Consideration
9 It is common ground that the Court will ordinarily permit a party to replead provided it is clear that there is point in doing so and that the further time and opportunity will have utility: Nulyarimma v Thompson (1999) 96 FCR 153 at 210; Kirby J in Thorpe v Commonwealth (No 3) (1997) 144 ALR 677 at 686-7. I am prepared to grant the applicants leave to file the proposed amended statement of claim in the form of annexure A to its interlocutory application. I have formed this view for the following reasons.
10 As a general proposition I note that, in order to be competent, the statement of claim must be such as to put the respondent on notice of an applicant's case. The parties have drawn my attention to a number of cases where this Court has considered pleadings and whether those pleadings stated material facts, being facts necessary for the purposes of formulating a complete cause of action. I note in particular Trade Practices Commission v David Jones (Australia) Pty Ltd (1985) 7 FCR 109; Charlie Carter Pty Ltd v The Shop, Distributive and Allied Employees' Association of Western Australia (1987) 13 FCR 413; McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services (1999) 165 ALR 409; and Wright Rubber Products Pty Ltd v Bayer AG [2008] FCA 1510. These cases contain helpful and learned expositions of legal principle relevant to the case before me. It is trite to note, however, that each case must be resolved in accordance with its own facts.
11 Critically, clause 2.11(1)(b) of the Tarong Agreement requires the respondent to notify employees and consult with them if the respondent has made a preliminary decision to introduce a major change to the workplace and "the change is likely to have a significant effect on employees of the enterprise". It is clear that mere bald allegations in the statement of claim to the effect of the language in clause 2.11(1)(b) would be inadequate to support that pleading. Indeed, the respondent claims in substance that the proposed amendments achieve no more than a bald statement to that effect.
12 I do not agree. The proposed amendments to the statement of claim in this case contain material facts upon which the applicants rely in support of their claim that the decision of the respondent to restart units 4 and 2 at Tarong is likely to have a significant effect upon employees. In this respect, for example, the statement of claim as proposed by the applicant in this case can be contrasted with the paragraphs in the statement of claim struck out in Trade Practices Commission v David Jones. In that case, in respect of a claim of parties acting in accordance with "an arrangement" in contravention of s 45(2)(a)(ii) of the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth), the applicant pleaded that the respondents "made an arrangement or arrived at an understanding" without actually pleading material facts supporting that statement. In comparison, the proposed amendments to the applicants' statement of claim in the case before me follow a pattern in that they:
state material facts describing a series of teams and their responsibilities;
state that those teams are working at capacity in that each of the members of the team was fully engaged in required work for his or her ordinary hours of employment; and
plead further that when units 4 and 2 are brought back into service additional work will be required of the teams because additional plant will be brought on line.
13 In the case before me the proposed amendments clearly state material facts relevant to the current duties of employees of the respondent, and the manner in which the recommencement of operation units 4 and 2 will allegedly impact on those duties.
14 The respondent takes particular issue with the applicants' claims in paragraphs 22, 27, 31, 35 and 40 that the workers are "working at capacity" because they are "fully engaged" in their work. While the phrases "at capacity" and "fully engaged" are conclusionary, I accept Mr Friend's submission that pleading in a statement of claim that workers are fully engaged with their work is unremarkable when supported by pleaded specific facts describing the occupations of employees and their respective duties. In this respect I also note the principle articulated in relevant authorities to the effect that not all conclusionary pleadings are liable to be struck out as deficient, and that the proper approach to such pleadings will depend upon whether the facts are pleaded at too great a level of generality (Charlie Carter at 418; Wright Rubber Products at [5]). In my view the facts here pleaded are not at too great a level of generality - rather they are specific and relate to the cause of action pressed by the applicants.
15 In McKellar v Container Terminal Management Services at [26] Weinberg J observed in the context of that case that material facts must be pleaded which show a required causal link between the impugned conduct and such loss as is said to have been suffered by the relevant applicants. It is also my view that, in this case, it is appropriate to read the pleaded material facts in the context of the applicants' cause of action, namely a claim that certain conduct of the respondent is likely to have a particular result. Clearly, the cause of action in this case raises speculative issues, and an evaluation of probabilities. The applicants have - in my view unobjectionably - set out the nature of the work performed by employees, and claimed that additional work will be required of those employees in the circumstances as a result of the respondent's plans. The relevant causal link between the obligation cast on the respondent by clause 2.11(1) of the Tarong Agreement and the necessity for the consultation required by that clause is adequately pleaded. If I were to accept the submissions of the respondent and require the applicant to further elaborate its pleadings in the manner the respondent submits is necessary, I consider that the result would be akin to requiring the applicants to put on evidence before the pleadings have closed. This is not an obligation of the applicants at this stage of the proceeding.
16 Finally, I note that in paragraph 42 the applicants plead that, in light of facts already pleaded in paragraphs 15 to 41, the respondent's decision to bring units 4 and 2 back into service is likely to result in major changes to matters including the composition, operation or size of the respondent's workforce at Tarong or the skills required of employees. The respondent takes issue with this paragraph. I consider however that this paragraph is unobjectionable in that it simply ties together facts pleaded earlier and links those facts with the case the applicants seek to prove in respect of clause 2.11(1) of the Tarong Agreement.