Commonwealth Bank of Australia v Geoffrey Anthony Shannon
[2013] NSWSC 1076
At a glance
Source factsCourt
Supreme Court of NSW
Decision date
2013-06-13
Before
Sackar J
Source
Original judgment source is linked above.
Judgment (49 paragraphs)
Background facts 19In early January 2006, Mr Shannon brought a proposal to the Bank for the development of Dockside. 20The property which was situated at Harrington was on the mid-north coast of New South Wales and was approximately a twenty minute drive north of Taree and about a forty five minute drive from Forster and Port Macquarie. 21Ryder Hunt, later Ryder Levett Bucknall (RLB), a firm of quantity surveyors, estimated in a report that the construction costs for the proposed development would be $4.79 million to $4.818 million (plus GST). 22The Bank prepared its credit analysis on the basis of the RLB report. It adopted RLB's figure of $4.79 million and then added estimated GST. It further did an estimate of marketing and legal costs, an estimate of capitalised interest on principal, audit development costs and section 94 contributions to be paid to the local council. All up, the Bank estimated that the total costs would be approximately $6.264 million. The Bank determined that following its analysis it could lend a total of $6 million for the construction facility (plus an Overdraft Facility of $100,000) on the basis that Mr Shannon/33 Electra would bear the estimated excess of $264,000. 23Mr Jim Williams (who at the time was employed by the Bank as a Business Manager), prepared a Credit Risk Submission dated 18 May 2006, in which he recommended approval of the loan facility based on the analysis referred to above. 24On 26 May 2006, the Bank made an offer to 33 Electra to provide loan facilities to it totalling $6.1 million. This was accepted by 33 Electra on 10 June 2006. 25On 31 August 2006, 33 Electra acquired the relevant land. At the time of its acquisition, there was already development consent in respect of the land permitting the construction of sixteen (two storey) residential townhouses, each with its own marina berth. 26On 30 September 2006, 33 Electra, as owner of the land, entered into a building contract with a related entity, C2C Developments Pty Ltd (C2C Developments), as builder. It was, as required by the loan facility, a fixed price contract ($5.3 million, including GST). 27On 31 August 2006, Mr Shannon was the sole director of C2C Developments. He and his father each owned 50% of the shares in the company. Mr Shannon was also the sole director of and controlled 33 Electra, a special purpose vehicle incorporated to carry out the relevant development. The facilities, as I have already mentioned, comprised a credit limit of $6 million and a "business bonus overdraft facility" with a credit limit of $100,000. 2833 Electra's obligations under each of the facilities was to be secured by a first ranking registered mortgage over Dockside and a first ranking registered fixed and floating charge over the assets and undertaking of 33 Electra, together with a guarantee from Mr Shannon. 29The Overdraft Facility was expressed to be "repayable at any time on demand". 30The Commercial Advance Facility ($6 million) was to expire 24 months after the first drawdown date. There is no dispute that the first drawdown date was 12 February 2007, and thus the facility expired on 12 February 2009. One of the conditions precedent in the facility's terms (subparagraph (o)), provided the drawdowns were to occur in accordance with progress claims certified by the appointed quantity surveyor (which was RLB). 31Subparagraph (o) of the facility terms also provided that it was a condition precedent to utilisation of the Commercial Advance Facility that: Progress claims are paid on a strict 'cost to complete' basis as certified by the Quantity Surveyor, ensuring the undrawn loan amounts remain sufficient to complete the project at all times. Any cost overruns identified at the time of a progress claim would need to be covered by the Borrower from their own resources at each progress payment as they are identified. 3233 Electra gave a positive undertaking that "all cost overruns identified by the quantity surveyor appointed by the Bank must be satisfied by the borrower from the borrower's own resources upon being identified and before any further drawings". 3333 Electra also gave a negative undertaking that it would not, without the Bank's prior written consent, "vary the building contract or any plans and specifications in respect of the development works". Events of default were specified as per the Bank's General Terms for business lending, dated September 2005. Clause 16.1 of the General Terms provided that an event of default occurred (whether or not it was in 33 Electra's power to prevent it) if (adopting the subparagraph lettering in clause 16.1): (a) 33 Electra did not "pay on time any amount payable by it under any Facility Document in the manner required under it"; ... (c) 33 Electra did "not comply with any other obligation under a Facility Document" and, where that default was capable of rectification, if it was not rectified within seven business days, or if in the Bank's opinion all action necessary or desirable to quickly rectify that result was not taken; ... (f) A representation "made or taken to be made by or on behalf of" 33 Electra "in connection with a Facility Document" is "found or is notified by the Borrower to be incorrect or misleading when made or taken to be made"; (i) An undertaking given to the Bank or its solicitors by 33 Electra in connection with any Facility Document was breached or not wholly performed within the period specified in the undertaking or, if no period was specified, within 7 days from the date of the undertaking; 34Apart from the events of default, clause 3.1 of the 2005 General Terms provided that the Bank need not provide any drawing unless a drawdown notice was given (clause 3.1(a)) and unless: (b)(iii) "The Bank is satisfied that no Event of Default or a Potential Event of Default is subsisting or would result from the accommodation being provided"; ... (b)(v) "All conditions precedent to that Drawing are fulfilled". 35On 9 February 2007, 33 Electra mortgaged Dockside to the Bank and also gave a fixed and floating charge over all of its assets and undertaking, including Dockside. 36Mr Shannon gave a guarantee to the Bank of all obligations of 33 Electra to the Bank under the $6 million Commercial Advance Facility and the $100,000 Overdraft Facility. Although the document is undated, it does not appear to be controversial that it was likely executed by him on or about 10 June 2006. The 33 Electra guarantee incorporated the "Guarantee and Indemnity - Terms (small business and consumer)" issued in March 2006. 37The Bank provided to C2C Investments in August 2006 the First Business Edge Facility, and in February 2008, what is called the Second Business Edge Facility. The First Business Edge Facility was varied on several occasions, including by way of introduction of the Second Business Edge Facility, which is said to be a supplementary facility. As varied, the First Business Edge Facility had a facility limit of $475,000 and was repayable in 2021, except in the case and in the event of a default; and the Second Business Edge Facility had a facility limit of $300,000 and was repayable in 2017, except in the case and in the event of a default. 38Mr Shannon gave a guarantee dated 11 August 2006 to the Bank of all obligations of C2C Investments to the Bank under the First and Second Business Edge Facilities. The C2C Investments guarantee also incorporated the same terms which were incorporated into the 33 Electra guarantee. 39Each of the guarantees specified a maximum sum which could be demanded including interest, but costs and expenses were additional. 40Each of the 33 Electra guarantee and C2C Investments guarantee contained the following provisions: [Clause 11(a):] "As long as any of the guaranteed money remains unpaid, you may not, without our consent ... reduce your liability under this guarantee and indemnity by claiming that you or the debtor or any other person has a right of set-off or counterclaim against us (except to the extent that you have a right of set-off granted by law which we cannot exclude by agreement)" [Clause 14.1:] "Except to the extent that you have a right of set-off granted by law which we cannot exclude by agreement (such as under a Code) you must pay us the guaranteed money in full without set-off, counterclaim or deduction." 41The Dockside development was progressing until early 2008, when Mr Shannon notified the Bank in an email of 29 January 2008 that he had "upgraded most items in the project". 42In an email of 14 March 2008 to Mr Williams, Mr Shannon described the "extras that are going into the Dockside development". The extras were said to include things like upgraded kitchen packages, pay television systems, full security systems and the like. Total "upgrade costs" were said by Mr Shannon to be in the order of $581,800. Mr Shannon indicated that the upgrades were appropriate because he had decided to raise prices due to the location of the project and the type of development. 43Mr Shannon indicated in the email that he was seeking "extra funding" and then he itemised the various amounts he intended to expend in upgrading the units. He concluded the email with the following remarks: Jim, I appreciate your input on this as I believe it only enhances this project and with the lvr at currently around the 50% this is roughly only an estimate of an extra 5% to the current lvr. I look forward to a positive response. 44On 15 March 2008, Mr Williams sent an email to Mr Shannon. Mr Williams indicated to Mr Shannon that he assumed he would be requiring an increase of some $600,000. Mr Williams emphasised the need for Mr Shannon to indicate that some sales had occurred and that this would cover the additional funding so that he could satisfy "Credit" with the proposal for any increase. Mr Williams also indicated the need for an amended report from the quantity surveyor to ensure that the extra funds would be "all that is required to get the development completed". 45Mr Williams and Mr Shannon had a conversation shortly after the 15 March 2008 email. Mr Shannon accepts that in the course of this conversation (according to Mr Williams) he said he wanted the Bank to fund the additional costs. 46By 27 March 2008, it appears that the work on the Dockside project had begun to slow down. RLB estimated in its progress report number 18 that only 1% of the project had been completed since 25 February 2008. At or about this time, Mr Shannon's wife was seriously ill. 47On 2 April 2008, Mr Shannon sent an email to Mr Williams modifying the 14 March 2008 email by adding two additional items (Items 8 and 9) and increasing the costs of the upgrades to $921,000. The two additional items related to increased building costs and increased capitalised interest. The increased costs of materials was said to be in the order of $240,000 and the increased interest costs were estimated at $100,000. Mr Shannon expressed the view that he had adjusted prices on some of the units to $1.1 million for the waterfront homes on the basis of what he said were "record prices" being achieved in the area. 48On 4 May 2008, Mr Shannon made contact with Mr Aaron Satchell at RLB, indicating that he needed to make a claim for Dockside and that the project was at a standstill until a proper assessment had been made of the costing of the upgrades. 49On 8 May 2008, RLB submitted its revised cost to complete, which identified variations (so described) in the order of $921,800. These corresponded with the variations that had been, or were in the process of being, implemented. At the date of its report, RLB indicated that the works completed to date for the new variations would be valued at approximately $75,000. 50On 13 May 2008, Mr Williams along with others from the Bank discussed the status of the 33 Electra account. It was decided that the Bank should negotiate an increase in the Facility Interest Rate Margin, effective immediately, in order to reflect a changed "risk profile" of the 33 Electra account. 51On 14 May 2008, Mr Shannon met with Mr Williams and a Mr Glen Triggs (employed by the Bank as a Regional Manager) at Dockside. It seems uncontroversial that Mr Shannon was asked by either Mr Williams or Mr Triggs how much he thought would be needed to keep the project going, to which he responded somewhere in the range of $200,000 to $210,000. Mr Shannon was invited to submit a progress claim in order to keep the project moving, but he was told that the claim would need to be approved by Credit. Mr Shannon also agreed that he was told that in order for the Bank to determine whether it would fund the variations, a number of matters need to be looked at, and a figure of $1.2 million was discussed as the possible amount of the increase in the facility limit that might be needed. Mr Shannon informed Mr Triggs and Mr Williams that his wife had been ill and that work had slowed. It is alleged by the Bank that there was an agreement reached at the meeting that there would be an increase in the Facility Interest Rate Margin to 2.75% in return for the Bank waiving its success fee. 52At or about this time, it appears that Mr Shannon decided that he would attempt to sell the project. 53Following the 14 May 2008 meeting, and on 15 May 2008, Mr Triggs wrote to Mr McIntosh (the Senior Manager Credit Sanctioning at the Bank of Western Australia, at the relevant time) and copied in Mr Williams and Ms Karen Ford (the Regional Manager Portfolio Enhancement, at the relevant time). Mr Triggs expressed the view that an extra $1.2 million in the loan amount was likely to be needed. He observed that work had slowed and that Mr Shannon's wife had been taken ill. He also observed that the quantity surveyor had been updated and that a new valuation had been commissioned. Mr Triggs indicated that he would be submitting a request for progress payments once it could be quantified with other materials including a pre-sales contract due diligence process. Later on 15 May 2008, Mr Shannon faxed to the Bank on behalf of C2C Developments a statutory declaration declaring that all sub-contractors and suppliers to C2C Developments had been paid all monies payable to them in respect of materials supplied and work performed for the purpose of the relevant building contract. 54At 3:58pm on 15 May 2008, Mr Shannon alleges that one of his staff working under his supervision and employed by one of his companies faxed to the Bank on behalf of C2C Developments a tax invoice from C2C Developments to 33 Electra in the sum of $225,800 with no GST component. It appears that, of that amount, $217,800 related to the variations/upgrades. 55At 4:41pm on the same day, Mr Shannon on behalf of C2C Developments caused to be faxed to the Bank a drawdown notice in the sum of $225,800, "ex GST". 56At 5:08pm on 15 May 2008, RLB issued what was described as the "Executed Report No. 19". The report refers to "approved variations of $921,800". This had the effect of increasing the forecast final figure from $4,818,181 to $5,739,981. 57Although the RLB report referred to the $921,800 as the "Approved Amount", the Bank at this stage had not approved any increase in the facility limit. The only approval of that amount was the approval between 33 Electra and C2C Developments as to the level of variation. 58On 16 May 2008, C2C Developments faxed a further tax invoice from C2C Developments to 33 Electra, this time including GST of $22,580 and stating a "Balance Due" of $248,380. RLB, in its covering letter of 15 May 2008 to the Bank, pointed out that the $225,800 would carry GST of $22,580, which would bring the total amount "Payable" to $248,380. 59The increased amount, however, was never the subject of any formal drawdown notice. 60On 16 May 2008, Mr Williams emailed Mr McIntosh attaching the report from RLB and indicating the fact that a request for $225,800 "ex GST" was made. The email indicated that, according to Mr Williams, GST would be "paid by Geoff". Mr Williams also reiterated that, according to him, Mr Shannon had told him that he would need around $200,000 to keep the project going for the next month. 61On 21 May 2008, Mr McIntosh sent an email to Mr Williams approving the payment of the $225,800 subject to the margin being increased to 2.75%. Mr McIntosh asserts that he approved the payment for commercial reasons and in order to prevent the project ceasing due to a lack of funding. In his email to Mr Williams, Mr McIntosh imposed certain conditions, which included updated valuations of all units and a "fresh" check of pre-sales contracts to ensure they complied with the Bank's requirements. Mr McIntosh observed that the use of the term "approved variations" in the RLB report was factually inaccurate as no such approval had been given and that it would only be considered once the various requirements and conditions had been satisfied. He also indicated to Mr Williams that he wanted the 33 Electra account placed on the "watch list". 62It is not in dispute that the $225,800 was paid in full but in two separate tranches. 63The Bank asserts that the monies advanced were not used by 33 Electra to reimburse the builder, C2C Developments, for construction costs, but rather, it contends that in large part the monies were used for payments to related companies, to relatives and for expenditure which had no direct connection with the project. As such, instead of facilitating a recommencement of the activity on the site, the Bank contends that subcontractors of and suppliers to C2C Developments were left unpaid. 64In May or early June 2008, Mr Shannon met with a Mr Leigh (a partner at PPB Advisory, a firm of accountants (PPB) at the relevant time) and told him that the financial position of 33 Electra, C2C Developments, C2C Investments, Abode Group and Shannon Trading Co (both are companies of which Mr Shannon was a director) was perilous and that there were a number of creditors that were actively pursuing recovery proceedings and that a number of his banks had also effectively frozen facilities. Mr Shannon and Mr Leigh met on approximately six further occasions in May and June 2008 and on 26 September 2008. 65On 5 June 2008, Mr Williams sent an email to Mr Triggs and Ms Ford following a conversation he had with Mr Shannon. In that conversation, as recorded in the email, Mr Williams had advised Mr Shannon of "the urgency of getting this finalised". The email records that Mr Williams had been told by Mr Shannon that he had an offer on the table to sell the entire project and that he had spent the whole of the previous day with his accountant and the prospective purchaser in an attempt to finalise the offer. Mr Shannon told Mr Williams that he was hoping to have something to him by close of business "tomorrow". The email also records that Mr Williams was told that there was a good chance the deal would happen, and if so, he (that is Mr Shannon) would probably not need to apply for any increase in facilities. Mr Williams recommended that a soft approach be taken in order to enable matters to be worked out amicably. Mr Williams records in the email as follows: He has asked us to hold back for a couple of days to see if he can get this deal for the sale of the project over the line. 66On 11 June 2008, Mr Triggs emailed Mr Williams asking for an update on the valuation for "33 Electra". He indicated that he and Ms Ford would like to visit the site "next Wednesday". Mr Williams responded indicating that an arrangement had been tentatively made, however Mr Shannon had said to him that he did not want to waste anyone's time given the fact that he had almost sold the development. Mr Williams also records having been told by Mr Shannon that "he is pushing to off-load the project". 67On 17 June 2008, Mr Shannon emailed Mr Triggs. He informed Mr Triggs that he thought "we are moving closer to a sale on the project". Mr Shannon referred to a request for a temporary overdraft for C2C Investments due to the fact that he would probably not be drawing on the facility if the deal proceeded. 68Later on 17 June 2008, Mr Triggs emailed Mr Williams and Ms Ford recording that he has spoken to Mr Shannon and that Mr Shannon had indicated to him that he had provided the "info to the valuer", which he (that is Mr Shannon) had promised on 11 June 2008. Mr Triggs expressed the view that he thought the sale appeared to be progressing but the site had to be completed and any increased funding needed to be considered if for any reason the sale did not proceed. 69On 18 June 2008, Mr Triggs, Mr Williams and Ms Ford met Mr Shannon near the development site. Mr Shannon informed those present that he was negotiating a sale with a Mr Smithson of Wagga Wagga and that it would occur by way of a sale of shares in 33 Electra. He also informed the group that the sale would clear the debt to the Bank and that he would not be seeking another progress claim. His only monetary request was for a temporary overdraft for C2C Investments of about $90,000 enabling the creditors of 33 Electra's "Abode Selections" division to be paid off. There was discussion at the meeting of the possibility of a sale of the project falling through and Mr Triggs asserts that he expressed concern about the "significant cost overruns and variations on the development and that the work are progressing slowly". 70On 20 June 2008, Mr Williams sent an email to Mr Shannon. In that email Mr Williams referred to the meeting and requested certain information be provided, including full and final statements of the supplier accounts on the Abode retail outlet. He wanted to do an analysis in relation to the request for additional funding. If the purchase was proceeding, Mr Williams indicated he wanted the purchaser's approval in relation to possible progress drawings and emphasised the need for a quantity surveyor report to support any additional drawdown that may be requested. He concluded by indicating that once that information had been received and the Bank obtained a new valuation, it would discuss the matter and advise Mr Shannon what its attitude would be. 71On 8 July 2008, Mr Shannon's solicitor, a Ms Megan Grainger of Stacks, wrote to Mr Williams to inform the Bank that an "agreement has been reached which will result in all of Geoff's liability ... being paid in full and we have commenced the documentation process for the agreement". She informed Mr Williams that the proposed purchaser was finalising his due diligence, which involved a number of items as set out in the letter. Ms Grainger informed Mr Williams that the contract was for the sale of shares and she confirmed that she had instructions to agree to pay "all Bank fees including valuation costs" on settlement. 72On 15 July 2008, Mr Williams assisted in the preparation of and signed a Credit Risk Facility Amendment. 73Under the heading "Change Sought", it is recorded that no increase in facilities for 33 Electra was requested at that point. The purpose of the report was indicated as required to update Credit Sanctioning about the progress of the sale of the Dockside development. This had been as a result of a verbal request from Ms Ford. The report makes mention of "cost overruns of some $1.3 million" and provides a breakdown of those amounts. It also indicated that the overruns had been confirmed via a new "QS report". Further reference is made to Mr Shannon's personal issues with his wife's health and the fact that he had been attempting to negotiate a sale. The report does mention that Mr Shannon had been strongly encouraged to sell and refinance the debt and that this was the Bank's preferred option, although it was accepted that this may take some little time. 74The entirety of the letter from Mr Shannon's solicitor, Ms Grainger, is set out in the body of the report. The report also mentions the fact that 33 Electra had "$90K of creditors" and refers to the possibility that the Bank may need to provide some short-term funding. The report specifically contemplated as an alternative that if the sale of the development fell through, the Bank could expect an application for an increase of $1.3 million to enable completion of the project. The view was expressed to be on the basis that the valuation was still accurate and that pre-sales were still in place. 75On 18 July 2008, Mr Shannon sent an email to Mr Williams updating him on sales of various properties and further updated him on the proposed sale of Dockside. Mr Shannon indicated that he had been working "hard" on getting funds in the door to clear up excesses. He apologised for the delay in attending to various matters but went on to explain that he had a good deal on his plate. 76On 31 July 2008, Mr Shannon again emailed Mr Williams. In the email, Mr Shannon stated "it would be good if the claim of $105K could be paid". 77On 21 July 2008, Ms Ford sent an email to Mr McIntosh. She undertook an overall appraisal of the credit risk to the Bank. In relation to 33 Electra she expressed the view that the project was "ticking over very slowly". She noted that construction had slowed considerably in recent weeks and she attributed the potential purchase that Mr Shannon had been trying to negotiate as the reason for that. She went on to provide other details as she understood them in relation to the proposed sale. Whilst on the one hand she expressed the view that provided costs to complete do not increase further, the project should be able to be completed within the covenanted LVR, she expressed concern that things may not be that simple. As far as C2C Investments was concerned, she noted that the Bank had been asked to provide funding of $95,000 in order that all trade creditors be paid up to date. She noted Mr Shannon had offered some additional security, but for various reasons it was unacceptable. She thought the request for further funds should be rejected unless appropriate security could be provided. In relation to 33 Electra, she thought that, as Mr Shannon had a good deal to cope with in a number of respects, if the Bank was going to go down the route of funding the completion of the development it would be wise to insist on the appointment of a project manager acting on behalf of the Bank as a condition of any additional funding. She also expressed the view that a sale of the project appears to be the best (and quickest) outcome for all concerned. 78On 23 July 2008, Mr McIntosh responded saying that he thought the proposed sale to Mr Smithson was "too good to be true", but equally, if additional funding was going to be contemplated, Mr McIntosh was prepared to accept the security offered by Mr Shannon and which Ms Ford thought was inappropriate. 79Mr Shannon received an email from Mr Smithson on 4 August 2008, the terms of which make it apparent that the sale of 33 Electra was still proceeding. 80On 5 August 2008, Mr Shannon and his solicitor, Ms Grainger, met with Mr Triggs, Ms Ford and Mr Williams from the Bank. It is plain from the handwritten notes made by Ms Grainger that a number of matters were discussed. The state of the accounts for 33 Electra and C2C Investments was clearly discussed along with possible sales. It is also plain that during the meeting somebody from the Bank, according to her notes at least, had mentioned that the Bank would want its own project manager over and above perhaps a quantity surveyor. Ms Grainger was not called to give evidence. Mr Triggs in his affidavit provides a detailed summary of what he asserts took place at the meeting of 5 August 2008. Mr Shannon asserts that he was told by Mr Triggs in no uncertain terms in the meeting that the Bank in effect wanted no further part of the facilities it had with him or his entities. 81On 12 August 2008, Mr Williams emailed Mr Shannon. Mr Williams referred to what was apparently a promise at the meeting of 5 August 2008 of an update from either Mr Shannon or from Ms Grainger regarding the progress of the sale, which was to be received by 8 August 2008. Mr Williams also requested a clearance date for all of the account arrears. He required Mr Shannon to provide an update so that he could inform the Bank the following day (13 August 2008). 82Mr Shannon responded on the same day indicating that he had to urgently go to Queensland as his youngest daughter had attempted suicide on the weekend. He informed Mr Williams that he would be liaising with his solicitor as to the progress as to the "dockside matters" but would have to postpone the meeting that was proposed for that week and he would deal with arrears when he was able. 83On 15 August 2008, Ms Grainger emailed Mr Williams and Mr Shannon. She informed Mr Williams that Mr Shannon had applied for various refinancing facilities and expected an approval of a new facility with another lender "early next week". She indicated that the facility should enable Mr Shannon to clear his arrears and pay out one of the properties over which the Bank held security, making it clear that it would not involve the Dockside properties. She promised to keep Mr Williams informed. She also indicated that she hoped that this would assist Mr Shannon to finalise negotiations for the sale of Dockside. 84On the same day, Mr Triggs emailed Mr Williams and Ms Ford. He indicated that he thought the Bank was "not getting anything from Geoff Shannon other than more promises". Mr Triggs also expressed concern about the Bank's security position, and he expressed the view that an assumption should be made that the sale of Dockside was becoming protracted and that it may not come to fruition. Mr Triggs indicated that he wanted a number of things attended to, including a new quantity surveyor's report and an updated valuation and information about pre-sale contracts. Having canvassed various options, he also addressed the option that if the Bank elected "to build out" then it would insist upon the appointment of an independent project manager and site manager and that Mr Shannon should stand aside. He also addressed a number of issues about the difficulties with subcontractors. On 19 August 2008, Mr Williams assisted in the preparation of and signed a Credit Risk Facility Amendment, again bringing Credit Sanctioning up to date. 85On 19 August 2008, Ms Ford sent an email to Mr McIntosh in which she indicated that she was keen to move quickly to determine how much it would cost to complete the development so that, amongst other things, the Bank could make a decision as to what might be the appropriate strategy to adopt. The email canvasses a number of options. On 19 August 2008, Mr McIntosh indicated by email to Ms Ford that he noted her comments and agreed with her views. There is little doubt, from the handwritten notes on Mr McIntosh's email to Ms Ford, that Mr Triggs instructed Mr Williams to keep from Mr Shannon the Bank's consideration of the various strategic options. 86On 26 August 2008, Middletons (which had been retained by the Bank to assist in reviewing the status of the pre-sales contracts) reported to the Bank on the pre-sales. The Middletons letter raised a number of concerns in relation to the pre-sales. 87On 27 August 2008, Ms Ford emailed to Mr Triggs and others her interpretation of the difficulties which Middletons had pointed out. 88On 29 August 2008, Page Kirkland (the new quantity surveyor) sought certain information from Mr Shannon in order to assist it with the preparation of its report. 89On 11 September 2008, Mr Shannon emailed Mr Triggs. Mr Shannon updated Mr Triggs on the sale, indicating that he would be in Sydney "on Monday" to finalise the deal on the property. He indicated to Mr Triggs that the price had been renegotiated. He also indicated he was uncontactable because he was in hospital. 90On the same day, Mr Triggs responded indicating he would like a meeting with Mr Shannon to discuss matters. 91Page Kirkland issued its report on 16 September 2008, estimating that the cost to complete was in fact $4,797,886 and that the project was currently 42% complete. 92On the same day, Mr Triggs provided an analysis of the Page Kirkland report. He noted in the report that Mr Shannon had been made aware of Page Kirkland's estimate but disputed it. Mr Triggs expressed the view that given the increased costs to complete the end LVR position was "poor at 87%". He also indicated that Mr Shannon appeared to be still in hospital for "unknown period/cause" and concluded in part by indicating that the position was not looking "great for sale". 93Mr Triggs prepared a Credit Risk Facility Amendment dated 23 September 2008. He noted that Mr Shannon remained in hospital and was clearly feeling the pressure of the current situation. He again acknowledged that Mr Shannon disputed the views of Page Kirkland as to the cost to complete, but expressed concerns about a number of issues, including the fact that the wider Shannon corporate group continued to "suffer from cashflow issues" and was endeavouring to undertake asset sales, though that was proving difficult. He also expressed the view that the ability of C2C Developments to complete was questionable, and ultimately he recommended that the file be transferred to Credit Restructuring for assessment on ongoing strategy for the group. 94The credit issues associated with Dockside were transferred to a Mr Onno Hornstra (Senior Manager, Group Credit Restructuring) and his group shortly thereafter. 95The Overdraft Facility was repayable on demand, the demand being made on 7 October 2008. 96The Commercial Advance Facility expired on 12 February 2009. 97Receivers (being primarily Mr Singleton, but also Mr Parbery) were appointed to Dockside on 1 July 2009. 98The Bank sold the Dockside property on an "as is" basis following a tender process for $2.215 million on 14 July 2010, which purchase settled on 1 September 2010.