Gans v Riley [1913] HCA 12

High Court of Australia|1913-07-01|Before: Hood J, Isaacs J

Armstrong, for the defendants. The Association could not H. ©. or A. create an interest in the land inconsistent with the terms of the 191% grant, and a lease of a room in the building is such an interest. oe

[GrirritH C.J. - The Association are entitled to possession of me the room, and the only question is whether the right procedure eae

Per cwriam. Special leave to appeal will be refused.

; BL. : [HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA] GANS a 5 Pe r ¥ 5 , APPELLANT ; PLAINTIFF, AND RILEY AND OTHERS . . 2 5, . RESPONDENTS. DEFENDANTS,

Contract - Rescission - Unconscionable bargain - Evidence.

In an action to set aside an agreement for a sale of property on the grounds H. C. or A,

that the price was grossly inadequate, and that it was made under circum- - _ - 1913.

stances of oppression almost amounting to actual fraud, judgment was given eed

for the defendants. On appeal to the High Court, MELBOURNE, March 12,

Held, that the appeal should be dismissed on the ground that the evidence 13, did not establish either that the price was grossly inadequate or that there - was fraud, and on the further ground that, as the parties could not berestored Garton ait'

in integrum, the plaintiff's only remedy would be an action in the nature of T0083

an action for deceit of which actual damage was an essential element, and that there was no evidence of such damage,

Decision of the Supreme Court of Victoria (Hood J.) affirmed.

An action was brought in the Supreme Court by Daniel Jacob Gans against James Henry Riley, Joseph de Saxe, Isidor Isaacson, Alexander Barnett Sternberg, Joseph Walter Isaacs, Lionel Mareus Bernard Marks, Perey Isidor Isaacs, Edith Isaacs, and the Gans and de Saxe Manufacturing and Agency Co. Pro- prietary Ltd. seeking substantially a rescission of a certain agreement dated 10th March 1908, and made with the defendant James Henry Riley by the plaintiff and other shareholders in the above-named company (being the persons named as defendants other than Riley) and the company. The nature of such agree- ment is stated in the judgment of Griffith C.J. hereunder, where

The action was heard by Hood J., who gave judgment for the defendants with costs.

From that decision the plaintiff now appealed to the High Court.

Arthur, for the appellant, referred to Robinson v. Abbott (1); Chesterfield (Earl of) v. Janssen (2); White & Tudor's Leading Cases, 6th ed., vol. 1, p. 667; Dowsett v. Reid (3).

[Isaacs J. referred to Ballantyne v. Ruphael (4); Nevill v. Snelling (5).]

McArthur K.C. and Macindoe, for the respondents Joseph de Saxe, Lionel M. B. Marks, Joseph Walter Isaacs, Perey Isidor Isaacs, and Edith Isaacs,

Jacobs, for the respondents Isidor Isaacson and Alexander Barnett Sternberg, and (1) 20 V.L.R., 346 ; 16 A.L.'T., 101. (4) 15 V.L.R., 538,

Irvine K.C: and Schutt, for the respondents the Gans and H.C. or A.

de Saxe Manufacturing and Agency Co. Proprietary Ltd., were not'called upon.

GrirrirH C.J. This is a perfectly hopeless appeal. The case was launched as a case of an agreement for a sale of property at a grossly inadequate price under circumstances of pressure almost: _ amounting to actual fraud. The subject matter of the alleged sale was 20,000 shares in a proprietary company in which there were 33,000 shares in all. The transaction was, in substance, very much as if a firm of traders in desperate straits were to agree to admit a new partner on the terms that he should have two-thirds of the partnership assets and should lend the new partnership a sum of money to enable them to carry on their business. That is the substance of the transaction.

The first step in the case was to prove that the consideration for the sale was grossly inadequate, It appears that at the time when the agreement was made the company were in an almost hopeless condition, and could not carry on any longer without outside help. They owed a creditor in Germany £7,000, which was substantially trust money that they had applied to their own purposes, and of which the creditor insisted upon immediate pay- ment. 'They could not find the money.- Their bank, to which they were largely indebted, would not help them further, and their position was desperate. Under these circumstances the respondent Riley agreed to acquire substantially a two-thirds interest in the company, and to advance to the company £5,000 by way of immediate loan, with the almost certain prospect of having to make or provide for immediate further advances of large sums. He did in fact become liable for sums amounting to about £30,000. It is suggested that, although the company was in such desperate straits, its assets, if realized under favourable circumstances, would have resulted in a considerable surplus. I cannot see upon the evidence any grounds for supposing that there would have been any surplus at all. The inference I should draw, if I were called upon to draw one, would be that the assets of the company would probably not have realized enough to satisfy their debts. In such circumstances it would

H.C. or A. be difficult to say that a man who came to the relief of the com-

pany, paying down £5,000 of his own money and undertaking other heavy responsibilities, paid a grossly inadequate price. On this point the appellant absolutely fails.

There are many other fatal objections to this suit, of which I will only mention one. The transaction took place four years ago. Since then the company has carried on business, and Riley is liable for a very large sum of money on its account. The Court will not rescind a contract unless the parties can be restored in integrum, which is impossible here.

The only possible remedy for the appellant would be an action in the nature of an action for deceit, in which actual damage is an essential element of the cause of action. In order to show such damage it would be necessary to show that the value of the plaintiff's chance of getting some dividend if the company had gone into liquidation was greater than the value of his interest in the assets of the company as it now exists. There is absolutely no evidence on either point to enable an inference to be drawn in the appellant's favour. That, in itself, is a fatal objection to his action. I have said nothing as to the fraud alleged, of which the learned Judge of first instance thought there was no evidence.

Barton J. I quite agree that there is no reason for disturb- ing the conclusions of Hood J.

Isaacs J. I agree. It is not Mr. Arthur's fault that he does not succeed. The only gross inadequacy in the case that I can see is in the plaintiff's evidence.

Solicitor, for the appellant, J. Woolf. Solicitors, for the respondents, Pavey, Wilson & Cohen.

At a glance

Court

Decision date

Before

Source

Judgment (32 paragraphs)