The state of satisfaction required to be reached
37 The first issue thrown up by grounds 1 and 2 is as to the construction of s 1023D(3)(b), viz. what is ASIC required to be satisfied of in being "satisfied that a class of financial products … has resulted in, or will likely result in, significant detriment to retail clients"? The question is really as to the narrowness or breadth of what it is that must "result in" the "significant detriment"; is it:
(1) narrowly, the class of financial products, or a financial product within that class, "itself"; or
(2) more broadly, the class of financial product, or a financial product within that class, in combination with something else that is not a financial product (in this case, the collateral contract with its fees and charges)?
38 Put differently, must the financial product or the class of financial products directly cause the significant consumer detriment, or is indirect causation sufficient?
39 Both Cigno and ASIC's submissions proceed on the basis that s 1023E applies to ASIC's assessment under s 1023D(1) of whether a financial product has resulted in, or will or is likely to result in, "significant detriment to retail clients", and its assessment under s 1023D(3) of whether a class of financial products has resulted in, or will or is likely to result in, "significant detriment to retail clients". Given the clear and deliberately different treatment of PIOs in respect of particular financial products, on the one hand, and classes of financial products, on the other, in ss 1023D and 1023L and the use of the language of "a financial product" and not "a class of financial product" in s 1203E, one might have doubted whether the latter section applies to an assessment of a class of financial products.
40 However, Note 2 to s 1023D(3), which is identical to Note 2 to s 1023D(1), states that s 1023E specifies the matters to be taken into account in considering whether a financial product has resulted in, or will or is likely to result in, significant detriment to retail clients. The notes form part of the Act and must be considered in interpreting the provisions to which they relate: Acts Interpretation Act 1901 (Cth) s 13(1); One.Tel Ltd (in liq) v Rich [2005] NSWSC 226; 190 FLR 443 at [54] per Bergin J; Oreb v Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) (No 2) [2017] FCAFC 49; 247 FCR 323 at [46] per Rares, Davies and Gleeson JJ. It is thus tolerably clear that s 1023E applies to the making of s 1023D(3) product intervention orders.
41 Cigno relies on s 1023E in support of its submission that the jurisdictional requirement is that ASIC is satisfied with respect to the detriment caused by the financial product itself, rather than by something extraneous to the product. In this case, that is the collateral contract with its fees and charges, whether on their own or in combination with the fees and/or interest charges attached to the short term credit financial product itself. ASIC merely refers to s 1023E as a source of meaning for the expression "significant detriment to retail clients".
42 In my view, Cigno's approach too narrowly casts what it is that ASIC must be satisfied of. There are a number of indications that it need not be a financial product or a class of financial products that "itself" directly causes the detriment, and that detriment caused indirectly by the financial product or a class of financial products in the sense of there being something in the circumstances of the availability of the product or the class of products to retail clients that causes the detriment. The causal requirement is satisfied if the detriment would not have occurred but for the financial product or the class of financial products being made available in those circumstances. There are a number of considerations that lead me to this conclusion.
43 First, as submitted by ASIC, the power in s 1023D(1) (in respect of a financial product) and in s 1023D(3) (in respect of a class of financial products) is nuanced; its exercise does not require a blanket prohibition of the product or the class once the requisite state of satisfaction has been reached, but allows for the prohibition of "specified conduct in relation to" the product or the class, "either entirely or except in accordance with conditions". This means that the prohibition or conditions need not relate to a feature of the product or products in the class of products themselves.
44 That the prohibition or conditions can relate to "conduct in relation to" the product or the class goes to show that the significant detriment that the prohibition or conditions must seek to avoid is not detriment necessarily caused by the product itself, or products in the class of products themselves. "In relation to" is an expression of wide import, its ultimate breadth depending on the context: Australian Securities and Investments Commission v Narain [2008] FCAFC 120; 169 FCR 211 at [68]-[69] per Jacobson and Gordon JJ. Here it requires that there be a connection between the conduct and the class of products, but the conduct is not, nor is it required to be, inherent in or a feature of the class of product or of products in the class. It is extraneous to such products. Thus that which can be prohibited or restricted is not inherent in or a feature of the products. Naturally the prohibition or restriction is expected to be directed at that which causes the detriment, and so it is that the finding of significant detriment that enlivens the power need not be detriment that results from something inherent in or that is a feature of the products themselves.
45 Secondly, Note 1 to ss 1023D(1) and 1023D(3) also supports the proposition that the detriment to retail consumers can arise from the circumstances in which the product or the class of financial products is issued. The notes provide an example of conditions that may be specified in a PIO as being that "a product in a class of products not be issued" to a retail client unless the retail client has received personal advice. This indicates that it is not the product or the class that necessarily directly causes the detriment, but it is rather the issuing of the product or products within the class to retail clients without the clients having received personal advice and therefore in circumstances potentially detrimental to them. For example, ASIC might be satisfied that, in respect of a particular financial product or class of financial products, uninformed clients are likely to suffer significant detriment, but that informed clients are not. Thus, it is not the financial product or class of financial products itself that is likely to cause significant detriment, but the issue of such products in circumstances where retail clients are not properly or adequately informed about the products.
46 Thirdly, the Revised Explanatory Memorandum for the Treasury Laws Amendment (Design and Distribution Obligations and Product Intervention Powers) Bill 2019 (Cth) offers some indications with regard to the nature of the detriment and its causes which are intended to enliven the product intervention order power.
47 Chapter 2 of the Explanatory Memorandum deals with the product intervention power introduced as Pt 7.9A of the Corporations Act. It explains (at [2.5]) that the Financial System Inquiry (Final Report, November 2014) (FSI), considered the scope of ASIC's powers in the context of past situations where consumers had suffered significant consumer detriment and ASIC had exhausted its regulatory toolkit. The FSI found that early intervention by ASIC could be more effective in reducing harm to consumers compared with waiting for a breach to occur. It recommended providing ASIC with a proactive intervention power that would enhance the regulatory toolkit available where there is risk of significant consumer detriment.
48 The Explanatory Memorandum (at [2.7]) states that the intervention power will allow ASIC to regulate or, if necessary, ban potentially harmful financial and credit products where there is a risk of significant consumer detriment. The power is intended to enable ASIC to take action before harm, or further harm, is done to consumers.
49 Paragraph [2.33] of the Explanatory Memorandum, in a section of the Explanatory Memorandum headed "When can the intervention power be used?", includes the following:
The meaning of detriment is intended to take its ordinary meaning in the context of the new provision. However, it is intended to cover a broad range of harm or damage that may flow from a product. The harm or damage may arise from any number of sources associated with the product, including the product's features, defective disclosure, poor design, or inappropriate distribution.
50 The final sentence of that quote indicates that the phrases "resulted in" and "result in" in s 1023D(3)(b) are not intended to require a direct causal link between the class of financial product and the identified detriment - the detriment can arise from indirect sources associated with the product including, for example, defective disclosure or inappropriate distribution. In the latter regard, paragraph [2.34] also refers to significant detriment arising from the distribution of a product.
51 Further, paragraph [2.38], in a section of the Explanatory Memorandum headed "What is the content of the new intervention power and how is it exercised?", gives some examples of the breadth of possible product intervention orders. These include "directing that a particular product or class of product only be offered by way of issue to particular classes of consumers or in particular circumstances" and "directing that a product or class of product not be distributed unless accompanied by an appropriate warning or label". These examples indicate that the type of relevant detriment may not be something inherent in the product or the products in the class of product, but rather to do with the particular class of consumer amongst the classes of consumer to whom the product or class of product is issued, the absence of a particular warning or label accompanying the product or class of product, or other particular circumstances in which the product or class of product is issued.
52 This indicates that the product intervention power contemplates that a financial product or class of financial products might be likely to cause significant detriment because of the particular circumstances in which it is issued or offered, and not because of something inherent in the product or the products in the class of product concerned. Thus, significant detriment indirectly caused by the product or the class of product is sufficient to enliven the power.
53 It is also apparent from the Explanatory Memorandum, and the FSI that preceded it, that Pt 7.9A of the Corporations Act is "a fundamental piece of remedial and protectionist legislation" and as such "should be construed broadly so as 'to give the fullest relief which the fair meaning of that language will allow'": Webb Distributors (Aust) Pty Ltd v Victoria [1993] HCA 61; 179 CLR 15 at 41 per McHugh J writing about the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth). There is nothing in the language of s 1023D(3) to suggest that the power, or the circumstances in which it is enlivened, should be narrowly construed. Indeed, I have explained that in my view there are indications to the contrary. The broader construction which I have favoured is consistent with the remedial nature of the power.
54 Cigno pointed out that the product intervention power impinges on parties' freedom of contract and submitted that for that reason it should be narrowly construed, or at least that the fact that it is remedial legislation is neutral in its construction. As with so much remedial legislation, I accept that the product intervention power interferes with freedom of contract. That is what it was intended to do. The question is, what enlivens the power? Having regard to the mischief sought to be addressed, there is nothing to suggest that the basis for the power to be enlivened should be narrowly construed and, indeed, in order for certain identified mischief to be addressed it is necessary that that basis is more widely construed than what Cigno contends for. Such mischief includes detriment resulting from the product in question being offered to a particular class of consumer or in particular circumstances. That serves to justify the broader construction that the text in any event points to.
55 Fourthly, I do not regard s 1023E as having a particular bearing on the problem at hand. It is true that it uses the language of whether "a financial product" has resulted in, or will or is likely to result in, significant detriment to retail clients, but it does not say anything, explicitly or otherwise, about the quality of the causal connection that is encompassed in the phrase "resulted in"; it does not say or indicate whether there must be a direct causal relationship between the product and the detriment or whether it can be indirect.