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[2000] WASC 37
Supreme Court of WA
2000-02-28
Wheeler J
Original judgment source is linked above.
JURISDICTION : SUPREME COURT OF WESTERN AUSTRALIA
CITATION : COMMONWEALTH BANK OF AUSTRALIA -v- RIDOUT NOMINEES PTY LTD & ORS [2000] WASC 37
HEARD : 14-18, 21-25 JUNE, 22 & 23 SEPTEMBER 1999
PETER ALLAN RIDOUT as Executor of the Will of GEORGE EDWARD RIDOUT
CHRISTOPHER JOHN RIDOUT as Executor of the Will of GEORGE EDWARD RIDOUT
Banking and financial institutions - Banker and customer and business of banking - Relationship between banker and customer - Customer under special disability
Corporations - Directors and special disadvantage - Whether corporation under special disability -Inter-company guarantees - Director's duties
Equity - Undue influence - Unconscionable conduct - Enforcement of guarantees
Guarantee and indemnity - Guarantees - The contract of guarantee - Rights of surety - Actions against surety - Indebtedness of company - Personal guarantees by directors - Unconscionability - Guarantee given by volunteers - Failure to understand effect of guarantee
Husband and wife - Contracts - Married women - Whether wife in position of volunteer - Whether principles in Yerkey v Jones applicable
Mortgages - Mortgages and charges - Execution of mortgages and agency - Remedies of mortgagor
Trusts and trustees - Construction of trust deeds - Breach of trust
Parties invited to make submissions on form of orders
Second Defendant : Mr W S Martin QC & Mr A Atkinson
Fourth Defendants : Mr W S Martin QC & Mr A Atkinson
Sixth Defendants : Mr W S Martin QC & Mr A Atkinson
Seventh Defendant : Mr W S Martin QC & Mr A Atkinson
Eighth Defendant : Mr W S Martin QC & Mr A Atkinson
Ninth Defendants : Mr W S Martin QC & Mr A Atkinson
A H McDonald & Co Ltd v Wells [1931] HCA 24; (1930-1931) 45 CLR 506
AGC (Advances) Ltd v Breton Bay Land Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA; Library No 8682; 18 January 1991
Alati v Kruger [1955] HCA 64; (1955) 94 CLR 216
Alderton v The Prudential Assurance Company Limited [1993] FCA 127; (1993) 41 FCR 435
Aliotta v Broadmeadows Bus Service Pty Ltd (1988) 10 ATPR 40-873
Allcard v Skinner (1887) Ch D 145
ANZ Banking Group v Barry [1992] 2 Qd R 12
Armitage v Nurse [1997] EWCA Civ 1279; (1997) 3 WLR 1046
Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Pty Ltd v Petrik [1996] VicRp 91; [1996] 2 VR 638
Avon Finance Co Ltd v Bridger [1985] 2 All ER 281
Balls v Strutt (1841) 1 Hare 146; 66 ER 984
Bank of Credit & Commerce International SA v Aboody [1989] 2 WLR 759
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Barclays Bank plc v Kennedy [1989] 1 FLR 356
Barclays Bank v O'Brien [1992] EWCA Civ 11; [1993] QB 109
Barclays Bank v O'Brien [1993] UKHL 6; [1994] 1 AC 180
Bawn v Trade Credits Ltd (1986) ANZ Conv R 709
Belmont Finance Corp Ltd v Williams Furniture Ltd (No 2) [1980] 1 All ER 393
Beneficial Finance Corporation v Karavas (1991) 23 NSWLR 256
Bridgewater v Leahy [1998] HCA 66; (1998) 194 CLR 457
Cairncross v Paterson [1894] VicLawRp 56; (1894) 20 VLR 258
Challenge Bank v Pandya [1993] SASC 3803; (1993) 60 SASR 330
Charterbridge Corp Ltd v Lloyds Bank Ltd [1970] Ch 62
Clough v North Western Railway Ltd (1871) 7 LR Ex 26
Cockerill v Westpac Banking Corporation (1996) 142 ALR 227
Commonwealth Bank of Australia v ABC Property Planners Pty Ltd, unreported; SCt of NSW (Equity Division); 23 May 1991
Corozo Pty Ltd v Total Australia Ltd [1988] 2 Qd R 366
Crisp v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd (1994) ATPR 41-294
Daniels v Anderson (1995) 37 NSWLR 438
Devaynes v Robinson [1857] EngR 430; (1857) 24 Beav 86; 53 ER 289
Doneley v Doneley as executor of the Estate of Doneley [1998] 1 Qd R 602
Drozd v VAskas [1960] SASR 88
Erlanger v New Sombrero Phosphate Co (1878) 3 App Cas 1218
Familiar Pty Ltd v Samarkos (1994) 115 FLR 443
Fry v Lane (1888) 40 Ch D 312
Gans v Riley [1913] HCA 12; (1912-1913) 15 CLR 731
Group 4 Industries Pty Ltd v Brosnan (1992) 8 ACSR 463
Guthrie v ANZ Banking Corporation (1989) NSW Conv R 55,463
Harkness v Harkness (1903) 20 WN (NSW) 269
Hedley Byrne & Co Ltd v Heller and Partners Ltd [1963] UKHL 4; [1964] AC 465
Henjo Investments Pty Ltd v Collins Marrickville Pty Ltd [1988] FCA 40; (1988) 79 ALR 83
HFMF v Porteous [1999] WASC 55
HG & R Nominees Pty Ltd v Fava [1997] 2 VR 368
Johnson v Buttress [1936] HCA 41; (1936) 56 CLR 113
Kabwand Pty Ltd v National Australia Bank Ltd (1989) 11 ATPR 40-950
Kings North Trust Ltd v Bell [1986] 1 WLR 119
Koorootang Nominees Pty Ltd v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [1998] 3 VR 16
Lancashire Loans Company Ltd v Black [1934] 1 KB 380
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Learoyd v Whiteley [1887] UKHL 1; (1887) 12 App Cas 727
Lisciandro v Official Trustee in Bankruptcy (1996) 139 ALR 689
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Maguire v Makaronis [1997] HCA 23; (1996) 188 CLR 449
Metal Manufacturers Ltd v Lewis (1986) 11 ACLR 122
Miles v Shell Company of Australia, unreported; FCA; 9 June 1998
Mills v Mills [1938] HCA 4; (1938) 60 CLR 150
Nolan v Westpac Banking Corporation (1989) 51 SASR 496
Norrish v Bostock [1921] 2 Ch 469; [1921] All ER 125
Partridge v Equity Trustees Executors & Agency Co Ltd [1947] HCA 42; (1947) 75 CLR 149
Permanent Building Society (In Liq) v Wheeler (1993) 11 WAR 187
Perre v Apand Pty Ltd [1999] HCA 36; (1999) 164 ALR 606
Powell v Powell [1900] 1 Ch 243
Public Trustee v Symon [1944] SASR 102
Radin v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, unreported; FCA; 23 October 1998
Re Pearce [1936] SASR 137
Rema Industries and Services Pty Ltd v Coad [1992] FCA 114; (1992) 107 ALR 374
Rhone-Poulenc Agrochimie SA v UIM Chemical Services (1986) 12 FCR 477
Selangor United Rubber Estates Ltd v Cradock (No 3) [1968] 2 All ER 1073
Sexton v Horton [1926] HCA 25; (1926) 38 CLR 240; 27 (NSW) 340; (1926) ALR 373
Shephard v Midland Bank plc [1960] VicRp 42; [1987] 2 FLR 175
Southern Cross Commodities Pty Ltd (In Liq) v Ewing (1988) 14 ACLR 39
Spedley Securities Ltd (In Liq) v Greater Pacific Investments (In Liq) (1992) 7 ACSR 155
Statewide Tobacco Services Ltd v Morley (1990) 2 ACSR 405
Story v Advance Bank of Australia (1993) 10 ACSR 699
Stroughill v Anstey [1852] EngR 832; (1852) 1 De GM & G 635; 42 ER 700
Sutherland Shire Council v Heyman [1985] HCA 41; (1985) 157 CLR 424
Swift v Westpac Banking Corporation (1995) ATPR 41-401
Teachers Health Investments Pty Ltd v Wynne (1996) ASC 56-356
The State Bank of New South Wales Limited v Vecchio (1998), unreported; SCt of NSW; 10 November 1998
Union Fidelity Trustee Co of Australia v Gibson [1971] VicRp 69; [1971] VR 573
Vadasz v Pioneer Concrete (SA) Pty Ltd [1995] HCA 14; (1995) 184 CLR 102
Walker v Wimborne [1976] HCA 7; (1976) 137 CLR 1
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Western Australia v Bond Corp Holdings (1991) ATPR 41-129
Westpac Banking Corporation v Bowden, unreported; SCt of NSW; 13 December 1993
Westwill Pty Ltd v Heath (1989) 52 SASR 461
Wickstead v Browne (1992) 30 NSWLR 1
1 WHEELER J: This is an action to recover certain moneys and to enforce mortgages and guarantees securing the repayment of the moneys. The defendants are natural persons who are related to each other, and companies in which those natural persons have a variety of interests. It seems not to be disputed that money was advanced and that certain amounts were not repaid. The case of the defendants is essentially that the various security instruments upon which the plaintiff seeks to rely should be set aside by reason of, inter alia, unconscionable conduct on the part of the plaintiff, undue influence and misrepresentation, and participation in breach of trust.
2 A broad overview of the position of the natural persons involved in this matter is as follows. I propose to refer to those people by their first names throughout the rest of these reasons, in order to avoid confusion between them.
3 George Ridout met Dorothy Ridout during the Second World War. She was born in 1925 and left school at 14, having reached third year high school. She first worked in a shoe shop and then in a library and then during the war worked in an aircraft factory sewing and applying dope to main wing assemblies. George and Dorothy were married in September 1946. George died on 25 June 1993 at the age of 69.
4 When George and Dorothy married, George's parents had a small dairy farm in Victoria and the Repatriation Commission lent George the money to buy his parents' farm. Twelve years later, George and Dorothy left the farm having built up a substantial herd of cattle, selling it for approximately £96,000, which was then a considerable sum of money. They purchased a house in Adelaide at a cost of £6,200 and in about 1960 George invested approximately £26,000 into a company called Ranleigh Ware Pty Ltd ("Ranleigh"). It was a silverware business. A company called Cloverdale Pty Ltd ("Cloverdale") acquired the shares in Ranleigh. George and Dorothy were directors and shareholders of Cloverdale.
5 In 1961 George went to Western Australia to look for suitable land for a farm and, he having compiled a shortlist of properties, Dorothy travelled to Western Australia to discuss the final selection with him. Cloverdale purchased the farm at Boyup Brook, known as "Camballan", for cash. It is not entirely clear from the evidence whether the purchase price was the offered £29,000 or the asking price of £32,000, but in any event in 1961 the property was purchased and George and Dorothy moved to Camballan in February 1962.
6 During the first years of their time in Western Australia, George flew regularly to Adelaide for directors or shareholders' meetings of Ranleigh. By 1974, Cloverdale had acquired 100 per cent of Ranleigh's shares; Dorothy was not much involved in Ranleigh, apart from assisting in the selection of goods to be imported from overseas. From time to time she signed documents when George requested her to. From time to time, she would accompany George to Adelaide and would occasionally sit in on meetings between George and the officers of the banks (initially Westpac and later the Commonwealth Bank) which were Ranleigh's bankers.
7 In the meantime, George and Dorothy had a number of children. At the time of George's death, there were five children surviving him, being three sons and two daughters ranging in ages from 33 to 45. Peter and Christopher are two of those sons, while Lynette and Jillian are their respective wives.
8 In 1976 George and Dorothy's son David took over as manager of Ranleigh. He managed Ranleigh for about nine years, leaving in about 1985.
9 Christopher and Peter, who were born in 1957 and 1960 respectively, left school before they had completed five years of high school to assist full time with farm work. When they married, they and their wives lived on the family farms. For a period of time, Peter and Lynette lived on and developed a farm in South Australia (Kacoonda), which was owned by Ranleigh. In 1980, Cloverdale bought a farm adjoining Camballan, called Marshalls. In 1985, a company called Ridout Nominees Pty Ltd ("Ridout Nominees") bought another farm in the same area of Western Australia called Brantwood. It appears that finance for that purchase came partly from the sale of Kacoonda, and partly from a foreign currency loan taken out by Ranleigh from Westpac in the sum of $800,000. Ridout Nominees mortgaged Brantwood as security for that loan.
10 Peter and Lynette lived on Brantwood after their return from South Australia, while Christopher and Jillian lived on Camballan at a house about a kilometre from the house occupied by George and Dorothy. I will return in a little more detail to the personal circumstances of the natural persons later.
11 The corporate structure, through which assets were acquired and held, can most conveniently be set out in chart form. A chart showing the corporate structure is set out as an appendix to these reasons . Broadly, the directorships of the companies and the operations of the relevant trusts were as follows:
12 Ridout Nominees was a company, formed in 1976, of which George and Dorothy were the sole directors and shareholders. It operated as the trustee of the Cloverdale Trust, a discretionary trust of which the beneficiaries were George and Dorothy, their issue, and companies in which they held at least one share.
13 Cloverdale was formed in 1960. Cloverdale had 3500 issued shares, one of which was held by George and the remainder of which were held by Ridout Nominees. It was not a trustee. At all material times the directors of Cloverdale were George and Dorothy with their sons Christopher and Peter becoming directors in 1979 and 1985 respectively. Dorothy had been a director and secretary of Cloverdale since its formation in 1960. George was the governing director of Cloverdale with power under article 41:
"... to exercise all the powers authorities and discretions by the Memorandum of Association or these Articles expressed to be vested in the Directors generally and all the other Directors, if any, for the time being of the Company shall be under his control and shall be bound to confirm (sic) to his directions in regard to the Company's business."
14 Ranleigh had 50,500 issued shares, two of which were held by George and Dorothy and the remainder of which were held by Cloverdale. The directors were George, Dorothy, Peter and Christopher. Dorothy was first appointed a director and secretary in 1985. Peter and Christopher had been directors since 1981.
15 Viners Silverware Pty Ltd ("Viners") and Estelle Gifts Pty Ltd ("Estelle") were silverware companies of which George and Dorothy were the sole directors and shareholders. Dorothy had been a director of Viners since October 1987 and a director of Estelle since March 1984. Viners operated as the trustee of the G E Ridout No 4 Trust and Estelle operated as the trustee for the G E Ridout No 2 Trust. The beneficiaries of those trusts included George and Dorothy, their issue, Ranleigh, Cloverdale and Estelle.
16 Wanata Holdings Pty Ltd ("Wanata") was a company in which George and Dorothy were the sole directors and shareholders. Dorothy had been director since May 1985. It was trustee of the G E Ridout No 3 Trust, the beneficiaries of which included George and Dorothy, their sons and daughters-in-law and the issue of the latter.
17 Kamberoo Pty Ltd ("Kamberoo") was a company of which Peter and Lynette were the sole directors and shareholders. It was trustee of the P A Ridout Trust, a discretionary trust, the beneficiaries of which included Peter, his parents (George and Dorothy), spouse and siblings and any company in which any of those persons held a share.
18 Kacana Pty Ltd ("Kacana") was a company of which Christopher and Jillian were the sole directors and shareholders. It was trustee of the C J Ridout Trust, a discretionary trust, the beneficiaries of which included Christopher, his parents (George and Dorothy), spouse and siblings and any company in which any of those persons held a share.
19 Fergal Pty Ltd ("Fergal") was a company of which the directors were George and Christopher and Lyell Kenneth Pontifex and in which the shareholders were George and Lyell Pontifex. It was the managing partner of a limited partnership involved in the motel business described below.
20 RSA Holdings Ltd ("RSA") was a company of which Lynette and Jillian became directors in June 1993. The company was set up to sell Ranleigh's stock, and did so without informing the plaintiff. As will appear, the plaintiff by then would have been in a position to claim an interest in the stock. The proceeds of sale of all the stock sold have not been paid to the plaintiff.
21 The assets which were acquired by George and Dorothy and by their corporate entities and the entities owned by their children, can be broadly classified into: family farms and family home; silverware businesses; other farms; and motel units. An overview of those acquisitions, from 1960 onwards, is as follows:
22 In the early 1960's Cloverdale acquired an interest in Ranleigh which operated a silver plating business, importing and completing partially finished products. In about 1974, Cloverdale acquired 100 per cent control of Ranleigh. In 1984, George and Dorothy acquired Estelle, the business of which was primarily the importation from overseas and sale within Australia of silver plated items. In March 1987, George and Dorothy purchased Viners, a silverware company with a business similar to that of Estelle. At some time prior to 1980, Ranleigh acquired an industrial property at Deloraine Road, Edwardstown, South Australia. Ranleigh was the principal silverware business, in that the business of Estelle and Viners was run from the Edwardstown property and Ranleigh charged Estelle and Viners for labour, storage, etc.
23 In 1961, Cloverdale acquired Camballan at Boyup Brook, Western Australia. In about 1980, Cloverdale acquired Marshalls, a farm adjoining Camballan and later run as one with it. In the 1980's, George and Dorothy acquired a home in Adelaide, known as the Panorama (a suburb of Adelaide) home. Dorothy, who was originally from South Australia, seems to have been particularly attached to this house, referring to it on occasions as "my home". In 1985 Ridout Nominees acquired Brantwood, another farm at Boyup Brook, Western Australia, some little distance from Camballan. George, Dorothy and their children lived mostly on the Boyup Brook farms.
24 In 1971 Cloverdale acquired a property called Timaru near Camballan which was subsequently sold at a profit. In 1981 George and Dorothy, or companies owned by them, bought the farm Kacoonda at Kingston in South Australia, and sold it in 1984 for a considerable profit. At about the same time, another farm at Naracoorte in South Australia was bought, which was sold within two and a half years for a considerable profit.
25 In October 1987, 29 units at the All Travellers Motel, Belmont, were acquired as follows:
Relationship Between the Group Businesses, and Between the Business and Family Members.
26 Broadly, the division of labour within the Ridout family seems to have been that George was the one who was primarily concerned with the making of financial and business planning decisions. He was the person who dealt with banks, accountants and solicitors as required. He was the person who was regarded as having the final decision as to what properties would be purchased or sold, although it appears that, in relation to farming properties at least, he consulted with Dorothy. So far as the practical running of the farms was concerned, Dorothy made a very substantial contribution to the running of the farms by drafting sheep, cooking for shearers, and performing the myriad of tasks that fall to a farmer's lot. Additionally, she was of course for many years very busy bringing up her and George's children. As Peter and Christopher grew up and gradually took over the running of the Western Australian farms, a great many day to day farming decisions were delegated to them, although it appears that within the family it was considered that all major expenditure or novel departures were required to be cleared with George.
27 Dorothy, and, when they were older, Peter and Christopher, had some interest in the running of the silverware businesses, but had by no means a detailed knowledge of them. Those businesses seemed to have been regarded largely as George's creatures. George seems to have been very pleased with, and proud of, the silverware businesses. From time to time, moneys were taken from the farming enterprises when the silverware businesses were in need of cash and directed to the silverware businesses. Dorothy was aware that the silverware businesses were from time to time and to an extent "propped up" with money from the farming operations and she did not like this practice but appears to have made no protest. Peter and Christopher were aware of the practice to a lesser extent.
28 Various inter-company loans were made from time to time amongst the enterprises and interest was charged on an ad hoc basis. So far as one can tell, these decisions were taken from time to time on the advice of accountants in order to minimise the incidence of taxation.
29 Additionally, funds borrowed by Cloverdale from external lenders, using the family farms as security, were channelled to the silverware businesses, while the silverware business also borrowed money from an external lender which they lent to Ridout Nominees in order to purchase a family farm which was used as security. The major transactions of this kind were as follows. In March 1976, Cloverdale mortgaged Camballan to secure Ranleigh's facilities with the Bank of Adelaide. In June 1976 Cloverdale mortgaged Marshalls in order to raise funds for Ranleigh's business. In April 1985, it appears that the foreign currency loan taken out by Ranleigh was on-lent to Ridout Nominees to provide a substantial amount of the funding for the purchase of Brantwood, which was mortgaged by Ridout Nominees to Westpac by way of security. In March 1987, Cloverdale mortgaged Camballan to the ANZ as security for Viners' debts to the ANZ.
30 The picture which emerges from the evidence is that of a gradual expansion of the business activities of what might be called the "Ridout Group", using that term in a non-technical sense to describe the family's business interests. Over time, George and Dorothy, and interests associated with them, bought seven farming properties, ending up eventually with the two Western Australian family farms (Camballan - including Marshalls - and Brantwood) which were run on a large scale and which were generally very successful.
31 Over time, they built up their holding in Ranleigh and expanded into other silverware businesses. Although money was from time to time directed into the silverware businesses from the farms, it appears that the silverware businesses were overall profitable and successful. Finally, they decided to branch out into other real property by purchase of the motel units. These decisions were taken by George, with some input from other family members, and under George's direction.
32 As the businesses expanded, their requirements for capital increased from time to time and George approached a variety of financial institutions for assistance. Over the years, George and Dorothy signed very many documents associated with loan transactions, and providing security as required. In an attempt to manage the very high interest rates prevailing at the time, George accepted advice from Westpac and caused Ranleigh to take out an $800,000 foreign currency loan which assisted in the purchase of Brantwood.
33 In the early 1990's, a number of things went badly wrong with what until then had been a prosperous and expanding set of enterprises. Wool prices plummeted, so that the farms were no longer making enormous gross profits. Currency fluctuations saw the amount of the foreign currency loan blow out in Australian dollars from $800,000 to almost $1.3M. The silverware businesses declined; the reasons for this are not entirely clear, but appear to include financial difficulties faced by the Proud's chain, which was a major customer, and a general market decline in demand for silverware. In about 1990, George's health began to decline. By the time of his death in 1993, it had become apparent that the Ridout Group would be unable to continue to service the level of debt which it was then carrying. Some asset sales were undertaken, but the shortfall was such that it appeared that the family farms would have to be sold in order to clear the amounts owing to the plaintiff. It is against that background that the plaintiff seeks to enforce its securities.
34 The relevant borrowings began in 1973 and continued through to a complex revised lending arrangement in late 1990 and early 1991. The plaintiff relies first upon the 90/91 instruments. However, if they are to be set aside for any reason, it relies upon arrangements in force as at March 1990, which are attacked by the defendants on grounds which overlap but do not wholly duplicate the grounds relating to the 90/91 instruments.
35 If those instruments should be set aside, the plaintiff points to still earlier instruments which would entitle it to recover at least some portion of the sums claimed. Even if those earlier transactions were not relied upon by the plaintiff directly, it would be necessary to understand them in order to grasp the nature of the 1990/1991 arrangements. As later mortgages and security instruments were obtained, earlier ones were not discharged, except where other external lenders, such as Westpac, were concerned. In relation to those other external lenders, the purpose of the transactions with the plaintiff was to enable those external lenders to be paid out, and consequently securities given to them were discharged.
36 In 1973 the plaintiff agreed to provide Cloverdale with $45,000 worth of finance in the form of a $30,000 farm "carry on" overdraft and $15,000 farm development loan, both secured by mortgage over Camballan (excluding Marshalls which was at that time not acquired). In that mortgage, which is the usual lengthy document in rather small type and written in somewhat impenetrable legal jargon, cl 1 provides that, as is usual in such a document, it "secures all moneys now or hereafter to become payable to the bank by the debtor and mortgagor" (the debtor and mortgagor in this case both being Cloverdale). That facility increased from time to time and by July 1986 had risen to $150,000. By July 1989 it had increased to $400,000.
37 Although the practice does not seem to have been invariable, in relation to most of the increases in overdraft, there is a formal letter of request signed by George as director and Dorothy as secretary and bearing the common seal of Cloverdale. In each case, a form letter was sent by the plaintiff addressed to "The Proprietors" of Cloverdale advising of approval of the increase in overdraft and containing reference to the security which is expressed as "to comprise securities already held by the bank in connection with advances to Cloverdale".
38 By mortgage dated 21 August 1989, Cloverdale mortgaged Marshalls to secure "the same moneys as are secured by mortgage ... 11 May 1973 from the said Cloverdale Pty Ltd to and in favour of the bank ...". Marshalls thus became part of the Cloverdale mortgage of Camballan. In August 1990 the plaintiff increased Cloverdale's facilities to $530,000, the letter dated 8 August 1990 from it referring to security for the increase as "securities already held in connection to Cloverdale" (ie Camballan and Marshalls).
39 A further application for accommodation was made by Cloverdale dated 2 November 1990, signed by George as director and Dorothy as secretary. No amount appears on the application. Further accommodation was granted as part of a package in late 1990 and early 1991. The details of the package will emerge later. For the moment, it is sufficient to note that in addition to the $530,000 facility already in existence (being $500,000 bill discount facility and a $30,000 overdraft limit), a further "multi-option facility" in the amount of $940,000 was approved, taking Cloverdale's total borrowings to $1,470,000. Approval was given by letter addressed to George c/- Ranleigh dated 6 December 1990 and security for Cloverdale was described as comprising, inter alia, "a mortgage by Cloverdale Pty Ltd over 1533ha property known as 'Camballan' ..." together with "a mortgage by Cloverdale Pty Ltd over 750ha property being Wellington Location 4931 WA [Marshalls]".
40 As part of the same re-financing package, the plaintiff again wrote to George on 3 January 1991, referring to the letter of 6 December 1990 and advising that revaluations on Western Australian farming properties and on the Edwards Town South Australia property showed "a substantial decrease in property values from those previously recorded". The letter continued that the approval given for the package "may stand subject to provision of additional security as follows"; that security included what was described as "amended fresh registered second mortgage by Cloverdale Pty Ltd over the farm 'Camballan'" and "amended fresh registered mortgage by Cloverdale Pty Ltd over the farm at Wellington Location". It appears no amended mortgages were prepared; rather (apparently to avoid further fees and stamp duty) the plaintiff decided to rely upon the earlier mortgages.
41 Finally, on 18 January 1991, again referring back to the letter of 6 December 1990, the plaintiff advised George that it confirmed approval for increased facilities, which together totalled almost $5M, to companies under his control. The letter advised, "A summary of facilities and securities is provided for your information." So far as Cloverdale was concerned, that summary relevantly was:
[The reference in (1) to a second mortgage is because a prior mortgage existed in favour of the Commonwealth Development Bank]
42 It is unnecessary to set out the security summarised under this heading here. It consisted of registered first mortgages over various of the motel units by various companies, a registered equitable mortgage, and guarantees by a variety of persons and entities including something described as "guarantee interlocking by ... Cloverdale Pty Ltd". It is to be noted that there is no reference under this heading to a mortgage of Camballan or Marshalls. The Clovelly Park Branch was the branch which approved the 1990/91 finance.
43 In relation to the Cloverdale mortgage, the defendants plead, as was the fact, that it was executed by George and Dorothy in 1973 as security for farm "carry on" finance. It is pleaded that George and Dorothy had no reason in December 1990 to suspect, and did not suspect, that the mortgage given by Cloverdale 17 years previously remained in existence and applicable to secure additional advances in excess of $1M. It is pleaded that the plaintiff was put on notice that there was a danger or likelihood that George and Dorothy would assume the Cloverdale mortgage did not secure indebtedness of Cloverdale to the plaintiff, other than the carry on finance; and that the plaintiff was on notice that George and Dorothy would not expect "the obligation purportedly imposed by the Cloverdale mortgage to the effect that the Cloverdale mortgage secured all moneys which at any time for whatever reason and on any account whatsoever ... might be or become due from Cloverdale to the plaintiff" to exist.
44 It is asserted that this silence and inaction amounted to an implied representation to Cloverdale and to George and Dorothy that those obligations did not exist, which representation was a false representation made in trade or commerce. It is then asserted that Cloverdale executed the Cloverdale mortgage in reliance upon that representation and that the Cloverdale mortgage was by reason of those matters obtained by means of unconscionable conduct.
45 The most cursory examination of the chronology reveals that the conclusion which it is said should be drawn from the events of 1990 cannot stand. The mortgage referred to as the Cloverdale mortgage was executed in 1973, and for that reason alone cannot have been executed in reliance upon, or obtained by means of, a series of representations which commenced after execution and culminated in implied representations made in 1990 and 1991.
46 If it is intended to suggest that there was an implied representation that the mortgage would not be used as security for later advances, or that the later advances were unsecured, then the pattern of correspondence up to and including the $530,000 facility is, in my view, inconsistent with any such representation. While the $1.09M facility gives rise to more complex issues, the events leading up to the grant of that facility, discussed in detail later, make it clear, in my view, that the plaintiff required all the farming properties to be included within its security "package". The defendants' attack on this security cannot be sustained.
47 By letter dated 25 February 1988, the plaintiff approved finance for Viners in the sum of $500,000. The application for accommodation was made on Viners' behalf on a standard bank "application for accommodation" form, and signed by George and Dorothy. The mortgage was signed on behalf of both Viners and Cloverdale by George and Dorothy as director and secretary respectively.
48 By this mortgage, Cloverdale mortgaged Camballan to secure the Viners' facility and to secure all moneys payable by Cloverdale to the plaintiff on any account. By virtue of its terms, the 1989 mortgage of Marshalls later also became security for Viners' debts. By a request signed by George and Dorothy as director and secretary and made under seal, which is undated but appears to have been made in about August 1988, an increase in the Viners' facility to $600,000 was sought. This increase was approved by letter dated 16 August 1988, and one condition of approval was said by the plaintiff in that letter to be "security already held by the Bank in connection with advances to the company".
49 With respect to this mortgage, the defendants plead that Dorothy, the "only director of Cloverdale other than George Ridout" was to the knowledge of the plaintiff in a position of special disability at its time of completion, that she was unduly influenced by George to the knowledge of the plaintiff, that the mortgage was of no benefit to Cloverdale, that George was the agent of the plaintiff for the purpose of obtaining execution of the mortgage by Dorothy and that the plaintiff was therefore liable for his undue influence and misrepresentation, and that certain implied representations which were false and which were made in the course of trade and commerce, were made by the plaintiff to Dorothy in the course of execution of the mortgage. There are in this pleading a number of themes which occur in relation to later transactions also. However, it is convenient to consider how matters stood in 1988, before turning to the later and more complex transactions.
50 There appears to be no shorthand way of summarising the pleadings. It is therefore necessary to set them out in all their detail. The defendants plead with respect to this mortgage that:
"44A With respect to Mortgage D777666 the defendants further say that:
44A.1 The fifth defendant, the only director of Cloverdale other than George Ridout, was to the knowledge of the plaintiff as at April 1988 or thereabouts in a position of special disability by reason that:
Personal details concerning the fifth defendant including her age were held on the plaintiff's file.
Personal particulars concerning the fifth defendant including her personal history were held on the plaintiff's file.
44A.1.3 She had little or no knowledge of financial matters and no involvement in the management of Cloverdale and Viners.
(a) The defendants repeat paragraph (a) of the particulars to paragraph 43.2.3.
[ie (a) The fifth defendant has lived in Boyup Brook, a small country town, since 1962 and had been a customer of the plaintiff since that time. She, her circumstances, and history were known to the managers who from time to time were stationed at the Boyup Brook branch of the plaintiff.]
(b) Cloverdale had obtained financial accommodation from the plaintiff since 1973 during which time the plaintiff dealt exclusively with George Ridout, the other director of Cloverdale.
(c) The plaintiff dealt exclusively with George Ridout one of the directors of Viners in relation to all financial accommodation granted by the plaintiff to Viners.
44A.1.4 She was unduly influenced and controlled by her husband George Ridout such that she was likely to sign whatever documents George Ridout requested that she sign and was likely to rely entirely upon whatever explanation was given to her by George Ridout concerning the nature of Mortgage D777666 in order to form an understanding of the said transaction and irrespective of the inadequacy of any such explanation.
The defendants repeat the particulars to paragraph 43.2.5.
[ie (a) By reason of the relationship of husband and wife between George Ridout and the fifth defendant undue influence arises by presumption of law.
(b) Further or in the alternative by reason of the high degree of trust and confidence reposed in George Ridout by the fifth defendant she was unduly influenced by George Ridout.]
(a) The fact that the fifth defendant was the wife of George Ridout was information held on the plaintiff's file.
(b) The plaintiff's knowledge was constructive arising from its knowledge that:
(i) George Ridout was the controlling mind and will of Cloverdale and Viners of which the fifth defendant was a director.
(ii) all written correspondence concerning the affairs of Cloverdale and Viners had been between the plaintiff and George Ridout;
(iii) George Ridout behaved with respect to all decisions concerning Cloverdale and Viners as the person in whom ultimate control resided;
(iv) the fifth defendant was shy, quiet and retiring person while her husband George Ridout was a firm, confident, opinionated, persuasive and optimistic person in apparent control of Cloverdale and Viners.
44A.2 With respect to Mortgage D777666 no copy of memorandum number 18 had been supplied to the fifth defendant by the plaintiff and no explanation had been given to the fifth defendant by the plaintiff of the meaning and effect of memorandum 18.
44A.3 By Mortgage D777666 the plaintiff was obtaining security for advances of $600,000 made by the plaintiff to Viners.
44A.4 The entry by Cloverdale into Mortgage D777666 was of no benefit to Cloverdale and was detrimental to Cloverdale.
Cloverdale did not have an ownership interest in Viners.
Viners' financial position was uncertain having made a substantial net loss in the preceding financial year.
The mortgage was an all monies mortgage which would secure all future debts of Viners to the plaintiff.
44A.5 To the knowledge of the plaintiff Camballan, excluding Marshalls Farm, was the home of the fifth defendant and her family, and had been since the early 1960's and was the primary source of the livelihood of the fifth defendant and her family and entering into Mortgage D777666 by Cloverdale as security for borrowings of Viners, a peripheral enterprise of George Ridout of doubtful financial standing, resulted in the fifth defendant risking the loss of her family home and livelihood which risk was ill-advised and avoidable.
44A.6 The fifth defendant was unaware that the substance and effect of Mortgage D777666 as is pleaded in paragraphs 44A.3, 44A.4 and 44A.5.
44A.7 The fifth defendant and Cloverdale did not obtain any independent advice as to the terms of Mortgage D777666 and as to the advisability of entering into Mortgage D777666.
44A.8 The plaintiff took no steps to ensure that the fifth defendant and Cloverdale obtained, alternatively to encourage them to obtain, independent advice as to the terms of Mortgage D777666 and as to the advisability of entering into Mortgage D777666.
44A.9 The plaintiff addressed all correspondence concerning Mortgage D777666 to George Ridout personally and took no steps to communicate in writing concerning the transaction with the fifth defendant.
44A.10 The plaintiff relied upon George Ridout to obtain the execution by Cloverdale and by George Ridout's wife, the fifth defendant, of Mortgage D777666 and relied upon George Ridout to convey to the fifth defendant the information necessary to appreciate the nature and extent of the obligations imposed upon Cloverdale by Mortgage D777666.
44A.11 George Ridout failed to disclose to the fifth defendant the information necessary to appreciate the nature and extent of the obligations imposed upon Cloverdale by Mortgage D777666.
44A.12 By reason of the facts and matters pleaded in paragraphs 44A.1 to 44A.11 the execution of Mortgage D777666 was procured in a manner which amounts to unconscionable conduct and at equity Mortgage D777666 should be set aside.
44A.13 Further and alternatively in all the circumstances the fifth defendant did not consent to Cloverdale entering into Mortgage D777666 and did not authorise the use of the company seal of Cloverdale for the purpose of executing Mortgage D777666 and that mortgage is not enforceable against Cloverdale."
Unconscionable Conduct in Relation to Cloverdale
51 The first broad observation that may be made about this pleading, is that it seeks to apply to the position of the company Cloverdale, which granted mortgage D777666, the equitable principles which are applicable to persons in a position of special disability. If one looks at the often quoted passage in Blomley v Ryan [1956] HCA 81; (1956) 99 CLR 362 (at 405 per Fullagar J) the circumstances adversely affecting a party which may induce a court of equity to set a transaction aside include -
"... poverty or need of any kind, sickness, age, sex, infirmity of body or mind, drunkenness, illiteracy or lack of education, lack of assistance or explanation where assistance or explanation is necessary."
52 It is immediately apparent that only a natural person can suffer from the majority of the disadvantages there mentioned. There have been few cases in which the principle has applied to a corporation. The learned authors of "Cheshire and Fifoot on Contract" (Butterworths 1997 p 560) observed:
"Although the cases have been concerned with disadvantaged natural persons, it is not difficult to imagine a commercial transaction involving a small one person or family company which might attract equitable relief."
53 It appears that the authors were not aware of any cases in which the principles had been applied to corporations, although the researches of counsel in this case have discovered two cases in which it appears to have been assumed that a corporation could be in a position of "special disadvantage" in this sense, they being: Brooks v Sunlife Properties Pty Ltd, unreported; SCt of WA (Scott J); Library No 960071; 21 February 1996 and NZI Capital Corporation Ltd v Fulton, unreported; FCt Fed Ct of A, NG766/97; 10 June 1998. In neither of those two cases does there appear to have been any consideration of whether a corporation could suffer such a special disadvantage; rather, it seems simply to have been assumed that the principle would apply in respect of a corporation.
54 If it is correct to say that the focus of equity's inquiry in relation to unconscionable dealing is the conduct of the stronger party in dealing with one who is under a special disability (Commercial Bank of Australia v Amadio [1983] HCA 14; (1983) 151 CLR 447 at 474 per Deane J) then there would appear to be more than one sense in which it is possible for such conduct to occur in relation to a corporation.
55 First, to a limited extent a corporation may itself suffer from a "special disadvantage". For example, on occasion individuals have been held to suffer from such a disadvantage where they are in a desperate financial position and, attempting to escape from that position, act without legal advice (eg Morlend Finance Corp (Vic) v Luke (1991) ASCR 56-095). A corporation too may be in a desperate financial position and may act without advice. However, at least at this point of the pleading, that is not how Cloverdale's disadvantage is said to arise. Rather, it appears that the disadvantage is relevantly Dorothy's and, because she was one of the two directors, it is sought to impute her disadvantage to the company.
56 It seems to me that there are principles which would justify taking the view that it is not appropriate to look behind the corporation to the natural persons who are its directors for the purpose of considering whether there has been unconscionable conduct. The first is that the corporation is self-evidently a means adopted for the purpose of engaging in commerce. While there are obviously large, well resourced, well advised, corporations which could not conceivably be suffering any relevant disability, it will not always be easy to discern whether a corporation is, or is not, so run that a disability in one or more key directors would amount to a disability of the corporation itself. Even if one confined the rule to "family" corporations, there is a very wide range of such corporations. It may be a substantial impediment to reasonable commercial activity if those dealing with the corporation must look behind it to consider the abilities of its directors before dealing with it. Small corporations could be adversely affected if they are not in a position to take action quickly where commercial circumstances require it, because of the need to convince lenders or others that their directors are not under a relevant disability.
57 Additionally, while a corporation is an artificial person, it is in law an entity distinct from those who are its directors and shareholders and is employed for commercial purposes precisely because it has that independent and distinct existence. There is much to be said for the view that those who choose to conduct their affairs through the medium of a corporation should not, for the purposes of avoiding obligations undertaken by the corporation, be permitted to rely upon characteristics which pertain to them as the natural persons who lie behind the corporation: Hobart Bridge Co Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation [1951] HCA 33; (1951) 82 CLR 372 at 385 per Kitto J, Tate Access Floors Inc v Boswell [1991] Ch 512 at 531, Morgan v 45 Flers Ave Pty Ltd (1986) 10 ACLR 692 at 694-5 per Young J.
58 In Dorothy's case, although the idea for the incorporation of Cloverdale and the other companies was not hers, she knew that Camballan was purchased by Cloverdale, she acquiesced in being a director and secretary, and in that capacity at George's request she signed very many documents holding herself out to the world as director and secretary of a corporation. To the extent that there were taxation and other benefits which flowed to the family members from the adoption of the corporate structure, she was prepared to accept the fruits of that corporate structure. It may be inequitable, as against third parties, for the courts to accede to her request to look behind that corporate structure. Further, although the maxim "ex turpi causa ...." is not relied upon by the plaintiff, in a case such as this Dorothy is in effect seeking to rely upon her own failure diligently to apply herself to the affairs of the company.
59 On the other hand, one can imagine cases in which it would appear to be inequitable if a court were to refuse, as a rule of blanket application, to look behind a corporate structure. No doubt there are individuals who are advised to adopt that structure and who do so without ever being capable of understanding the responsibilities and the consequences of that decision. One can imagine situations in which individuals may be advised to adopt a corporate structure by advisers who know of their special disabilities and who then proceed to take advantage of those disabilities. Because of equity's focus on the conduct of the other party, it may be possible to deny reward to unconscionable conduct without unduly inhibiting commerce, if those dealing with the corporation are not permitted to rely upon transactions with it in circumstances where it is sufficiently evident to them that the person or persons who is or are the corporation's effective decision makers suffer from a special disability or disadvantage which makes them unable to make a real judgment as to the best interest of the corporation. It may be thought inappropriate that a third party, having notice of such a disability, be permitted to insist on a transaction by reason only of the fact that it was made with a corporate entity.
60 For the purposes of the somewhat similar principle enunciated in Yerkey v Jones [1939] HCA 3; (1939) 63 CLR 649, courts, including the High Court, have thought it appropriate to look behind the corporate veil for the purposes of determining whether a wife who provides a surety is truly to be regarded as a volunteer. In Garcia v National Australia Bank Ltd [1998] HCA 48; (1998) 155 ALR 614, although Mrs Garcia was both a director and shareholder of the company in respect of which the guarantee was provided, it was held that the company was in effect the creature of her husband. In the absence of authority expressly dealing with the point, this appears to me to be an indication of the way in which a Judge of first instance should consider the application of these equitable principles where they may involve a corporation. Similar inquiries are to be found in Armstrong v Commonwealth Bank of Australia, unreported; SCt of NSW; Equity Division; 17 June 1999; Hamilton J, Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Khouri [1998] VSC 128; and Cranfield Pty Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia [1998] VSC 140.
61 For the purpose of these reasons, I am prepared to assume that what might in shorthand be referred to as "Amadio" unconscionability will be available in respect of a corporation in some circumstances. However, for the reasons which follow, I take the view that Dorothy did not suffer any relevant special disadvantage which should be imputed to Cloverdale.
62 Most broadly, it needs to be borne steadily in mind that it is accepted on all sides that George was the "directing mind and will" of each of the family companies in which he was involved. The extent to which Dorothy understood the affairs of those corporations and the extent to which she participated in decisions is disputed, but there seems to be no doubt that the decisions were ultimately made by George, and that George conducted the overwhelming majority of negotiations and other dealings with banks and with other third parties. Were George suffering a relevant special disability, it might well be thought to be unconscionable of the bank to take advantage of that disability in order to enter into a transaction with Cloverdale. However, it seems to me to be stretching the principle in Amadio too far to hold that where a lender is aware of any special disability of any director of a corporation, it is unconscionable for the lender to rely upon its transaction with that corporation, even where it is plain that decisions about the transaction on behalf of the corporation will effectively be made by some other person.
63 In the case of Cloverdale, not only was George apparently in each case the person who assessed Cloverdale's requirements for finance and entered into negotiations and made decisions concerning those requirements, but he was also the governing director to whose directions all other directors were, pursuant to Cloverdale's articles of association, required to conform. If George suffered no special disability which would affect his ability to consider the interests of Cloverdale, it appears to me to follow that Cloverdale suffered no such disability. However, in case that conclusion is wrong, I turn to consider each of the aspects of special disability alleged in respect of Dorothy, and I do so by reference to the relevant paragraph number in the defence.
64 At the relevant date, being April 1988, Dorothy was 63. This is not such an advanced age as necessarily to give rise to suspicion of mental disability. The transactions were not some novel sort of commerce in respect of which a person of her age might be thought to lack experience. Further, I note that before me, 11 years later at the age of 74, she presented as an alert lady with a good memory and an ability to understand the relevant transactions. I appreciate that during the course of this litigation she has been required to consider the various transactions in detail, and has no doubt had them clearly explained to her. It therefore cannot be concluded that what she appeared to understand in 1999 she would necessarily have understood in 1988. However, I am sure that her age would not have presented any barrier to her understanding at that time.
65 Although Dorothy left school at 14, there is nothing to suggest that she lacked ordinary literacy skills. In cross-examination, she was able to understand that various documents were mortgages, and it appears that she understood in broad terms what a mortgage was. She was able to recognise on the various mortgages the descriptions of the various locations which identified the property being mortgaged as Camballan. She was able to identify the relevant bank and the family companies involved in the transactions. Although her evidence was that at some time prior to the litigation she was given a copy of the Cloverdale mortgage and found it long, complicated and confusing and could not understand it, it appeared to me during the course of cross-examination that she would have been able to understand the gist of each transaction had she concerned herself with it. She knew that various documents that she signed at her husband's request were security. She simply did not attempt to ascertain at the relevant time what each document was.
Paragraph 44A.1.3 (her lack of knowledge of financial matters and lack of involvement in the management of Cloverdale and Viners)
66 As I have suggested above, I think that Dorothy was in a position to understand what a mortgage was and to understand the concept of one company securing the debts of another. She understood that the family businesses were conducted through a number of corporations and that she was requested to sign documents in relation to them from time to time. It is not clear to me what "knowledge of financial matters" Dorothy relevantly lacked, as an abstract proposition.
67 So far as the management of Cloverdale and Viners was concerned, she plainly was involved to the extent of signing documents at the request of George. She knew that Cloverdale had purchased Camballan; indeed it was her evidence in cross-examination that she and her husband decided that Camballan would be purchased through the company Cloverdale. She was aware of the purchase of the silverware companies, although she had disagreed with George when he wanted to purchase them, and she was aware that some money went from the farms from time to time to the silverware companies.
68 The evidence does suggest however, that she did not know what the duties of a director were, and that, rather than attempting to apply herself with any diligence to the affairs of the companies, she chose to leave management of them to George because she placed trust in him. To the extent that this was a "disability", it was one which Dorothy chose, and chose (albeit unknowingly) in breach of her legal duties. I will return to the relevance of her directorship later.
69 So far as the plaintiff's knowledge of Dorothy's disability in relation to Cloverdale and Viners is concerned, the pleading essentially boils down to two elements: they being, that Dorothy lived in a small country town and her circumstances must have been known to the Boyup Brook managers of the plaintiff from time to time; and that the plaintiff dealt exclusively with George in relation to financial accommodation to Cloverdale (with a similar pleading later in relation to Viners).
70 Paragraph 43.2.3(b) pleads, in relation to a later transaction in late 1990, that the plaintiff had knowledge of Dorothy's "disability" by reason of inquiries made by its officers Mr Thede ("Thede") and Mr Jazarbek ("Jazarbek"). It is convenient to deal with this allegation in this section, so that all allegations relating to Dorothy remain together.
71 So far as the first proposition is concerned, there was some evidence from Mr Shackleton, who was the branch manager at Boyup Brook from 1985 to 1990. His evidence was that on a few occasions he visited Camballan when he required documents to be signed by Dorothy and George. On those occasions he said:
"I would take documents out to the property and Dorothy, George and I would sit around a table to discuss the documents."
72 He was cross-examined specifically about this paragraph. He agreed that no such discussion occurred in relation to provision of financing to Viners, which was done from South Australia. However, it was not suggested to him that no such practice ever occurred; rather, it seems to have been implicit in the cross-examination that it was accepted that such discussions had occurred from time to time. So far as the local branch is concerned then, it seems to have been the view taken there that Dorothy was involved in at least some of the family businesses to an extent that required her participation in discussions about "documents".
73 So far as the second proposition is concerned - that is that officers of the bank dealt entirely with George - the difficulty for the defendants lies in acceptance of the proposition that it necessarily follows either that Dorothy was not involved with the management of the two companies or that the bank should have been aware of her non-involvement. It is more often than not the case, perhaps, that in any organisation - even a small family company - different people will adopt different roles as a matter of convenience. The mere fact that one person appears to be the public face of the corporation and the person who engages in negotiations on its behalf, does not entail the conclusion that no other person has any role to play or any interest in management. George's role leads to no conclusion one way or the other about whether Dorothy read or understood, or inquired about, or discussed with George, any of the documents which he took home for her to sign, or any of the proposals which the company negotiated with external bodies.
74 It should also be remembered in this context that the structure adopted by Cloverdale and Viners was a corporate one. Dorothy was a director, and had a duty to apply herself with reasonable diligence to the affairs of those companies. Indeed, the statutory provision in respect of corporations entitles those dealing with them to assume that officers properly perform their duties to the company (s 129 Corporations Law). In the absence of anything indicating the contrary, it seems to me that the plaintiff was entitled to assume that, notwithstanding that it dealt with George, Dorothy was taking a role in the management of the company.
75 To the extent that the pleading relies upon the actual knowledge of officers of the plaintiff such as Thede and Jazarbek, I think the evidence is against the defendants. Dorothy herself conceded in her evidence-in-chief that from time to time when in South Australia, she would sit in on meetings with the bank officers. She said that she spoke little at such meetings because she did not generally understand what was being discussed. However, unless she said anything to indicate her lack of comprehension, her presence at such meetings would have been capable of being seen as participation in the management of the bodies the affairs of which were being discussed. Both Thede and Jazarbek were cross-examined and neither was asked questions directed to establishing that they had notice of Dorothy's lack of involvement in the management of the affairs of the companies. Jazarbek agreed that he did not discuss the Viners' transaction or indeed any subsequent transactions with Dorothy. Thede was asked to recall discussions with Dorothy during late 1990 or early 1991 and replied, "No. I can't recall the specific issue", which tends to suggest that he had some discussions with her about some issue at some stage, but otherwise does not advance the position at all.
76 Some evidence relevant to Dorothy's involvement in the family companies generally was given by Mrs Barker ("Barker") who was a loans officer at the Clovelly Park, South Australia branch of the plaintiff, from 1989 to 1992. Although it post dates this mortgage, it is mentioned here as the only evidence shedding light upon what Dorothy said to officers of the bank, or what was said about Dorothy to officers of the bank. George apparently told Barker that he "and his wife" would be taking control of the motel units to ensure that they were run professionally, and he advised Barker that Dorothy was not prepared to mortgage the house at Panorama in Adelaide as security for any of the companies' dealings. Evidence of these statements was not given to prove the truth of their contents. The fact that they were made, however, might well have led officers of the bank to think that Dorothy was playing an active role and taking an active interest in at least some aspects of the management of the companies. Barker said that she spoke to Dorothy by telephone on a number of occasions and each time explained to her the purpose of the telephone call, which calls were broadly concerned with the financing of the various companies' activities. On one occasion, Dorothy asked her about the bank's taking security over the motel units, and explained to Barker that she thought that the units were becoming profitable, and why she held that view. The only evidence bearing on any actual knowledge of any bank officers of Dorothy's involvement with the management of the various family companies then, tends to suggest that the plaintiff could reasonably have believed there was a degree of active involvement on Dorothy's part.
77 Contrary to the allegation in the pleadings, no presumption of undue influence arises at law by reason of the relationship of husband and wife: Yerkey v Jones, nor can undue influence be assumed simply because a "high degree of trust and confidence" was reposed in George by Dorothy. Trust and confidence may be justified. It was, broadly, justified in this case; George applied himself with skill and diligence to the affairs of the varied family companies over many years and built up very substantial enterprises to the benefit of Dorothy and their children.
78 It is perhaps fair to say that George had an enthusiasm for the silverware businesses and a faith in their profitability which appears to have been excessive in the light of the actual position of those companies. However, in this one respect, Dorothy did not repose a high degree of confidence in George and in his judgment. Her evidence, which I accept, was that she was opposed to the purchase of the silverware businesses in the first place, that she wanted to see the family confine itself or substantially confine itself to farming enterprises, and that she had been "on at George for years" to sell Ranleigh. Knowing as she did that their views diverged on this point, she nevertheless made no attempt to insist that the Ridout family be divested of the silverware businesses, and she chose not to examine documents which were presented to her for signature in connection with those businesses.
79 Dorothy's reasons for acting in this way appear to have included the following: she and George regarded George as having greater skill in business and financial matters; she was busy with the bringing up of five children and with other domestic tasks; she took the view that George had had an unhappy early life and she wished to spare him arguments and conflict. In any marriage, where there is a difference of view about a decision of importance, if there appears to be no prospect of consensus or compromise, it is inevitable that the view of one party will prevail. It is not in my view possible to label every occasion on which this occurs as an instance of "undue influence"; unlike other relationships in which undue influence has been held to arise, the intertwined fortunes of parties to a marriage make it most unlikely that, should they disagree, they can simply pursue independent courses, following their own preferred inclination in respect of their joint marital assets.
80 Having reached the view that there was no undue influence, it is not strictly necessary to consider the question of the plaintiff's knowledge in this respect. However, all that is really pleaded in this respect seems to be that Dorothy was George's wife, that George presented himself as the person in control of Cloverdale and Viners, and that Dorothy was quiet and retiring, whereas George was confident, opinionated and persuasive. As I have noted earlier, it does not seem to me to follow from the fact that one person presents themselves as the public face of a corporation that no other officer of the corporation is permitted a role in its management. Such a division of roles may be no more than a matter of convenience, which says nothing about the relationships between the various directors. Nor in my view can it be assumed that a person who presents as confident, opinionated and persuasive, must therefore be suspected of exerting undue influence upon a person who presents as quiet and retiring; this is perhaps particularly so where the persons are married to each other, in which case one would normally expect a degree of mutual dependence which would give the retiring person an influence which they might be unable to exert in ordinary social situations.
81 Memorandum No 18 is the document which sets out the terms and conditions of mortgage D777666. It is a standard form document consisting of a number of pages of closely typed impenetrable prose. The evidence as to whether or not Dorothy was given this document is unsatisfactory. This is not surprising, after the passage of such a period of time.
82 Dorothy recalls an occasion in 1988 in which George brought a document home with him and asked her to sign it and told her that it was about Viners. She signed the document. She does not purport to recognise mortgage D777666 as the document, but given that it was signed in 1988 it may have been. She did not give evidence to the effect that she positively recalled that she had never been given a copy of memorandum No 18. Indeed, her evidence was that she did not concern herself with the nature of the documents she was signing; it is therefore most unlikely that she would have concerned herself with, or have had any reason to recall, what accompanying documents were put before her together with the documents she was to sign. Equally, there is no evidence from any of the plaintiff's witnesses which would assist in establishing whether memorandum No 18 was ever sent to, or provided for the attention of, Dorothy. It is clear that no officer of the plaintiff explained memorandum No 18 to Dorothy at that time.
83 The only conclusion which can flow from Dorothy's evidence about signing documents generally is that she would not have read a copy of memorandum No 18 if it had been provided to her, and it therefore seems to me impossible to regard the question of whether it was provided as being of any significance.
84 The principal vice with these paragraphs is the confusion between Cloverdale the corporate entity, Viners the corporate entity, and the individuals - particularly Dorothy - who conducted their affairs through those corporations. It is illustrated most clearly in para 44A.4, in which it is asserted that the entry into the mortgage was of no benefit to Cloverdale, contrasted with para 44A.5, in which it is pleaded that the result of the transaction was that the fifth defendant (Dorothy) risked "the loss of her family home" (ie Camballan). While Dorothy may have lived at Camballan, it was not hers. Rather, it belonged to Cloverdale. The property of the corporation is not the property of its shareholders or directors: Macaura v Northern Assurance Co Ltd [1925] AC 19.
85 In considering these portions of the pleading, and other portions where like issues arise, I see no justification for an inconsistency of approach. Either, one must have regard to the "practical" situation of the members of the Ridout family, and consider the effect upon the family of the web of transactions which were conducted, or alternatively, one must disregard the natural persons and consider only the interests and status of the relevant corporations. It is not open to the defendants to say on the one hand that Cloverdale and Viners were separate corporate entities so that the entry by Cloverdale into a mortgage to secure advances to Viners was of no benefit to it, and then to look behind both corporations in order to find disadvantage to Dorothy. Either Dorothy is to be considered only to the extent that she is a director of the relevant corporations, and what is then important is the understanding and position of the corporations, or alternatively, she is to be considered as an individual and the various corporate transactions are to be considered by reference to their practical effect upon her.
86 Consistency of approach would mean that these transactions would be understood in one of the following two ways. If one considers the members of the family as individuals and has regard to the corporations only as vehicles through which the family members transact their business, then the position was that Viners was an asset which the family wished to acquire (although Dorothy may have been opposed to this decision, she acquiesced in it so that it can be seen as a desire of the family). The family already owned a silverware business, which was apparently running profitably by that time. If the family could acquire another silverware business, then one can see that there might well be economies of scale or advantages from elimination of a competitor or matters of that kind which would lead reasonably to an expectation of profit to the family. Camballan was an asset which the family held and was able to offer as security. It was potentially in the interests of the Ridout family, therefore, to make Camballan available as security for the sum required to fund the acquisition of Viners, in the expectation that profit could be derived in future.
87 If one has regard to their corporate structure, then one starts with the fact that Cloverdale owned the majority of the shares in Ranleigh, which was a silverware business. Although there is no evidence suggesting what the dominant reason for the acquisition of Viners was, one can see that in the normal course of business it might be of assistance to Ranleigh if Viners were to fall into "friendly hands". As it happened, Ranleigh, Viners and Estelle were to an extent later run as one operation. Because of its shareholding, any benefit to Ranleigh would in turn be of benefit to Cloverdale. The practical reality of the acquisition, either from a family or from a corporate point of view may be seen in an internal memorandum of the Clovelly Park branch of the plaintiff dated 2 August 1988 which recorded that "interim figures to 5/88 show Viners is now up and running and making a strong contribution to Group [ie Viners/Cloverdale/Ranleigh] profit". Whether or not the information was accurate, plainly that was the role which Viners was expected to play, when it was acquired.
88 The first two of these paragraphs are concerned with a failure by the plaintiff to ensure that Dorothy and Cloverdale had independent advice. To the extent that these paragraphs are directed to establishing that Cloverdale was unaware of the nature of the transaction, the answer to them appears to me to be that George was the directing mind and will of Cloverdale and George understood the nature of the transaction. There was no need for Cloverdale to have independent advice.
89 However, these paragraphs also refer to a lack of independent advice obtained by Dorothy, and plead reliance by the plaintiff upon George to obtain Dorothy's execution of the mortgage. To that extent, they appear to be attempting to raise the principles discussed by the High Court in Garcia.
90 In that case, the court held that it was unconscionable to enforce a transaction in circumstances where: the wife, who was surety, did not understand the purport and effect of the transaction; the transaction was voluntary, in the sense that the wife obtained no benefit from the contract the performance of which was guaranteed; the lender was to be taken to have understood that, as a wife, the surety may repose trust and confidence in her husband so that the husband may not fully and accurately explain the transaction to her; and the lender did not itself take steps to explain the transaction to the wife or ensure that it had been explained independently to her. The application of the principles enunciated in that case to this, founders on the proposition that the wife must be a "volunteer" in the sense of obtaining no benefit or no substantial benefit from the transaction.
91 As I have endeavoured to explain, whether one has regard to the natural persons or to the corporate structure, Dorothy or Cloverdale stood to benefit from the transaction. This case is far removed from the situation of a wife who puts at risk either her own independent business assets or the matrimonial home, which is a place of residence only. Camballan was not only a home but was also the very substantial business operated by Cloverdale from which both George and Dorothy derived their living. Ranleigh was a secondary, but still very substantial, business, which also contributed to George and Dorothy's living. The acquisition of Viners might reasonably be expected to benefit those entities. If one has regard strictly to the corporate structure and to the fact that Viners was a separate corporate entity, in my view one must likewise in applying the Garcia principles, give effect to the fact that Cloverdale was a legal entity separate from Dorothy and that Cloverdale's asset - the farm - was not hers. Alternatively, if one looks to Dorothy's individual position and sees her as benefiting from Camballan, one must likewise see her as potentially benefiting (on the assumption that the acquisition would eventually prove to be a profitable one) from the acquisition of Viners.
92 There is a further difficulty in the application of the Garcia principles to this case. Although it is not necessary to determine the point, it seems to me that it might well be thought that principles which are appropriate to be applied where a wife offers surety as a wife - that is, as an individual - are not appropriate to be applied in all cases where a director of a company is the wife of the other director or one of the other directors of that company. To do so may have the effect of substantially impairing the operation of companies as commercial vehicles for small business enterprises. The considerations which led the common law to develop what is called the "indoor management rule" would tend to suggest that a lender should not be put upon inquiry merely because two directors are married to each other.
93 In my view, the execution of mortgage D777666 was not procured in a manner which amounts to unconscionable conduct, and there is no reason to find that Dorothy did not "authorise the use of the company seal" for the purpose of executing the mortgage, which in my view is a valid and enforceable one.
94 Although the subsequent portions of para 44, being para 44A.14 to para 44A.24 inclusive, attempt to raise issues of undue influence, of agency and of the effect of the Trade Practices Act in relation to this mortgage, they in substance merely repeat the pleadings with which I have already dealt, and must fail for the reasons which I have already given.
95 In 1985 Ranleigh borrowed $800,000 from Westpac by way of foreign currency loan. It was secured by a first registered mortgage granted by Ridout Nominees over Brantwood. The Westpac loan and a further sum were loaned by Ranleigh to Ridout Nominees to enable the purchase of Brantwood for a sum of approximately $1.6M.
96 It appears that Ranleigh's banking had been largely conducted through Westpac, either under that name or under its prior name of the Bank of New South Wales, for some time. George became dissatisfied with Westpac. All of the reasons for this dissatisfaction are not clear, but a major one is likely to have been the fate of the foreign currency loan. Changes in the value of the Australian dollar relative to the Swiss franc meant that that debt increased very substantially and in a way which George had obviously not expected. I should note that there seems to have been in due course a quantity of litigation, or threatened litigation, from borrowers who felt that they had been poorly advised in relation to foreign currency loans. The loan was by no means an idiosyncratic folly of George's, but seems to have been a strategy recommended at the time by apparently reputable lenders for coping with what were very high Australian interest rates. In any event, George determined that it would be desirable to move some of Ranleigh's business to the plaintiff.
97 Initially, Ranleigh obtained from the plaintiff an overdraft limit of $750,000 and a trade import facility of $600,000. Finance of $300,000 was also approved for Estelle. The security required for that transaction was, in respect of Ranleigh, a registered mortgage over the Edwardstown property and an equitable mortgage over the whole of the assets of the company and a "fully interlocking guarantee unlimited as to amount" to be given by each of Viners, Ranleigh and Estelle. So far as Estelle was concerned, the security was an equitable mortgage by it over its assets and an interlocking guarantee. It appears that the effect of Viners' guarantee of the debts of Ranleigh and Estelle was to make the earlier Cloverdale mortgages of Camballan security for the debts of Ranleigh and Estelle.
98 It appears that in addition to the mortgage of Brantwood, Ranleigh had at some time provided an equitable mortgage over its assets to Westpac, presumably (although this too is not clear) as security for the foreign currency loan. The amount of the foreign currency loan, by the time George came to refinance it, was approximately $1.3M. At the end of 1989, the external borrowings of the various Ridout companies and their securities were as follows:
Cloverdale mortgage 11 May 1973 over Camballan (Cloverdale Mortgage)
mortgage 14 April 1988 over Camballan (mortgage D777666)
mortgage 21 August 1989 over Marshalls (mortgage E 813334)
Viners mortgage D777666, 14 April 1988 over Camballan and Cloverdale's covenant to pay Viners' debts to CBA
Estelle guarantee 17 May 1989 from Ranleigh and Viners
Estelle Camballan, Ranleigh's, Viners' and Estelle's debts to CBA were also secured by Ranleigh's mortgage of Edwardstown and Cloverdale's 1973 and 1988 mortgages of Camballan and 1989 mortgage of Marshalls
Ranleigh 1985 mortgages of Brantwood by Ridout Nominees Pty Ltd, plus equitable mortgage over assets
Ridout Nominees, Ranleigh Cloverdale and the other unitholders, jointly and severally
Ridout Nominees, Cloverdale, Ranleigh and the other unitholders - mortgage D582608 over motel units
Ridout Nominees, Ranleigh, Cloverdale and the other unitholders, jointly and severally (approx)
Ridout Nominees, Cloverdale, Ranleigh and the other unitholders - mortgage D582609 over motel units
99 It is desirable to note at this point that the information available to the plaintiff in late 1988 and early 1989 was that an offer had been received from prospective purchasers of Viners/Ranleigh/Estelle at a price of $4.6M. The advances to Ranleigh and Estelle were made against the background of that offer having been made and eventually not accepted. As at March 1990, an internal memorandum of the plaintiff dated 16 March 1990 establishes that the plaintiff appeared to accept that Ranleigh was worth approximately $4.8M. This document also suggests that both Westpac and the plaintiff at that date held registered equitable mortgages over Ranleigh but with priority to the plaintiff in the amount of $2.25M. The plaintiff apparently accepted valuations of $398,000 approximately for Viners and $313,000 for Estelle. That document also refers to offers received by George for the silverware businesses during 1989 of "$5.5M to $6M". It is not clear where the information in relation to potential sales came from, but it seems to have been information on the basis of which the plaintiff was prepared to act.
100 In March 1990, the plaintiff refinanced the Westpac loan, increasing the total facilities to Ranleigh, Viners and Estelle to $3.012M, the Westpac loan standing at about $1.17M. The Westpac debt was paid and the Westpac mortgages over Brantwood were discharged and by mortgages E 355681 and E 355679 in March 1990 Ridout Nominees mortgaged Brantwood as security for Ranleigh's debts which were also secured by Ranleigh's 17 May 1989 equitable mortgage. The limits of the individual facilities for the three silverware companies were: Ranleigh, $2,397,000; Viners, $405,000; and Estelle, $210,000.
101 The defendants plead that although the additional money made available to Ranleigh was used to repay the foreign currency loan, the giving of the mortgages referred to by Ridout Nominees was not to the benefit of, and was manifestly disadvantageous for Ridout Nominees because Ridout Nominees' contingent liability pursuant to the Westpac mortgages was approximately $1.3M (or approximately $1M if one makes allowance for the fact that at a later time Westpac paid $300,000 to Ranleigh in satisfaction of a claim for compensation for losses pursuant to the foreign currency loan) whereas Ridout Nominees' contingent liability pursuant to the new mortgages for the debts of Ranleigh amounted to $2,397,000, which amount was liable to increase and did in fact increase. It is further pleaded that Ranleigh had experienced, and continued to experience "serious financial difficulties" and that in the circumstances it was imprudent for Ridout Nominees to give those mortgages over Brantwood as security for advances given to Ranleigh.
102 The particulars of Ranleigh's worsening financial position are said to be that in 1989 it had a net loss of approximately $288,000 on a trading loss of $671,000 with accumulated losses of Ranleigh, Viners and Estelle combined of $31,198, while in 1990 it had a net loss of approximately $247,000 on a trading loss of $626,000 with accumulated losses of Ranleigh, Viners and Estelle combined at $494,211. It is said that Ranleigh had fallen from a peak profit in 1981 of $169,459 until 1986 when it first incurred a loss, which losses increased thereafter. Ranleigh's liabilities increased substantially from 1986 to 1990; I do not think it is necessary to set out the figures.
103 All of this pleading in relation to alleged manifest disadvantage is coupled with a plea that both Dorothy and George, as at March 1990, were in a position of special disability. Dorothy's alleged special disability is relevantly the same as the special disability pleaded in relation to mortgage D777666 of Camballan. I repeat what I said in relation to that mortgage so far as Dorothy is concerned. It is probably convenient to defer a consideration of George's position until I come to examine the transactions at the end of 1990, in relation to which there is the most extensive pleading concerning George's alleged disability.
104 For the present, it is sufficient to deal with these allegations to find, as I do, that the transaction was not "manifestly disadvantageous" for Ridout Nominees. First, Ridout Nominees had the benefit of the foreign currency loan, in that the sum advanced by Westpac had been "on-lent" by Ranleigh in order to fund the purchase of Ridout Nominees' asset, Brantwood. To the extent that the mortgage secured the amount advanced for the purchase of that property, together with the further losses incurred as a result of the method of borrowing of that sum, it was proper and reasonable that the entity which had acquired the asset should provide security for the moneys used for its acquisition. So far as Ridout Nominees' "exposure" to the other debts of Ranleigh was concerned, plainly there is potential for disadvantage wherever security is provided. However, although Ranleigh had been incurring losses, as at March 1990 an examination of the silverware group's accounts suggests that Ranleigh would have been in a position to meet its debts from its own assets should that have been necessary, so that there would have been no need for recourse to the mortgage over Brantwood.
105 The assumption of manifest disadvantage appears to stem from the wisdom of hindsight; in fact, Ranleigh's losses did increase and when the Edwardstown property and the business came to be sold after George's death, they remained on the market for a considerable time and realised much less than seems to have been anticipated in 1990. However, if one looks at the position as at 1990, the silverware businesses had initially been unprofitable, had then become profitable and had recently incurred losses. George and Dorothy had had silverware interests by then for approximately 30 years. The bank's 1988, 1989 and early 1990 memoranda show that the bank had been told that problems with the silverware businesses included holding of excessive levels of stock, adverse effects from exchange rates, and lack of diversification, amongst other things. However, specific proposals are recorded in those memoranda, which are intended to deal with those adverse conditions, such as progressive running down of stock levels, and local manufacture of some product lines. Such information can only have been obtained from either George or from the manager he employed at Ranleigh, Mr Ladyman.
106 In the light of what was apparently believed in 1988-1990 by both George and by the plaintiff, there would be no reason to expect that Ranleigh's profitability would not improve, although of course it was always possible that it would not. Further, both George and the plaintiff apparently considered that the sale of the silverware businesses was an option which could be taken if necessary; I have already referred to the evidence concerning offers apparently received for the businesses which would have left a surplus even after payment of all debts of Ranleigh.
107 If Ranleigh's position were to dramatically deteriorate, it must be noted that there were substantial inter company loans by Ranleigh to Ridout Nominees, upon which the equitable mortgage granted by Ranleigh would have fastened had it been necessary for the plaintiff to take action pursuant to that security. As at June 1989, Ridout Nominees owed Ranleigh over $2M, an amount apparently approximately equal to the value of Brantwood. The giving of the mortgage by Ridout Nominees in that context involved the furnishing of a direct security where an indirect one already existed.
108 Finally, it must be remembered that the increase in the amount of the foreign currency loan due to movements in the exchange rate had caused a very substantial increase in Ranleigh's debt, part of which had flowed through to Ridout Nominees by reason of ad hoc charges of interest on the inter-company loan (whether for taxation or other reasons is not clear). The re-financing of that loan was of benefit to Ranleigh, which was in substance a wholly owned subsidiary of Ridout Nominees.
109 The purchase of the motel units in 1987 was funded principally from Farrow by Cloverdale and Ranleigh and partly by a loan by Cloverdale which was later refinanced by Elderslie Finance Corporation ("Elderslie"), and in part by funds advanced by Ridout Nominees, Wanata and Ranleigh. Those loans from Farrow and Elderslie fell due for repayment on or about 11 October 1990. Those lenders were unable to extend finance and so required that the loans be discharged. From the date of their expiry, they would, of course, attract penalty interest. George turned to the plaintiff to refinance those loans. It is the events and the series of transactions that resulted from this application which was the cause of the most substantial dispute in this matter.
110 A review of the plaintiff's internal memoranda reveals that by about March 1990 there was a concern with the level of debt of the Ridout enterprises and particularly with the profitability of the silverware businesses. As I have noted, there was a reference to information suggesting improvement in management practices at Ranleigh. However, Thede had discussions with George in which he encouraged George to sell assets in order to reduce debt levels. It was Thede's impression that George intended to apply his superannuation funds to the bank debt, to sell the Panorama house, and to sell the units in the motel complex after improvements had been made to the management of them.
111 There was some considerable discussion in evidence as to whether the idea of selling assets was something that originated with George or with the plaintiff. I do not think it matters. What is important is that the officers of the plaintiff were by then of the view that a reduction in overall debt level was desirable and that they were also of the view that George proposed to identify assets for sale and to reduce overall debt level.
112 Mr Verringer ("Verringer"), another officer of the plaintiff, reviewed the Ridout accounts in July 1990, when trade facilities for Ranleigh were in excess of approved limits. While he regarded the excess as a temporary situation due to the ordering of Christmas stock and due to slow payment by a major creditor, he too noted George's intention to inject superannuation funds and to sell the motel complex.
113 It seems that George had kept Ranleigh's position under review for some time. The evidence of Mr Rawson ("Rawson"), an accountant who dealt with some of the Ridout affairs, was to the effect that in early to mid-1988 he had discussions during which George said that he wished to discuss the future direction of the silverware businesses, because he wished to spend more time in Western Australia on the farm. By 1989 George had engaged Mr Ladyman ("Ladyman") as manager of Ranleigh. In 1988, George informed Rawson that he had received an offer for the silverware business, which Rawson recommended that he accept. The question of sale of the silverware business also arose in about May or June 1990 when Ladyman asked Rawson to prepare financial details of the business for the purposes of discussions about its possible sale. Rawson's advice was essentially that there would not be a very large surplus on sale, but that the real benefit to the Ridout family would be the elimination of the internal (ie inter-company) debt. By late 1990 George discussed with Rawson the engagement of Chilman Bilna as agents for the sale of the business.
114 It was against this background that in September 1990 the plaintiff came to consider George's application for re-financing of the Farrow and Elderslie loans in sum of a little under $1,140,000. The bank's processing memorandum of 13 September 1990 noted that George would consider whether to continue with the units or to sell them after a further three months' trading, that he had put in $400,000 from his own superannuation, that he was proposing to list the residence at Panorama for sale, and that an offer of $100,000 compensation had been received from Westpac in respect of the foreign currency loan but that negotiations at that stage were "stalled". It noted that George had "mooted" the sale of the Ranleigh group but at his preferred price only. The memorandum suggested that George's valuation of the units totalled $2,435,000.
115 A further internal document dated 21 September relating to the proposed re-financing estimated the interest costs of the Ridout Group for the next 12 months. The view was reached that the business could not sustain those costs, and that consideration should be given to further asset disposal. However, the view was expressed that "director's (sic) have proven themselves to be astute and quick to recognise deficiency in coy's and take remedial action."
116 On 25 September 1990 the plaintiff wrote to George advising as follows:
"We are pleased to inform you that the Bank has approved a Multi Option Facility of $1,140,000 to refinance existing borrowings with Farrow Mortgage Services Pty Ltd and Elderslie Finance Corporation Ltd.
As discussed, accommodation will initially be drawn on a Bill Discount Facility basis.
Approval is on the Bank's usual terms and conditions and subject to:-
An interlocking guarantee from all abovementioned companies; and
Section 230(8)(a) Certificates from all abovementioned companies; and
* review of your requirements in January 1991, and annual review thereafter;
* interest only payments for up to three years, then renegotiation at that time;"
117 It is not necessary to set out the remainder of this approval.
118 However, unfortunately, although the plaintiff in October 1990 advised both Elderslie and Farrow that it had approved finance to pay out their respective mortgages over the units, a number of obstacles then presented themselves.
119 A trainee valuer valued the units in early October at $57,000 for each one bedroom unit and $65,000 for each two bedroom unit, but gave the aggregate of the units an "In-one-line" value of $1,300,000; that is, the valuer took the view that if all the units were sold as a package they would realise only the latter amount. The plaintiff took the view that that valuation was unsatisfactory and on 16 October, Mr Hawkes, the deputy regional manager took the view that the plaintiff would be prepared to provide the accommodation "provided additional tangible security is made available to support proposed debt level". This was noted in a diary note of 16 October.
120 On 17 October, Adelaide solicitors Knox & Hargrave advised Ranleigh that Ridout Nominees, as trustee of the Cloverdale Trust, did not have power pursuant to the provisions of the trust deed to give security by way of a mortgage over trust assets in support of a guarantee. They advised that, although the trustee had express power to borrow and, in respect of borrowings, to grant a mortgage or other security over trust assets, and an express power to enter into a guarantee, it was not possible to aggregate the powers so as to grant security over trust assets in support of a guarantee. They prepared a supplementary deed containing the following power:
"7(c) to give such Guarantees or Guarantees and Indemnities in relation to the borrowings of money by any person or company or the performance of any contract, obligation or undertaking by any person or company or for any other person or any other account whatsoever and to give and execute any mortgages, charges or other securities over the whole or any part of (sic) parts of the trust fund as may be required to secure the same."
121 The supplementary trust deed was executed and the common seal of Ridout affixed by George and Dorothy as director and secretary on 25 October 1990. By early November - apparently on 2 November 1990 - all of the documentation then requested by the plaintiff for security had been signed by Ridout family members. However, on about 29 October, the plaintiff had apparently requested its solicitor to consider the trust deeds of a number of the mortgagor companies. On 12 November 1990 it referred the amendment cl 7(c) of the Cloverdale Trust to its legal department.
122 By 8 November, the plaintiff's internal memorandum recorded that it had determined that its earlier approval for the facility "may stand" subject to additional security by way of a registered equitable mortgage by Fergal, and a statement confirming that there had been no changes in relation to certain of the trusts. It was prepared to allow settlement to proceed without viewing the trust deeds for the PA Ridout and CJ Ridout family trusts, provided that registered mortgages over those units were signed and ready for registration. The plaintiff had apparently been requested to permit rearrangement of the "Ridout Group facilities" so that excesses by one company of its facility would be permitted provided total group facilities were within approved limits. The plaintiff decided to let "rearrangement consideration pass for the present" at that time. Mr Hawkes, then acting regional manager, recorded "we are presently at a crossroads with this connection and without proceeding precipitously, Mr Ridout is going to need to either provide more information re his present position or agree to some orderly asset disposal program to reduce existing debt level." In the meantime, the Farrow and Elderslie loans had expired, penalty interest had commenced, and George was obviously anxious to ensure that the re-financing took place as soon as possible.
123 On 14 November 1990, the plaintiff's solicitor reminded it of an earlier advice dated 31 May 1990. This advice does not seem to have received any attention at the time at which it was originally given. The solicitor summarised the advice as:
"I did not consider the Cloverdale Trust could be amended to enable the Trustee to give the security proposed as the amendment would necessarily favour the appointor, George Edward Ridout as he was a director and shareholder of Estelle Gifts Pty Ltd and Ranleigh Ware Pty Ltd and Viners Silverware Pty Ltd and I confirm that I do not consider that third party security can be taken from this Trust."
124 I will return later to the question of whether the advice given was correct.
125 That legal opinion, however, led the plaintiff to determine that settlement would have to be deferred until that issue was resolved. The plaintiff's solicitor later apparently explained to its officers that it would still be possible for it to execute against Ridout Nominees' units if the need arose without such security, but that a warrant of execution would need to be obtained, which would involve application to the court, and that it could not guarantee that such a warrant would issue. Because Ridout Nominees was unable to provide a mortgage over its units, and because trust deeds for Kacana and Kambaroo had not been viewed, the relevant bank officer took the view that "the only alternative I see is for Ridout Nominees P/L to raise sufficient finance in their own name and on-lend it to Cloverdale P/L".
126 One of his superior officers expressed the view that while the plaintiff would "stand on the terms of our approval as conveyed", if the Ridouts then sought to resolve the situation by direct borrowing, "We will consider but I lean at this stage to letting the business pass". Read with the prior approval letter, this memo appears to mean that, the valuation and guarantee conditions not being satisfied, the plaintiff would not be making the financial accommodation available to re-finance the Elderslie and Farrow loans.
127 It appears that the Clovelly Park branch then advised the plaintiff's southern region office, at which this decision had been taken, that Ridout Nominees had already provided a mortgage over Brantwood to support advances of $2.83M to Ranleigh. Although the branch had apparently been aware of prior advice that Ridout Nominees could not provide what the bank referred to as a "supported guarantee", it had been given George's undertaking that the trust deed would be amended, and it had apparently not appreciated that the legal advice was to the effect that such an amendment was not possible.
128 Faced with the apparent invalidity of the Brantwood mortgage, Verringer suggested that the plaintiff provide a fresh loan to Ridout Nominees for $1.45M to be secured by a mortgage over Brantwood with an interlocking guarantee from the other companies in the group. Ranleigh's residual debt of $733,000 would then be secured by a mortgage over the Edwardstown property, the equitable mortgage over Ranleigh, and an interlocking guarantee which excluded Ridout Nominees.
129 At about this time also, Verringer was advised that other officers of the plaintiff had waived the condition that George give an undertaking to sell the units if no improvement was observed, since George had indicated that he would assess the viability of the units in six months and sell them if necessary. It appears that George was not happy with the concept of an undertaking when he had already indicated to bank officers that he would sell if necessary. Verringer instructed another officer to amend the offer of finance previously made to include a condition that interim financial statements be provided for the group to enable a review to be conducted in March 1991, with an "orderly asset disposal program" to be established if servicing of the debt was then to the bank's satisfaction.
130 By 30 November, however, the Clovelly Park branch in South Australia, with which George had primarily dealt, was recommending to the southern region office that settlement of the new facility should proceed. The proposal put forward by the branch noted that the "Group structure is complex and difficult to deal with. This has been brought home to Mr Ridout by the legal impediments to security ... Mr Ridout's primary accountant has been involved in discussions with this office and has advised that he proposes to strongly encourage Mr Ridout to simplify the group structure." It was also noted that the "accountant concurs with proposal that more frequent assessments of groups financial health be undertaken."
131 The branch recommended that settlement proceed notwithstanding that deeds for the PA Ridout Trust and CJ Ridout Trust had not been located and that, in view of the urgency of George's requirements for re-financing, the "Group set off arrangements and need to re-arrange securities and debt in name of Ranleigh Ware Pty Ltd resulting from Legal Opinion stating Security number 4 is unenforceable are being addressed, however will be dealt with separately."
132 However, the southern region office took the view that all security aspects should be satisfied prior to the funds being made available. It also considered that the rearrangement of securities and debt should be dealt with then, rather than being deferred.
133 Verringer explained in cross-examination that he took the view that the bank should have a "failsafe" security position and that, further, it was his experience that unless issues were dealt with at the time, they could be "put on the backburner" and never dealt with. Verringer agreed that by the time of this memorandum, he was of the view that if the group's past trading pattern continued and no assets were sold, the group would be unable to meet the interest burden it was undertaking.
134 In a memorandum dated 4 December 1990, Verringer set out in some detail the views he then held about the application. He began by noting that the branch submission that rearrangement of facilities be deferred was unacceptable. He noted that the purpose of the present proposal was, as to Cloverdale, to assist in payout of the Farrow and Elderslie loans, and as to Ridout Nominees, to assist in payout of those loans and to refinance the multi-option facility currently funded in the name of Ranleigh. There were other purposes to which it is not necessary to refer. Under the heading "Proposed Reductions" he noted that the review in March 1991 had been agreed to when Ridout Nominees "refused" to sign an undertaking to sell assets if servicing could not be demonstrated by 31 December.
135 He analysed the position of each of the entities. So far as Cloverdale was concerned, his calculations revealed that it would be in a position to service the interest on the loans attributable to it, but he noted that the position was "marginal" particularly in view of the decline in farming income. He further noted under this heading that no cashflow had been provided for any of the companies, which he thought reflected badly on the directors, primarily George.
136 Ridout Nominees, he noted, was an asset holding company only, which received its income from rental from the farming property (Brantwood) and the five units in Western Australia. Its position revealed that if it were required to meet the interest on the debts attributable to it, there would be a $130,000 shortfall. He noted a loss had been incurred by Ranleigh, although the loss had been smaller for 1990 than for 1989 on the draft 1990 figures, leading to a shortfall of $141,211, while Viners had a shortfall of approximately $30,000. Estelle had a shortfall of $20,000. He expressed some doubt about the figures for Ranleigh and Viners and expressed the view that the position might be worse than it appeared. The total shortfall was of the order of $300,000. He noted that directors' drawings were unknown.
137 He noted that the group "has managed to survive the 1990 financial year with the injection of funds received from [George's] superannuation ... which was obviously a once off situation". He regarded the placing of the Panorama home on the market as a step in the right direction but added, "There is a long way to go before viability is evident." He noted that funds might be received from Westpac in settlement of the litigation at some stage but that it should be disregarded as far as the bank was concerned. He thought that the sale of the units could become very protracted and observed that his view was that "if [George] was genuine, non-performing assets would be on the market now not April '91/June '91 as is suggested." He queried, "Is Ridout and his accountant fully aware of their current predicament, the last two years have resulted in trading losses in excess of $4K each year." He looked at the total security available. The end result of that consideration was that the total of the securities to be held compared to the total of the amount lent was acceptable.
138 As a general comment, he noted that previous bank writings suggested George was an astute businessman, but he observed, "I question this in the light of financial controls". His ultimate recommendation was that, "In light of our previous approval we would support the above increase rearrangement as outlined herewith subject to [a variety of conditions which included provision of the relevant trust deeds, quarterly reviews, reduction of debt load over the next 12 months and the bank to bear re-documentation costs]". (Emphasis supplied).
139 Mr Hawkes took the view that the present debt load could not be sustained, although he did note a dramatic improvement in the performance of Fergal (ie the units), which might have some effect. He thought that in hindsight the approval of September 1990 had been hasty and the conditions not demanding enough, but given that there were not really any new moneys (by which I understand him to mean that the group was not seeking to increase its level of debt but simply to refinance) it would be difficult to "sell the servicing concept" at that stage. By this expression, I understand that it might not be easy to convince George that the group was unable to deal with the level of debt which it had apparently sustained to that time. He suggested that the Clovelley Park branch "discuss the position fully and comprehensively with directors and ... ensure that directors fully understand and are prepared to divest assets as soon as possible".
140 The regional manager commented on 4 December 1990 that he had certain concerns also; he raised for the first time a question as to the current valuation of the Boyup Brook and Edwardstown properties. Despite those concerns, he added, "Against all the above, we have an obligation to show good faith by searching out a scenario which will allow the previous approval to be honoured". He therefore took the view that he would be prepared to approve the proposal provided that there was a firm undertaking to dispose of assets within 12 months and to show servicing of the residual debt could be accommodated, together with guarantees from the directors and an urgent revaluation of the securities (ie the farms and Edwardstown). He too recommended "a full and frank discussion with directors" so that the respective positions of the Ridout Group and of the plaintiff could be made clear.
141 Through the various bank memoranda, two themes can be discerned. They were also evident in the evidence of the bank officers. On the one hand, there was a desire to assist a valued customer. The Ridout Group generally was often referred to as a valuable or even "prestigious" connection, and there was recognition that both the Westpac loan and then the need to re-finance the Elderslie and Farrow loans had placed the Ridout Group in a difficult position. There was also, particularly in the later memoranda, a concern with the bank's security position, particularly in the light of what appeared to be deteriorating results in diverse areas of the group's activities. In the later memoranda, George's business ability is doubted for the first time and some doubt is cast for the first time upon his integrity, in the sense that there is some query as to whether he would actually do what he had apparently undertaken to do, namely, divest of non-performing assets.
142 The correspondence, the memoranda, and the evidence which dealt with the changing fortunes of the re-financing package, were all lengthy. In my view it is not necessary to go further into detail, because the memoranda to which I have referred give sufficient of the flavour of the stance taken by the bank. In my view, a fair reading of the memoranda and a review of the evidence of the bank officers, which in general I accept, make it clear that the defendants' thesis that the plaintiff was prepared to use George's very difficult financial situation as a lever to dictate a transaction favourable only to itself, cannot be sustained.
143 So far as the "invalid" mortgage was concerned, bank officers were simply concerned to put in place an arrangement which they had until then assumed to have been already in existence, and they appear to have assumed that George would have also wished to ensure the validity of the mortgage which he had already purported to give of Brantwood. So far as the whole of the transaction is concerned, I think it is fair to say that some reservations are expressed in the memoranda as to whether, even with all of the security in place, the transaction would necessarily be a favourable one to the plaintiff; certainly, it seems that at the least, continuing supervision of these accounts would be required, as it could not be assumed that they would be trouble free from the plaintiff's point of view. It seems to have been assumed that there was not a reasonable alternative to re-financing, since the Farrow and Elderslie loans had expired.
144 On 6 December 1990 the plaintiff wrote to George care of Ranleigh confirming approval for borrowings totalling $4.88M to "companies under your control". It noted that revaluation of the farming properties would be sought and valuation was to be "in line with figures currently held". It also, under the heading "Repayment Arrangements", wrote in terms that plainly indicated the plaintiff's concern about the ability of the Ridout Group to service its debts. The portion of the letter under that heading reads:
"All facilities are to be reviewed again by 25 January 1991 [only two months in the future] and at that time, the following information should be provided:
* Interim Financial Statements for all companies within the group and to cover the period up to and including at least 30 September 1990.
* Detailed cashflow budget covering at least the next twelve months, and again, all companies within the group.
* An ability to service all commitments with a net position of the group achieving at least a 'break even' result will be presumed.
* Should the group of companies be unable to achieve this, the Bank will require a written undertaking from company principals to dispose of assets within the next twelve months, to ensure that residual debts can be serviced to the Bank's satisfaction.
* Further quarterly reviews will be sought during the next twelve months and production of interim financial statements will be required at each review."
145 On 3 January, the plaintiff advised George by letter that revaluations on the farming properties and Edwardstown showed a substantial decrease in property values and that the previous approval then "may stand" subject to provision of additional security, which included a mortgage by George and Dorothy over the Panorama home.
146 On 4 January 1991, the meeting urged by a variety of memoranda took place. George flew to Adelaide and met Verringer and Barker, and perhaps another bank officer.
147 Barker was of the view that George appeared to be realistic in his assessment of the seriousness of his financial position, acknowledging that the group was presently unable to service the proposed debt load. He assured bank officers that he had a number of assets on the market and that he was expecting to receive around $350,000 in the next twelve months in settlement of the Westpac foreign currency loan litigation (in the end, $300,000 was received). George further advised the officers that his accountant would have preferred the majority of the debt to be "kept with Ranleigh" but that his accountant was now happy with the bank's proposal involving transferring of the debt to Ridout Nominees. He advised, however, that he was not prepared to sell either of the Western Australia farms, they being intended for his sons, and that Dorothy did not wish to provide a mortgage over the Panorama house as she always wanted to have somewhere in Adelaide as her home.
148 Verringer explained to George that although George was hoping to receive approximately $3.5M from the sale of the Ranleigh business, it might be better to accept a lower price rather than continuing to attempt to service the debt. Verringer said that George acknowledged the force of that argument. As a result of that meeting, Verringer recommended that facilities be approved to Cloverdale and Ridout Nominees on the terms of the earlier December approval without taking security over the Panorama house.
149 The change in borrowings by the Ridout Group as a result of the new arrangements finally approved in January 1991 may be summarised as follows:
150 The further securities obtained by the plaintiff were a mortgage from Ridout Nominees of Brantwood to secure Ridout Nominees' debts (as opposed to the previous mortgage securing Ranleigh's debt), mortgages of the motel units, and all moneys guarantees provided as follows:
Viners, Estelle and Ranleigh Viners, Estelle and Ranleigh
Ranleigh, Viners, Estelle, Cloverdale Cloverdale, Ranleigh
Wanata, Kamberoo, Kacana, Fergal Viners and Estelle
151 In relation to the whole of this transaction, the defendants assert that the re-financing transactions, and in particular the grant of the mortgage over Brantwood and the direct borrowing by Ridout Nominees, were not to the benefit of, but were to the detriment of Ridout Nominees and the Cloverdale trust; that the effect was to enable the plaintiff to better secure a pre-existing liability until then borne by Ranleigh; that the granting of the mortgage by Ridout Nominees was a breach of trust; and that George and Dorothy were to the knowledge of the plaintiff in late 1990 in a position of special disability by reason of a number of matters which were pleaded. I will deal shortly with the breach of trust issue and with the personal guarantees. However, in broad terms, it appears to me that the rest of the defendants' claim must fail unless it can be said that all that was happening was that the bank was better securing its own position in respect of a pre-existing liability in a manner disadvantageous to Ridout Nominees and to the Cloverdale trust.
152 To support their characterisation of the events of late 1990 and early 1991, the defendants point out first that as a result of this transaction, Ridout Nominees assumed primary liability for a debt of Ranleigh to the plaintiff in the sum of nearly $2M, which it did not have the means to service. It is said by the defendants that any reduction in liability by Ridout Nominees to Ranleigh consequent upon that transaction was no adequate compensation to Ridout Nominees, by reason of the fact that no interest was contractually payable by Ridout Nominees with respect to the inter-company loan, that no capital payment instalments were contractually payable, that repayment could be deferred indefinitely and that the inter-company loan was entirely unsecured. Further, the defendants say that one can treat the March 1990 mortgage and later re-financing as one entire transaction, which was manifestly improvident because immediately prior to that series of transactions Ridout Nominees was (assuming the Westpac mortgage to be valid) contingently liable to Westpac for $1.3M (later reduced to $1M by reason of the compensation payment received from Westpac) which was secured by an equitable mortgage over the assets of Ranleigh, which assets were sufficient to satisfy the debt, while subsequent to the transactions Ridout Nominees was liable for a primary debt of almost $2M secured by mortgage, which debt it could not service.
153 The defendants' contentions have at their heart the proposition that the best course - indeed the only commercially rational course - as at either March 1990 or at late 1990/early 1991 would have been to reduce the exposure of the group to debt, avoid unnecessarily increasing the exposure of assets of the Cloverdale trust, and take steps to stop the losses being incurred in Ranleigh. Specifically, an expert report prepared on behalf of the defendants suggests that the only appropriate course as early as March 1990, would have been liquidation of Ranleigh rather than either re-financing of the Westpac debt or taking the course of the later re-financing.
154 There are three principal difficulties with the contentions of the defendants in this respect. One is of a practical nature, while the others go to the reasoning which lies behind them. Taking the practical concern first, a difficulty with the expert report prepared is that it relies upon a number of assumptions which either are the product of hindsight or cannot be tested. It is assumed that the $300,000 compensation from Westpac may be taken into account as early as March 1990, although as at that date no compensation had been received, so that if Ranleigh were to be liquidated as at that time, there would in fact have been an additional $300,000 to be found. Further, doubtful assumptions are made about the realisable values of the assets of Ranleigh. For example, the expected sale proceeds of land and buildings, plant and equipment is said to be over $1.6M. This relies upon valuations current at the time; however, there was no evidence that as at that time, any purchaser would have been found for what was a relatively specialised business. George had received earlier offers, but there is no evidence of an offer current as at March 1990, and the later dealings with the property make one question whether it could have been sold for anything like its valuation. When it came to be sold after George's death, it appeared that there was substantial difficulty in locating a purchaser.
155 As Ms Gerard, an expert witness called on behalf of the plaintiff, demonstrated, if one were to use book values for the assets of the business, one would find a deficiency (leaving aside unsecured external debt other than the plaintiff and inter-company balances) of something over $800,000, while the use of a "going concern" valuation results in a small surplus. In neither case is allowance made for taxation or other costs on realisation. The difficulties with Ranleigh's business, which are adverted to at length in the plaintiff's memoranda, suggest that it may well be that the business would not have realised the "going concern" valuation. The history of the attempts to sell the businesses after George's death supports this thesis. Additionally, the amount of surplus or deficiency would be further affected by the question of whether trade debtors and stock could be realised for their book value.
156 A relatively small deficiency might have been funded by way of a relatively small loan secured against one of the farming properties, but in view of the difficult position of the Ridout Group during 1990, a very substantial deficiency - of the order of $800,000 say - could not have been funded without recourse either to Camballan (which was already security for loans by the plaintiff) or Brantwood.
157 A difficulty with the reasoning underlying the report is that it assumes that a forced sale of Ranleigh would have left the facilities of the other entities intact. However, on Verringer's analysis, all of the companies in the group were in a degree of difficulty. The plaintiff could have been expected to appreciate the difficulties in achieving full value for Ranleigh once an attempt was made to dispose of it, and a failure to enter into a "package" giving it adequate security might have led it reasonably to terminate the other facilities, which were subject to annual review.
158 More broadly, the difficulty with the defendants' submissions is that they appear to be based upon the proposition that the re-financing was undertaken, and encouraged by the plaintiff, as an alternative to an orderly disposal of assets. The evidence, in my view, reveals that the plaintiff consistently encouraged George, who was relevantly the directing mind and will of Ranleigh and Ridout Nominees, to dispose of assets in an orderly way in order to reduce the group debt burden. While in the end the plaintiff did not insist on a written undertaking, both its written communications to George and the evidence of meetings with him in early 1991, which I accept, suggest that the plaintiff was at pains to make clear to George that the debt burden undertaken by the group could not be serviced on any long-term basis and that his only realistic choice was to dispose of assets. The choice of assets was left to him.
159 I accept in this connection the evidence of Mr Verringer to the effect that the sale of the motel units might have made a significant contribution to debt reduction. Although their valuation suggested that the sale of the units would do little more than cover the debt which related directly to them, it was his evidence that he regarded the valuation as, in effect, a "worst case" position and that it was not uncommon for values significantly better to be realised on sale. So far as Ranleigh was concerned, the offers which George had told the plaintiff he had received in the past, tended to suggest that the interests of the entire group might best be served by attempting in the short-term to improve Ranleigh's position (it having already improved somewhat from the previous financial year by late 1990) and then seeking a purchaser on a "going concern" basis.
160 The re-financing of the Elderslie and Farrow debt was part of a broader package of loans and securities, the effect of which was to give George time in which to investigate the sale of any or all of the group assets and to proceed to orderly realisation of them, as the bank encouraged him to do. Given the difficulty which all of the group had been facing, it was in my view entirely reasonable, and not unconscionable, that the plaintiff should seek to protect its interests during that transaction by ensuring that it had adequate security.
161 Like many commercial decisions, the decision by George to enter into the re-financing package is one which hindsight suggests was not the best of the options available at the time, if one assumes that a prompt disposal of some assets would have been possible at a reasonable price. However, considered from the standpoint of the time at which the re-financing took place, and remembering that Ranleigh's borrowings had been for the benefit of Ridout Nominees and that Ranleigh was an asset of the Cloverdale trust, it appears that it was open to George and to the plaintiff to take the view that it was in the best interests of each of the various entities which George controlled that sufficient finance be obtained to enable him to assess the viability of both the motel units and of Ranleigh and to seek a purchaser for them without requiring a forced sale.
162 Whether George was really interested in finding a purchaser for any of the assets, and whether he would have sold at a realistic price if a purchaser had been found, are matters of speculation. All that can be said based upon the contemporaneous documents is that he was prepared to assert to the plaintiff on many occasions that that was the course which he proposed, and that, notwithstanding some reservations that were expressed from time to time about his genuineness, the plaintiff appears to have accepted those assurances. In that context, it is in my view not possible to find either that the transaction was manifestly disadvantageous to Ridout, or that it was a breach of Ridout's duty of care to the beneficiaries of the Cloverdale trust, or that the plaintiff should have formed the view that it was manifestly disadvantageous and a breach of the trustees' duty of care.
163 In the light of the views I have formed concerning the March 1990 and the 1990/1991 transactions, it is not I think necessary for me to deal with the pleadings concerning George's position of special disadvantage stemming from his health. However, in case I am wrong in the conclusions which I have reached, I think it is appropriate to make findings in relation to those matters.
164 It appears to have been common ground that George was diagnosed with prostate cancer in around March 1990, which cancer was inoperable. He commenced a course of female hormone treatment in March 1990, which treatment continued until his death in 1993. Side effects of the hormone with which he was treated include elevated blood pressure, nausea, vomiting, headaches, dizziness, depression and the development of the breasts. Although these are the reported side effects, there was no evidence that George had been diagnosed as suffering to any degree from those side effects (apart from some hot flushes and some breast development by early 1991). He was, from time to time, in considerable pain because of the cancer. Between the time of his diagnosis and mid-1991, it appears he also took some alternative medications for the cancer (particularly apricot kernels and selenium), which appear to have caused no particular effects, and he considered but initially rejected a bilateral orchidecthomy (ie a removal of both testicles) which he eventually underwent in mid-1991.
165 Additionally, in early November 1990, he experienced chest pain which was provisionally diagnosed and in due course confirmed by blood testing as a myocardial infarction, that is, a heart attack. It was apparently of a relatively minor nature. No angiogram was performed, and George was given medication for this condition also.
166 Generally, George's general practitioner observed him looking very ill on occasions during 1990 and 1991. He said that George's cancer was of a type which caused considerable pain in patches and would at other times leave him relatively pain free. So far as the heart attack was concerned, he regarded it as a serious condition, although George, by early 1991, was apparently relatively cheerful, able to do gardening, chop wood and so on to a degree, with shortness of breath was brought on by severe exertion.
167 Members of George's family observed very considerable changes in him during 1990 and 1991. He appeared to them to be, broadly, distressed, less decisive, quieter and less energetic. Mrs Brand, an employee of Ranleigh, thought from 1990 onwards that he appeared less well, that his demeanour was less cheerful, that he tired more easily and was more "vague". However, I am not persuaded that any of the plaintiff's officers were in a position to notice, or did notice, any significant change in George's outward demeanour.
168 There was evidence from Rawson that he had discussions with George during late 1990, from August through to December, both over the telephone and in person. He gave evidence as to various discussions he had with George and noted that on one occasion George did not appear to be well. However, on that occasion and on every other occasion, Rawson was of the view that George discussed matters of business and finance with him in a "clear, reasoned and sensible way."
169 Mr Ladyman, who was employed as general manager of the Ranleigh silverware business from 1989 to 1994, dealt with George on very many occasions. In his witness statement, which was tendered by consent and in respect of which there was no cross-examination, he said that to the best of his recollection he learned that George had cancer sometime in late 1991 or 1992, and that until he learned of the cancer he did not observe any change in George's health or in his capacity to deal with the affairs of the various companies.
170 Barker said that in mid or late December 1990, when she telephoned the farm to speak to George, Dorothy mentioned to her that George had had a heart attack and was recovering in hospital. Dorothy's evidence was that she had telephoned either Thede or Jazarbeck to advise of George's heart attack and to cancel a meeting which she had scheduled with them. Neither Thede nor Jazarbek recall such a conversation. They both said that they were not aware that George was suffering from any serious illness, although Jazarbek was aware in about March 1990 that he had had some sort of prostate operation. Each of them said that the knowledge of a serious illness of a "key" individual such as George would have led them to have been concerned with "succession issues" in relation to the various companies which he controlled. There is no note of any such concern in any of the internal memoranda in around 1990 or 1991.
171 On balance, therefore, it appears to me probable that Dorothy mentioned George's heart attack to Barker rather than to Thede or Jazarbek, and that Jazarbek and Thede were unaware of it. I also accept their evidence that they did not notice any significant change in his demeanour. Barker met George on fewer than ten occasions, but considered that he always looked "sprightly and alert" on those occasions. She was not, she said, aware of any cancer.
172 In my view, while George's medical problems were known to his general practitioner, and while a general deterioration in his health was apparent to those who were close to him, his illness did not, during 1990 and the early part of 1991, prevent him from considering business matters in what was apparently a rational and sensible way and it would not have been apparent to those dealing with him only sporadically, such as officers of the plaintiff, that he was affected to any significant degree by illness.
173 While Barker was given information concerning George's heart attack by Dorothy, she did not pass it on to other bank officers. Further, she appears not to have been given any indication of the seriousness of the heart attack and there does not appear to have been anything in her own observations of George to suggest that it had a significant effect on his health or any effect on his ability rationally to conduct business affairs.
174 There were two other relatively small incidents which were pointed to by the defendants as suggesting that the plaintiff had knowledge of George's various medical conditions. One was that on some occasion prior to the heart attack but during 1990, Jazarbek came out of his office and, in Dorothy's presence, asked George in a sympathetic tone something to the effect of, "How are you George? How are you feeling?" While I accept that Dorothy appears to have viewed this as showing a knowledge of and concern for the cancer diagnosis, there is nothing in the words themselves to suggest this. Even if they were said in a "sympathetic" tone, there are many alternative explanations, not least of which is that the Ridout businesses had been experiencing a number of difficulties and that during 1990 George was involved in the no doubt stressful exercise of re-financing them.
175 Finally, Mr Shackleton, while manager of the Boyup Brook branch of the plaintiff, made a diary note on 12 July 1990 to the effect that George was not well. However, his evidence was that he did not recall ever discussing his illness with George and he did not recall George's illness affecting his business acumen or mental ability. The diary note went on to record George's intention to sell the Ranleigh and motel operations once they were trading well enough. Mr Shackleton rather thought that the diary note had arisen because George had told him of an intention to sell the businesses and he had seen George not looking well and that he assumed the illness may be a cause of the desire to sell, knowing as he apparently did that George's sons were not interested in taking over the silverware businesses if anything were to happen to George. He was not able to say what specifically he observed about George's appearance or demeanour on any occasion to lead to that conclusion.
176 In short, it appears to me that George's illnesses during the course of 1990 and 1991 would have had the effect of making him, on occasions, unable to conduct his business affairs and would, no doubt, have been stressful for him. However, he was on most occasions able to consider and deal with his business affairs in a rational fashion, and it would not have been apparent to those such as officers of the plaintiff who dealt with him only occasionally, that his ability was at all impaired.
177 I have approached the disputed transactions of 1990/1991 as if the defendants were correct in their contention that the mortgage purportedly granted by Ridout to secure its guarantee of Ranleigh's debts was not valid by reason of the terms of the Cloverdale trust deed. In my view, it is not necessary to determine whether that assumption is correct, but in case that view is wrong I make certain observations concerning that question.
178 The original trust deed of 21 September 1976 empowered the trustee by cl 6 to apply the whole of the trust fund to any beneficiary, which category included Ranleigh, Viners and Estelle. The trustee was further empowered by cl 7 relevantly:
"(b) 'to advance and lend moneys to and to borrow and raise moneys from and to secure by mortgage bill of sale ... the payment of money to any persons ... ' (cl 7(b));
(c) 'to give any guarantee for payment of money or the performance of any contract ... by any person ... ' (cl 7(c)); and
(d) 'to hold use purchase ... sell ... mortgage charge ... or otherwise deal with any real or personal property ... ' (cl 7(e))."
179 The deed of 27 March 1985 amended the original deed by granting to the trustees in addition power to:
"(a) give any guarantee or indemnity with or without security solely and jointly with any other company or natural person and with or without remuneration or payment of money or the performance of any contract, obligations or undertaking by any person ... and to secure by mortgage ... or otherwise howsoever such guarantee or indemnity ...".
180 The question which arises on the defendants' submissions is whether either under the original or the amended deed there was any power to give what the plaintiff in its internal documents referred to as "a supported guarantee"; that is a guarantee of payment of money by another, which guarantee was secured by mortgage.
181 In my view it is not necessary to turn either to other provisions of the trust deed or to any general principles relating to construction of trust deeds in order to reach the view that the original deed did not permit the giving of such guarantee. Clause 7(b) appears to be directed to the securing of the trustee's borrowings, not at securing the borrowings of any other person; cl 7(c) permits the guaranteeing of payment of money by any person but contains no reference to the granting of any security in connection with such a guarantee, while cl 7(e) appears to be directed at the trustee's own dealings in property for trust purposes. Whatever might be the general commercial desirability of being able to give a "supported guarantee" the instrument itself appears to keep the giving of the guarantee and the giving of security carefully and distinctly separate.
182 It appears to me that the terms of the 1985 amendment do permit the giving of a "supported guarantee". However, a question arises in relation to that amendment as to whether it was within the scope of cl 14 of the 1976 deed, which contained the power to amend. Clause 14 relevantly provided that the trustee might vary the trust powers but subject to the condition that "such new or other trust powers ... shall not be in favour of or for the benefit or result in any benefit for any person for the time being being a member of the excluded class or the Appointor or the Trustee".
183 George was the Appointor and the defendants' contention is, as I understand it, that the amendment of 1985 would result in a benefit to George because it would enable the giving of a guarantee supported by mortgage to a company (Ranleigh) of which he was a director and in which he was a shareholder.
184 I do not think it is necessary to determine whether the limitation in cl 14 relates only to amendments which directly result in a benefit to the appointor as distinct from amendments which may in their future application result in such a benefit. Clearly, the mere power to give a supported guarantee could not directly result in a benefit for anyone; the question of benefit would come to be determined when the power was exercised so as to guarantee the debts of a particular person or entity. Assuming for the moment that the words "result in any benefit" in cl 14 are not a condition of validity of an amendment (which I would be inclined if necessary to think that they were) but are intended as a continuing limitation upon the scope of any amending provision so as to prevent the exercise of a new power in a way which would result in such a benefit, the question then arises as to what in this context is meant by "benefit".
185 It seems unlikely, having regard to the other provisions of the trust deed, that a "benefit" would result to George whenever a secured guarantee were given in favour of a company of which he was director and/or shareholder, even where the company concerned is itself an asset of the trust and a beneficiary. If that were to be regarded as a benefit, it would appear that while the Appointor was director of the trustee company (which the 1976 deed plainly contemplated; cl 15, cl 17) then it was not open to exercise the power in such a manner as to benefit the assets of the trust. This would appear an odd result. The better construction, I think, would preclude the exercise of power so as to result in a benefit to the appointor in his personal capacity.
186 In December 1990, personal guarantees were executed by George and Dorothy guaranteeing the debts of Ridout; by George, Dorothy, Christopher and Peter guaranteeing the debts of Cloverdale; and by George, Dorothy, Christopher and Peter guaranteeing the debts of Ranleigh. Mr Bassett, then the manager of the Boyup Brook branch, witnessed the documents. Much time during the course of the evidence was devoted to the question of precisely when and how the documents were executed.
187 Generally, the evidence of each of Dorothy, Christopher and Peter was to the effect that at about this time George had simply presented them with numbers of documents requiring to be signed just prior to Christmas 1990. He explained, broadly, that they were to do with the motel units, but did not go into any further detail. They do not recall signing the documents in front of Mr Bassett. The guarantees were not explained to them, they said, either by Mr Bassett, George, or any other person.
188 By contrast, Mr Bassett, although he said that he could not recall the circumstances in which the documents were executed, gave evidence that he had never purported to witness documents that had not been signed in front of him. His evidence was also that he had not ever been to the farms, so that it follows that the documents must have been signed at some other place, most probably at the bank. His evidence was that with guarantee documents, prior to execution by the guarantors, his invariable practice was to inquire whether the guarantors understood the nature of their liabilities and to provide them with an explanation of the nature of the transaction.
189 I was impressed with the manner in which Mr Bassett gave evidence. Notwithstanding cautions that have been expressed about relying on evidence of "invariable practice", it seems to me unlikely that he would have departed from his usual practice so far as to witness these documents if they had not been signed in his presence.
190 It is relatively easy to reconcile the evidence of Mr Bassett with that of Dorothy, because it is clear from the evidence that Dorothy signed very large numbers of documents relating to the affairs of the Ridout Group. She did from time to time go into the Boyup Brook branch. Further, although in my view she appeared to have a good memory for most of the various transactions in which she was involved at the time, she gave evidence that she was diagnosed with "some type of epilepsy" in 1978 and since then has been taking medication which occasionally affects her ability to concentrate. In that context, it would be understandable if Dorothy had signed these documents at the Boyup Brook branch in front of Mr Bassett but had simply forgotten the occasion.
191 However, Christopher and Peter rarely signed documents of this kind, although each of them was naturally required to sign documents from time to time - mostly cheques but on occasions other documents such as orders or leases or agreements to purchase equipment - in relation to the farming businesses. It is less likely that they would simply have forgotten or been mistaken about the occasion.
192 Further, during the same series of transactions, and at about the same time, guarantees were executed by Christopher, Peter, Jillian and Lynette on behalf of Kacana and Kamberoo. Jillian and Lynette rarely were called upon to sign any business documents, and they too could not recall executing anything in the presence of Mr Bassett; rather, they were of the view that documents (although they were unable to describe them clearly because they had not paid a great deal of attention to them) had been brought to them by George for execution at home.
193 None of Christopher, Peter, Jillian or Lynette were very clear about the circumstances in which the documents came to be executed; much of their evidence about where the various company seals came from, what colour ink was used, and things of that kind, had a flavour of reconstruction. This is not surprising, because the documents were not seen to have been of great significance by them until some years later, when it became apparent that the Ridout Group of companies would be unable to meet their debt and that the bank might need to enforce the guarantees.
194 It is difficult to accept that these five Ridout witnesses could be mistaken. Further, my observation of the Ridout witnesses suggested that they were occasionally prone to understating their understanding at the time and to exaggeration of some aspects of the evidence of significance to their case (particularly the extent to which George would discuss the affairs of the family businesses) but I do not think it likely that there was any agreement among them to give evidence about the execution of the documents which they did not believe to be true. However, if it were necessary to do so, I would still be inclined to prefer the evidence of Mr Bassett; he recognised during the course of cross-examination, I think, that his practice might be seen as over scrupulous by some and his reaction when asked about that practice, suggested to me that he had indeed insisted upon having documents signed in his presence even on occasions when it was inconvenient to do so.
195 However, it seems to me that nothing in this case turns upon the question of whether these documents were executed in Mr Bassett's presence or not. While his practice may well have been to explain the nature of a guarantee to potential guarantors, in that sense he was not doing anything more than the persons executing the documents would have understood. Christopher was somewhat more involved in the detail of the businesses than was Peter, and he expressly agreed that he did understand the nature of a guarantee. Jillian was tertiary educated, and had been a schoolteacher for a number of years. It seems to be most unlikely that she would not understand broadly the nature of a guarantee. So far as Peter and Lynette are concerned, each signed above the word "guarantee" and each was, in my observation, of sufficient intelligence to be able to understand what a guarantee was, had they turned their minds to it. However, even if each were aware of the nature of a guarantee, that information alone would have been of little assistance in understanding the nature of the transaction involved here.
196 This was a complex restructure of a very substantial amount of debt assumed by a number of companies. The debt assumed by each, and the relationship between the various companies, and the effect of the securities undertaken in respect of each of the debts, would need to be appreciated before anyone signing a guarantee in the circumstances of this transaction would be in position to understand what debts were being guaranteed and to evaluate, if the person chose to do so, the risks involved in executing such a guarantee.
197 Mr Bassett had no overall understanding of the transactions involved. The documents had been sent to him from Clovelly Park in South Australia so that he could attend to their execution. In cross-examination, he explained his role as "all I was doing was acting as an intermediary and getting the documents signed." In my view, Mr Bassett's presence, even if he had provided a general explanation of the nature of a guarantee, would not have assisted any of those persons providing guarantees to understand what obligations they were undertaking and in what circumstances.
198 Turning first to the guarantees given personally by Christopher and Peter in respect of the debts of Cloverdale and Ranleigh, the defendants rely upon the presumption of undue influence as between parent and child which, they say, arises at law. The plaintiff points to the relatively mature ages of Christopher and Peter (33 and 30 years in December 1990), their experience in running the family farms, and evidence of their access to accountants and familiarity with some business transactions, in order to suggest either that no such presumption arises or that it can be rebutted in this case.
199 While it is true that in the majority of cases involving children and undue influence, the person entitled to the benefit of the influence has been a child who has relatively recently attained the age of majority, there are cases in which transactions have been set aside against third parties where the child was of mature age. In Berdoe v Dawson [1865] EngR 222; [1865] 34 Beav 603 (55 ER 768) for example, a father induced his sons, who were 25 and 23, to join in securing a debt. The sons were resident with and maintained by the father, and the transaction was set aside as against the creditor, who was well acquainted with the family. In Bank of New South Wales v Rogers [1941] HCA 9; (1941) 65 CLR 42, a presumption of undue influence arose from the relationship of a niece with an uncle with whom she lived and whose advice she had sought and followed without question in matters of business, notwithstanding that she was described as being of "mature age" (she was approximately 60 at the time of the relevant transaction) and "of average intelligence and firmness".
200 In this case, while Christopher and Peter were in their 30's, and I have no doubt that they were each of "average intelligence and firmness", in my view a presumption of undue influence does arise out of their relationship with their father. They were each in an unusual situation for a mature adult child, in that each had lived all his life (apart from a short period of time in South Australia in the case of Peter) "with" his parents in the sense of living on the family farm in close proximity to them. Each had left school at a relatively young age and had taken up employment on the family farms, which farms were ultimately run by George, so that each was in the habit of deferring to him in matters of importance to those businesses. Finally, each was "dependent" upon George in a way which is rarely found outside farming families, in the sense that George was both father and employer, and the farms, upon which they were employed and which they hoped ultimately to be able to take over (having apparently no training for other employment) were effectively controlled by George. Christopher vividly explained his position in his evidence by saying, "I was an employee of my father, and a very poor-paid one at that, and I did as I was told because he was my employer, and I had nothing, and I owned nothing to the day he died".
201 Officers of the plaintiff were aware that Peter and Christopher were George's sons, that they had worked the farms for a very long time and that they resided on the farms. While some officers of the plaintiff may on occasion have met Peter or Christopher, there is nothing in the evidence relating to those meetings, or in any correspondence, which would suggest that either son made, or participated in, significant decisions in respect of the family business enterprises. Those circumstances are, in my view, sufficient to fix the plaintiff with knowledge of the factors giving rise to the undue influence.
202 It is appropriate to apply to the guarantees taken from Peter and Christopher the words of the Master of the Rolls in Sercombe v Sanders [1865] 55 ER at 683:
"It is important that creditors should understand that they cannot improve their security, taken from persons to whom they have given credit, by inducing them, at the last moment, to compel relations or persons under their influence, and not in a situation to resist their importunity, to pay their debts."
203 Nor, as was observed in Bank of New South Wales v Rogers, can a creditor take advantage of a security if the creditor has notice that it has been obtained by such means, in the sense of having notice of the relationship between the parties giving rise to the influence. I would therefore set aside the guarantees given by Christopher and Peter personally in respect of Cloverdale and Ranleigh.
204 So far as Dorothy is concerned, in respect of guarantees which she gave in her personal capacity in respect of Ridout Nominees, Cloverdale and Ranleigh, it is appropriate to apply the equitable presumption in favour of wives enunciated in Yerkey v Jones [1939] HCA 3; (1939) 63 CLR 649 and subsequently explained by the High Court in Garcia.
205 The only question of notice that arises in such a case is whether the creditor knew at the time of the taking of the guarantee that the surety was then married to the borrower. The principle extends, as in Garcia, to the situation in which the "borrower" is a company, where the company is effectively under the control of the husband.
206 Applying the principles enunciated in that case, it is first necessary to consider whether Dorothy did understand the purport and effect of the transaction, and in my view it is clear that she did not. She signed these documents, as she was in the habit of signing other documents, in reliance upon George. She left it to him to run those businesses. Whether or not Mr Bassett gave any explanation of the nature of a guarantee in general terms, I accept that Dorothy did not understand, at the time that she signed it, that this was a transaction in which she was risking assets which she personally owned as distinct from assets which belonged to any of the various companies through which the family's businesses were conducted. Dorothy's unwillingness at about this time to allow the use of the Panorama home as security further suggests that she would be unlikely, knowingly, to enter into a transaction which put that home at risk (assuming, as the plaintiff's memoranda suggest, that this home was owned jointly by George and Dorothy as natural persons).
207 The transaction was voluntary in the sense that while the family businesses obtained a benefit from it and, in that sense, as a practical matter, there might have flowed an indirect benefit to Dorothy, she gave the guarantee in her personal capacity and in her personal capacity received no benefit from it.
208 Finally, whether Mr Bassett explained guarantees generally to Dorothy or not, it is clear that the plaintiff took no steps to ensure that the particular transaction was explained to her, in the sense of explaining that this document was different from the very many others which she might have signed, that it was a personal guarantee, or that it was guaranteeing enormous business debts. No question arises in this case of any independent explanation or advice given to Dorothy. I would therefore set aside also, the guarantees given by Dorothy in her personal capacity.
209 So far as the guarantees given by Kamberoo and Kacana are concerned, which guaranteed the debts of Ridout Nominees and Cloverdale, the question arises as to whether the principles applicable in respect of the personal guarantees may be applied in respect of the companies Kamberoo and Kacana. As I have earlier pointed out, there are conflicting principles which might be thought relevant and there is no authority of which I am aware governing the question.
210 However, for the reasons which I tentatively expressed when discussing Dorothy's position as a director and shareholder of the Ridout Group, it might well be appropriate to apply those principles in respect of a corporation. If one were to do so, then Kacana and Kamberoo would, in my view, be appropriate corporations in respect of which they might be applied. Each was a small family company, with Peter and Lynette the sole directors and shareholders of Kamberoo and Christopher and Jillian the sole directors and shareholders of Kacana. It is not clear whether the companies had any activities other than the holding of units (two owned by each company) in the All Travellers Motel, Belmont. Each company played a very small part in the overall transactions of the family companies.
211 I have already dealt with the presumption of undue influence, which I find applies in respect of Peter and Christopher. So far as Lynette and Jillian are concerned, although there would not be affection and habits of deference dating from childhood to found an undue influence, Jillian and Lynette to an extent shared the position of Christopher and Peter in the sense that each was resident on what were effectively George's farms and each appears to have been conscious of the relatively junior position which their respective husbands occupied within the family businesses, including a relatively junior position in relation to the running of the farms. Each might further be expected to feel ties of affection with George and each gave evidence that suggested that such feelings of affection in fact existed. Further, each might, as explained in Garcia, be expected to repose trust and confidence in her husband and, as I have explained, each husband was in this case subject to the undue influence of George. It seems clear that the plaintiff's officers knew not only that Peter and Christopher were sons engaged in farming the Boyup Brook properties and residing on them, but also that Lynette and Jillian were their wives.
212 As I have noted, the Garcia principles, and - it might be added - cases dealing with presumptions of undue influence, are grounded in the usual relations of natural persons, so that there are both practical and conceptual difficulties in applying them in respect of corporations. However, in the present case, all of the natural persons who were directors and shareholders of these two corporations were subject to the types of relationships of influence with which those cases are concerned. I am therefore prepared to find that each of these corporations was in a position of special disadvantage, in relation to companies controlled by George, for the purpose of the principles governing unconscientious use of superior bargaining power.
213 Having found such a special disadvantage existing as between Kamberoo and Kacana and the companies effectively controlled by George, it can be seen not only that these two corporations were in a position of special disadvantage, but also that the companies controlled by George took advantage of a superior position in order to obtain a guarantee, which was of real benefit to them but which, having regard to the very small unit holding of Kamberoo and Kacana, and the part which they played in the overall re-financing transaction, was of no real value to those companies.
214 While it is true that in one sense Kamberoo and Kacana benefited from the re-financing of the Elderslie and Farrow loans either no practical advantage was gained by Kamberoo and Kacana from the giving of the guarantees, or alternatively any advantage was nominal compared with the very great advantage obtained by the Ridout Group of companies from the overall re-financing transactions. That this was so appears from the valuations of the units; the fact that Kamberoo and Kacana had no links through intercompany loans with the Ridout Group; the fact that there were no taxation or other advantages which would flow to Kamberoo and Kacana from treating them as part of the group; and the likelihood that there would not be any loss incurred by Kamberoo and Kacana if the loans could not be refinanced and the units had to be sold (or alternatively any loss would probably be relatively small). While each of Christopher, Peter, Lynette and Jillian may have understood that they were signing a "guarantee", there is no evidence which suggests that they did know or could have known the magnitude of the debts guaranteed, or the overall structure of the re-financing "package", so as to be able to appreciate the disadvantageous nature of the transaction.
215 The relevant relationships, and the lack of any real benefit to Kacana and Kamberoo, were known to the plaintiff. It procured George to obtain guarantees from them to benefit companies which were effectively his, and to improve the plaintiff's security. These guarantees should therefore be set aside.
216 If one puts aside the principles explained in Garcia in respect of Dorothy's actions as director and/or secretary of the Ridout Group, then it is my view that Dorothy did not suffer from a special disability and was not in a position of special disadvantage affecting her ability to make a judgment as to the interests of those companies for the reasons set out in relation to mortgage D777666. Further, for the reasons I have also already explained, George was under no relevant special disability. Further, because of the connections previously referred to between the Ridout Group of companies, the giving of guarantees was not detrimental to Viners, Estelle or Wanata.
Sales in 1994/1995 and Appropriation of Sale Proceeds
217 In about August 1994, the motel units were sold, realising net proceeds of approximately $1.436M. $1.4M was applied to discharge all of the debts owed to the plaintiff by Estelle and Viners and most of the debt owed by Ranleigh. The Edwardstown property was sold in two parts, with net proceeds of $192,622.48 applied in May 1995 as to $134,000 in reduction of Ranleigh's debt and as to $58,622.48 to reduce Cloverdale's debt, with further net proceeds of $532,364.43 applied in December 1995 in reduction of Cloverdale's debt.
218 The defendants assert that the sum of $1.4M from the proceeds of the units should have been applied to the debt of Cloverdale and, if any surplus existed, then to the debts of Ridout Nominees. They complained that the plaintiff lacked authority to apply the funds in the manner in which it did.
219 During the course of their negotiations with the plaintiff subsequent to the death of George, the remaining members of the family had from time to time used the services of a Mr Michael Adams. However, on 28 March 1994, Peter and Christopher wrote to the plaintiff, with copies to a number of officers, informing them that Michael Adams was no longer representing them and requesting that no further correspondence be sent to him. That letter was plainly received by the plaintiff, since it replied in a letter of 15 April 1994 referring not only to recent telephone conversations with Mr Steadman, the asset management officer, but referring also to "your letter dated 28 March".
220 On 6 June 1994, Mr Grieger, also an asset management officer, recorded in a file note that he had had a telephone conversation with Christopher, who indicated that on the sale of the motel units "these two facilities [being a Cloverdale bill in the amount of $1,090,000 and Ridout Nominees bill in the amount of $170,000]" will be repaid. The file note indicated, "will need to clarify what other facilities are to be repaid/reduced with the surplus".
221 On 14 July 1994, Mr Steadman wrote to Mr Adams asking for "repayment preferences". Although the content of the letter suggests that Christopher had indicated that Mr Steadman should contact Mr Adams, Mr Steadman, in evidence, was unable to recall why he had written to Mr Adams. A diary note just a few days later - 18 July - under Mr Steadman's name showed that "clients have been requested to provide directions as to which advances are to be repaid/reduced" and that telephone conversations indicated that "the two remaining bill facilities [ie Cloverdale and Ridout Nominees] are to be repaid".
222 In fact, Mr Adams did attend at settlement. The role he played is not clear since neither he nor anyone who attended settlement gave evidence. However, on 28 July, Mr Steadman sent a facsimile addressed to "Mr and Mrs Chris Ridout" advising that settlement would be the following day in Perth and that Mr Adams had provided some of the figures. After settlement, the proceeds were distributed as I have already indicated.
223 On 15 August, Mr Steadman had a telephone conversation with Christopher which caused him to write a file note indicating that Christopher had telephoned to say that he had been in Bali at the time of settlement and had just returned and had found out how the proceeds had been distributed. It records that Christopher said, "Did not want accounts repaid. Adams did not have instructions to advise bank. Wanted Cloverdale $1.9M repaid".
224 Mr Steadman agreed in cross-examination that that file note accurately recorded, so far as he could recall it, the conversation that he had had with Christopher. The very last portion of the note is somewhat confusing, as Cloverdale was not indebted in the sum of $1.9M - that was approximately the figure owed by Ridout Nominees - but in the sum of $1.09M. In any event, it is clear from the note that Christopher wanted either Cloverdale and/or Ridout Nominees facilities to be repaid in preference to those of Viners, Estelle and Ranleigh. Mr Steadman's evidence was that it would at that time have been possible, subject to the taking of legal advice, to rectify the repayments in line with what appeared to be Christopher's instructions, but that for reasons which he is unable to explain, nothing was done about it.
225 There are two odd aspects of the transaction involving distribution of the funds from settlement of the motel units. The first is that despite requests, which clearly assumed that written instructions would be provided, no written instructions were ever provided by Christopher, who was apparently representing the family interests at this time, or by any other member of the family. Further, it appears that Christopher knew that Mr Adams would be attending settlement and that he told Mr Steadman so. It would not be surprising in those circumstances if Mr Steadman had assumed that Mr Adams would be in a position to give instructions; there appears to be no other reason why he should attend.
226 In cross-examination, Christopher was not clear as to what Mr Adams' role could possibly have been, except that he said, "He was to see it through" and in answer to the question "From the family's point of view?" he answered, "Possibly, yes." Notwithstanding those answers, he insisted that he had terminated Mr Adams' instructions to act for the family.
227 Although one can see some ambiguities in the messages received by the bank, it is clear that prior to settlement the bank was informed in writing that Mr Adams did not have authority to represent any members of the Ridout family and that the bank was to refrain from contracting him. It is also clear that prior to settlement there was verbal indication that the preference was for repayment to be directed to Cloverdale and/or Ridout Nominees, and that Christopher complained promptly on his return from Bali when he found that this had not occurred, indicating his preference (in which he was expressing the view of all family members) once again. In those circumstances, I do not think it can be concluded that Mr Adams had either actual or ostensible authority to give instructions in respect of the use of the funds at settlement. Indeed, it is only a matter of inference that Mr Adams even purported to give such directions; there is no direct evidence as to how the decision to repay the facilities which were in fact repaid, was taken. The debt due to the plaintiff should be calculated therefore on the basis that there had been retirement of the debt of Cloverdale, rather than repayment of those facilities which were repaid.
228 I propose to make an advance copy of these reasons available and will hear counsel on the appropriate form of orders. Broadly, it appears to me that the indebtedness to the plaintiff should be calculated on the basis set out in par 6 and following of the supplementary statement of Gregory Michael O'Brien, and that the plaintiff may enforce the securities which it has in respect of the first through to the fourth defendants inclusive, in respect of those amounts.
229 It does not appear to me necessary to consider questions of restitution. The only transactions which I have indicated should be set aside, are those in respect of which I have found the relevant defendants were volunteers and in respect of which they obtained no benefit. The authorities referred to by the plaintiff, to the effect that a party may not keep the fruits of a transaction of which the party complains, are not therefore applicable.
Commonwealth Bank of Australia
Ridout Nominees Pty Ltd & Ors [2000] WASC 37
(1955) 94 CLR 216
(1993) 41 FCR 435
(1991) 23 NSWLR 256
(1998) 194 CLR 457
(1993) 60 SASR 330
(1996) 142 ALR 227
(1995) 37 NSWLR 438
(1994) 115 FLR 443
(1988) 164 CLR 539
(1988) 79 ALR 83
(1936) 56 CLR 113
(1996) 139 ALR 689
(1958) 101 CLR 428
(1996) 188 CLR 449
(1938) 60 CLR 150
(1989) 51 SASR 496
(1947) 75 CLR 149
(1993) 11 WAR 187
(1999) 164 ALR 606
(1992) 107 ALR 374
(1986) 12 FCR 477
(1926) 38 CLR 240
(1985) 157 CLR 424
(1995) 184 CLR 102
(1976) 137 CLR 1
(1993) 41 FCR 399
(1989) 52 SASR 461
(1992) 30 NSWLR 1
(1980) 18 NSWLR 750
(1956) 99 CLR 362
(1983) 151 CLR 447
(1951) 82 CLR 372
(1939) 63 CLR 649
(1998) 155 ALR 614
(1941) 65 CLR 42