeding in the Tribunal 10 It will be seen that there was a very long time between the making of the applications to the Tribunal and their determination. Counsel for the respondent informed the Court that part of this delay might have been due to the fact that the appellant commenced other proceedings in this Court in the course of that time. The Tribunal hearing began on 21 June 2005. The appellant was not in attendance, having advised the Tribunal on the previous day that he would be unable to attend. The Tribunal decided to proceed in his absence, pursuant to the power granted by s 40(1)(b) of the AAT Act to proceed in the absence of a party who has had reasonable notice of the proceeding. The Tribunal gave reasons for proceeding in that manner. Those reasons are set out in full in [15] of the reasons for judgment of North J. They detail the attempts that the Tribunal made to accommodate the difficulties the appellant claimed to have in relation to the Tribunal hearing. Hearing dates were fixed for days that were not consecutive. Difficulty in arranging the attendance of Mr Wearne, an orthopaedic surgeon who was to give evidence on behalf of the appellant, were overcome. Financial assistance with public transport was offered, because the appellant said his wife was ill and could not drive him to the Tribunal. The Tribunal detailed its attempts to conduct directions hearings by telephone and the appellant's refusal to participate, on the ground that he had defective hearing. The Tribunal referred to telephone calls in which Tribunal staff and the appellant had spoken. 11 Counsel for the respondent informed the Court that, after the Tribunal had made its decision on 21 June 2005 to proceed in the absence of the appellant, the Tribunal did not hear any of the substance of the application until 23 June 2005. On that day, the Tribunal heard the evidence, including evidence from Mr Wearne, and submissions by counsel for the respondent. The third day that had been fixed for the hearing, 26 June 2005, was not used. Subsequently, the appellant communicated with the Tribunal as to the accuracy of evidence given by a witness for whom the appellant had worked for some time. The Tribunal conducted a further day's hearing on 28 March 2006, at which the appellant did appear in person. The Tribunal heard further evidence on that day. 12 The Tribunal's decision on 29 May 2006 was accompanied by detailed reasons on the merits of the applications for review, amounting to 72 paragraphs. For present purposes, it is unnecessary to deal with the detail of those reasons.

The proceeding at first instance 13 By his amended notice of appeal from the Tribunal's decision, which was apparently drawn by his pro bono counsel, the appellant raised what was essentially a case of denial of procedural fairness. He questioned whether the Tribunal failed to afford him procedural fairness by proceeding to hear the applications for review in his absence, notwithstanding that he had given adequate prior notice to the Tribunal that he was unable to attend the hearing on the scheduled dates due to illness, and that material witnesses were unable to attend because they were out of Victoria or ill at the time of the scheduled hearing. He also referred to the denial of his right to cross-examine witnesses on questions of fact as to which the Tribunal had made findings beneficial to the respondent. The appellant invoked s 39 of the AAT Act, which requires the Tribunal to "ensure that every party to a proceeding before the Tribunal is given a reasonable opportunity to present his or her case". In addition, the appellant relied on the principles of procedural fairness, particularly the denial of the opportunity to cross-examine. 14 The crucial reasoning of North J is found in [21] of his Honour's reasons for judgment: I do not accept that the Tribunal breached s 39(1) of the Act. It was reasonable for the Tribunal to offer Mr Cook a phone directions hearing in view of the contact by phone which Mr Cook had previously had with the Tribunal. The Tribunal was not obliged to simply accept his assertions in favour of an adjournment without further elaboration. It explained in its reasons that the absence of Mrs Cook to assist him at the hearing could be addressed by arrangements made at the hearing. It had the report of Mr Wearne about Mr Cook's ability to drive and use the train which justified its conclusion that Mr Cook could attend. In any event, the Tribunal was not bound to accept that Mrs Cook could not attend as the medical certificate relating to her was fairly uninformative. Her unavailability was not necessarily, on its own, a reason for the Tribunal to grant the adjournment. At [24], his Honour pointed out that the Tribunal had attempted to mitigate any difficulty for the appellant in attending the Tribunal by suggesting that a directions hearing would be held by telephone. He said that there was nothing to suggest that the Tribunal failed to take into account the fact that the appellant was unrepresented, or the consequences of proceeding in his absence, if it was bound to take those consequences into account. He referred to the fact that s 40(1)(b) of the AAT Act provided for the conduct of a hearing in the absence of a party.

The grounds of appeal 15 It is clear that the grounds in the appellant's notice of appeal to this Court have not been prepared with the assistance of legal advice. Ground 1 reads "Procedural unfairness/no recognition of appellants [sic] deafness", followed by two sets of ditto marks under the word "recognition" and the words "severity of injury." Ground 2 is "Error of Law! Reliance on AAT judgment when unable to attend thro' [sic] illness". Ground 3 is "Misunderstanding basic facts of case". Ground 4 is "Narrow judgment of facts AAT knew at the time - misuse of surreptitious' [sic] phone recording-failure to independantly [sic] determine whether illness was factual."

Consideration of grounds 16 An appeal from a decision of the Tribunal is limited by s 44(1) of the AAT Act to an appeal on a question of law. It is therefore not open to a person appealing from a Tribunal decision to invite the Court to make findings of fact at variance with those made by the Tribunal. The facts found by the Tribunal are the facts of the case, for the purposes of such an appeal. Only if there is error of law can the Court send the case back to the Tribunal to undertake the task of finding the facts again, if necessary. To the extent to which the appellant's grounds of appeal seek to invite the Court to take a view of the facts different from that taken by the Tribunal, they invite the Court to do something beyond its powers. In one way or another, all four of the grounds of appeal appear to invite the Court to form its own views as to what the facts were. Ground 1 asks this Court to form a view as to the appellant's deafness and the severity of his injury. Ground 2 invites a finding that the appellant was unable to attend the Tribunal hearing because of illness. Ground 3 seeks at least a reinterpretation of what are described as the basic facts of the case. Ground 4 asks the Court to find that there was surreptitious recording of telephone conversations, and to find that the Tribunal failed to determine independently whether the appellant's illness was factual. These things the Court cannot do. Nor could they have been done by North J. Counsel then appearing for the appellant did not invite North J to make findings of fact. So far as it is based on a desire to challenge any finding of fact made by the Tribunal, this appeal cannot succeed. 17 It has been recognised that a denial of procedural fairness is an error of law on the part of the Tribunal, and can therefore form the basis of an appeal to the Court under s 44 of the AAT Act. See Clements v Independent Indigenous Advisory Committee [2003] FCAFC 143 (2003) 131 FCR 28 at [30]-[35] per Gray ACJ and North J. A failure by the Tribunal to comply with its obligation under s 39(1) of the AAT Act, to provide a reasonable opportunity to a party to present his or her case, would also be an error of law, by parity of reasoning. It has also been recognised that, for the purpose of establishing a denial of procedural fairness, a person appealing from a decision of the Tribunal may tender evidence to the Court, if it is necessary to do so to establish such a denial. See Clements at [9]-[14] per Gray ACJ and North J. This is because the facts that disclose a denial of procedural fairness are sometimes not apparent from the Tribunal's reasons. Clements was a case in which the Tribunal dismissed an application for review because the applicant did not appear at the hearing. It did so without being aware that, through no fault of his own, the applicant had not received notice of the hearing. 18 In the present case, it is apparent from the reasons for judgment of North J that the appellant did not place before the Court at first instance any evidence designed to establish a denial of procedural fairness on the part of the Tribunal. Counsel then appearing for the appellant argued that, in the circumstances that the Tribunal found were disclosed by the facts as it found them, the Tribunal had failed to afford the appellant procedural fairness, and had failed to comply with its obligation to provide him with a reasonable opportunity to present his case. The proceeding at first instance was therefore conducted on the basis of the facts as found by the Tribunal, in its reasons for decision on the question whether it would proceed in the appellant's absence, delivered on 21 June 2005. On the basis of those facts, it is clear that North J made no error. The efforts made by the Tribunal to satisfy the appellant's requests in relation to the hearing, and its efforts to involve him in the process of managing the case for a hearing, demonstrated amply that the Tribunal gave the appellant a reasonable opportunity to present his case. In doing so, it afforded him procedural fairness. The appellant did not take advantage of the opportunity offered. 19 The appellant did not apply to this Court for the exercise of its limited power to admit further evidence on appeal, pursuant to s 27 of the Federal Court Act. His failure to complete the process of preparation of the appeal papers has meant that he has not placed before the Court any of the material that he should have, let alone any other material. If he had invited the exercise of the power to receive further evidence, the appellant would have had to persuade the Court that it was appropriate to give him leave to rely on grounds of appeal that were not advanced as grounds at first instance. If the evidence he had proposed had been contentious, this would have been a further difficulty. 20 The decision of the Tribunal to deal with the case in the exercise of its power given by s 40(1)(b) of the AAT Act, by hearing it in the appellant's absence, was the exercise of a discretionary power. An appeal from an exercise of discretion does not succeed on the basis that the appeal court might have exercised the discretion differently, if it had been doing so afresh. Such an appeal succeeds only if the exercise of the discretion has miscarried, on the application of the well-known principles laid down in House v The King (1936) 55 CLR 499 at 504-505 per Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ. In their application to the exercise of discretion by the Tribunal, these principles are circumscribed by the requirement that an appeal from a decision of the Tribunal be limited to questions of law. To the extent to which the grounds of appeal in the present case appear to challenge the Tribunal's exercise of discretion on the ground that it mistook the facts, they cannot be entertained. Nothing in the grounds of appeal provides a basis for suggesting error on the part of North J in refusing to overturn the Tribunal's exercise of discretion. In order to succeed on an appeal, it is necessary to show that the judgment appealed from is the result of error. 21 We have examined the reasons for judgment of North J. We are unable to discern any error by his Honour. Nor have we been able to discover any basis on which the exercise of the Tribunal's discretion to proceed in the absence of the appellant could be overturned. The appeal to this Court is entirely without merit. It is appropriate to dismiss it on that basis, notwithstanding the absence of the appellant from the hearing. It is unnecessary to look in detail at material the appellant sent by facsimile transmission to the Court after the Full Court refused to adjourn the hearing of the appeal. That material relates to the appellant's medical conditions. Nothing in that material supported a conclusion that the date of the appeal hearing should be vacated.

Conclusion 22 For the reasons we have given, the appeal to this Court must be dismissed. In accordance with the usual principle, that costs follow the event, the appellant will be ordered to pay the respondent's costs of the appeal. I certify that the preceding twenty-two (22) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justices Gray, Emmett and Besanko.

The appellant did not appear and was not represented

Counsel for the respondent: Mr J Lenczner

Solicitor for the respondent: Holman Fenwick Willan