Factual Context
4 The factual context leading up to both the Forward Exchange Contract and the subsequent Forward Agreement was the subject of findings by the primary judge in her Honour's Reasons ("R") at [6] to [70]. Save for one finding at R [39] (see ground 7(a)), her Honour's findings of primary fact were not challenged on appeal. Nevertheless, a number of those findings are important to an understanding of what her Honour drew from those findings, either by way of conclusion or findings of secondary fact, as well as to an understanding of our reasons for concluding that there is no error in her Honour's judgment. If only for these reasons, her Honour's more important findings of primary fact are set out below.
5 The Pratt group of companies carried on a diverse range of businesses, including waste collection, paper and cardboard box manufacture, primary packaging and property and share investments ("Pratt Group"). The Pratt Group has been controlled by the Pratt family since 1948.
6 In the late 1980s, the Pratt Group significantly expanded both in Australia and internationally. A complex group and business structure developed. Between 1989 and 1993, the Pratt Group restructured itself into business groups. Three business divisions were created - the Australian Manufacturing Group ("AMG"), the Overseas Manufacturing Group ("OMG") and the Family Finance and Investment Group. Each division had its own management team. Each division was separately accountable for its operating and financial performance.
7 The AMG included the entities conducting paper packaging and recycling businesses in Australia. The parent company of the AMG was Visy Industries Australia Pty Ltd ("Visy Industries Australia"). All of the AMG's borrowings were raised through Pratt Finance, which acted as the internal finance company for the AMG. The OMG included the entities conducting paper, packaging and recycling businesses and investment activities in the United States ("US"). The Australian holding company of the OMG was Visy USA.
8 In early 1997, Pratt Finance was looking to refinance its debt then constituted by a Bilateral Finance Facility ("BIFF") with a panel of local and overseas banks. The BIFF was due to mature in 2022. The quantum of the debt in early 1997 was approximately AUD563 million.
9 After seeking and receiving advice from Credit Suisse First Boston, the Pratt Group Finance Committee ("Finance Committee") decided that it would recommend to the board of Pratt Finance that it seek to repay the existing local BIFF by borrowing USD400 million through the issue of senior unsecured notes (also referred to as bonds).
10 On 19 March 1997, the board of Pratt Finance resolved that Pratt Finance would participate in the placement of senior unsecured notes ("Bonds") to institutional investors resident in the US, repayable in 15 to 18 years ("Proposed Bond Issue").
11 Given the size of the Proposed Bond Issue denominated in USD, the Finance Committee engaged Coopers & Lybrand to consider the potential choices open to Pratt Finance to hedge its USD liability. Mr O'Halloran, the Group Finance Director of Pratt Holding Pty Ltd and a member of the Finance Committee, described the transaction as "the likes of which [they had] never entered into before".
12 Not all hedging methods identified by Coopers & Lybrand were available to the Pratt Group. For example, one method described utilising the US operations to hedge the debt for the entire life of the debt. Mr O'Halloran's evidence was that method was not available to the Pratt Group because there were no unencumbered US assets.
13 Taking into account the Coopers & Lybrand report, the Finance Committee adopted Mr O'Halloran's recommendations and recommended to the directors of Pratt Finance and Visy USA that they adopt a combination of external and internal hedging methods.
14 The Finance Committee recommended that Pratt Finance enter into an internal hedge with Visy USA which at the time, directly and indirectly, owned all the issued share capital of the US resident Pratt holding company, Pratt Holdings USA Inc ("Pratt Holdings USA"). Pratt Holdings USA was not the borrowing entity within the US group. The exchange rate for the internal hedge was to be the same as that negotiated with the external financial institutions; that is, USD0.775. Under the arrangement, Visy USA would agree to deliver USD to Pratt Finance at maturity dates between 2015 and 2017 in exchange for AUD at the rate of USD0.775. It became known as the Forward Exchange Contract. Mr O'Halloran's evidence was that advice was not sought about the pricing and terms of the Forward Exchange Contract because:
"We knew that the particular transaction was unique in its own fashion, and we used our own judgment in terms of what the rate ought to be on that contract. We were keen to ensure that the contract did offer Pratt Trading the opportunity to actually do something with the contract, or through to maturity, simply see it out."
15 Messrs O'Halloran and Byrd (Mr Byrd was the Chief Executive Officer of Pratt Industries (USA) Inc) were members of the Finance Committee. Both gave evidence that they considered the risks and opportunities the proposed hedge held for Visy USA. Mr O'Halloran's unchallenged evidence was that:
"In so far as the opportunities were concerned, I expected that the volatility in the AUD/USD exchange rate would continue and that over the term of the contract, the AUD would experience both increases and decreases in value. I also regarded it as highly probable that at some point over the 20 year swap period, the value of the AUD as against the USD would climb above USD 0.775. [Visy USA] stood to make a gain if the value of the AUD increased against the USD. I expected that because Pratt Finance held a credit rating, financial commitments made by it would have significant commercial value and potential for gain. Because Pratt Finance held a credit rating of BBB+ (and was therefore investment grade), I considered that it would be commercially possible for [Visy USA] to realise any gain by either selling the swap at the time when the AUD had increased above USD 0.775 or by entering into some form of derivative transaction. Because of Pratt Finance's credit rating, I considered the forward exchange contract to be like a marketable security in respect of which [Visy USA] would be able to realise any increase in its value even prior to its maturity. This was an issue which was discussed at finance committee meetings held at the time to consider the Coopers & Lybrand report.
I also considered the risks to [Visy USA] should the AUD depreciate against the USD. [Visy USA] directly and indirectly owned all the shares in [Pratt Holdings USA]. This meant that [Visy USA] had a 100% indirect interest in the US operating assets. Because the AMG (of which Pratt Finance was part) and OMG (of which [Visy USA] was part) operated as standalone entities, I considered that it was important that the OMG executives and directors of [Visy USA] be aware of the obligations being placed on [Visy USA]. However, I expected that any depreciation in the value of the AUD against the USD (which could give rise to liability for [Visy USA] under the forward exchange contract) would be matched by an increase in the AUD value of the earnings and cashflows from the US operations and that accordingly, the risks to [Visy USA] were relatively low provided the base value market value of the US business remained stable. As a result, I did not expect [Visy USA] to incur any additional costs merely as a result of having exposure under the contract. Instead, I considered that because of the duration of the forward exchange contract, [Visy USA] was more likely to be able to profit from it at some point over its term with minimal cost and risk."
16 Mr O'Halloran stated in cross-examination that because the AUD "had traded up well and truly above 77 cents at various times in the previous 20 year period", he had "good cause" to think that entry into the Forward Exchange Contract was "a reasonable position" for Visy USA to be in and that "the likely movement in the exchange rate up would give [Visy USA] the profit opportunity to capitalise on the position it was in."
17 Mr Byrd's evidence was to similar effect. In cross-examination he stated that:
"[T]he long dated maturity was particularly advantageous because it gave us many years of opportunities when the Aussie dollar would be in the money as opposed to out of the money. So I - I looked at that as being prudent because of the long dated maturity; not imprudent because of the long dated maturity. Could get as many opportunities in which to either re-hedge or take advantage of when the Aussie dollar is strong."
Mr Byrd could not recall discussing the possibility of profit with anybody else. His explanation was that it was a "no-brainer in terms of there's a profit opportunity as well as a loss opportunity in any financial … unit hedge transaction that you enter into, whether it's … two banks or a private company".
18 Mr Geminder's evidence (Mr Geminder was a member of the Pratt family) was also to similar effect. In cross-examination he stated that:
"It was hoped in fact that [Visy USA] would ultimately make a profit on the instrument that it put in place … I never anticipated that we would lose money on that contract. My anticipation was that we would make money on that contract."
19 The precise form a derivative transaction might have taken in the future was not considered at the time. Mr Geminder explained in cross-examination that:
"We didn't actually sit down and think about when the - when we were in a profitable position, how are we going to crystallise that profit. But - why would we do that? You know, crystallising a profit in a synthetic hedge, or a hedge like that is not that complicated … There's lots of ways that you can crystallise a profit; there are lots of mechanics and lots of tools … lots of ways to make a mark-up to realise a profit." (Emphasis added.)
20 Mr Geminder's evidence was that it would have been, for example, open to seek to re-hedge either internally or externally, thus achieving both a profit and a hedge. He described the market as "very vibrant and active".
21 Similarly, when asked in cross-examination whether there were other methods that Visy USA could have used to lock in a profit, Mr O'Halloran responded that:
"I've mentioned the concepts of derivatives; I've mentioned the assignment of all of the obligations. Whether there are other opportunities that could avail themself over a period of time with a range of products that appear in a marketplace, I was aware of that. I had been involved in finance for quite some period of time and seen considerable change in different products that avail themselves; we could have levered off the value of the benefit. Pratt Finance had the underlying obligation - was actually BBB rated credit at the time, which is … great credit for a private company … And whilst it had that credit profile, that instrument that was created and the obligations created under it, in our view, had the ability of being levered and a benefit taken from it."
22 Mr O'Halloran rejected the proposition that the alternatives that were in contemplation all necessarily involved a termination or cancellation of the Forward Exchange Contract and noted that the Forward Agreement that was entered into between Visy USA and Pratt Investments (see [38]-[42] below) did not involve a termination of the Forward Exchange Contract. The primary judge accepted that as a result of the different "mechanics" and "tools", it was open to Visy USA to crystallise a profit without affecting the hedge arrangement; cancellation of the Forward Exchange Contract was just one option.
23 Visy USA did not seek a fee or immediate payment from Pratt Finance for entry into the Forward Exchange Contract because the exchange rate of USD0.775 which it used represented what was described as a "reasonable amount". As Mr O'Halloran explained:
"I felt that the exchange rate that was in the forward agreement at the time reflected the risk that [Visy USA] was entering into the contract. [Visy USA] was not a bank. The nearest comparable amount that we had was the amount in the cross-currency swaps. We had no indication of how much of the fees embedded in the cross-currency swap actually related to principal and how much related to the interest flux. So the nearest comparably comparable we had was what was actually in the cross-currency swap. We didn't know what was allocated to principal and what was allocated to interest flux. We considered the position of [Visy USA] we considered its asset base. We considered what it might be able to do with the contract, and we considered that it had some 18-year period in which to make a profit."
24 That there was no express cost to Pratt Finance is not surprising. Mr Carroll, General Manager of Finance for the Pratt Group, explained that in a forward exchange agreement such costs are generally built into the exchange rate.
25 It was expected that any loss arising to Visy USA if the AUD was to devalue against the USD would be offset by the gain in value of Visy USA's USD denominated assets. If, on the other hand, the value of the AUD increased against the USD, Visy USA would be able to profit from the hedge. Overall, because of the duration of the Forward Exchange Contract, it was considered that Visy USA would be likely to profit from the Forward Exchange Contract at some point over its term with minimal cost and risk.
26 On 21 April 1997, the directors of Pratt Finance and Visy USA resolved that their respective companies would enter into the Forward Exchange Contract.
27 The terms of the Forward Exchange Contract were as follows:
(1) Visy USA agreed to sell to Pratt Finance five amounts of USD, being amounts that matched Pratt Finance's USD liability under half of the Bonds.
(2) In exchange, Pratt Finance agreed to deliver to Visy USA equivalent amounts of AUD at the agreed exchange rate of USD0.775.
(3) The time for delivery of the amounts was fixed by reference to the maturity dates under each tranche of the second half of the issued Bonds as follows:
Commence Date Maturity Date Amount (USD)
23.05.1997 23.05.2015 9 million
23.05.1997 23.05.2016 26 million
23.05.1997 23.05.2016 50 million
23.05.1997 23.05.2017 15 million
23.05.1997 23.05.2017 100 million
Total 200 million