181 In the first place, formal contracts of sale were executed with a consideration stated. The affixing of the company's seal to the contracts was approved. The transfers were expressed to be pursuant to those contracts. There can be no voluntary transfer resulting trust in those circumstances. The purchase price was not paid at settlement, but on 30 June 1990 the amount of the unpaid purchase price was debited to a loan account in the name of Mrs Porteous in HPPL's ledger. On the same date, 30 June 1990, the "debt" was transferred to a loan account of Mr Hancock (see Schedule, table 1, item 12). So, according to the source documents, records and accounts of HPPL there was a sale, a conveyance pursuant to it and an assumption by Mr Hancock of the purchaser's obligation to pay the purchase price. There is no evidence that he did not intend to accept and meet that obligation or that he could not do so. It is true that the purchase price was not paid in cash as provided for in the contract. But this means only that, instead of receiving cash, the company got Mr Hancock's promise to pay. As there is no evidence that that promise was not bona fide or that it was unenforceable, there does not seem to be any basis on which equity should intervene. In fact, the accounts show that on the same date (30 June 1990) the debit balance in Mr Hancock's account was cleared to Dinari's loan account (see Schedule, table 1, item 14). There is no evidence that Dinari could not or did not intend to pay out the debit balance in its account. In fact the accounts show that on 30 June 1990 Dinari's account was cleared to a nil balance. (See Schedule, table 1, item 15.) It seems to me that, on that state of affairs, even if this sale was in breach of Mr Hancock's duty not to let his duty to the company conflict with his own interests, no relief could be granted in equity except on a rescission. That is not possible in these proceedings. I think that at least Mr Hancock's estate, and perhaps also Dinari, would have to be parties.