Consideration
20 In my view the Court should not grant the interlocutory relief sought. I take this view for the following reasons.
21 As Logan J observed in Communications, Electrical, Electronic, Energy, Information, Postal, Plumbing and Allied Services Union of Australia v QR Ltd (2010) 198 IR 382 at 395 the right to be consulted is a valuable right. Clause 2.11 of the Tarong agreement requires the respondent to consult with relevant employees and unions in circumstances where a preliminary decision has been made to introduce a major change to production, program, organisation, structure, or technology in relation to its enterprise.
22 "Preliminary decision" is not defined by cl 2.11, however "major change" is defined by cl 2.11(9). Mr Friend SC for the applicants submitted that in this case there had been a preliminary decision, and indeed possibly a final decision, to reactivate the two generating units at Tarong in light of the decision to "mothball" Swanbank. If a "preliminary decision" is one where the employer informs the workers of a proposal, then on the facts of this case it does appear that, indeed, a final decision has been made by Stanwell to reactivate the two units at Tarong, as it was clear from the evidence of both Mr Franklin and Ms Mills that Stanwell is committed to the recommissioning of units 2 and 4 at Tarong rather than merely considering that possibility. No submission was made by Ms Moody for the respondent to suggest that the decision in respect of the reactivation of the units is anything but final, particularly in light of the evidence as to the financial loss the respondent may suffer in the event of delay in its strategy to reactivate those units.
23 If the respondent has made a final decision without consultation in circumstances which trigger cl 2.11 of the Tarong agreement, it is in breach of that agreement. A key question for the Court however at the moment is whether, in the circumstances of this case, the applicants have demonstrated that there is a serious question to be tried - namely, that the decision made by the respondent will introduce a major change and will have a significant effect on employees at Tarong.
24 Mr Friend SC for the applicants submitted that the Court did not need to resolve any conflict in the evidence at this point, that there was more than enough evidence to establish a serious issue to be tried, and that according to Mr Tucker's evidence Mr Franklin accepted that there will need to be a change in the way things are done at Tarong (which is sufficient to trigger cl 2.11). I accept these submissions to a degree. It is true that the Court does not need to resolve any conflict in evidence at this point. However, it is necessary for the Court to consider the evidence put on by the parties at this point to determine whether there is a serious question to be tried, such that the applicant has shown a sufficient likelihood of success to justify in the circumstances the preservation of the status quo pending the trial.
25 In my view there is not.
26 It is clear that the reactivation of units 2 and 4 at Tarong will result in some change in operations at Tarong. Indeed, any claim that the reactivation of those units would result in no change to operations at Tarong would be peculiar. However the plan to reactivate those units does not, of itself, mean that there will be a major change to production, program, organisation, structure or technology in relation to Tarong within the meaning of cl 2.11(9).
27 Numerous affidavits were filed by the applicants in support of their interlocutory application. In my view the statements in these affidavits, to the extent that they seek to sustain a claim of "major change", are in the nature of assertions rather than evidence. Overall I find the evidence filed by the applicants weak and speculative. In respect of certain aspects of evidence of Mr Brunker, Mr Henderson, Mr Bradley and Mr Young, their statements are unsupported opinion evidence. At its highest, the essence of the evidence of the applicants can be distilled as:
1. Stanwell proposes to "mothball" Swanbank, and some workers at Swanbank are interested in being redeployed to Tarong.
2. Two currently "mothballed" generators at Tarong will be reactivated, which will necessarily require more workers, or more hours by existing workers, or changed hours of existing workers.
3. The necessity of more workers or more/different hours of the existing workforce is based upon the fact that there were many redundancies following the decommissioning of the two units in 2012 and 2013.
28 However in light of the strong and credible evidence of Mr Franklin for the respondents, it does not follow - for the purposes of consideration of whether the applicants have established a prima facie case and a serious question to be tried - that simply because there were redundancies following events in 2012 and 2013, the reactivation of the units will automatically require a major change to the composition, operation or size of the workforce, their hours of work or the restructuring of jobs currently at Tarong. In the context of this application I accept Mr Franklin's evidence that following the decommissioning of units 2 and 4 in 2012 and 2013 there were major operational changes at Tarong as well as organisational changes to the workforce structure at Tarong, with the result that the current reconstituted workforce at Tarong will be able to cope with the recommissioning of the two units without major change. Mr Franklin's evidence, founded on his clear experience and a depth of knowledge of operational matters and procedures at Tarong, supports a conclusion that the plans concerning units 2 and 4 will not have a significant effect on employees at Tarong. I agree with the submission of Ms Moody for the respondent that the circumstances currently before the Court are, to that extent, clearly distinguishable from the case in CEPU v QR Ltd, where the employer was required to consult the workers in respect of any proposed changes that would impact on their terms and conditions of employment. I consider that the evidence of Mr Franklin in particular effectively refutes the assertions and claims of the applicants.
29 The applicants have filed evidence in support of their claim for interlocutory relief, and to that extent have raised a question for consideration by the Court in respect of their claim. However if any evidence filed by an applicant for interlocutory relief sufficed to warrant the grant of an interlocutory injunction there would be no role for the Court in assessing the material before it, and no place for the test explained by the High Court in O'Neill. In this case I do not accept the submission of the applicants that the prospect of a change in the way things are done at Tarong triggers cl 2.11 of the Tarong agreement, or that the evidence of the applicants supports a finding by this Court that there is a serious question to be tried justifying the grant of interlocutory injunctive relief.
30 Further, even if I considered that there was a serious question to be tried, I consider that the balance of convenience is clearly tilted in favour of the respondent.
31 Mr Friend SC argued strongly that if the Court did not grant the opportunity for consultation over the next two weeks it would be lost. The logical conclusion to draw from this submission is that the applicants would be irretrievably prejudiced if the interlocutory relief they sought were refused. However no specific detriment to the applicants was identified should the interlocutory relief be refused (and in this context I note the submission of the respondent that no industrial dispute has been raised by the applicants, and no application made to the Fair Work Commission in respect of any absence of consultation). On the other hand, I consider that there would be very real prejudice to the respondent should the interlocutory relief sought by the applicants be granted. Ms Mills gave evidence that the loss to the respondent from even a two week delay would be in the realm of $1.2 million-$1.8 million. I accept her evidence to this effect. I do not accept the submission of the applicants that such sums should be brushed aside as inconsequential for an organisation like Stanwell.
32 The appropriate order is to dismiss the interlocutory application.
I certify that the preceding thirty-two (32) numbered paragraphs are a true copy of the Reasons for Judgment herein of the Honourable Justice Collier.