Grounds 1, 2 and 5
44 These grounds provide:
1. The primary judge erred in concluding that the delegate had, for the purposes of s. 1023D(3)(b) of the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), reached a state of satisfaction that a class of 'financial products' had resulted in, or will or is likely to result in, significant detriment to retail clients.
2. The primary judge erred in reasoning that the answer to the question of whether or not the delegate had formed the requisite state of satisfaction turned on whether or not it was sufficient as a matter of statutory construction for the class of financial products to result 'indirectly' in significant detriment to retail clients and the primary judge further erred in finding (at [56]) that the applicant had made a concession to this effect.
…
5. The primary judge erred in finding that it is sufficient, for the purposes of s. 1023D(3), that ASIC be satisfied that there is 'something in the circumstances of the availability of the … class of financial products to retail clients' that causes the detriment (at [42]), or that such detriment arises from 'indirect sources associated with the product' (at [50]).
45 By grounds 1, 2 and 5 Cigno contends that the delegate could not have reached the required state of satisfaction required by s 1023D(3)(b) because she did not distinguish between whether the source of detriment was the financial product or the financial product together with the collateral contract. Cigno contends that the source of detriment must be the financial product itself.
46 As to these grounds, Cigno contends that:
(a) the delegate did not turn her mind to any detriment caused by the class of financial products, being short term credit facilities, but turned her mind only to detriment caused by the short term lending model;
(b) the delegate did not seek to consider whether the class of financial products provided without any collateral contract caused any consumer detriment;
(c) the source of detriment must result from the financial product itself - it is not sufficient to identify a circumstance or source that causes detriment other than the class of financial product;
(d) the question is not one of direct or indirect causation of detriment, and the primary judge erred insofar as his Honour proceeded on that basis; and
(e) the language of s 1023D(3) supports a narrow view as to the object of the state of satisfaction - ASIC must be satisfied that it is a class of financial product that has resulted in, or is likely to result in significant detriment. That is to be contrasted with the broad power to ban specified conduct that is 'in relation to' the class of products. The change of language as between the state of prerequisite satisfaction and the consequence of that being achieved is significant.
47 For the reasons that follow, we do not consider that ASIC was obliged to look only at the features of the financial product within the class in considering detriment.
48 It is clear that Part 7.9A is intended to provide a beneficial, remedial set of powers. It sets its aim at detriment to retail clients, and, as the objects clause in s 1023A seeks to explain, is preventative in nature. A broad construction should therefore be favoured: Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v State of Victoria at 41.
49 While the text may be the starting point for the ascertainment of the meaning of a statutory provision, it is the text of the statute as a whole, and at the first stage of inquiry regard must be had to its context and purpose in the widest sense: SZTAL v Minister for Immigration and Border Protection [2017] HCA 34; (2017) 262 CLR 362 at [14] (Kiefel CJ, Nettle and Gordon JJ); and Alcan (NT) Alumina Pty Ltd v Commissioner of Territory Revenue [2009] HCA 41; (2009) 239 CLR 27 at [47] (Hayne, Heydon, Crennan and Kiefel JJ).
50 The text of s 1023D(3) uses language that links satisfaction as to actual or anticipated detriment to the class of financial product in question. However, we are not persuaded that the search for detriment must be conducted without regard to the context in which the financial products are made available to clients, including the surrounding circumstances. Having regard to the text, nothing in s 1023D (nor s 1023A) qualifies the manner in which the detriment might result.
51 In our view it is clear that it is the short term credit facility that is the financial product in question. The short term lending model is not a financial product. Nor was it suggested that entry into a short term credit facility is necessarily or always conditional upon entry into a collateral agreement. However, we are not here concerned with short term credit facilities generally, or a short term credit facility that is offered without a relevant collateral agreement. As ASIC has identified by issue of the PIO, the concern is the short term lending model; that is, a short term credit facility when used in a particular context.
52 Where the short term lending model is made available to clients, then the entry into and terms of the collateral agreement are necessarily part of the conduct in which the short term credit facility is provided. The short term credit facility is provided in circumstances where, according to ASIC's PIO Notice, detriment by way of additional fees (at least) may result. To seek to distinguish any detriment under the short term credit facility from any detriment that flows from the collateral agreement is to ignore that such agreement is entered into in conjunction with the short term credit facility.
53 We accept, as senior counsel for ASIC submitted, that it is somewhat artificial to assess detriment that may result from a 'class of financial product' rather than from the product. A client does not buy a class but a product. Further, Notes 1 to s 1023D and to s 1023E direct attention to the consideration of whether detriment results from the financial product, rather than the class. It is therefore appropriate to focus on detriment having regard to the financial product. There may well be particular characteristics of the financial product that cause detriment. However, we do not consider that such prospect limits the source of relevant detriment. Detriment may result from a financial product because of the particular circumstances in which it is supplied. The text of s 1023E(2) is also consistent with this approach: its reference to the matters that are relevant to detriment not being limited counters any suggestion that they are to be narrowly circumscribed. Section 1023E(3) in fact highlights the potential scope of the source of detriment, providing in effect that even if other disclosure requirements and obligations have been met, a financial product may result in significant detriment to a client.
54 Nor have we minimised the relevance of the use of the term 'result' or its corresponding grammatical forms in s 1023A (objects) and s 1023D(3). Cigno focussed on the contrast between the broad connecting term 'in relation to' as used with respect to conduct and (it submitted) the narrower and more direct requirement that detriment 'result' from the financial product. On Cigno's argument, there would be a distinction in scope as between detriment that 'results' from a financial product as against (for example) detriment that may arise 'in relation to' a financial product.
55 But we are not persuaded that the use of the terms 'resulted in' or 'result in', even when compared with the use of the broader (and different) 'in relation to', compels a consequence that the detriment to which ASIC is to have regard is limited to a particular type of outcome that flows directly from a particular feature of the product viewed in isolation. A 'result' may follow from the known circumstances in which a product is utilised or distributed. The natural meaning and use of the word 'result' encompasses such an interpretation, and the text of s 1023D does not limit it. The reference to 'conduct' in the provision is also important. It anticipates that the financial product may be used in a number of different circumstances that constitute conduct. To focus solely on a result that is attributed to a feature of the financial product without regard to the context in which the product is deployed is, in our view, artificially narrow and not required by the language of the section.
56 Note 1 to s 1023D(3) also provides support for the broader approach:
An example of conditions that may be specified in a product intervention order include that a product in a class of products not be issued to a retail client unless the retail client has received personal advice.
57 So much was acknowledged by the primary judge (at [45]). The sample condition referred to in the note contemplates that the detriment may arise from the failure to obtain personal advice rather than from the financial product. The detriment is considered not by regard to the product alone but in the circumstances in which it is provided. The primary judge referred to the difference between the informed or uninformed client: the product is the same for both clients, but the uninformed client may suffer detriment if they fail to obtain personal advice. And as senior counsel for ASIC submitted before us, it might be that a complex product is understood by some but not others. The complexity might be considered a feature of the product or it might be considered a surrounding circumstance in that some clients in the market may not understand it. Such difficulties emerge where an unduly narrow approach to the scope of 'resulting' detriment is adopted.
58 The grant of broad powers to ASIC to modify specified conduct by the imposition of nuanced orders and conditions is also consistent with a construction that permits consideration of the circumstances in which a product is used in assessing the source of detriment.
59 Turning to broader issues of context, Cigno also emphasised the objects clause (s 1023A), relying on its reference to detriment 'resulting from financial products', and contending that such phrase circumscribes the operative provisions that follow. That submission must be treated cautiously. Whilst regard may be had to an objects clause to resolve uncertainty or ambiguity, the objects clause does not control clear statutory language, or command a particular outcome: see the principles collected in National Disability Insurance Agency v WRMF [2020] FCAFC 79; (2020) 276 FCR 415 at [145] (Flick, Mortimer and Banks-Smith JJ). However, in this matter the phrase 'resulting from financial products' in the objects clause does not confine the manner in which those similar words are used in s 1023D in any event. The phrase may be interpreted consistently with the manner in which we have construed s 1023D(3).
60 We have also taken into account the Revised EM, having regard to s 15AB of the Acts Interpretation Act and the principles as to resort to explanatory memoranda as recently discussed by the High Court in Mondelez Australia Pty Ltd v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union [2020] HCA 29.
61 The narrow construction promoted by Cigno is not so clear that it is inappropriate to consider the Revised EM. The broad meaning ascribed to 'detriment' in the Revised EM is consistent with and supports the view we have taken that it is open to consider the context in which a financial product is offered for acquisition in the market. To repeat the relevant part:
However, [the word detriment] is intended to cover a broad range of harm or damage that may flow from a product. The harm or damage may arise from any number of sources associated with the product, including the product's features, defective disclosure, poor design, or inappropriate distribution.
62 The reference to detriment from 'sources associated' with the product is telling, as is the reference to 'inappropriate distribution'. Those references indicate that the context in which a financial product is deployed is relevant to the question of detriment. The product is not hypothetical, to be considered as if quarantined from any context. It exists to be deployed, and is deployed, in some cases, by way of the short term lending model. When it is deployed or distributed in that manner, with related service fees imposed by way of a collateral agreement, harm may flow.
63 The broader construction we prefer promotes a construction that is more readily and naturally understood and permits, as senior counsel for ASIC described it, 'a practical and real-world assessment'. It is consistent with the objects of Chapter 7 of the Corporations Act (which includes Part 7.9A), as set out in s 760A. Those objects include the promotion of fair, orderly and transparent markets for financial products.
64 It follows that we would dismiss grounds 1, 2 and 5.
65 Having regard to the grounds of appeal, we note that we have not found reference to the concept of direct or indirect loss, as utilised by the primary judge, to be of any particular assistance in construing s 1023D, but that make no difference to the outcome or orders.